Lectures on the Philosophy of World History

Volume I: Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–3

G. W. F. HEGEL

Edited and translated by
Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson,
with the assistance of William G. Geuss

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GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

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PREFACE

With this book an entirely new version of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* is made available to the English-reading public. Earlier editions, in both German and English, amalgamated various manuscript and lecture sources into an editorially constructed text that obscured Hegel's distinctive presentation in each of the five series of lectures he delivered on this topic. The present edition, based on German critical editions, publishes Hegel's surviving manuscripts of his Introduction to the lectures, and then presents the full transcription of the first series of lectures, that of 1822–3. A second, later volume will publish the transcription of the last series, that of 1830–1, together with selections from intervening years. The Editorial Introduction surveys the history of the texts and provides an analytic summary of them, enabling the structure of Hegel's presentation to stand out clearly; and editorial footnotes introduce readers to Hegel's many sources and allusions. The volume concludes with a glossary and a bibliography. For the first time an edition is made available that permits critical scholarly study. Presented in this way, the *Weltgeschichte* becomes more accessible than in the past.

German pagination is provided in the margins. For the manuscripts of the Introduction, our source is *Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1816–1)*, edited by Walter Jaeschke, *Gesammelte Werke*, xviii (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995), 121–207. For the transcription of the Lectures of 1822–3, the source is *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Berlin, 1822–3*, transcribed by K. G. J. von Griesheim, H. G. Hotho, and F. C. H. V. von Kehler; edited by Karl Heinz Ilting, Karl Brehmer, and Hoo Nam Seelmann, *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, xii (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996), 3–521.

The editors, Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson, are deeply indebted to the assistance provided by William G. Geuss in reviewing and correcting the sections we translated and in initiating the translation of one of the sections. Our collaborative work has greatly improved the quality of the translations. Readers for the Press also reviewed the translation and made several helpful suggestions, for which we are grateful. Our thanks go to Walter Jaeschke for answering several questions and for providing a preliminary typescript of the transcription by Karl Hegel of the Lectures of 1830–1.

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EDITORIAL

INTRODUCTION

THE LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD HISTORY

Hegel lectured on the philosophy of world history for the first time in the winter semester of 1822–3 in Berlin.[1] The lectures were repeated on four occasions, in 1824–5, 1826–7, 1828–9, and 1830–1. World history was the last discipline of Hegel's system to become the topic of lectures, with the exception of those on the proofs of the existence of God, but thereafter they had a secure place in the two-year cycle of his lectures. These were also among the most popular of his lectures, for they served as an introduction to his thought and addressed other parts of his system as well, such as the philosophy of right, the philosophy of spirit, the philosophy of art, and the philosophy of religion. Prior to 1822–3, Hegel treated world history in the context of his lectures on the philosophy of right, where it comprised the third and final section of his discussion of the state. These lectures were published as a textbook in 1820–1,[2] and thereafter Hegel developed philosophy of world history into a full topic in its own right. Hegel's other major historical work, his lectures on the history of philosophy, also attained their final form during the Berlin period.[3]

1. Information for this first section is derived from the 'Editorischer Bericht' in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1816–1831)*, ed. Walter Jaeschke, *Gesammelte Werke*, xviii (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995), 377–87; and from the 'Vorbemerkung' and 'Anhang' in *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (Berlin 1822/1823)*, ed. Karl Heinz Ilting, Karl Brehmer, and Hoo Nam Seelmann, *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, xii (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996), pp. vii–x, 527–36. Our translations are from these two edns.

2. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); see §§ 341–60 on world history.

3. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825–6*, 3 vols., ed. Robert F. Brown, tr. R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, 2009; a 1st edn. of vol. iii was published by the University of California Press in 1990). Hegel first lectured on the history of

Auditors' transcriptions (*Nachschriften*) exist for all of Hegel's lectures on world history, but his own manuscripts survive for only a fragment of the Introduction, used in 1822 and 1828, and for most of the Introduction in 1830–1. The present edition, as explained more fully below, translates the manuscript materials and the transcription of the first lectures (1822–3) in this first volume, while a second volume will contain the transcription of the last lectures (1830–1) and selections from intervening years.

MANUSCRIPTS OF THE INTRODUCTION[4]

The Manuscript of 1822, 1828

This manuscript consists of three sheets; the first sheet is in the Hegel Collection of the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin; the second two sheets are in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv of the Schiller-Nationalmuseum in Marbach. The two sets of sheets are clearly connected and form a unitary whole, even though, through uncertain circumstances, they were separated and found their way to different locations.

At the top of the first sheet Hegel wrote the date of the beginning of his lectures in 1828, 30 October 1828; and, adjacent to this notation, the date of the beginning of the lectures in 1822, 31 October 1822. The two dates might suggest that Hegel wrote this manuscript for the earlier lectures and then at a later time revised it. But the order in which he wrote the dates, as well as differences in the quality and color of the ink, indicate that the extant sheets come from the later lectures. The earlier date was most likely copied from an earlier (and now lost) notebook, which served as a prototype for the preparation of the notes for 1828–9. Nonetheless, the manuscript agrees in content with the beginning of the lectures of 1822–3, except for marginal additions. It covers only the first two of three types of historiography, original and reflective history, before breaking off. In the Introduction to the lectures other than those of 1822–3 and 1828–9, the varieties of historiography are not discussed as such, and the Introduction begins with the philosophical concept of world history.

philosophy in Jena, 1805–6. The lectures were repeated eight times, and a tenth series had just begun prior to his sudden death in 1831. During the Berlin period (1818–1), Hegel also lectured regularly on logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit, philosophy of art, and philosophy of religion, and once on the proofs of the existence of God.

4. The manuscript materials have been ed. and publ. by Walter Jaeschke in the work cited in n. 1 (pp. 121–213).

The Manuscript of 1830–1

This manuscript has been in the Hegel Collection of the Staatsbibliothek since the end of the nineteenth century. It contains the date of the beginning of the lectures, 8 November 1830. The manuscript is very carefully prepared and evidences a great deal of editing and revision, so that it almost has the quality of a fair copy. In terms of both diction and care of composition it was apparently intended to serve as the preliminary stage of a publication, even though reports are lacking of a plan for publication such as exist for the proofs of the existence of God.[5] Despite its highly edited condition, the manuscript is not complete. A comparison of the manuscript with transcriptions of the lectures of 1830–1 shows that at several significant places (marked as such in our translation), Hegel presented shorter or longer passages in the lectures that drew on earlier preparatory materials and for which today there is no extant manuscript. At other places the manuscript has passages that are not used for the lectures at all, and passages that differ from parallels in the lectures. Toward the end of the Introduction there is a diminishing agreement between the manuscript and the transcriptions, until in the last section (on 'the course of world history') they diverge completely.[6]

Hegel's announced topic for the winter semester of 1830–1 was not, as it had been previously, *Philosophiam historiae universalis*, but *Philosophiae historiae universalis partem priorem*. Thus he intended to lecture on only the first part of the philosophy of world history, and by this he in all likelihood meant the Introduction that preceded the historical presentation. Hegel apparently intended to reverse the tendency of the more recent lectures, which his son Karl Hegel described as reducing the philosophical and abstract aspects, expanding the historical material, and popularizing the whole.[7] However, Hegel in fact did not follow through with this plan and again lectured on the whole of the *Weltgeschichte*. We can only assume that he did not proceed as quickly as expected with the revision of the Introduction, and thus it was not possible for him to devote the entire course to introductory and conceptual matters. Hegel's Berlin rectorate fell during the

5. On possible motives for a publication, see the Manuscript of 1830–1, n. 72.

6. For a detailed comparison of the manuscript with Karl Hegel's transcription of the lectures, see Walter Jaeschke, 'Das Geschriebene und das Gesprochene: Wilhelm und Karl Hegel über den Begriff der Philosophie der Weltgeschichte', *Hegel-Studien*, 44 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009), 13–44. Jaeschke believes it is possible that the main source for the actual lectures was not the extant manuscript but other now-lost materials.

7. See Karl Hegel's Preface to the 2nd German edn. of 1840, tr. John Sibree in 1857 as *The Philosophy of History*, with a new introduction by C. J. Friedrich (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), pp. xi–xii.

preceding year (1829–30), and his numerous publication plans—a new edition of the *Science of Logic*, a revision of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a work on the *Proofs of the Existence of God*—made it impossible to undertake a thorough revision of the beginning of the philosophy of world history lectures. The writing of the manuscript probably occurred only in the weeks immediately preceding the beginning of the winter semester, that is, in October 1830; and, in place of the expansion of the Introduction that Hegel intended, his version in 1830–1 is shorter than that of 1822–3.

Loose Sheets

Two sets of loose sheets relate to the philosophy of world history. The first of these, contained in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek, beginning with the words 'Also Spectacles of Endless Complexities', is written on the back of a single quarto sheet, which on the front has a notice by Eduard Gans on the current state of the July Revolution in France, dated 5 August 1830. This fragment relates to Hegel's preparation of his manuscript of the Introduction to world history. It represents a preliminary stage of the middle section of the manuscript, in which Hegel discusses the means by which freedom is actualized in the world. Its themes are recognizable in corresponding passages of the manuscript. The motif of struggle and of the mutual destruction of particular passions is, to be sure, not found in the existing manuscript. But comparison with the transcriptions of the lectures of 1830–1 shows that Hegel treated these themes, including his famous reference to the 'cunning of reason', immediately following the discussion of world-historical individuals, notably Caesar. In our edition this occurs at the transition from page 165 to 166 of the German text.[8] Since the fragment is one of several preliminary pieces to the manuscript, it is probable that Hegel wrote it at the beginning of his preparation for the lectures of 1830–1, namely in September 1830.

The second of the loose sheets, 'Course [of World History]', is owned by the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Florence. It is written on the back of a letter from Hegel to Friedrich Wilken, dated 27 November 1829. The fragment corresponds to the beginning of Part C, 'The Course of World History', in the 1830–1 manuscript. But it is not a preliminary draft of this material as formulated in the manuscript; rather it contains themes found in the actual delivery of the lectures.

8. See below, Manuscript of the Introduction, 1830–1, n. 44.

THE TRANSCRIPTIONS OF THE LECTURES

The Lectures of 1822–3

Two excellent transcriptions exist of this first course of lectures: those prepared by Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim (located in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek) and by Heinrich Gustav Hotho (owned by the Bibliothèque de Sorbonne, Paris, the Victor Cousin Collection). Griesheim provides a careful, complete, and reliable fair copy of Hegel's lectures, while Hotho's transcription was written down during the course of the lectures with many abbreviations and some obscurities. According to the German editors of the edition we have translated,[9] Hotho is better at providing the language and philosophical conceptuality of Hegel without interjecting his own point of view, while Griesheim has fewer details and more summaries that reflect his own view. However, an astonishing amount of nearly verbatim agreement exists between Griesheim and Hotho. Hotho serves as the guiding text (*Leittext*) for our edition, but the extensive agreement with Griesheim makes it possible to employ both sources in the construction of a continuous, 'integral' text, which approximates as closely as possible to what Hegel actually said. Where necessary, reference can be made to a third transcription, that of Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler (Staatsbibliothek), which is not complete and comprises only twenty-three quarto pages; Kehler also transcribed the 1824–5 lectures.

In his first lectures on the philosophy of world history, Hegel devoted considerable attention not only to the Introduction but also to the Oriental World (China, India, Persia, Egypt), which comprises nearly half the volume following the Introduction. He shared the growing interest in Asia of the 1820s and studied much of the available literature, acquiring a knowledge that he utilized also for lectures on the philosophies of art and religion and on the history of philosophy. Toward the end of his lectures he ran out of time and as a consequence his treatment of the Germanic world was compressed. This imbalance was redressed in later lectures.

From these lectures we learn that Hegel's treatment of geography (at least in 1822–3) is systematically anchored in his discussion of the state as one of its essential features, rather than the topic being treated separately or relegated to an appendix, as in earlier editions. The state as the bearer of history has not only a spiritual-cultural aspect but also a natural aspect, and in this

9. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (see n. 1), 527–8, 531. For details on the methods of the German editors, see pp. 532–6.

way it is the unity of spirit and nature. Historical events are objectifications of spirit in interaction with nature, yielding the history of the consciousness of freedom. The latter, as we shall explain below, also constitutes a theodicy, for the progress of freedom is the work of God in history.

The Lectures of 1830–1

Hegel's last lectures on the philosophy of world history were completed only a few months before his death in November 1831. A transcription by the philosopher's son, Karl Hegel, is in the possession of the Hegel-Archiv (Ruhr-Universität, Bochum), and it will serve as the basis for our second English volume when the transcription is published in the *Gesammelte Werke* a few years from now, along with selected materials from intervening years. As we have indicated, these lectures provide a more balanced treatment of the four major 'worlds' or 'realms' comprising world history (Oriental, Greek, Roman, and Germanic).

We could have elected to hold our translation of Hegel's manuscript of the Introduction to the lectures of 1830–1 for this second volume, where it would appear along with the transcription of these lectures. However, there are good reasons for presenting all the manuscript materials together in a single volume, as is the case with the German critical edition (*Gesammelte Werke*, vol. xviii). And the uncertainties involved in the delay led us to proceed with its publication now.

PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND THIS EDITION

Previous Editions

Eduard Gans, a former student and friend of Hegel, was the first editor to work with these materials. His edition appeared in 1837 as volume ix of the *Werke*, an 18–volume edition prepared by an 'association of friends of the deceased'. Gans's edition was based principally on transcriptions of later lectures, especially those of 1830–1, but he also made use of Hegel's lecture manuscript of 1830.[10] After his death, a second edition of the *Werke* appeared in 1840, edited by Karl Hegel, who added to what Gans had done

10. See Gans's Preface to the 1st edn. in the reprint of the 2nd edn. in the *Jubiläumsausgabe*, ed. Hermann Glockner, xi (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommans Verlag, 3rd edn., 1949), 14–15. Gans made use of transcriptions of all the lecture series, but especially that of Karl Hegel for 1830–1.

by introducing materials from earlier lectures.[11] John Sibree translated Karl Hegel's edition into English in 1857, and it remained the only English source for over a hundred years.

In 1917 Georg Lasson published a 4-volume edition of the *Weltgeschichte*.[12] The first volume of his edition, containing the Introduction (under the title *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*) was revised by Johannes Hoffmeister in 1955, and the latter was translated by H. B. Nisbet in 1975.[13] As the German editors of the new edition point out, all these earlier editions obscure the conception of the individual lectures and mask the changes Hegel introduced. They had the principal goal of producing an editorially constructed unitary text, of making 'a book out of lectures',[14] rather than of providing a critical source for study of the *Weltgeschichte*.

According to his notes on the composition of the text, Lasson published in his first volume Hegel's 1830 manuscript of the Introduction. He interwove passages from the manuscript with parallel texts from the transcriptions, distinguishing the manuscript by larger type. For the transcriptions he used Griesheim as the source for the lectures of 1822–3, Kehler for the lectures of 1824–5, and Stieve for 1826–7. Apparently unaware of Karl Hegel's transcription of the lectures of 1830–1, he assumed that Hegel lectured only on 'Part One' in the final year. Where the lecture transcriptions available to Lasson paralleled the printed text of the second edition of the *Werke*, Lasson corrected the printed text in light of the transcriptions; but he found numerous sections in the printed text for which no parallels existed in his transcriptions, and these he reproduced exactly as they appeared in the published version. Thus Lasson's edition, apart from the manuscript, was an amalgam of diverse materials with no identification of sources and no distinction between lecture series.[15]

11. See Karl Hegel's Preface, *The Philosophy of History*, tr. Sibree, pp. xi–xii (*Jubiläumsausgabe*, 16–20). He praised the lectures of 1822–3 as being the richest in philosophical conceptuality, and he drew the Griesheim and Hotho transcriptions into his edn.

12. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1917–20); i. *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte* (2nd edn., 1920; 3rd edn., 1930); ii. *Die orientalische Welt*; iii. *Die griechische and die römische Welt*; iv. *Die germanische Welt*.

13. *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1955). *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History*, tr. H. B. Nisbet with an Introduction by Duncan Forbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). The remaining vols. of the Lasson edn., containing the main body of the text, were not translated. A tr. of the Introduction, based mainly on the Karl Hegel edn., was publ. by Robert S. Hartman as *Reason in History* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953).

14. This is the goal announced by Gans (*Jubiläumsausgabe*, 12).

15. *Reason in History*, 221–6.

Hoffmeister made only minor changes to Lasson, although he recognized that the whole needed to be re-edited. In addition to following Hegel's own subdivisions in the 1830 manuscript of the Introduction, he made use of the sheets containing what he called 'The Varieties of Historical Writing', realizing that this material constituted the beginning of the lectures in 1822 and 1828.[16] Consequently, Hoffmeister placed it at the beginning of the volume, designating it the 'first draft' of the Introduction, followed by the 'second draft' of 1830. In both cases the manuscript materials were printed in italic, and they were interwoven with passages from the transcriptions in roman type.[17] The 'geographical basis of world history' and the 'division of world history' remained in the appendix. As indicated, it is this edition that was translated by Nisbet in 1975; and until now it has remained the best source for Hegel's Introduction in English.

This Edition

The underlying principle of the critical edition of Hegel's lectures is that the transcriptions must be treated separately and published as independent units. Obviously, it is impractical to edit and translate transcriptions of all five of Hegel's series of lectures on *Weltgeschichte*. A selection must be made, and here the principal criterion is the reliability and intrinsic value of the sources. The two best transcriptions are those by Griesheim and Hotho of the first series, 1822–3; and the possibility of constructing an integral text based on both sources makes this an obvious choice. Karl Hegel's transcription of the lectures of 1830–1 is also reliable, and its inclusion will make it possible for the critical edition to publish the first and the last lecture series, with selections from intervening years.[18] Added to this is the fact that the manuscripts of the Introduction are from the first and the last series.

16. Lasson did not have access to the manuscript fragments of 1822 and 1828 for his 1st edn. but only to indications from the *Werke* edns. and from the transcription of 1822–3 that the Introduction had begun differently in this year. He provided an edited version of the material, calling it a 'special introduction', placing it after the 'general introduction' based on the 1830–1 manuscript. When the 1822 and 1828 fragments became available, he added them as 'addenda' to later edns. of his work but did not alter the 'special introduction', so the same material appeared twice, at two different places.

17. *Reason in History*, 5–9.

18. This is the plan for vol. xxvii of the *Gesammelte Werke*, which will be issued in two or three part-volumes. The first part-volume will contain the transcription of the lectures of 1822–3, based on Griesheim and Hotho. The editorial principles for preparing this volume may differ from those used by Ilting, Brehmer, and Seelmann in vol. xii of the *Vorlesungen*—a series also published by Meiner Verlag and intended as preliminary to the treatment of the lectures in the *Gesammelte Werke*. The second part-volume will contain Karl Hegel's transcription of the lectures of 1830–1,

Considerable agreement exists between Walter Jaeschke's edition of the manuscripts of the Introduction in volume xviii of the *Gesammelte Werke* and the earlier work of Lasson and Hoffmeister on these materials. Consequently we have been helped by H. B. Nisbet's translation of the manuscripts in *Reason in History*. However, our translation differs from his in many ways, large and small, and we always follow Jaeschke's critical text and annotations. For the transcription of the lectures of 1822–3 in volume xii of the *Vorlesungen*, there is no precedent in English, although parallel passages are found in the Sibree translation of the second *Werke* edition.

Our translation is a collaborative effort. The work of each of us has been read and corrected by the other two. The German editors of the lectures of 1822–3 provide detailed annotations for the sections on China, India, and Persia, but very few for the remainder of the work where (they claim) Hegel draws upon well-known sources. We have extensively supplemented the annotations for these other sections and have provided additional annotations for China, India, and Persia.[19] The German editors of both the manuscripts and the transcriptions include a detailed apparatus on the construction of the text. We have not translated the apparatus except at a few places where there is a significant bearing on meaning or where we prefer an alternative reading of the main text. We have held bracketed insertions to a minimum, not reproducing the many brackets used by the editors of the transcription to complete sentences grammatically. In the manuscripts we indicate Hegel's frequent use of emphasis by means of italics; elsewhere italics are found sparingly. We have provided the subheadings for the 1822–3 lectures. Pagination of the German texts is in the margins, with the page breaks marked by vertical slashes.

Our translation principles follow those originally worked out for the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*.[20] These principles are in brief: (1) to achieve uniformity in the translation of key terms, we have worked from a

and a third part-volume may contain selections from other lecture series. Hegel's lecture manuscripts have been published in vol. xviii of the *Gesammelte Werke* (see above, n. 1). Drawing upon vol. xviii of the *Gesammelte Werke* and vol. xii of the *Vorlesungen*, we are able to proceed now with the translation of the first vol. of our English edn.

19. For this purpose we have relied in part on *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 2nd edn., ed. N. G. L. Hammon and H. H. Scullard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), and on *The New Columbia Encyclopedia*, ed. William H. Harris and Judith S. Levy (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975). We also have drawn on resources from the internet.

20. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, tr. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), i. 52–8. Originally publ. by the University of California Press, 1984–7.

glossary, which is modified from that used for the *Philosophy of Religion* and the *History of Philosophy*, and is printed at the back of the volume; (2) we have not sacrificed precision for the sake of fluency and believe that the more precisely Hegel's thought is rendered the more intelligible it generally becomes; (3) we have attempted to preserve a sense of the spoken word and of Hegel's oral delivery; (4) we have used a 'down' format and have avoided capitalizing common Hegelian terms such as 'idea' and 'spirit'; (5) we have employed gender-inclusive references to human beings and wherever possible to God.

We conclude these preliminary remarks by noting that what follows after the Introduction is not a history in the sense of a chronological account of events but rather a cultural and political portrayal of various 'worlds', a 'portrait' of what is distinctive about each of several great civilizations (Chinese, Indian, Persian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and Germanic or European), and why Hegel thinks they constitute a meaningful progression in the development of spirit, truth, and freedom, viewed on a large scale. For the purpose of philosophical portraiture, the medium of oral lectures is ideally suited. Duncan Forbes claims, in his Introduction to *Reason in History*,[21] that Hegel's philosophy 'is best approached in the spirit of Plato's, as something that is in danger of being destroyed or distorted if it is written down'. Forbes points out that Hegel was in fact reluctant to publish, and that only four of his books were published during his lifetime. To give these publications a definitive priority over his spoken lectures, with which he was almost exclusively occupied during the last decade in Berlin, is to treat his philosophy as a closed book, whereas it was an attempt to 'think life', dialectically yet concretely, holistically yet with shrewd insight into detail—and it is precisely the details that occupy most of the *Weltgeschichte*. The only way to appreciate this kind of thinking, says Forbes, is to 'watch it at work' on the podium. Once it ceases to be thinking and becomes thought, once it stops speaking and is reduced to an editorial amalgam (as with older editions of the lectures), it ceases to be a living process and becomes a system. The principal goal of Hegel's philosophy is to permit *thinking* to remain open, fluid, and continuous.

Our analysis of the texts attempts to honor that intention. In this analysis, references to footnotes are to those belonging to the texts of the various units under discussion, not to the note sequence in the Editorial Introduction.

21. *Reason in History*, pp. xiii–xiv.

ANALYTIC SUMMARY OF THE TEXTS

MANUSCRIPT: INTRODUCTORY FRAGMENT, 1822, 1828

By way of indicating what is distinctive about a *philosophical* history of the world, Hegel begins his lectures in 1822 and 1828 by surveying three varieties of historiography: original history, reflective history, and philosophical history.

Original[22] *history* is written by historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides who have themselves witnessed, experienced, and lived through some of the events they describe. They transposed things that merely happened and existed externally (*res gesta*) into the realm of intellectual representation by constructing narrative and poetic[23] accounts (*historia*). It is the *historian* who does this, who fashions a whole out of what has passed away, thereby investing it with immortality, giving it 'a more exalted and better soil than that transient soil in which it grew'. Original historians, however, do this only with events that for the most part are contemporaneous with them and that belong to their own world, the world in which they themselves are participants, leaders, authors. Such historians are immersed in the material and do not rise above it to reflect on it. They have written the 'bibles' of their peoples,[24] and through them the material comes to us, fresh and alive.

Reflective history[25] goes beyond what is present simply to the author; it depicts what was present not only in time but also in the life of *spirit*. It includes everything written by those whom we customarily call historians.

22. The German is *ursprünglich*, which can also be translated 'primeval' or 'primordial'. For analyses of Hegel's discussion of the varieties of historiography, see George Dennis O'Brien, *Hegel on Reason and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); and Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, *Hegel's Philosophy of History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974).

23. While Hegel claims that poetry, legends, and folksongs do not belong to original history because they are the product of an 'obscure' consciousness, it is clear that he uses epic poetry such as the Mahābhārata and Homer to help construct the worlds of India and Greece. He even says that Homer is the *Grundbuch* of Greece.

24. The Holy Bible of Jews and Christians is an example of such an original history. Peoples invest such histories with divine inspiration, which is a way of recognizing their archetypal importance in constituting identity.

25. Reflective history (*reflektierende Geschichte*) is to be distinguished from speculative history, which is in fact philosophical history. The subtypes of reflective history are universal, pragmatic, critical, and specialized (for the latter two, see the beginning of the Lectures of 1822–3). Hoo Nam Seelmann argues that the three main types of history (original, reflective, philosophical) correspond to Hegel's underlying logical structure: original or immediate unity, separation or reflection, and re-established unity on a higher, mediated level. See *Weltgeschichte als Idee der menschlichen Freiheit: Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie in der Vorlesung von 1822/23* (doctoral dissertation, University of Saarland; Saarbrücken, 1986), 7–14.

The author comes to the material with his own spirit, which likely is different from the spirit of the content itself; and everything depends on the maxims and representational principles that the author applies to the content and to the style of his writing.

Hegel distinguishes between several modes of reflective history. The first consists of *surveys* of a people or country or even the world as a whole, which are compilations from the accounts of original historians and other sources. When the reflective historian attempts to depict the spirit of the age about which he writes, it is usually his own spirit that is heard (compare an original historian such as Polybius with a compiler such as Livy). No more than such a writer can we transpose ourselves completely and vividly into the times of the past; so, for example, as much as we admire Greece and find its life congenial, we cannot truly sympathize with the Greeks or share their feelings. As an example of a historian who endeavors to compile individual traits and to portray them in a faithful and lifelike manner, Hegel introduces a reference to Leopold Ranke (see note 25) when he revises his notes in 1828–9. He does not have a high opinion of Ranke, who in his judgment offers an assortment of details of little interest, with little or no reference to political concerns and general purposes.

The second mode consists of *pragmatic* history, of which Hegel is both critical and appreciative. On the one hand, the historian can, like an amateur psychologist, take up moral questions, deriving motives not from the concept of the thing itself but from particular inclinations and passions, and offering hortatory reflections. On the other hand, this pragmatism can be a rational history, which focuses on a totality of interests such as a state, a constitution, or a conflict. Here the historian reflects on how a people becomes a state, what the ends of a state are, what institutions are needed to bring true interests to actuality, and what sort of necessity is at work in history.

The manuscript breaks off at this point, without completing reflective history or addressing philosophical history. For the continuation we must refer to the transcription of the lectures of 1822–3.

MANUSCRIPT: INTRODUCTION, 1830–1

Instead of surveying the varieties of historiography, Hegel begins the lectures in 1830–1 by remarking that 'the philosophy of world history is nothing other than the contemplation of it by means of *thinking*'. But this raises the question as to whether thinking should not be subordinated to what exists,

to what is given empirically. 'Philosophy by contrast is assumed to have its *own* thoughts, produced by speculation from out of itself without reference to what is. With such thoughts it supposedly approaches history as a material to be treated; it does not leave it as it is but *arranges* it in accord with thought and *constructs* a history a priori.' The aim of history, so it is said (by historians such as Ranke?), is simply to discover 'what happened'. To refute the claim that philosophy imports its thoughts into history is the purpose of the first section of Hegel's Introduction.

A. The General Concept of World History

The sole conception that philosophy brings with it is the admittedly audacious claim that *reason* governs the world and that world history is a rational process. From the point of view of history itself, this is a *presupposition*. But philosophy, by speculative cognition, *proves* that reason (and with it, God) is substance and infinite power—both the material of all natural and spiritual life and the infinite form that activates this content. Such reason is its own presupposition, the absolute final end; it is the activation and bringing forth into world history of both the natural universe and the spiritual realm. Nothing is revealed in the world except the divine reason, its honor and glory: this may be presupposed as demonstrated. The demonstration is provided by the whole of philosophy, including the science of logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit, one of whose components is Hegel's *Weltgeschichte*. Thus the presupposition is also the *result* of the inquiry we are about to undertake. What will make itself evident from the consideration of world history itself is that a rational process has been taking place in it, 'that world history is the rational and necessary course of world spirit'. This presupposition and result, this 'speculative cognition', can be described as Hegel's *metahistory*; and every historian has a metahistorical perspective, whether acknowledged or not.[26]

26. See Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), ch. 2. Hegel's metahistorical perspective is stated abstractly and from a bird's eye perspective in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §§ 341–4; in the details of the *Weltgeschichte*, he comes down to earth. The metahistorical perspective does not exclude historical and humanist perspectives. In fact, *Geist* for Hegel assumes three basic shapes: that of human individuals, that of peoples or nations (*Volksgeister*), and that of universal or world spirit (*Weltgeist*, which is a form of *absoluter Geist* or God). The three are reciprocally dependent on each other. God is the ontological ground, but this ground is of such a nature that it requires actualization in the 'thick' community of human *Sittlichkeit* (ethical life) because the triune God is absolute *inter*subjectivity. See Alan Patten, *Hegel's Idea of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 1; and Rudolf J. Siebert,

But history must also be taken as it is, and we must proceed in a historical, empirical fashion. Hegel's empiricism is manifestly evident from the *Weltgeschichte*, which pursues the minutest details of analysis and accords great attention to the framework provided by nature. Hegel accuses the professional historians themselves of introducing a priori fictions into history, such as claims about an original, primeval people who lived in perfect insight and wisdom. But truth does not reside on the superficial plane of the senses; in regard to everything scientific (*wissenschaftlich*), 'reason may not slumber and must employ meditative thinking.[27] Whoever looks at the world rationally sees it as rational too.'

The conviction that reason has governed and continues to govern the world is not ours alone. Hegel cites philosophical precedents going back to Anaxagoras and Socrates. The alternative is to attribute everything to *chance*, as Epicurus did (and as many others have done in modernity and postmodernity). The conviction about reason also assumes another form, that of our own religious faith that the world is not given over to chance and external, contingent causes, but is ruled by *providence*. 'Divine providence is the wisdom that has the infinite power to actualize its purposes, that is, the absolute, rational, final purpose of the world.' This is *spiritual* power, not physical power, and it interacts with finite spirits freely; it does not coerce them but, as we shall see, works both in a positive fashion as a lure and in a negative fashion at cross-purposes to narrow human interests. Most people believe that the providential plan is hidden from our eyes, that it is presumptuous to want to know it. It is allowed to appear only here and there in particular cases. But we should not be content with this 'petty commerce' on the part of faith in providence. Rather, the *ways* of providence are its means, its appearance in history, and they lie open before us.

At this juncture Hegel is led to consider the question as to whether it is possible to *know God*. In a comment remarkably prescient of the postmodern suspicion of religion on the part of philosophy, he says that he has chosen not to avoid this question of knowing God in order 'to allay any suspicion that philosophy shies away from or should shy away from mentioning religious truths, or that it circumvents them because it does not, so to

Hegel's Philosophy of History: Theological, Humanistic, and Scientific Elements (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979).

27. The reference to 'meditative thinking' (*Nachdenken*) is an aspect of Hegel's mystical perspective, i.e. his *rational* mysticism or 'Hermeticism'. See Glenn Alexander Magee, 'Hegel and Mysticism', in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch. 10.

speak, have a good conscience about them'. With this he advances one of his central theological claims. 'In the Christian religion God has revealed godself; i.e., God has given it to humanity to know what God is, so that God is no longer something hidden and concealed.' Along with this revelation comes a *theodicy*, a justification of God's ways in the world. We are able to comprehend the horrendous evils of the world as negated through the negation of the negative. *How* this is accomplished will be examined shortly.

B. The Actualization of Spirit in History[28]

World history takes place in the realm of spirit (*Geist*), and the actualization of spirit is what constitutes history. This actualization occurs in three (or four) main stages.[29] The Orientals did not know that spirit, the human being as such, is *intrinsically free*; with them, only *one* is free, the despot. The consciousness of freedom first arose among the Greeks, but they, like the Romans, knew only that *some* are free (adult male citizens for Greeks, rulers and aristocrats for Romans), and their beautiful freedom depended on slaves. The Germanic or European nations, through Christianity, were the first to know, in principle, that the ***human being as human*** is free, that freedom of spirit constitutes humanity's inherent nature. The application of this principle to actuality is the long and arduous process that is history itself.[30] In Hegel's famous formulation: 'World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom'. History involves the 'education of the human race',[31] but to what? To freedom—not directly, but as a result. Hegel notes the immense difference between the principle as it is intrinsically and what it is in actuality, and the immense labor required of spirit to achieve the principle. But freedom contains 'the infinite necessity within itself to bring itself to consciousness and to actuality'. The question then becomes: what *means* does it employ for its actualization?

28. Hayden White observes that Hegel views the historical field as both a 'synchronic structure' and a 'diachronic process' (*Metahistory*, 106). The first comprehends history as a spectacle of *purpose*; the second comprehends it as a process of *development*. The present section is concerned with purpose (the actualization of spirit in history), while the next section ('The Course of World History') presents development as a meaningful process.

29. See *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 352–3. The typology of stages of the consciousness of freedom is already found in Hegel's 1820–1 lectures on the history of philosophy (*History of Philosophy*, i. 181, 195).

30. In the Germanic World (1822–3), Hegel says that the spirit of the modern era is that of freedom, and that 'the ages prior to our age have faced but one labor, have had but one task, and that has been to incorporate this principle into actuality' (below, p. 506).

31. We know from the *Philosophy of Right*, § 343, that Hegel's reference here is to Lessing's *Education of the Human Race* (see n. 31 of the text).

Hegel's answer focuses on two instruments: human *passions* and divine *ideals*. The first represents a negative means, the second a positive or affirmative means. History shows that the actions of human beings proceed from their *needs, passions, and interests*, although individuals sometimes pursue limited goodness and other virtues. Passions, private interests, the satisfaction of selfish impulses are the most powerful forces in history because they do not heed the limitations of justice and morality. They are not just irrational instruments but reason governed by emotions, self-interest, fear, and greed. Hegel testifies eloquently to the destruction wrought by these passions, to the immensity of evil, the untold miseries of individual human beings, the misfortunes that have befallen even the finest creations of culture, the transience of everything. 'As we look upon history as this slaughterhouse in which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtues of individuals are sacrificed, our thoughts are necessarily impelled to ask: *to whom, to what final purpose*, have these monstrous sacrifices been made?'

Hegel does not answer this question conceptually or in the form of logic. He begins by noting that passions are necessary because they provide the volition and energy by which anything happens at all. To accomplish something, our own interests must be at stake. But all the individual activities by which individuals satisfy their own ends 'are at the same time the *means* and *instruments of a higher* and wider purpose, which they know nothing of but unconsciously carry out'. He provides examples of how human action can produce an effect entirely different from that intended: a man, out of revenge (whether justified or not), sets fire to someone else's house, but the fire spreads, destroys much property, costs many lives, and the arsonist, rather than being vindicated, is punished for a crime; or Caesar, by opposing his rivals out of self-interest, gained undivided sovereignty over the Empire, thus accomplishing not merely his own negative end but the end for which his age was ready. At this point a break occurs in the manuscript, one filled by the first of the Loose Sheets and the orally delivered lectures of 1830–1 (see note 44). It is from the very conflict and destruction of particular interests that the universal emerges. This is what we may call the *cunning of reason*: it makes use of the passions for its own purposes and is not scathed or damaged by them; indeed, it brings itself forth through them. The conceptual truth behind the metaphor is that reason, because it is *spiritual* and not physical or natural power, must work *negatively*; it overcomes opposition and evil not directly, not by intervention in natural processes, but indirectly, by letting evil combat evil, letting passions wear themselves out. Reason in its 'cunning' subverts human intentions, has the power of apparent weakness (not of 'force' or 'violence'), and brings good

out of evil. The deep tragedy of history is that in the process many are sacrificed and a terrible price is paid for human freedom. But the vision is ultimately tragicomic, for good *does* come out of evil, however imperfectly, and reconciliation *is* accomplished through conflict.[32]

The second instrument is positive. Morality, ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), and religion are means that are suitable to their ends because they are governed by the divine principle of reason, the divine idea of freedom. In fulfilling rational ends, individuals not only fulfill their own particular ends but also '*participate* in that rational end itself'. The term 'participation' suggests that the divine idea functions as a 'lure' that draws human actions to higher ends; it has the power of 'persuasion', not coercion. This language of process philosophy is not found in Hegel, but he is moving toward it. He is interested in human responsibility combined with divine initiative, but acknowledges that the development of this theme would require a complete treatise on freedom. The great project of history is that of overcoming the difference between and achieving the unification of the subjective side (the knowing and willing individual) and the objective, substantial side (the universal final end).

The institution through which this project is carried out is principally the *state*—the institution that bears all other human institutions: laws, morality,

32. It can hardly be said that Hegel makes light of evil, but the question remains as to whether his tragicomic perspective is one that can be embraced by a post-Holocaust, terrorist-afflicted, environmentally destructive nuclear world. We have experienced what seem like irredeemable horrors. Have the problems become so immense that philosophical hope and religious faith are destroyed? But to concede to evil is to let it defeat us. See Emil L. Fackenheim, *God's Presence in History* (New York: New York University Press, 1970). See also Eberhard Jüngel's comment: 'In making what one will of Hegel's *cunning of reason* (a not very humanly-reassuring expression), one ought not, in any event, to overlook the fact that Hegel does not rationalize away "the total mass of concrete evils" in world history. Quite the contrary, he takes it so seriously that it calls for *reconciliation*, indeed, reconciliation on the part of the self-divesting God.... This reconciliation takes place in the course of history itself. "Indeed, there is no arena in which such a reconciling knowledge is more urgently needed than in world history." And where such reconciling knowledge takes place is the point at which world-historical "consideration" becomes "a theodicy, a justification (*Rechtfertigung*) of God". For the judgment of the world (*Weltgericht*), which takes place in world history conceived as theodicy, it means that this is not a *judgment* for the purpose of *retribution* (*Vergeltung*) but instead a *judgment* in the service of *reconciliation* (*Versöhnung*). God justifies godself not by *exercising retribution* but instead by *reconciling*.' Eberhard Jüngel, '"Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht" aus theologischer Perspektive', in Rüdiger Bubner and Walter Mesch (eds.), *Die Weltgeschichte—das Weltgericht? Stuttgarter Hegel Kongreß 1999* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2001), 25. Jüngel's quotations are from the Manuscript of 1830–1 (see below, pp. 85–6). Hegel introduces the concept of the 'cunning of reason' in *The Science of Logic*, tr. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), 746–7, where he contrasts 'cunning' (*List*) with the 'force' or 'violence' (*Gewalt*) that would result if reason intervened directly in natural processes. On world history as 'world judgment', see below, pp. 166, 463 incl. n. 2.

family, civil society, culture, art, religion. World history is about the spiritual totalities called states, each of which constitutes a unique *Volksgeist*. Hegel is concerned at this point to refute misconceptions about the state. The first error is the opposite of the conception that the state is the actualization of freedom; it is the view that humans are *free by nature*, but that in society and the state this natural freedom must be restricted (Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte; see note 61). The second misconception concerns *patriarchy*, which is regarded as providing the circumstances in which juridical and ethical concerns are satisfied. However, the patriarchal condition is based on the family relationship, which is the earliest form of ethical life, while the state is the second, consciously developed form. The bond that binds individuals moves from love (the family) to service (patriarchy) to citizenship (the state).

The conditions of citizenship are spelled out by a state's *constitution* or system of government (*Verfassung*). Hegel notes that, in determining the distinction between ruler and ruled, constitutions have been classified as those of *monarchy, aristocracy,* and *democracy*; and the question has been raised as to which is best in securing the end of the state, which is the actualization of freedom. The answer cannot be aristocracy, where the focus is on the education of princes or rulers alone; nor can it be that of pure subjective free will. Oligarchy and anarchy are not true options. The fundamental definition of freedom 'has led to the widespread theory that the *republic* is the only just and true constitution'. However, Hegel adds that advocates of republican government 'have seen that such a constitution, even though it may be the best, in actuality cannot be introduced everywhere, and that, because *humans are what they are*, one must make do with a lesser degree of freedom. As a consequence, under these circumstances and in light of the moral condition of the people, the monarchical constitution may be the *most workable one*.' Thus Hegel's preference for a constitutional monarchy is based on pragmatic as well as theoretical considerations.

C. The Course of World History[33]

History not only has a synchronic structure; it is also a diachronic process: it progresses through time. According to Hegel this progression occurs only in the realm of spirit. 'Changes in nature, no matter how diverse they are, exhibit only an eternally recurring cycle. In nature there is nothing new under the sun.' In accord with the science of his time, Hegel understood nature to be a hierarchy of independent, coexisting levels, not an evolutionary process with

33. See n. 72 of the Manuscript.

higher stages coming later in time. Darwin's soon-to-be formulated theory of evolution would require that Hegel's view of nature as purely repetitive be modified and that 'history' be applied to nature, although in a profoundly different sense than to spirit.

The history of spirit is one of *progressive development*. Spirit does not drift about in the external play of contingencies but rather makes use of contingencies for its own purposes. 'Spirit in itself is opposed to itself; it has to overcome itself as the genuine and hostile hindrance to its purpose.' Thus development within spirit is 'a hard and ceaseless conflict with itself', not a harmless and conflict-free process of emergence as in organic life. The *end* of spiritual development is spirit itself in its essence, the *concept of freedom*. Because the development comes through conflict, its trajectory has not been one of steady advance but rather one of retrogression and destruction as well as of progression and rebirth. Here Hegel repeats his typology of stages in the history of the consciousness of freedom, noting that spirit starts from what is only a possibility and attains its goal as a result of the travails of history.

Repeating, too, his critique of the notion of an original paradisiacal human condition—and adding a critique of politically conservative theories of an original revelation of all knowledge—Hegel says that we take up history at the point where *rationality* begins to appear in worldly existence, where it steps forth into consciousness, volition, and deed. The prehistory prior to the formation of family and tribal life lies outside our interest. With the discovery of Sanskrit and the Indo-European linguistic connection, we know that tribal peoples spread outwards from Asia and developed in disparate ways from a primordial kinship. 'History' begins with the writing of historical narrative, the *historia rerum gestarum*, which we assume appears more-or-less simultaneously with the happenings themselves, the *res gestae*. This narrative takes the form of family memorials and patriarchal traditions, but 'it is the state that first supplies a content that not only lends itself to the prose of history but helps to produce it'.

The development of spirit's consciousness of freedom forms a sequence of *stages*—stages in the 'self-developing shape of freedom'. One must be familiar with this concept philosophically in order to grasp it empirically. Advances in this shape occur on a higher plane than that of individual morality. Therefore the deeds of the great human beings, the individuals of world history, appear justified not only in their own frame of reference but also from the standpoint of the larger world. Each stage of world history must develop into a political state, where the arts and sciences of culture flourish, including eventually philosophy. Philosophy in the form of the 'reflective

understanding' attacks the 'sacred and profound elements that were naively introduced into the religion, laws, and customs of peoples, and debases and dilutes them into abstract and godless generalities. Thought is then impelled to become thinking reason, and to seek and accomplish in its own element the undoing of the destruction that it brought upon itself.' The work of the understanding (*Verstand*) is destructive; that of speculative reason (*Vernunft*) is constructive.

The manuscript of 1830–1 continues for a few more pages with reflections on thought and freedom, unity and diversity, Eastern and Western culture, and the like. It breaks off before reaching a conclusion.

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE LECTURES OF 1822–3

Introduction: The Concept of World History

The Types of Treatment of History

The first few pages of the transcription of the lectures of 1822–3 parallel what is said in the introductory fragments of 1822 and 1828 about original history and reflective history. Expanding on his discussion of pragmatic historiography, Hegel remarks that moral lessons and judgments are often regarded as the essential purpose of the study of history. 'But the fate of peoples and the overthrow of states occur on a different plane than that of morality, a higher and broader one.'[34] For this reason, 'history and experience teach that people generally have not learned from history', and the formative power of history is something other than the reflections derived from it.

In his oral lectures Hegel addresses two additional modes of reflective history, *critical* (reflection on the writing of history) and *abstractive* or *specialized* (special histories within a universal outlook, such as the histories of art, science, government, law, navigation). The latter forms a transition to the final type of historiography.

The point of view of *philosophical world history* is not that of a particular, abstract universal but of a *concrete* universal, which is the 'guiding soul of events'. This guide is not a mythical figure like Mercury but is *the idea*; 'it is *spirit* that guides the world, and its guidance is what we wish to learn about'. This universal is infinitely concrete and utterly present, for spirit is eternally present to itself. The spirits of peoples (*Volksgeister*) are the totality

34. See also *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, § 345.

of the one world spirit (*Weltgeist*). Thinking is the self-production of spirit. Spirit's highest goal is to know itself; this achievement, however, is its demise and marks the emergence of a different stage and a new principle. World history is the matrix in which this transition comes about.

The first category of history is that of *change* or *alteration* (*Veränderung*)—the constant supplanting of one individual or one civilization by another. When viewing 'the ruins of ancient splendor', a profound sadness comes over us, a sense that everything passes away and nothing endures. But at the same time alteration and decline entail the *creation and emergence of new life*. That new life arises out of death is the radical idea of Oriental metaphysics, its greatest conception. The phoenix builds its own funeral pyre but arises anew from the ashes, rejuvenated. However, this image applies only to natural life, not to spirit. The Western conception is that spirit comes forth not merely rejuvenated in its old form but rather elevated and transfigured, purified and elaborated. Thus the conception of simple alteration becomes that of *spirit*, which radiates its energies in all directions. Its activity has the most varied results: sometimes it shines with beauty and freedom; sometimes it is mere dominion and power; sometimes all one's strength produces only tiny results; other times an insignificant event has enormous consequences.

We grow weary from the press of details and ask: what is the *purpose* of all these events and their enormous cost? Beneath the din and noisy appearances of history, we wonder whether there is concealed 'an inner, silent, secret working'. Thus we arrive at the third category of history (beyond alteration and new life), that of *reason*, the conception of a final end within itself. Such a final end 'governs and alone consummates itself in the events that occur to peoples', and therefore we find '*reason in world history*'. Philosophical world history is more an *exposition* than a demonstration of this proposition, for in history reason simply proves itself. When it comes to proof, Hegel acknowledges the hermeneutical circle: 'In order to recognize reason in history or to know history rationally, we must surely bring reason along with us; for the way in which we look upon history and the world is how it in turn looks to us.' History as such is empty; 'nothing is to be learned from it if we do not bring reason and spirit with us'.

If we do not bring reason, we must at least bring *faith*—'the faith that there is an actual causality in history, and that intelligence and spirit are not given over to chance'. Our faith is that a 'divine will and final purpose rule in history', that 'God governs the world'. But when it comes to more specific matters, we refrain from inquiring about the providential plan, for God's providence is said to be inscrutable and inexhaustible. To this 'humility' we

must juxtapose what the Christian religion is about: that God's nature and essence are revealed to humanity, that we know what God is, that we have the obligation to know God.

Hegel summarizes his philosophy of providence in a condensed formulation that is reminiscent of Aristotle:[35]

> [The] final end is what God has willed for the world. To this end everything is sacrificed on the altar of the world; this end is what is operative and enlivening. What we know about it is that it is what is most perfect, and God wills the most perfect; what God wills can only be God godself and what is like unto God, God's will. God's will is not distinguished from God, and philosophically we call it *the idea*.

In his discussion of the Greek World, Hegel fleshes out this view slightly.[36] He compares the Christian category of providence with that of fate for the Greeks. In the case of both Christians and Greeks, the connection of particularities to the universal is incomprehensible, for destiny 'unfolds on a soil that must be called contingent in respect to particular purposes'. These are particularities such as the life-journey of each individual. 'But Christians have the view that all these particularities serve for the best, that God guides all these contingencies and leads them to the best outcome.... The Greeks lacked this view just because what is particular, the end of individuals, was not taken up into God.' The Christian focus on the value of 'the *this*'—a theme to which we shall return—makes all the difference.

At the beginning of the Germanic World, Hegel remarks that providence is 'a veiled inner power that achieves its end and prevails via the recalcitrant volition of the peoples—so that what it achieves and what the peoples desire are often at odds'. And his concluding words are: 'What is happening and has happened does not just come from God but is God's work.'[37] The question remains, *how* does God work?

The Idea of Human Freedom

We consider the idea—the divine idea—in the element of human spirit; it is *the idea of human freedom*. Freedom is the way in which the idea brings

35. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1072b 18–30 (*The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 1941), 880). Hegel quotes this passage at the end of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, § 577 (see *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, tr. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 315). As an abstract formulation it is also reminiscent of Leibniz's theodicy.

36. See below, pp. 397–8.

37. See below, pp. 465, 521.

itself forth, displayed in a series of ethical shapes whose sequence constitutes the course of human history. Here we grasp the idea in the concrete shape of spirit, not as the logical idea. At this point Hegel introduces his famous metaphor of the weaving of crossed threads:

> Two elements are salient: first, the idea itself as abstract; and second, the human passions. The two together form the weft and the warp[38] in the fabric that world history spreads before us. The idea is the substantial power, but considered for itself it is only the universal. The passions of humanity are the arm by which it actualizes itself. These are the extremes; the midpoint at which these elements are bound together, by which they are reconciled, and in which they have their living unification, is ethical freedom.

There follows a section on the *concept of spirit*. Spirit as such is thinking; it is consciousness and self-consciousness, and it is what distinguishes us from animals. It gives us a measure of control over drives and passions, and it enables us to orient our action toward goals. This means that spirit is only what it makes of itself; it has its being and concrete existence only as a result, not as what is initial and immediate. Animals are born nearly complete, but human beings must cast off the natural aspect and be nurtured, disciplined, and educated. The most sublime example of this quality of spirit, claims Hegel, is found not in human beings, who are finite creatures, but in God. In God, however, it is not a mere example but the truth itself, of which everything else is but an example. For Christianity, God *is* spirit: 'Father' (the abstract universal), 'Son' (the object that cleaves itself, posits an other to itself that is just as immediately God's own self), and 'Spirit' (the self-possessing, self-knowing unity of the first two, being-present-to-self-in-the-other). The whole is spirit, and as spirit God is for the first time the true, the complete. The *Trinity* makes the Christian religion the revealed and only true religion. If Christianity lacked the Trinity, thought might find more truth in other religions. The Trinity is the 'speculative element' in Christianity, the idea of reason in it.[39]

Hegel next takes up a lengthy discussion of the *history* of spirit, a history that unfolds in three stages: the beginning of history, the progress of history, and the end of history. At the *beginning* of history, we find a natural state, which is a state of bondage and sensuous desire if by 'nature' we mean a condition of immediacy, not the concept or essence of a thing. Hegel refutes

38. See n. 19 of the text. On the idea of human freedom in general, see Patten, *Hegel's Idea of Freedom*, chs. 2–6.

39. The full elaboration of God as Trinity is found in vol. iii of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*.

the popular view, held by Schelling and Schlegel and others of his time, based on the biblical story and other creation myths, that the original condition was one of beautiful innocence and pure knowledge. The assumption here, he notes, is that humanity could not have developed from 'animal stupor'. This assumption is correct, but humanity could well have developed from human stupor, and that is just what we find at the beginning. Spirit is already imprinted on the human, but it must develop; it is an infinite *energeia* and *entelecheia* that discovers itself in its labor, brings forth its concept, and this production comes last, not first. (From a post-Darwinian perspective, of course, the 'development' of spirit starts much earlier than Hegel thought, in the long transition between 'animal' and 'human'. Hegel is vague about when human beings first appeared, but his view does not entail a theory of 'special' creation.)

Second, the *progress* or *progression* (*Fortgang*) of history occurs in time. The quality of the negative is intrinsic to time because things come into being and pass away. 'The abstract contemplation of being and nonbeing is time' (see note 29). Here we enter into a consideration of *change* or *alteration*. Whereas in nature nothing changes, for nature instead constitutes a hierarchy of levels, spirit constantly changes and climbs a 'ladder of stages'. But because the peoples as spiritual configurations are also creatures of nature, some of the shapes that we see in history as a succession in time also stand perennially alongside one another in space. Thus today we find three major, long-existing configurations: the principle of the Far East (nature), the principle of the Islamic world (absolute antithesis), and the principle of Christian Western Europe (spirit's knowledge of its own depths). But other peoples, such as the Greeks, Romans, and Germanic tribes, have long disappeared. This variation introduces an element of contingency into an otherwise necessary process.

Every people goes through specific moments of progress or of cultural formation. The categories employed by Hegel are development (*Entwicklung*), refinement (*Bildung*), over-refinement (*Überbildung*), and decline (*Verbildung*). In the first moment of the history of a people, that of *Bildung*, the people lives for the sake of its work, bringing forth and enacting its inner principle. The second moment, that of *Überbildung*, is the source of a people's destruction: spirit, having achieved itself, no longer needs its activity and has lost the highest interest of life in goals not yet fulfilled; it lives with its habitual routine, which leads to natural death. The way is now open for the final moment, that of *Verbildung*, when spirit prepares its own downfall and the coming forth of a new life. The transition (*Übergang*) to a new cultural form is the work of thought itself, in whose negativity

everything is dissolved and existent being is superseded. For this reason thought is suppressed as something that is politically dangerous. With the emergence of new forms of determinacy, the universal is becoming increasingly concrete. A previous particularity, such as being merely a citizen of Athens, 'melts under the light of thought, as snow melts under the sun'. When a new work is at hand, world history makes the transition to a new *Gestalt*, for no people can be epoch-making more than once. Such is the 'tribunal of history', as each age in succession is judged by and appropriated into the hard project of freedom's actualization (see note 32).

Finally, there must be an *end* of history: if only new principles constantly emerged, world history would have no purpose leading to a goal. But religion and reason recognize a goal because they are seeking what is genuinely true, what subsists in and for itself and is not merely transient. The religious final end is expressed as follows: 'that human beings should attain eternal peace, that they should be sanctified'. This goal is proper for the individual, but it does not concern us in the here and now because it represents a future, otherworldly end. Thus Hegel continues: 'What constitutes the way to the goal is no mere means but directly the absolute thing-that-history-is-about, the absolute history in which individuals are only single moments'. The thing-that-history-is-about, expressed religiously, is 'the glorification and honor of God'.

> Spirit's absolute is the absolute of everything, the divine being. Spirit's purpose, its absolute drive, is thus to gain a consciousness of this being such that it is known as the one and only actual and true being through which everything happens and proceeds—to know that everything must be arranged, and is actually arranged, in accord with it, and therefore that it is the power that guided and guides the course of world history, the power that rules and has ruled it.... The individual spirit has its glory in glorifying God. This is not its particular honor; rather its honor comes from knowing that its self-feeling is the substantial consciousness of God, that its action is to the honor and glory of God, the absolute. In this knowledge the individual spirit has attained its truth and freedom.

Thus the end is achieved not in some timeless eternity or chronological future, but in every temporal *now* when spirit comes to this recognition of God. How it is that the divine power guides and rules the world is addressed in the final subsection of this part of the Introduction.

Human *passions* are the instrument for the rule, power, and dominion of the divine idea. Passions are what make each person what he or she is, and in history we have before us a 'colorful din' of passions. The connection between the idea and the passions has two aspects: first, it is found

intrinsically in the concept, in the idea itself; second, the question concerns its actual workings. As for the *idea* itself, we recall what has been said about the Trinity. Initially, the idea is what posits itself as over against itself and makes this ideal object its own: this is the eternal life of God within itself, before the creation of the world; it is the logical nexus and does not yet have the mode of reality. Then the idea goes forth from itself into antithesis, positing distinctions on their own account, positing the finite other, whose extremity of freedom reflects the divine freedom.

This is the point at which the passions come into play; they are the means by which the idea is actualized. Individuals who achieve harmony and reconciliation with the idea are called 'happy'. But 'world history is not a soil of happiness; in history the periods of happiness are blank pages, for the object of history is, at least, change'. In history there may be satisfaction—the satisfaction of universal purposes that transcend individual desires—but not happiness, at least not for world-historical individuals. Thus world history is principally a realm of conflict, and this conflict is embodied by the great historical figures, the 'heroes', who grasp the new universal that is coming on the scene and turn it to their purposes. They are perspicacious, ahead of their times, perceiving the new thing that needs to be done. 'They desire and do what is correct and right, although what they do appears to be... their own passion, their own free will because others do not yet know it.'[40] The necessity of the idea becomes ethical only through the passion of historical human beings. Because the great figures 'are driven unresistingly to do what they do, they are satisfied. They have not been happy; for their work has perhaps become bitter to them, or at the moment they achieved their goal they have died or were murdered or exiled.... Their entire life was a sacrifice.' This is the tragic dimension of world history. In this section Hegel discusses principally the negative aspect of the connection between the idea and passions—the way in which the idea uses the passions against their own immediate ends to achieve a higher end.

The affirmative aspect of the connection appears in the next section, for it is *the state* that unifies the idea and the subjective will in the form of a rational, ethical whole. The state as such is 'the idea as human freedom'.

40. There are also, presumably, antiheroes, world-historical criminals, who embrace what is utterly evil, demonic, and destructive. At least Hegel's theory does not rule this out. Antiheroes ultimately find their ends and means used against them and are destroyed by them.

The Nature of the State

World history is the history of states, not of individuals. Art, religion, scientific knowledge, and other cultural products are comprehended within the state. The nature of the state is that in it freedom becomes objective to itself and does not simply remain subjective free will. The state is an *ethical whole*, not an abstraction over against individuals but that in which individuals live; it is an organism in which everything is end and means simultaneously. In a formulation subject to misinterpretation, Hegel says that the state, as the actualization of freedom, 'is the idea as it is present on earth'; this is not a deification of the state but an indication of its critical role in the freedom project. The family also is an ethical whole, but in the family love is the means by which individuals relate to one another. The ethical whole of the family is subsumed under that of the state, and in the state the relationship of individuals is one of citizenship and laws.

Hegel explores three aspects of the nature of the state as the actualization of freedom: its *constitution* (its inner nature), its relationship to the *spiritual world* (religion, art, science, and culture), and its relationship to the *physical world* (geography and climate) (see notes 43, 47). 'Constitution' (*Verfassung*) refers to the principles by which a system of government is organized; it can assume a written form, but such is not necessary. Since 'the best and most complete state is the one in which the greatest degree of freedom prevails', the question becomes which type of constitution promotes the greatest degree of freedom. By 'freedom' we do not mean subjective free will (*Willkür*), for such a view presupposes that the government and the people (as individuals) constitute two sides that must be balanced and limited. There is 'something malignant' in this notion, for the idea of the state is precisely that of an organic union between the universal and the particular, the government and the people.

Three forms of constitution are distinguished, depending on how this union is construed: compulsory unity, a loose unity in which the union itself is a secondary matter, and a unity in which 'the spheres, subsisting independently, find their efficacy only in the production of the universal'. These translate into three great world-historical epochs: the Oriental empires (massive, undivided, substantial unity), the Greek and Roman empires (democracy and aristocracy), and the modern European or Germanic world. The latter represents a 'second monarchy' (see note 46), by which Hegel means not an absolute monarchy but a constitutional monarchy in which the sovereign has limited though important powers *vis-à-vis* the

executive branch, the representative assembly, and the courts. These constitutions succeed one another in history in such a way that the earlier principles are subsumed in the later ones. Hegel's idea of a constitutional monarchy is similar to a parliamentary system with a head of state, a president or sovereign, who has symbolic or representative but not executive power. For him, of course, the head of state is not elected but hereditary, and the choice of delegates in the assembly is made by 'corporations' and social groups ('estates') rather than by direct vote.[41]

Under the category of the relationship of the state to spiritual matters, Hegel discusses first a content that is *the universal in and for itself*, the infinite. This content is the concern of religion, art, and speculative science or philosophy. The center point of this knowledge is *religion*, and in this respect art and science can be viewed as 'forms and aspects' of religion. In a repudiation of Kant, Hegel says that 'the human being is infinite in cognizing, limited in willing'. The instrument of cognizing, reason (*Vernunft*) or thought (consciousness and self-consciousness), constitutes the openness of the human being to the universal and humanity's very participation in the universal. Thus Christianity reveals that 'God is the unity of human and divine nature' and that 'the unity... of the divine and the human is the genuine idea of religion', whereas the understanding (*Verstand*) makes the divine idea into an abstraction, a being beyond the human against which humans futilely butt their heads. Such an analysis yields two types of religion: a religion of *separation* (Judaism, Persian and Islamic dualism) and a religion of *unity* (Hindu incarnation, Greek art, and Christian theology where the speculative truth of divine-human unity is grasped). Religion sets forth the principle of the state in its truth, and in this respect it is rightly said that 'the state rests on religion'. The state as a determination of the divine nature itself—that aspect of the divine that is present on earth as ethical freedom—derives from religion and does not supersede it.

The finite aspects of human culture represent the real as opposed to the ideal sphere of the state: customs and practices, law, property, family and marriage, satisfaction of needs, empirical sciences. These too are a subject of world history.

41. See *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §§ 275–319; and *Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818*, transcribed by Peter Wannenman, ed. the Staff of the Hegel Archives with an Introduction by Otto Pöggeler, tr. J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), §§ 127–58.

The third aspect of the nature of the state is its relationship to the *physical world*. Here it is most important to appreciate, in Hegel's conception, the systematic position of the state in its external natural setting, that is, its *geography* (see note 55). As Hegel himself remarks, 'world history is spirit in the element of worldliness; thus we must also recognize the natural and the corporeal in it. The natural and the spiritual form one shape, and this is history.' Thus the one shape of history includes an essential natural dimension, and Hegel describes in detail how geography and climate affect the formation of human cultures, east and west, north and south. He was quite familiar with the science of geography in the early nineteenth century, and he put this knowledge to good effect.

However, Hegel's conception of nature, while organic (a hierarchy of related levels), is almost entirely static. He refers to the fact that 'in the north the earth is continental in scope, with a wide breast, while in the south the shapes taper into points'. He would have been astonished to learn that this 'wide breast' was once part of a super-continent, Pangaea, that for millions of years the continents have drifted back and forth, and that for just as long natural species have been evolving. For him the present arrangement of the 'old world'—three continents positioned around the Mediterranean Sea, which both sunders them and facilitates communication—is a necessary relationship and constitutes a 'rational totality'. However, in nature everything is as fluid as in human history (over a much longer scale of time), and the extension of history to nature might be viewed as simply an extension of Hegel's fundamental conception. But 'natural history' is fundamentally different from human history, which is a history of spirit, consciousness, and freedom—categories that do not apply to nature.

For one who thinks so obviously from a Western and Eurocentric perspective, Hegel devotes enormous attention to Asia. In part this focus reflects the exhilaration of new discovery, but in part too it reflects the fact that human culture arose in Asia before it did in Europe. Hegel would have been surprised to learn that *homo sapiens* first appeared in Africa, but he is certainly correct that states first appeared in Asia, and his *Weltgeschichte* is a history of states. We cannot go back further in history than written documents will take us, and such documents are the product of states. Hegel is always interested in transitions; however, the first transition encountered by history is not from nature to spirit (that transition is buried in prehistorical depths) but from tribal and family life ('patriarchy') to the state and its institutions. This transition occurred in Asia and gradually spread to the West.

The section on the state and geography is quite lengthy; we believe that readers will find it to be of interest and need no further guidance.

The Division of World History

World history unfolds through four (or five)[42] stages, which are compared with stages in the life of the human being: the phylogenetic replicates the ontogenetic and vice versa. We have to begin, claims Hegel, where the state is still internally oppositionless, that is, where subjectivity has not yet come into its own. This represents an immediate form of ethical life and constitutes the *infancy* or *childhood* of history. Here the state is based on patriarchal family relationships, and it appears historically as the Oriental empires, each with a single ruler or absolute principle.

The second shape is the *boyhood* of the world in which the states are in a constant tussle with each other and with themselves (the Egyptians, for example, are 'impulsive boys'). However, conflict and struggle cause a self-concentration into individuality, which grows into the age of *youth*; here Greece comes into prominence. This is the realm of beautiful freedom and of ethical unity as individual personality; but it is fragile and momentary: the Greeks 'intuited' their unity, whereas the Romans 'reflected' it.

With the Romans we enter upon the *adulthood* of life with its demanding labor and the sacrifice of individuality to universality. An empire such as the Roman, in which subjectivity is outwardly reconciled with substance and individuals are subjugated to abstract universality, seems to be eternal. But, notes Hegel, its successor, the Holy Roman Empire, expired in 1806 with the renunciation of the imperial title by the last of the Habsburgs to hold it. The transition to the next principle (a transition that occurred over several centuries) is to be seen as the internal struggle between particular subjectivity and abstract universality. The struggle must end with the victory of subjective singularity, and the latter assumes the form of spiritual reconciliation. Now a spiritual realm (the church) stands over against the worldly one (the state).

At this point the fourth stage is attained, that of *old age*. This is the realm of the Germanic or European peoples,[43] in which the enormous antithesis between the spiritual and the worldly realms is resolved. The principle of this age is free spirit subsisting for itself, the unity of subjective and objective truth, the Christian principle. But at first the reconciliation is only implicit (the Reformation and Protestantism); it must realize itself in the world through

42. The variation depends on whether 'boyhood' is counted as a separate stage.

43. Hegel believed that the so-called Germanic principle pervaded most of Europe; thus he used the terms as roughly equivalent. See n. 79.

a process of secularization that constitutes modernity. 'Spirituality and freedom have, and find, their concept and their rationality in worldliness.'

In a brief final summary the stages are reduced to three: the substantial immediacy of ethical life (the Oriental world), the antithesis of subjectivity and abstract universality (the Greek and Roman worlds), and the unity of subjectivity with universality (the Germanic world). The process of overcoming the antithesis constitutes the great work of world history. Stated so baldly, the principle has little meaning; but Hegel puts flesh on these bones.

The Course of World History

The Oriental World

We begin with the East, where the dawn of spirit occurs, while its setting or 'descent into itself' happens in the West.[44] Our cultural-historical analysis also moves from East to West: we start with China; turn next to India and its rivers, the Ganges and the Indus; then move on to the Middle East, Persia, the Tigris and the Euphrates. Finally, after a detour through North Africa (Egypt), we continue on a westerly course to Greece, Rome, and Europe. Temporal and geographical co-ordinates are synchronized; spirit moves through time from East to West. This is the metanarrative on which Hegel plots world history. The future of the plot remains open, with hints of the rise of America and Russia.

China

Hegel, who engages in a fundamental way with China,[45] notes that China has astonished Europeans ever since it became known. It is self-contained, has reached a high level of culture independently of foreign ties, and is the only world empire that has lasted from the most ancient times up to the present day. It is vast in expanse with a very large population; its government is well-regulated, just, benevolent, and wise; and it has written documents that go back thousands of years. But the principle of this empire has never changed, nor has an alien principle ever been imposed on it, so in this sense it has no history; everything is forever the same.

Each people has original books that contain its myths and ancient traditions. Homer is such a book for the Greeks, as the Bible is for us. The Chinese named such books *Jing*—the principal ones being the *Yi-jing* and

44. See n. 1 of The Oriental World/China.
45. See n. 2 on Hegel's sources.

the *Shu-jing*. The latter was translated into French by missionaries, so in Hegel's day it was accessible to those who did not read Chinese. It begins its narrative with Yao of the Xia dynasty in the third millennium before Christ (see note 15) and contains the work of court historians. Prior to these written documents, history disappears into unrecorded time.[46]

Hegel refers to 'Fo, a divine figure, whom people in eastern India call Buddha'. Distinct from him is Fo-hi or Fu-hi (Fuxi), to whom the invention of the Gua is attributed. The Gua consist of certain arrangements of lines, and meditation on these lines is found in the *Yi-jing*. The straight line is the simple material from which all things are constituted, and the broken line is the distinction of this simplicity. Various combinations of these lines represent the speculative philosophy of China.

As to the ancient history of China, separate warring kingdoms were eventually unified under a single emperor. What is 'factually historical' commences with Yu (or Yao) of the Xia dynasty in 2201 BC (see note 31). Hegel is struck by the coincidence of this date with the historical beginnings of other empires, for all of which he gives precise years: Egypt (2207), Assyria (2221), and India (2204). Struggles with river flooding and the maintenance of dikes for rice cultivation were major preoccupations of the Chinese from the beginning. China was conquered twice by Mongols and Tatars, but was not long under their dominion. The Great Wall was built to keep out the Manchu-Tatars but it did not succeed. The Manchu emperors were among the best, and under them China reached its greatest extent, ranging as far as the Caspian Sea and Siberia.

The Chinese state is similar to European institutions in its ethical life and art. But its principle rests wholly on patriarchal or family relationships. Hegel identifies several characteristics of the latter. First, strict rules and instructions govern all family relationships: children have a total duty to parents; marriage is monogamous but husbands may own concubines; the father alone has possessions while children have none; families must honor their ancestors. Second, the entire state rests on the person of the emperor and his hierarchy of officials, who control everything in accord with strict moral codes and laws as determined by the emperor and overseen by the mandarins. Third, there are no castes and no aristocracy of birth or wealth among citizens. At one time state public property was apportioned to patresfamilias, but private property now exists with laws governing

46. The science of archaeology was just getting under way in Hegel's time and prior to the 19th cent. was confined principally to Greek and Roman civilization.

inheritance. Anyone can sell himself as a slave, and parents can sell children; women, children, and concubines of criminals can be enslaved.

In the patriarchal principle, the legal sphere is not separated from the moral aspect, so that no internal moral autonomy exists. Rather, detailed regulations govern all aspects of life, the violation of which incurs very strict punishment. The government that issues such legislation takes the place of one's own inner being, and by doing so the principle of subjective freedom is annulled. This freedom, this intangible sphere of inwardness, respect for this inviolable zone, are essential to the European principle but lacking here. Thus, when a crime is committed, the entire family undergoes punishment, which is totally contrary to the recognition of individual moral responsibility. Goods can be confiscated, and corporal punishment such as flogging is common. Hegel remarks that the Chinese have been governed as an 'underage people', which fosters an ethics of dependency and the principle of vengeance.

In ancient times the Chinese were famous for their scientific knowledge, but, like everything else, it has been controlled by the emperors and the court, so that the free soil of inwardness on which alone intellect flourishes is lacking. Nonetheless, the Chinese did make great strides in particular sciences such as physics (the magnet and compass), astronomy, the circulation of fluids, and mechanical devices for calculating (they use a binary rather than a decimal system). Their written language is hieroglyphic, not the expression of sounds by letters of the alphabet, and it is extremely complicated, requiring the learning of many thousands of characters and their combinations; but the spoken language is meager and monosyllabic.

The Chinese are skilled in the mechanical arts but lack the creative power of spirit. They make beautiful landscape paintings and portraits, which are lacking, however, in subtlety of light and shadow. They excel at horticulture and gardens.

Hegel concludes with a discussion of Chinese religion,[47] noting that missionary reports (our principal source) are suspect because the missionaries' own religion is an obstacle to fair reporting. The ancient patriarchal religion is simply that humans pray to God as the ruler of earth and heaven—God who is one, eternal, benevolent, and just, rewarding goodness

47. Hegel treats the Oriental religions for the first time in a significant way in his 1824 philosophy of religion lectures. Here he discusses the religions of China, India, Persia, and Egypt, all under the general rubric of the religion of nature. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 233–381. Religion, as we have already seen, is also a central topic of the present lectures.

and punishing evil. In its abstractness this religion excludes the richness and profundity of nature and spirit. They call their supreme being 'Tian' or heaven, but they do not simply worship nature. 'No people can be said to have taken what is simply sensible to be the divine, since it is necessarily spirit's nature not to stop short with its natural aspect, but to proceed to something inward. All pure religions involve a metaphorical transposition from the sensible into thought.' With thought, conceptions of the universal arise, but here the universal lacks determinacy. The emperor is called 'son of heaven', and he alone presents offerings on behalf of his people during the four seasonal festivals. The religion is not exclusive, so Jews, Muslims, and Christians are accepted so long as they do not incite rebellion. The Chinese also revere 'Shen' or spirits, similar to Greek dryads, the souls of natural things, arranged in hierarchical ranks. Temples to the Shen are found everywhere, and superstition subjugates the inner spirit of the people.

Particular sects are found, one of which is that of Lao-Tse (Laozi). By withdrawing into self through study, the more profound devotees become Shen themselves through strenuous discipline, initiating an elevation of human beings to the divine. According to Lamaism, 'the emperor's private religion', divinity has its concrete existence in a living human being. Such a belief 'is linked to the religion of the Buddha'. The religion of Fo (which may or may not be the same as that of Buddha) holds to metempsychosis, according to which all shapes (humans, stars, etc.) are only forms or revelations of the One, the absolute. Followers of this religion locate what is supreme in nothingness; they elevate themselves by renunciation of all sensation, seeking utter emptiness. From these compressed remarks, we recognize the confusion and misinformation in Hegel's early characterization of Chinese religion.

India

Hegel engaged with India for the first time in a significant way in these lectures. German scholars had confined themselves to the language, art, religion, and philosophy of India and had arrived at a romantic, idealizing interpretation. Hegel relied on the English sources because they acquired their information from first-hand experience, but he also adopted the largely negative judgment formed by the British. He was blind to their bias because it confirmed his own suspicions not only about moral and philosophical issues but also about the inability of the Indians to organize life politically (and for Hegel political organization is the actual bearer of history).

Whereas the Chinese remained cut off, India 'has been receptive toward the rest of the world' and 'appears as an effective link in the chain of world history.... It has been a source of wisdom, science, and culture, as well as of natural treasures.' Thus all nations have beaten a path to India and all have attempted to acquire a foothold there.

Hegel begins with some general remarks about the 'principle' of India. This is a land of *dreaming fantasy* in which rationality, morality, and subjectivity are nullified. It is also a land of extremes—oscillating between a wild, sensuous imagination and a totally inanimate abstraction of inwardness. It lacks a history in the sense of chronological records of actual events. It advances on the Chinese in that the determinacy that hitherto had been posited externally becomes inward, but its idealism is one of sheer imagination devoid of reason and freedom. It allows no free being-for-self of subjects, and no distance between subject and object. Its fundamental intuition is that of an absolute substantiality that constitutes the essence of all things. This is not a pantheism of thought (as with Spinoza) but a pantheism of representation, which imports sensible material directly into the universal. 'The divine is grasped in finite form, the finite spun out extravagantly.'[48] This rendering of God in sensuous form can have two meanings. In the first, that of Hinduism proper, the representation of unity is universal, and the entire sensible realm, without exception, is divinized. In the second, that of Buddhism or Lamaism, the rendering of God concentrates to 'an immediately present focal point'.

The discussion turns next to 'the region of India'. Its main features are the river basins of the Ganges and the Indus, with mountains to the north and west. The name 'Indian' derives from the Indus River, but it is not known whether the people called themselves 'Indians' or even had a common name for themselves. Alexander the Great came as far as the Indus, and the British in turn arrived some twenty-one hundred years later (at Delhi). In India, everything necessary for a state is lacking, above all the principle of freedom; in China the state is the totality, but in India there is just a people without a state and without an ethical life. The government is an unprincipled, lawless despotism. Asia as a whole is the breeding ground of despotism, and if the ruler is evil, despotism becomes tyranny. The Indians are nonetheless a

48. Somewhat later in this discussion Hegel distinguishes between 'the One', Brahman, which is beyond all concept and representation and is invisible, eternal, omnipresent, and omnipotent, and the representation of this One in numerous gods, which are worshiped in specific sensual shapes. So his summary at this point seems unbalanced.

people of ancient culture because the fertility of the river valleys made for an easy existence and from early times produced a communal life.

Hegel devotes considerable attention to the system of castes, which correspond to four occupations that are found in every society in one form or another. These are the intellectual class (priests, scholars, scientists), the practical class (government and military leaders), the manufacturing and agricultural class, and laborers and servants; to these is appended (in India) a fifth, ignoble caste. The distinctive feature about India is that these become natural distinctions, based on birth, and cannot be chosen freely. They entirely dominate Hindu life and become a permanent, despotic arrangement in which the highest group (the Brāhmans) assumes the status of divinity while the lowest (the Pariahs or Chandalas, see note 8) is reduced to subhuman status. Persons who are neglectful of their duties can become outcastes and lose all legal protections. Detailed regulations governing the castes are found in the *Laws of Manu*. Hegel notes in particular the degraded status assigned to women, who are the property of their fathers and husbands. Human life in general has no inherent ethical value, and without free will there can be no proper political life, no freedom of a political state, but only capricious despotism.

In Hegel's view, Hindu religion is composed of two extremes: on the one hand a singular absolute substance, Brahman, into which everything vanishes, and on the other hand an indeterminate multiplicity of sensuous images (natural phenomena, animals, deities) and a cultus that is an 'unbridled, licentious sensuality' (young women placed in the temple as sexual objects, and so on). The Hindus do have worthy views of the one substance: it is beyond all conception and understanding and is invisible, eternal, omnipotent, and omniscient; but it lacks consciousness, and thus self-consciousness cannot know itself in relating to it. Renunciation is the supreme virtue, a self-mortification even unto death; this is a liberation that has a merely negative significance.

We have defined the Hindu principle as withdrawal from self and complete lack of freedom in the positive sense. Without self and freedom, nothing good is possible: the state, purpose, rational and ethical life. The political condition as the Europeans found it was a host of principalities ruled by Muslim and Hindu dynasties. No laws governed their succession, so the history of the Indian realm is a ceaseless interplay of uprisings, conspiracies, violence, and brutal episodes. Only in their epic poems are there traces of an earlier splendor, which proves to be a fantasy world, although conditions flourished under a few individual kingdoms. The entire

ethical situation is determined by the caste distinctions that seem to have been in place already at the time of Alexander the Great. The Hindus have no historical perspective and are incapable of historiography; everything for them blurs into extravagant images lacking intelligibility. Because they have no subjective sense of history, they have no objective sense either.

Where does India stand in the framework of world history? Whereas China as the patriarchal whole has oneness as its basic characteristic, the Indian principle is the second element of the idea, that of distinction. Both are necessary, and in this sense India represents a world-historical advance. Moreover, distinction and difference must go outward, and thus India is connected with the rest of the world, while China remains isolated. India has always been an object of desire, especially by peoples of the West. The ancient Indian language, Sanskrit, lies at the basis of all the Indo-European languages (a recent discovery in Hegel's time), and this fact indicates an ancient and widespread dispersal of tribes from India and Persia.

The section on India ends with a discussion of Buddhism and Lamaism. In note 106 we indicate the reasons for Hegel's limited and unsuccessful treatment of the most widespread and influential of Asian religions. Confusion abounds in Hegel's discussion of the historical circumstances of Buddha, who is the 'other' to Brahmā and Brahman. Buddhism is a more humane religion than Hinduism, and the Buddhist's God is a living human being. Buddha attained nirvana, 'a condition of supreme abstraction in which spirit was immersed within itself', a condition of bliss. While Buddha was a historical figure, the lamas are human beings who are 'revered as God present today'; when one lama dies, the new one is found in an infant selected by priests. Thus a chain of living incarnations of God continues uninterruptedly.

Persia

Ancient Persia was much more involved in the external connections of world history than were China and India; but, while the Chinese and Indian worlds are still contemporaneous with us, the Persian world has long vanished. In Persia we find a true *empire* comprised of many diverse peoples, extending from the Indus River to the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Ethnic groups within the empire persisted in their autonomy and yet were dependent on a point of unity that held them in equilibrium. Thus the principle of the Persian Empire is the combination of the preceding principles, exemplifying both a unification of the whole (the Chinese principle) and the distinction of peoples (the Indian). In Hegel's treatment, Persia is composed of four main

ethnic and geographical divisions: the Zend people in Bactria, the Assyrian and Babylonian peoples, Media or Persia proper, and Syria (see note 5).

Anquetil du Perron's discovery and publication of the ancient religious book of the Zend people, the Zend-Avesta, introduces us to the injunctions of Zoroaster and the religion of the ancient Persians, which is still found today in isolated clusters. Hegel names this religion the 'religion of light', for light involves the higher, spiritual element worshiped by the Persians. This is a nature worship but not an idolatry of natural objects. Light is 'this universal, simple, physical essence that is pure like thought'. In the intuition of light, 'the soul goes within itself and thus also makes the object seen within itself; this being-within-itself of the pure object, of the light, is then immediately thought, or the spiritual as such'. But because of light's sensible nature, 'free thought is not yet the free foundation'. Directly opposite to light is darkness, the great antithesis in Persian religion, its dualism—the absolute antithesis of good and evil, light and darkness, Ormazd and Ahriman. Hegel considers this dualism to be superior to the absolute pantheism of the Hindus, but it is still the natural mode of expressing opposition. The unity from which the two sides originate is uncreated time, which itself is only an abstract unity. Profound metaphysical characteristics adhere to Ormazd: he is not fire as such but the fluidity of fire; his light is the excellence of all creation; he is love, the basic seed of all good, the gift of knowledge, the ground of actuality and possibility, the source of everything living. One serves Ormazd and reveres light by planting trees and growing crops, by avoiding impurity, by obeying the laws, and by partaking of Hom, a plant juice that is consumed along with unleavened bread—a ritual that (says Hegel) mirrors our Christian sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

The wealthier part of the empire is on the western side, namely Babylonia and Assyria in the river region of the Euphrates and the Tigris. Here we find agricultural and city life displacing nomadic existence. We know little about the spiritual customs other than that the worship of nature is universal. Hegel makes a point about the subordinate status of women (each woman of Babylon had to sit in the temple and offer herself once to a stranger, and maidens were married annually by auction). It is not a general Oriental practice that women should have a voice in the choice of a husband; this is found only later in Europe. Communal, not individual, values prevail.

Hegel turns next to Persia proper, for which he is dependent on Greek and Jewish sources and Persian epic poems such as the *Shahnameh* of Firdawsi. Cyrus, a Persian from the house of the Achaemenids and related to the Median royal line, consolidated the empire in the sixth century BC, and

through a series of wars became the most powerful ruler in the world. The empire he created was a loose union of peoples who were allowed to retain their own characteristics and individual identity. This allowance for individuality was one of the great features of Cyrus, who was a brutal conqueror but magnanimous in victory. 'The Persian, the worshiper of the light, of purity, hovers tolerantly over the whole, free of animosity and hostile particularity.' The successors of Cyrus continued this policy, but a thousand years later there appeared the fanaticism of Islam, which produced the complete opposite, the destruction of all differences.

Under 'Syria' Hegel considers the Semitic peoples who lived along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Whereas Central Asian peoples worshiped nature as a power over them, the Phoenicians conquered the most savage of natural powers, the sea, and used it to colonize and to engage in extensive commerce.[49] The religion of Astarte and Adonis infuses a higher spiritual element. Adonis both dies and is reborn, so that anguish and suffering are not devalued as in Hinduism but affirmed as an essential element of human experience, and indeed of the deity's experience. Suffering is discovery of the negative, but in it is contained the infinite affirmation, the sense of self, the positive factor. Here we find anticipations of Hegel's treatment of the so-called 'religion of anguish' in the 1831 philosophy of religion lectures (see note 89).

Finally, Hegel turns to the Jewish religion. Israel's significance at this stage in history is not in its being an independent state, and thus Israel does not constitute its own realm of world history, but its religion is far advanced over others of the Persian Empire. Its God is grasped purely as thought: in Israel the light of the Persians has been completely spiritualized and has blossomed as thought. Thus human beings can relate themselves positively to this object and find themselves in it. 'The moment of the overturning of the Oriental principle commences at this point, the moment of the changeover from nature to spirit.' But this religion has not yet given universality to its principle; it is still bound to locality, to the Jewish people alone. Its thought is abstract, not yet concrete. But a new self-consciousness has emerged and new tasks are posed. Before turning to Greece, we must examine Egypt 'as the [first] land to which is relegated the carrying out of this task'. We note here that the connections Hegel is pursuing are not historical but typological and philosophical. There is no direct line of influence from Persian to Jewish

49. The Phoenicians are also credited with the invention of the alphabet, but Hegel does not mention it here. He alludes to it, however, in his discussion of Greece (below, p. 376).

to Egyptian and Greek religion, but rather stages in the consciousness of spirit.

Egypt

Egypt occupies an intermediary position between the Oriental and Western worlds: it was conquered by the Persians under Cambyses, its traditions are indigenous to North Africa, and it had a powerful effect on the Greeks. It addresses but does not resolve the 'task' of liberating spirit from its natural and animal forms; rather everything for it remains an enigma (*Rätsel*). The symbol of the enigma, and of Egypt itself, 'is the sphinx, this twofold figure, half animal and half human, and indeed female. It symbolizes the human spirit that tears itself away from the animal domain, that frees itself from the animal and casts its gaze about but has not yet completely grasped itself, is not yet free, does not yet stand on its own two feet.' Moreover, 'the language of Egypt is still hieroglyphic; it is not yet the word itself, not yet script'.[50] We lack a literature, and our knowledge of how they thought is dependent on ancient sources, principally Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus.

Their priests told Herodotus that the Egyptians were the first human beings, and indeed their civilization is very ancient, with communal life first appearing in the upper Nile valley, principally at Thebes. Later, commercial activity shifted into central Egypt (Memphis) and then the delta (Sais). Egypt's geographical locale is the long and narrow Nile valley, which is subject to flooding twice a year. Floods are the only source of water for agriculture, and Egyptians mastered the art of irrigation. Herodotus claimed that they were the most rational of all the peoples he had observed, with their well-ordered society and monumental achievements, but that they do all things the opposite from how other peoples do them (e.g. men attend to household matters whereas women engage in external affairs and thus are not in seclusion).

It would seem that this tranquil people must have a comparably tranquil religion.[51] Instead we find 'an ardent, active, laboring spirit, ... a people aglow and afire', pressing toward an 'objectification within itself that, however, does not attain the free self-consciousness of spirit. There is still an iron band around the eyes of spirit.' Egypt remains within the bounds of a nature religion for which everything is a symbol of something else. The

50. Hegel was unaware that in 1821 a beginning had been made in deciphering the Rosetta Stone.

51. See the discussion of Egyptian religion, the 'religion of the enigma', in Hegel's 1824 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 358–81.

principal symbols are the sun (Osiris) and the earth and moon (Isis). Osiris and Isis rule in a cyclical process that is related to the Nile: fertility and growth are followed by drought and desolation. Osiris is buried in the earth and becomes lord of the dead before he is reborn in the next cycle.

Animal worship plays a principal role in Egyptian religion. The incomprehensibility of the divine appears in the soul of the animal, its vitality and intelligence, which remain impenetrable for humans. With a truly spiritual religion, the incomprehensibility vanishes, for spirit is self-understanding, self-transparency, presence to self and freedom. The mystery of the divine remains concealed in animal life, and this is why, for example, the flight of birds could serve as an oracle for the Greeks. The Egyptians worshiped Apis and other oxen as well as cats, ibises, and crocodiles. They read the signs of the dung beetle and the scarab. Respect for living things is found among all ancient peoples, for whom truth is something 'over there', something beyond human spirit. At the same time, the Egyptians were resistant to this unselfconscious state and downgraded animal vitality to a symbol of something else. They accomplished this by juxtaposing animal figures, for example, a snake with the head of a bull or ram, or a lion's body with a crocodile's tail and a ram's head. The juxtaposition signals the symbolic nature of the figures. More explicit are animal bodies reduced to sphinxes from which a human head emerges. But the appropriate sensible figure of the spiritual, as the Greeks discovered, is the human figure, not a hybrid.

Egypt knows only the struggle of spirit to free itself from nature. The principle of this 'African spirit... is precisely to endure such harshness and to overcome it, whereas the Indians take their own lives'. This spirit expresses itself in the great labor that produced wondrous works of art and architecture—works that we still admire after three thousand years. In higher religions art is subordinate, but in Egypt art is the necessary means of self-representation. Its medium cannot be intellectual but rather the hardest of natural materials, stone, into which are carved hieroglyphs and sculptures, and from which are constructed the most massive structures, requiring an advanced knowledge of mechanics. Hegel then writes:

> With other peoples, the work of their effort is subjugation or domination of other peoples. The vast and abundant realm of the Egyptians' deeds is, in contrast, their works of art. Works of annihilation endure in memory, but we still possess the [actual] works of the Egyptians, though only in ruins. One hundred thousand men were engaged for ten years in the Trojan War, and what they accomplished, the endeavor of the Trojan War, was the devastation of Troy. The chief result is the futility of both sides, of the besieged and the besiegers. What the Egyptians presented, and left behind them, is a far loftier achievement, a positive one that, albeit in ruins, is

still something more or less indestructible and enduring. These are works of the greatest kind.

This statement not only is a tribute to the Egyptians but also offers a rare glimpse into Hegel's attitude about the incessant warfare that has plagued human civilization from the outset. The suffering and devastation of war represent a gigantic exercise in futility, which can only be described as tragic and makes of history a 'slaughterhouse'. Hegel views warfare as something tragically inevitable until such time that spirit has advanced beyond this primitive mode of competition.

A novel aspect of the work of the Egyptians is their dedication to the dead and to the underworld in particular, because the souls of mummified bodies live on. Theirs is not a true belief in the immortality of the soul, which is something alien to the Oriental character. Immortality of the soul means that the inwardness represented by the soul is infinite of itself. The Egyptians did not know 'that spirit has a higher, eternal purpose, and that, reflected within itself, spirit is inherently infinite'. For them the dead are given a continuation by embalming, whereas with true immortality the preservation of the body is completely nonessential. The Egyptian orientation is to vitality in the present, to the particularities of life's sensual pleasures. Their energy is not yet directed to the universal, and spirit does not yet come to be *for* itself, although it is struggling toward it. 'That this particularity is also explicitly ideal is what must now come forward as the joyous, free, cheerful spirit, and this is the spirit of Greece.'

The transition to Greece is one of the most critical of the *Weltgeschichte*. Hegel quotes Herodotus to the effect that 'the Egyptians are impulsive boys who lack the ideality of youths and who will become youths only by means of the ideal form'—an incorrect citation, but one that fits Hegel's stages in the maturation of spirit. Spirit must break free from the self-enclosed night of nature; the Egyptians are absorbed in this labor, but the Greeks complete it. The fruit borne by the goddess at Sais is, according to the Greeks, the sun, Helios. This sun is the Greek spirit, or light, and Apollo is the god of light. At his chief temple are inscribed the words, 'Human being, know thyself!' 'This knowledge is what is primary, and the labor of the world, the striving of every religion, ascends to it; there is no inscription more sublime than this.' The Oriental principle must give way to self-knowledge, which in turn requires political freedom.

Over against Greece stood Persia. The Persian intuition of light as the principle of unity was authentic, but unity was not interconnected organically with the elements of particularity. In Greece an authentic integration

came about through the deepening of spirit within itself, whereas Persia sank back into Asian opulence and military dominance. Greece and Persia were drawn into an inevitable conflict, one in which Greece suffered a near-death experience but ultimately triumphed.

The Greek World

The world spirit now moves beyond childhood to the age of youth, and it finds its home in Greece. Two youths exemplify the spirit of Greece: the first is Achilles, the poetic creation of Homer, who is the great literary source for the intuition of the Greek people; and the second is Alexander the Great, the actual youth, whose conquest of the East brought the age of youth to its end. It is the *concept* of youthfulness that is important for Hegel, its vitality and immaturity, its enthusiasm for life combined with an inability to achieve universal goals. Greece offers a concrete yet sensuous spiritual vitality, a spirituality that still has sensuous presence and that highlights the beautiful human form, the individual human being. 'The Greek world has as its foundation the Oriental world; it starts out from the divinity of nature but reconstructs it, giving it spirituality as its inner soul.'

The Periods of Greek History

The three periods that mark the history of the Greek people are especially clear in the case of the Greeks because they are the first to enter into the concrete nexus of world history. The periods are: the beginning; a retrospective contact with an earlier world-historical people (for the Greeks, the Persians); and a prospective contact with a later empire (the Romans). The first period is the first formation of a people up to a condition of sufficient maturity that it can come into contact with the people that precedes it. Here a struggle occurs between indigenous and alien elements, and when they have been unified a people's distinctive vigor is marshaled. The second period is that of a people's triumph. But when this people turns too much to external relations and accomplishments, it lets internal matters slip and falls into disunity and conflict; it disintegrates into a real and an ideal existence, the latter being the realm of critical thought. So the seeds of destruction are planted precisely at the point of triumph, and the destruction is wrought partly by thought. The third period is that of decline and fall, which culminates in contact with the next world-historical people, a people called upon to construct a higher stage of the *Weltgeist*. We find these three

periods replicated in the history of the Roman and Germanic peoples, but with distinctive twists in each case.

The geographical characteristics of Greece (its islands, rugged coastlines, interior mountains, and dependence on the sea for connection) are such as to lend themselves to the creation of a spirit of 'self-subsistent individuality', which can be unified not by a beneficent (or despotic) patriarchy but only by law and spiritual custom.

The Origins of the Spirit of the Greek People

This spirit, free and beautiful, could emerge only gradually out of the mixture of heterogeneous elements. Some of the original tribes and peoples were entirely non-Greek, and we cannot say with certainty which ones were originally Greek in origin. The uniqueness of the Greek spirit is found in how it assimilates what is foreign: colonists arrived from Asia Minor, Phoenicia, Egypt, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean, creating the 'Greek' identity out of 'Hellenic' tribes. From this foreign lineage famous dynasties were established, which founded enduring centers of power in the form of cities and citadels established near or on the coastlines. These circumstances are described in the Homeric poems, which show that birth and lineage are one aspect but that a figure must establish his own authority, and that relationships were familial rather than patriarchal. The Greeks were united just once, under Agamemnon, but it was his reputation and power that persuaded the chieftains and peoples to go to war. Later the Greeks were no longer politically united, not even against the Persians.[52]

What truly united the Greeks was their *culture* by which they became a world-historical people and distinguished themselves from other peoples whom they called 'barbarians'. 'Each of us feels at home, and takes pleasure, in the realm of Greek culture, art, and science.... It is here, with Greek culture, that there begins the conscious connection of the chain of cultural tradition. We come from the Romans, who were educated by the Greeks.' Under the peaceful conditions established among the various Greek associations and communities, individuals were able to thrive in their quest for excellence. The drive to manifest joyful self-awareness progressed into fine art. 'Art arises from... a labor that is free of need and consists in the fact that individuals make themselves into something, that they... exhibit... the character of universality.' The physical body is formed into a work of art

52. Despite what he says here, Hegel later remarks that a second, partial unification did occur when Sparta joined Athens to defeat the Persians at Salamis and Plataea in 480–479 BC.

through garments and attire; then games and dances celebrate the beauty of the human form, and songs express the individual subject.

At this point Hegel introduces a lengthy discussion of Greek *religion*.[53] Religion is concerned with what is *essential*, and this essentiality for the Greeks is not something exterior and natural but interior and human: it is the beautiful human shape, comprehended in its freedom. 'God is for humans their own essence. Humans conceive God to be in a positive relationship to them, as their "other" to immediate contingency and finitude, as their essence and substantiality.' However, for the Greeks this essentiality is the *beautiful*, which means that it is spirit in its sensible manifestation and thus in its finitude, whereas the true essence is infinite. Beauty is the unity of sensibility with spirituality, and free beauty is what constitutes the divine for the Greeks. The principle of free *thinking* has not yet been conceptualized, and so the freedom of spirit is still associated with the human-natural form.

We confront two questions. First, why is it that the Greeks do not yet worship the absolute in spirit, why is it that spirit does not yet appear to spirit *in the spirit*? Second, why is it that the God of the Greeks does not at the same time appear to them *in the flesh*, even though they possess divinity in human shape? The answer to the first question is that God does not appear to the Greeks in *pure thought*, as what is nonsensuous, for the Greeks are still closest to the Oriental principle. Subjectivity here is still only emergent, and spirit is not yet one with itself in thought. God cannot yet be revered in spirit, and spirit is not yet the knowing of spirit. The answer to the second question is that, while Greek religion is anthropomorphic, it is not anthropomorphic enough: it does not know God in an immediate human existence, as a *this*.[54] It knows God in the beautiful shape of the human, as it is fashioned in marble or other media, but it cannot conceive of God as actually *becoming* human, appearing in and as the subjectivity of a single human being. Thus, against Schiller, Hegel contends that 'the Christian God is much more thoroughly human' than the gods of Greece.

The Greek gods are not merely natural powers but are essentially spiritual individuality, which for them is what is essential and supreme. But the latter is not yet established as *free* individuality, and spirit is not yet comprehended

53. Compare his treatment of Greek religion in the 1821 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 141–52, 160–89.

54. The 'this' is a theme of increasing importance as Hegel's lectures progress, reaching its culmination in the Christian doctrine of incarnation as found in the medieval church and in the Reformation. See the Greek World, nn. 36, 43; and the Germanic World, n. 28.

in the spirit; it is not yet *subject* in addition to substance. The Greeks start with nature, but natural divinity is sublated in spiritual progress. This sublation constitutes the difference between the Titans, who were nature deities, and the Olympian gods, who overthrew them. The 'resonance' of the natural powers is preserved in the new gods. Thus Apollo is the knowing god but has the resonance of being the god of light, and Poseidon is partly the resonance of the nature god Oceanus. This resonance represents the Oriental legacy in Greek consciousness. On the one hand, the Greeks took their gods from Asia and Egypt, but on the other hand their labor, their cultural work, was the transformation of this alien element.

The resonance echoes in the Greek *mysteries* and *oracles*. The mysteries derive from an old nature religion with the presumption that ancient and venerable sources reveal the truth of all that follows. To address particular concerns or to know what one must do in the future, one must consult the oracles. In this respect, Greek religion is still superstitious. The Christian, by contrast, 'is confident that his particular destiny and welfare, temporal and eternal, is an object of God's care. ... The Greeks did not and could not arrive at this view; for it is only in the Christian religion that God has become a *this* and has taken the character of the *this* into the character of the divine concept.' With their trust in God's care and providence, Christians can decide and resolve things for themselves and do not need to consult an oracle. The Greeks lack infinite subjectivity and have to rely on an exterior source.

Closely connected with the oracles is the Greek view of *fate*—a fate that mysteriously governs individual events and must be accepted for what it is. Hegel at this point makes important remarks regarding his own view of providence:

> The category of providence, or faith, for Christians stands opposed to what we call fate for the Greeks. In other respects, however, for Christians as well as for Greeks the connection of particularities to the universal is something incomprehensible and misunderstood. Destiny unfolds on a soil that must be called contingent in respect to particular purposes; ... but Christians have the view that all these particularities serve for the best, that God guides all these contingencies and leads them to the best outcome. Thus they assume that God's object is what is best for them. The Greeks lacked this view just because what is particular, the end of individuals, was not taken up into God. They accepted individual events as they happened and where they found them, but they did not have the conception that what is best for them would be a final end, that as a 'this' they would be an end. So they were just left with the thought, ... 'That's how it is, and humans must submit to it'.

Thus faith in God's providence does not eliminate the contingency that applies to particular events, and these contingencies are often incomprehensible. But Christians believe that God, having become flesh, has the well-being of each and every human being at heart, and that therefore God 'guides' the contingencies to the best outcome, which means taking up the final end of each individual 'into God'. We have discussed the manner of the 'guidance', noting that it assumes principally a negative form, and we observe too that the 'best outcome' is not a historical utopia but a mystical assumption into God. History is governed by contingencies, but God, not fate, is the lord of history. Thus Christians find 'solace', whereas for Greeks there is no solace, simply a submission to what is.

To conclude his discussion of the origins of Greece, Hegel turns to its *political constitution*. The Oriental world offers a brilliant display of despotism; the constitution of the Roman world is that of aristocracy, and of the Germanic, monarchy. In Greece the constitution is democratic, which for Hegel means direct rule by the people (that is, the citizens among the people). Such rule presupposes the unity of subjective and objective will, which is possible only where infinite subjectivity or subjective freedom has not yet developed. Monarchy emerges when external order requires a 'focus' for the sake of stability and subjective freedom is recognized and honored; thus in Hegel's view monarchy is the highest form of governance. Under democracy, the will is still the objective will, the collective will of citizens, not that of individual subjects.

Three conditions are required for the form that democracy takes in Greece. First, citizens make decisions based on their 'inner oracle'. They cast votes, and the majority decides. The greater the number of votes (and/or the closer the vote), the more the decision appears to be arbitrary, a matter of chance, and individual votes are devalued. Contingency appears on every side: one citizen stays away from the assembly for this or that reason while another speaks eloquently; issues are manipulated by interest groups; perhaps only one insignificant vote decides the matter, and the decision is resented. The second condition is slavery: freedom holds good for the Greeks only because they are these particular citizens; it does not apply to human beings as such simply because they are human. Presumably what Hegel means is that not everyone can participate in a democracy, only Greeks who are adult male citizens. This points to the third condition, which is small size. A democratic state cannot spread out very far because it is the whole body that renders the decision. Thus the citizens must be present together and the various interests must be alive for them. Hegel does not consider here the possibility of a *representative* democracy and a balance of

power among the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive; for him these conditions apply only in the modern world in the form of a constitutional monarchy (where the monarch is a figurehead but an important symbol of unity and national identity). Today constitutional monarchies are considered a form of democracy, along with republics, but both differ greatly from the Greek model.

The Maturity of the Greek Spirit

The second period involves contact with the antecedent world-historical people—in the case of the Greeks, with the Persians in the events involving what Herodotus called 'the War with the Medes'. Hegel notes that not all the Greeks participated in the Persian Wars. Even when the stakes were highest, 'particularity' maintained the upper hand over a common Hellenism. In fact, the Greeks were (partly) united only once, when Sparta came to the aid of Athens at the Battle of Salamis in 480 BC. The next year the Persian army was defeated at Plataea, ending the very real threat of Greek destruction. These battles marked a major turning point: 'West and East stood so opposed here that the interests of world history lay in the balance.' Over against a mighty Oriental despotism, united under a single ruler, stood 'a few peoples of limited means but possessing free individuality'. 'Never in world history has the advantage and superiority of the noble power of spirituality over massed forces . . . been displayed so splendidly.' This was Greece's finest hour, and Herodotus gave it immortality by his words.

As soon as the Greeks had repelled the external threat, the tension had to be turned inward. They turned to inner dissension and conflict in the form of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. These city-states were opposites in every respect. Athens was a place of refuge for a diverse populace. Solon gave the Athenians a democratic constitution, but with an aristocratic element. Slaves could be acquired by purchase, but no free Greek peoples were ever enslaved. The Athenians achieved an enviable refinement in customs, beauty, talent, and discourse. The Spartans, by contrast, came into the Peloponnesus from Thessaly and made slaves, 'helots', of the native people. They lived in a continuous state of warfare and were constantly involved in military exercises. Sparta was an aristocracy or oligarchy run by wealthy overseers and military leaders. They forced an austere communal asceticism on their people and banned science and art.

Hegel concludes this section by observing that, while we always feel ourselves drawn to Greece (especially Athenian Greece), our spirit cannot find its highest satisfaction there. 'The objective absolute that is beautiful lacks a principal element, namely truth; and here right and ethical life still

lack the sublime freedom that comes from the subjective unity of self-consciousness.' Another principle is on the way, and it first appears as something 'revolutionary and demoralizing'.

Decline and Fall

The struggle between Athens and Sparta erupted into the Peloponnesian War, which dragged on for twenty-seven years (431–404 BC). Sparta obtained financial support from the Persians and eventually defeated Athens and the other states, transforming democracies into oligarchies and abandoning the Greek cities in Asia Minor. The Greek ideal had been fatally betrayed, and several centuries of decline ensued.

It was precisely at this point that Greek philosophy attained its greatest achievement, threatening the religion of beauty and the order of the state by its critical thought and principle of subjectivity. Against the notion of the Sophists that human beings as finite ends are the measure of all things, Socrates grasped *being in-and-for-itself* as the universal and *thinking* as the final end. Then the existence of the gods (though not the unitary divine itself) was questioned by Plato, who sought to ban not art but what art portrayed as the highest: *thought* of the absolute is required rather than merely sensible representation. The fate of Socrates, remarks Hegel, was the highest tragedy: for his part he had the justification of thought; but for their part the Athenian people were right in recognizing that the Athenian state would be weakened and destroyed by the principle that justification resides in one's own inwardness.

In the state an irresolvable conflict arose between the principle of individuality (which had dark, destructive aspects as well as beneficial ones) and that of rule by the people as a whole. The Greeks needed a foreign king to impose his will on them. That king was Philip of Macedon, and his son, Alexander, inherited his father's vast power and had a free hand to use it. This 'second youth of Greece' consolidated

> the inner impulse of Greek life, ... turning it against the motherland of Greece, the East, the Orient. ... In one respect, Alexander avenged the evil that had befallen Greece at the hands of the Orient; in another respect, however, he repaid a thousandfold all the good that Greece had received from the Orient in the form of early cultural impulses. ... The great work of Alexander, his great and immortal deed, is that he made the Near East into a Greece.

Historians say that, although there was nothing but bloodshed in Alexander's conquest, he was still great. However, remarks Hegel, 'One must be prepared for blood and strife when one turns to world history, for

they are the means by which the world spirit drives itself forward; they come from the concept.' The means are undoubtedly tragic and self-destructive, but, as we have seen, they are used by the spirit to further its own ends. Part of Alexander's tragedy is that, while he established a Greek world empire, he could not establish a family dynasty. He was a military genius, an interpreter of history, and a man of great personal bravery. He died at the right time, when his work was finished, leaving behind a legacy that has endured to the present day.

In the absence of Alexander, only an ugly, barren particularity remained, and the Greek states were torn asunder into rival factions. The biographical writings of Plutarch and Polybius tell us about the tragic individuals of this last period: good persons could only despair or withdraw from public life. In these circumstances, 'a destiny appears that can only negate what has gone before; it is blind, harsh, and abstract. And the Roman Empire plays the role of this fate.'

The Roman World

The Roman Spirit

With the Romans 'politics is destiny', which means for Hegel that individuals were not taken into account but were sacrificed; it means that the achievement of the Roman Empire was *power* for its own sake. Rome represented a prosaic, practical dominion without a spiritual dimension. 'Rome broke the heart of the world, and only out of the world's heartfelt misery... could free spirit develop and arise.'

Rome expanded outward from a single hub (the reverse of the origins of Greece), embracing tribes of Latins, Sabines, and Etruscans. There was no family or patriarchal form at the outset but a robber band, a brotherhood of shepherds and bandits. Having no wives of their own, the Romans robbed neighboring people of their women. This genesis in 'abduction' is typical for the subsequent history of Rome. The Romans lacked the instinct of natural ethical life, a lack that led to harsh familial conditions. Wives could either become legal possessions of their husbands or be acquired without a marriage ceremony by continued use or possession for a year. The husband was the family despot, but he in turn was ruled over by the state. The greatness of Rome depended on its sacrificing everything to the political bond, to the state. By contrast with the immeasurable infinitude of the Orient and the beautiful poetic individuality of the Greeks, the Romans simply held fast to

finitude, to the prose of life, the ultimate abstraction. The development of formal law was an expression of the constricted, unsentimental understanding of the Romans. It was their greatest achievement. Their art had a merely technical aspect, and religion was reduced to utility and finitude. In these respects, although Hegel does not mention it here, the Roman Empire is very similar to our own age.[55]

'Religion' means 'to bind' (*religio*, from *religare*), and 'for the Romans there is in fact a "being bound", whereas for the Greeks religion is free fantasy, the freedom of beauty, and for the Christians it is the freedom of spirit'. The constraint of the Romans manifests itself in superstition. Their gods serve specific utilitarian purposes: everything, from political fortune and the minting of coins to baking and drainage, is governed by a god, and gods were imported to meet specific needs. The Romans gathered all these gods into the Pantheon and destroyed their divinity by reducing them to finite usages. They expressed no disinterested thankfulness toward, or exaltation and invocation of, what is higher.

A similar, indeed gruesome utility manifested itself in their festivals and performances. These presented the Romans with the spectacle of murder—of animals tearing human beings to pieces and of men and women slaying one another. To hold their interest, the Romans needed to see actual suffering and cruelty. These spectacles were an objectification of their own suffering, their veneration of finitude and death.

The Periods of Roman History

Here too, as with the Greeks, three periods are found: the origins of Rome (the formation of Roman power), its reference to the East (the world-dominion of Rome), and its relation to the principle that ensues (the downfall of Rome). In the second period, Christianity arrives on the scene as a religion that mediates between East and West, and Hegel devotes such attention to it as to warrant its being regarded as a separate topic. Part of the irony in his treatment is that Christianity subverts the Roman principle and requires another people, the Nordic, in which to mature. So the seeds of destruction are sown at the height of Roman power, just as they are in Greece.

55. Hegel makes this comparison in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 159–62. For a detailed discussion of Roman religion and festivals in the philosophy of religion lectures of 1821, see ii. 190–231.

The Formation of Roman Power

Here we find no beautiful mythological antecedent, as in Greece, but simply a prosaic beginning. The early kings were driven out, and the transition to 'republicanism' was in reality a transition to an oligarchic aristocracy that suppressed the plebeians. Aristocracy, says Hegel, represents the worst political condition, despite the desire for 'the best' to rule, because it simply offers an equilibrium between despotism and anarchy, and it produces only unhappiness and exigency. But it also produces a highly effective military strategy, based on the principles of abstract solidarity and obedience to the laws of the state.

The World-Dominion of Rome

With its increasing wealth and power, Rome enters into a second period, into a world theater that lies around the Romans like a panorama, the entire perimeter of the Mediterranean Sea. With its defeat of Carthage, Rome became mistress of the Mediterranean and all the lands around it. Gradually it worked its way from this periphery more deeply into these lands until it became the mightiest empire the world had witnessed, stretching from Roman Britain to Asia Minor. Julius Caesar emerged as the consummate image of Roman purposiveness, a man who wished nothing other than to be the ruler, undeterred by ethical constraints. He suffered the fate of all such great individuals, having to trample underfoot what he lived for. After making inroads into Gaul and Germania, he turned against the republic, cleansed Rome of base interests, and established the emperor as the one person whose will dominated all. Hegel describes this principle as that of 'spirit's complete coming-out-of-itself, the utter, intentional, deliberate finitude that is without constraint'. This principle reached its consummation in Caesar Augustus, and in opposition to him, to this 'profound breach' in spirit, there appeared its opposite, namely infinity—an infinity that did not negate finitude but encompassed it.

The Arrival of Christianity

With this concept of infinity, Christianity arrives on the scene. Hegel says that his purpose is not to describe what constitutes the true religion and the true infinite, but only its *appearing*, the necessity of its appearing at this time, when 'the time was fulfilled'; for history deals with the appearing of what is true, not with truth itself. Despite this caveat, Hegel first launches into precisely a discussion of the true idea, not just its appearing.

The absolute idea is the universal that subsists in and for itself—not, however, as an empty essence but as internally concrete and determinate within itself. It posits itself as its own finite 'other' but then draws back into itself as infinite fullness; it does not lose itself in bringing itself forth as an other to itself. 'God is this infinite life of separating the other from itself and being present to itself in this separated element. This relationship is the speculative form.' This form constitutes the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and it is present in the sentiment of love, which entails loving another for the sake of the other and finding oneself in this other.

There are two ways to grasp this truth: the way of faith via representation, and the way of knowledge via reason. Between these two resides the understanding (*Verstand*), which holds fast to the distinction between finite and infinite and does not know how to resolve it. 'Upon approaching truth, the understanding destroys what is true in it.' The truth of Christianity—the doctrine of the Trinity and of the divinity of Christ—does not appear simply at the beginning, in biblical statements literally construed, but through the living spirit of the community of faith, speculatively interpreted.

Our primary task, however, is to describe the appearance of the idea, the fact that the time had been fulfilled. When the categories of finite and infinite are separated, we find on the one side the absolute finitude of the Roman world, a harsh servitude, the principle of abstract personality, *this one*; we find it in the capricious form of the emperor, who is 'the god of the world'. The other category is infinite freedom, the principle of abstract universality, which appears philosophically in Stoicism and religiously in the 'immeasurable expanse' of the East. This expanse, says Hegel, becomes supersensible only in the God of Israel, who is stripped of sensuality and is conceived as pure thought. Here, for the first time, in the Jewish religion, the characterization of God as 'the One' becomes a world-historical principle. These two, the infinite One and finite singularity or subjectivity, are the two categories of the self-consciousness of this age. 'In isolation they are one-sided; . . . in their truth they are posited as one. This uniting of East and West, and the assimilation of the two principles, took place in the Roman world.' The Western longing for a deeper inwardness, a profound vastness, led it to the East where it found expression in diverse forms: Syrian mystery cults, Egyptian religion, Greek mythology, Neoplatonic philosophy.

This is the world into which Christianity was born, on Jewish soil, under Roman domination. For Christianity, the infinite One, the God of Israel, comes into sensible presence as *this one*, Jesus Christ. God reveals godself as a human being in human shape. In this way the longing of the world is fulfilled—its longing that the human being as finite should 'be elevated and

grasped as element of the divine essence', and that God should 'come forth from his abstract remoteness into appearance and into human intuition'. Faith is the intuition of the unity of God and humanity, the certainty that the divine spirit dwells within oneself, that one is in mystical unity with the divine. It entails a liberation from the natural state. But the intuited unity must also be present in a natural mode, the mode of an immediate single being, a *this one*. The unity could appear only once, in a single individual. 'God is inherently only *One*, and God's appearing must therefore be designated utterly with the predicate of *oneness* and so it excludes all multiplicity.' This appearing of God emerges within the Jewish religion, for this people prayed to God as 'the One', and it emerges under Roman domination as the antidote to the claim of Caesar to be 'the one'. Within Judaism, God is not internally concrete, cannot take on the determinateness of finitude, and remains the God of just the Jewish people.[56] Within the Roman Empire, Christianity is able to break out of this constraint and to present itself as the true and universal religion. 'Just as the divine idea has within itself this crossover to human being, the human being knows itself as infinity within itself.' Thus individuals attain an infinite inwardness, but only through the hard labor of breaking through the natural sphere, of taking up the cross, and of enduring the persecution of the state.

The triumph of Christianity has several consequences for life and the state. The first is that slavery is ruled out. Humans have infinite worth as human beings, and they are destined for freedom. Its external history to the contrary notwithstanding, when Christianity is truly practiced, it can have no slavery; Christianity is the true humanity. The second consequence is that the forms of ethical life have changed. An authentic, inner spiritual subjectivity arises, which is no longer the beautiful ethical life of the Greeks, nor can it be the merely private interest and caprice of the Romans. The third consequence is the establishment of two worlds: a supersensible spiritual world of subjective inwardness and a temporal world, a worldly existence that appears in one aspect as the church, and in the other aspect as the state.

The final consequence concerns the political constitution that corresponds to Christianity. For reasons already adduced, the true constitution cannot be Oriental despotism; nor can it be that of Greek democracy, in which subjective will is immediately identical with the will of the state; nor

56. Hegel remarks that the Jews attained a deeper speculative insight with the story of the creation of human beings in the image of God and their 'fall' into the knowledge of good and evil. This story is unique to Judaism, but it is found only at the beginning and remains without consequences elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible.

can it be the sort of servitude that exists under Roman aristocracy. In the true state, obedience to the secular order must be a matter of 'negotiation' with individual, subjective purposes. The state must be strong enough to accommodate these private interests within it and to satisfy them. It must be rational in itself, and inherently just. Hegel believes, as we have seen, that these conditions appear most satisfactorily in the modern principle of monarchy, of which he has an organic view, that is, a view in which legitimate competing interests of freedom combine into an organic totality. 'Each element is posited as an independent power and at the same time as an organ of the whole organism.'

The Downfall of Rome

While Christianity came into being during the era of the Roman world, it required a different people to be the bearer of its principle, namely, the 'Nordic' people. The Romans were inextricably linked to their irrational, barren, and abstract principle of imperial dominion, and when they came into contact with a new world-historical people their end had arrived.

Three characteristics mark their downfall. First, internal corruption destroyed the empire from within. Second, spirit withdrew into itself as something higher: Stoicism on the one hand and Christianity on the other. Finally, the onrush of foreign peoples overwhelmed the empire in a flood that no dam could withstand. These were mass migrations of Nordic and Eastern barbarians. 'Since these... barbarians were called "*Germanen*", the world-historical people is now the Germanic people'.

The Germanic World

Introduction

In addressing the Germanic world, we face the subjective difficulty of being unable to approach more recent history as impartially as we can the distant past, and the objective difficulty of having 'both the idea as such and the particularity from which fulfillment of the absolute final end is to emerge'. The latter difficulty arises because the subjectivity of will now predominates, along with the absolute idea as such; these two are essentially different, yet their unification is the ultimate goal of world history.[57] The particular will,

57. See n. 1, which also discusses Hegel's use of the term 'Germanic' and his principal sources for this period.

in pursuing its own ends, initially resists being driven toward an absolute final end; 'it affects the absolute itself by fighting against it'. The drive is at first obscure and unrecognized; 'hence we are often forced to judge what has happened in just the opposite way from how it appears to be in the history of peoples'. The French say, 'In repulsing truth one embraces it', and this is what modern Europe has done by exhausting itself in bloody struggles. Its history shows 'that the idea in the mode of providence ruled—providence as a veiled inner power that achieves its end and prevails via the recalcitrant volition of the peoples—so that what it achieves and what the peoples desire are often at odds'. This is a principal instance of the negative rule of God in history.

Individual European states form, struggling and fighting against each other, yet they are also being driven toward a general unity. When the latter has been accomplished, Europe turns outward—not backward to an earlier people or forward to a new people. This is because, 'with the Christian religion, the principle of the world is complete; the day of judgment has dawned for it' (see note 2). When it turns outward, Christianity encounters the world of Islam, which is for it an inessential moment (see note 3). 'The Christian world has circumnavigated the globe and dominates it'; any future essential revolutions will occur within it.

Following this abstract summary of how Europe 'ends', Hegel returns to its beginning. The beginning occurred with mass migrations of Romance and Germanic peoples in the fourth and fifth centuries AD. The Germans were attracted by the cultural world they eventually vanquished, but for several centuries they lagged behind the Romance nations, which directly inherited Roman culture. Further east, Slavic nations existed, and from the south came later incursions of Hungarians, the Magyars. But these peoples, of Asian origin, have not yet entered into the realm of European history.

The Periods of the History of the Germanic World

Using the most sweeping generalizations, Hegel distinguishes three periods (early, medieval, and modern), which represent three types of unity (real, ideal, and universal), and which are compared with earlier periods of world history (Persian, Greek, and Roman[58]). However, the Reformation does not fall easily into this classification, and in Hegel's actual treatment it belongs to a fourth period, which we have called 'The Transition to Modernity'. Just as

58. Here the Persian principle represents authoritarian rule, the Greek principle an ideality of spirit, and the Roman principle a quest for universal unity.

Christianity subverted Roman hegemony but did not yet find its 'people', so the Reformation subverts the medieval synthesis but is not yet fully modern. The final period of the Germanic world is not that of 'decline and fall', as with earlier empires, but that of 'modernity', which for Hegel seems to represent the consummation of world history—yet he broods over it. The comparison with Rome is unsettling.

The Preparation of the Early Middle Ages

Covering the period from the fall of the Roman Empire (480) to the reign of Charlemagne (800–814), the early Middle Ages struggled with the tension between the independence of individuals and the need for social organization. Germany always had free individuals, but they came together into assemblies and gathered around commanders-in-chief and kings. Their allegiance to the king was called 'fealty', which is a principle of the modern world: 'from one's innermost mind and heart to be in association with another subject'. The two elements were united in the formation of the state—the unification of fealty with the will of individuals. However, the unification occurred only gradually, and Germany in particular was initially splintered into numerous principalities in which private privilege and particularity of mind and passion triumphed.

In contrast to this extreme of particularity in early Europe stood the other extreme, that of the pure thought of the One, which emerged in the Oriental world in the form of Islam in the seventh century (see note 14). Here all particularities become accidental. Judaism and Christianity share with Islam its worship of the One, but in Islam this characteristic becomes fanatical because all differences and determinacies are abolished. Everything drops away: positive rights, property, possessions, particular purposes. 'That is why Islam devastates, converts, and conquers all.' At the same time, the ardor and beauty of love are nowhere expressed more fully; and—though Hegel does not take note of it—tolerance of other religions is an early feature of Muslim rule over subjugated peoples. Hegel does note that the 'natural father' of the Christian world is the West, but its 'more sublime and spiritual father' is the East. The East is the birthplace of freedom and universality, over against the Nordic reliance on individual subjectivity. Christianity could combine these elements, but Islam remained largely untouched by Western influence. It conquered all that it could: the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, and southern France. Only at Poitiers (or Tours, 732) were the Arabs halted by Charles Martel, grandfather of Charlemagne. Great cities appeared in Asia Minor, Egypt, and Spain; scholars and schools were

established, which disseminated the sciences and the works of classical antiquity, together with free poetry and free fantasy. But this magnificent empire soon disappeared. Islam did not impinge again on the history of Europe until early modernity, with the invasion of the Ottoman Turks—a presence with which Hegel was familiar in the 1820s in the form of the Greek struggle for independence.

The Middle Ages

The Middle Ages continued from the early ninth century to the Reformation.[59] Charlemagne unified the Frankish Kingdom and was named Holy Roman Emperor in 800. Later the empire split up and fell apart, and the Germanic world reverted to private dependencies. Thus during the medieval period the 'real' authority and unity became 'ideal', or spiritual, through the triumph of the Catholic Church. Its first great accomplishment was to make the Christian religion into an object of scholarly study by bringing rational reflection to bear on it. The basic doctrines of the church had been established by the early church fathers and the ecumenical councils. 'What there is now, in addition, is the elaboration of this subject... by theologians of the West, who formulated it in thought; these theologians were essentially philosophers.... Every theology has to be philosophical; for purely historical treatment does not address the content as truth.' Theology brought dialectical thinking to bear upon faith and transformed it. The science of theology as cognition of the truth became the principal mode of scholarship, but other sciences also appeared, such as law and medicine.

A second aspect, however, was that of feeling, 'the deepening of religion in the hearts of individuals'. The church established convents and monastic orders. Even the 'firm gnarled oaken heart' of the Germanic peoples was split in two by Christianity, pierced by the power of the ideal. 'It is the incredible power that breaks the stubborn self-will of barbarism and wrests the strength of that nature to the ground.' The envisaging of the ideal took the form, finally, of transforming laws in accord with the church: murder became a crime and was no longer tolerated as a form of vengeance; laws governing marriage prevented the treatment of women as property to be bought or sold, and divorce was not allowed; but celibacy and the religious life attained a higher status.

59. On the divisions of the medieval period and the transitional character of the Reformation, see n. 18.

Hegel describes at some length the role of the church in medieval politics. Power struggles occurred between secular and ecclesiastical authorities, and different regions of Europe experienced different solutions. Especially in Germany a protracted struggle persisted between emperors and popes, a struggle that undermined the unity of Germany and led ultimately to the victory of the church. At the height of its power, the church asserted authority over every aspect of life and scholarship. The real kingdom had been replaced by 'the dominion of this ideal kingdom'.

The church seemed to possess everything, but one thing was lacking: 'the presence [of God] experienced by self-consciousness'. The early church councils long ago established the objective, absolute content of Christianity. The content was not altered by scholastic philosophy, and 'philosophy in our own time too can only transpose the content into the form of the concept'. One aspect of this doctrine is that divinity is not a *quantity* of some kind but a *relationship*, the unity of the divine with the human, 'such that God appeared to humanity and is utterly present to humanity'. The divine nature has within itself the quality of the *this*. 'Christ has appeared, and this presence, this unity of the human and the divine, ... is what the world has ever been striving for.'

But where is Christ today? The God-man Jesus Christ existed as a temporal being and thus as a past being. His spiritual presence cannot be that of a prolonged physical presence such as that of a string of Dalai Lamas. What is past exists no longer, but the *this* should still be present. The divine singularity is no mere mode or accident of substance but is essential to the infinitude of God, and this singularity must be present. For medieval Catholicism, this presence is found in the Mass or the Last Supper. The Mass happens not once but eternally, for it is the life, suffering, and death *of God*. The sacrifice of the Mass is an actual presence, not merely a historical remembrance or a psychological phenomenon. It takes place perpetually in the community of faith, which is itself the co-celebrant along with the priest. The problem with the Mass, however, is that Christ is represented as something external, as the host that is consecrated by the priest. Sensible presence as such is essential to the *this*. But when it becomes the *host*, the consecrated bread and wine that is supposed to be worshiped as God, then it can be repeated endlessly, and the need for such a physical presence multiplies exponentially. Miracles and relics extend the divine presence; single details of nature are converted into particular manifestations of the divine. Christ is reproduced in countless churches, but Christ himself, as the Son of God, remains utterly one. What the church demands is this utterly one presence, on earth, here below, in his physical, if now long-decomposed, form. But access to the Holy Land and

the tomb of Christ was blocked by infidels, Muslims. The Crusades became necessary.

The ineptitude of the Crusades (nine of them, between 1095 and 1291), together with the grandiosity of their mission, resulted in massive bloodshed and a failed objective; and the cross of Christ was converted into a sword. But when they finally reached the tomb of Christ, the crusaders discovered the ultimate meaning of the sensible *this*: 'Why do you seek the living among the dead? He is not here but has risen.' Following upon Christ's sensible presence, the Holy Spirit comes upon the community, filling the *hearts* and *minds* of people, not their hands. The Crusades expelled the illusion of Christians about the meaning of the *this*; spiritual presence replaced sensible presence; and the interests of sensibility could now be directed to the world of nature.

Hegel concludes his treatment of the Middle Ages by examining the turn to nature and to worldly affairs. Here he discusses the appearance of industry, crafts, and trade, and new inventions such as gunpowder and the printing press. The feudal system was broken by the rise of freedom in the cities. Social classes in Europe were political in nature and did not constitute natural distinctions, as in the Orient. Ordered states were found only in Europe, together with private rights and private property. A balance of power obtained between them, as well as among states.

The Transition to Modernity

Hegel briefly examines art and the corruption of the church before turning to the Reformation.[60] Art inwardly transfigures the external *this* by spiritualizing, elevating, and breathing life into it, raising it to a figurative form that belongs to spirit. A piety that remains in a state of bondage, in a feeling of dull dependency, has no need of art and fails to recognize genuine works of art.

As for the corruption of the church, we are speaking of a necessary, not a contingent, aspect. This corruption resides *within* the church, in the fact that it has not truly and wholly excluded the sensible element. It resides within its piety itself, in its superstitious veneration of sensible things as absolute. The church's highest virtue now assumes a negative form: retreat, renunciation, lifelessness. By contrast, in Hegel's view, the highest virtue is found in the realm of the living, in the family. The church is supposed to save souls from corruption, but it makes this salvation into a merely external means,

60. On this transitional section, see n. 47.

namely, the indulgences. Indulgences were sold to support the construction of St Peter's, the most splendid church in Christendom. Hegel reminds us that the Athenians used funds from the Delian League to build the Parthenon. 'Just as this was the misfortune of Athens, so too this structure, St Peter's, which Michelangelo adorned with the image of the Last Judgment, became the last judgment on this proudest and grandest structure of the church—a last judgment on the church itself in its corruption.'

In describing the Reformation, Hegel reaches the narrative climax of the *Weltgeschichte*.

> In Germany there emerged a simple monk who was conscious that the *this* is to be found in the deepest recesses of the heart, in the absolute ideality of inwardness.... Luther's simple teaching is that consciousness of the *this* in the present is nothing sensible but something actual and spiritual; it is consciousness of an actual presence, not in the sensible realm but in faith and partaking.

Faith here does not mean a belief in something that has already taken place or is in the past; rather it is subjective certainty about the eternal, about the truth that subsists in and for itself, and it is produced and given only by the Holy Spirit. The content of this faith is not its own subjectivity but the objective truth of the church: Christ, Spirit, the Trinity, the absolute being of God. In faith the absolute being becomes the being of subjective spirit, and subjective spirit becomes free in relating to it because it is thereby relating to its very being and truth. The *ontological* participation of faith in God, the communication of spirit with spirit, of finite spirit with infinite spirit, and vice versa, is the key insight for Luther and for Hegel. This is how Christian freedom is actualized—by participating in the true content and making this content its own. Faith and freedom are not merely forensic categories, as neo-Kantian interpreters of Luther have insisted.

As proof that we have arrived at the narrative climax, read the following words: 'This is the new and ultimate banner around which peoples gather, the flag of freedom, of the true spirit.... The ages prior to our age have faced but one labor, have had but one task, and that has been to incorporate this principle into actuality, thereby achieving for this principle the form of freedom, of universality.' But, while the climax has been reached, the plot fully disclosed, history itself goes on and work remains to be done. Above all, the work of actualization remains: the reconciliation that has happened implicitly in religious faith must take on concrete existence in the institutions of modern life, and it must be universalized so as to encompass the world. This is a tall order, and Hegel's relative optimism about its accomplishment has become vastly more complicated in our own time. We say 'relative'

optimism, because Hegel's brief account of the history of modernity recognizes deep ambiguities and difficulties.

The History of Modernity

The first development of modernity (see note 61) requires that the 'new church' (the Protestant church) should create a worldly existence for itself. This was not a simple task, for the 'old church' retained a considerable basis in power and did not surrender its hegemony easily. In fact what happened is that religious wars endured for many years, Germany was severely damaged, the Turks invaded Europe, and no true religious accommodation was ever achieved. In addition to the Catholic–Protestant (or Romance–Germanic) divide in Western Europe, there was a third large constellation, the 'Slavic nature', which persisted in its 'initial solidity' despite Russia's approach to the West. The Protestant church did achieve a legally secure existence, but Europe was far from unified, and deep divisions persisted throughout the rest of the world.

The second development of modernity is that of the scientific investigation of nature, representing what Hegel calls 'the formal universality of thought'. True culture now essentially becomes that of science and is aligned with the state, not the church. The church does not assume the lead in advancing either freedom or the sciences. The sciences of the understanding, claiming to honor both humanity and God, were widely accepted as valid, although the Catholic Church did not concede that science honors God. The church is correct in the sense that the sciences could lead to materialism and atheism, for nature and its laws are now taken to be something ultimate and universal. One could indeed add that God created the world, but empirical science has no way of recognizing God. The understanding recognizes only itself in the universality of its laws.

The third development of modernity is that the formal universality of thought turns to the practical, to actuality. The understanding with its laws turns itself as 'enlightenment' against the spiritually concrete, the religious sphere. Its principles, derived from nature, are logical consistency, identity, and coherence. It recognizes a natural sense of immortality, sympathy, and so on, but it is intrinsically antireligious. 'For the very principle of religion is that the natural is precisely what is negative and needs to be sublated.... Religion is speculative ... and thus is inconsistent with the abstract consistency of the understanding.' Reason (*Vernunft*) grasps distinctions within itself as a unity, whereas the understanding (*Verstand*) holds fast to an

abstract identity that lacks distinctions. For it, 'the finite is not infinite', and that is that.

When thought turns to the state, however, it has a more beneficial effect. It produces insight into the universal purposes of the state, which take precedence over privileges and private rights. Wars and revolutions are now fought on constitutional grounds, not religious ones. Such wars attempt to change governments through force from below, in the interest of freedom of the will and self-determination. 'Freedom of the will is freedom of the spirit in action', and it emerges directly from the principle of the Protestant church. 'The freedom of will that is in and for itself is the freedom of God within itself; it is the freedom of spirit, not of a particular spirit but of the universal spirit as such, in accord with its essential being. Revolutions, then, have proceeded from thought. This thought has had to do with actuality and has turned forcibly against the established order.' Such revolutions have already occurred in Protestant states, which now are at peace, but in Romance countries the revolutions have been strictly political and are not yet accompanied by a change in religion. Religion must change for there to be genuine political change.

Conclusion

This is where Hegel leaves the story—in a state of irresolution and inconclusiveness (forced upon him, perhaps, by his having run out of time). He offers only brief summary remarks about the whole of history being nothing other than the actualization of spirit. What is true in thought must also be present in actuality, and vice versa. 'Thus it is spirit that bears witness to spirit, and in this way it is present to itself and free. What is important to discern is that spirit can find freedom and satisfaction only in history and the present—and that what is happening and has happened does not just come from God but is God's work.'

MANUSCRIPTS OF THE INTRODUCTION

Gentlemen!

The subject of these lectures is the *philosophical history of the world*. Our concern is to work our way through universal world history as such. It is not with *general reflections* abstracted from it and illustrated by examples, but rather with the content of world history itself. I have no textbook to use as a basis. However, at the end of my *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §§ 341–60,[2] I have already indicated the more precise conception of world history as well as the principles and periods into which our consideration of it is divided. (It will enable you to at least become acquainted with the abstract shape of the elements that we shall be discussing.)

By way of an introduction to our philosophical history of the world, I will begin by providing an *indication*, both general and specific, | of what 122
constitutes a *philosophical history of the world*. I will go over and describe other ways to expound and *treat history* by distinguishing—[in] a survey that has nothing philosophical about it—*three different* modes of writing history:

α. original history
β. reflected[3] history
γ. philosophical history

(α) As to the *first mode*, the mention of a few names should give a more specific picture of what I have in mind—e.g., Herodotus, Thucydides,[4] and other historians who have themselves *witnessed*, experienced, and *lived through* the events, deeds, and circumstances they describe, who have themselves participated in these events and their spirit, and who have compiled a report of these events and deeds. In this way they transposed things that merely *happened* and existed externally *into the realm of intellectual representation* and elaborated them *in its terms*. First, [there was] something

1. *Next to the heading in the margin, designating the dates the lectures began in 1822 and 1828*: 31/10 22 30/10 28

2. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Berlin, 1821). See *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), 372–80.

3. The manuscript here reads *reflectirte* ('reflected') but at the beginning of the treatment of the second mode, *reflectirende* ('reflective').

4. Editions of Herodotus' *The History* and Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* were in Hegel's library: Herodotus, *Historiarum libri IX* (Paris, 1592), and *Libri novem* (Cologne, 1562); Thucydides, *De bello Peloponnesiaco libri VIII* (Frankfurt, 1594).

existent—now something intellectual and representational. That is how, for example, the poet elaborates the material that he has in *his* feeling, in his
123 inner and | outer soul, into a *sensible representation*. Admittedly, the *narratives* and *reports of others* were also an ingredient for these historians, but they are merely the *more scattered, less important, fortuitous, subjective*, and transitory of their materials (just as the poet owes much to the shape of his language and the structured information he receives). But it is *the historian* who fashions a whole out of what in actuality has already passed away and is scattered about in subjective, fortuitous memory or indeed preserved [only] in fleeting memory, and sets it up *in the temple of Mnemosyne*, thereby investing it with immortality. The historian transplants [the past], gives it a more exalted and better soil than that transient soil in which it grew—transplants it into the realm of the *departed* and now *eternal* spirits, as the *ancients* described *the Elysium* in which their *heroes* do perpetually what in their lives they did only *once*.

From such original history I exclude all *legends, folksongs, traditions*, and
124 even *poems*; for such | legends and *traditions* are but *obscure* methods [of recording events], and therefore methods of peoples—or parts thereof—whose consciousness is still *obscure*. I shall return later[5] to the matter of the relationship of *history* to a people.[6] Peoples with an *obscure* consciousness, or the *obscure* history [of such peoples], is not our topic—at least not the topic of the philosophical universal history of the world, whose end is to attain knowledge of *the idea* in history. [Its object is] the spirits of those peoples who have brought their principle to consciousness and who know *what they are and what they do*.

Such original historians, then, shape the events, deeds, and situations that are *contemporaneous to them* into *a work of representation* for representation. It follows from this: (αα) The content of such historical narratives cannot therefore be of great extent. Their essential material consists in what is vital for humans in their own experience and current interests,
125 what is present and alive in their environment. |

[These historians] describe events in which they have shared to a greater or lesser extent, or at least of which they have been contemporaries. [They describe] *brief periods of time, individual* configurations of persons and

5. *In the margin*: To be *examined* later – *historia, res gesta* – the objective history proper of a people begins for the first time when they have a historical record [*Historie*]. *India* still [has] none. [Despite] a cultural development of 3,500 years, [it has] not yet arrived at a culture in which a history is possible.

6. The development of this idea is not found in the extant manuscript fragment.

events. They work *from intuitions* drawn from their own experiences and lives, assembling *individual and unreflected* elements into a [composite] *picture* in order to give to posterity a *representation* as specific as that found in [their own] *intuition* or in the *intuitive* narrative they have *before* them [from someone else].

(*ββ*) With such historians the *development* of the *author* and the *development* of the *events* on which his work is based, or the spirit of the author and the general spirit of the actions he relates, are *one and the same.*

Thus initially the author brings no reflections to bear, for he is immersed in the spirit of the historical material (*der Geist der Sache*) and does not *rise above it* to reflect on it. This unity [of author and material] also means that—in an age in which a greater differentiation between classes occurs, and in which the culture and maxims of each individual are related to his *class*—the historian must belong to the *class of statesmen, generals*, etc., whose aims, intentions, and deeds are part of the same political world that he describes. When the spirit of the material is itself *cultivated*, it becomes *aware* of itself. A major aspect of its life and activity is its[7] *consciousness* of its purposes and interests and of the *principles that underlie them.* | One aspect of *its actions*[8] is the way in which it *explains*[9] itself *to others, acts on their imagination*, and manipulates their will. The *author*, then, does not explain and *portray this consciousness* in terms of *his own* reflections; rather he allows the *persons* and *peoples themselves* to express their aspirations and their knowledge of their aspirations. He does not put into their mouths alien words of his own devising; and even if he elaborates on what they said, the substance, culture, and consciousness of this elaboration are identical with the substance and consciousness of *those whom* he has *speak in this fashion.* Thus in Thucydides, for example, we read the speeches *of Pericles, the most* 126

7. At this point the transition occurs from the first sheet of manuscript materials, now located in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, to the second and third sheets, located in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv of the Schiller-Nationalmuseum in Marbach. The smooth transition indicates that the sheets, though subsequently separated, originally formed a single manuscript.

8. *In the margin (two lines lower)*: Words are *actions*—among human beings, very *essential and effective actions.* But words of a people, or between peoples, or to a people or sovereign, are, as *actions*, an essential *object* of history, especially ancient history. Admittedly one hears of persons whose utterances have been taken amiss often saying that what they maintained or uttered was '*just* words'. If they are right in this judgment, that what they say is just words, then they must be pronounced innocent (*unschuldig*), for such words are nothing other than *idle chatter*, which has the sole advantage of being something harmless (*unschuldiges*).

9. *In the margin (above the previous addition)*: [The historian] has no need to explain motives (and feelings) in his own name or to bring them into his *particular consciousness.*

profoundly cultured, the truest and noblest of statesman, and of *other orators, envoys of [various] peoples*, etc.[10] In their speeches these *men* express *the maxims of their people* and of their *own personality*, the *con-*
127 *sciousness* of their *political condition* | and of *their ethical* and *spiritual condition* and nature, and the *principles* that underlie their *purposes* and *conduct*. The historian has left himself little or no room for [personal] reflections, and what he lets [his characters] express is not an alien consciousness *lent to them* but *their own culture* and *consciousness*.

Anyone who seeks to study substantial history, the spirit of nations, to live and have lived in and with it, must *immerse himself in such [original] historians*, must linger with them, and indeed it is impossible to linger too long with them. Through them the history of a people or a government comes to us fresh, alive, and at first hand. Anyone who does *not* desire *to become a learned historian* but rather *to enjoy history* can limit himself almost entirely to such authors alone. From them [we must] distinguish [i.e. identify] the *bibles* of peoples; every people has a basic bible (*Grundbibel*), a Homer. Such [authors] are, after all, not so common as frequently supposed. Such historians include Herodotus, *the father* or originator of history and moreover the greatest of historians, and Thucydides—[both are] to be admired for their naiveté. *Xenophon's* Retreat of the Ten Thousand is an equally original book;[11] *Polybius;*[12] the *Commentaries of Caesar*[13] are likewise masterpieces of simplicity by a mighty spirit. To have such histor-
128 ians, it is necessary *not only* that *the culture of a people have attained to a* | *high level*, but also that it not be limited to the *priesthood* and *scholars* but rather be shared by leaders of the state and military. Naive chroniclers such as monks were certainly found in the Middle Ages, but they were not statesmen. To be sure, there were also learned *bishops* who stood at the center of commerce and the affairs of state, and were thus also statesmen, but in other respects [their] political consciousness was not developed. However, [such works] are characteristic not only of antiquity. *In modern*

10. On the speeches of Pericles see Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 1.140–4; 2.13, 35–46, 60–4 (tr. Steven Lattimore (Indianapolis, 1998), 67–71, 81–2, 91–7, 103–6); on those of others, including the speech of the Corinthians, 1.120–4 (Lattimore, pp. 57–9), or that of the Spartan king Archidamos, 2.11 (Lattimore, pp. 79–80).

11. Hegel was familiar with two edns. of Xenophon's works: *Quae extant opera* (Geneva, 1581), and *Anabasis* (Leipzig, 1811).

12. Hegel owned two edns. of Polybius's *Historiarum libri quae supersunt* (Frankfurt, 1619; Leipzig, 1816).

13. Julius Caesar, *Commentariorum Belli Gallici Libri VIII; Commentariorum Belli Civilis Libri III.*

times, *all* this has changed. Our culture immediately *grasps* and *transforms* all *events* into *representational accounts*. In modernity we have excellent accounts of military and other events that are simple, ingenious, and specific, and that compare favorably with Caesar's commentaries; because of their wealth of content and specific declaration of means and conditions, they are even more informative.

Works of this kind include *numerous French memoirs*. Many of them are *cleverly* written [accounts] of *trivialities and anecdotes*, often with a narrow content on *narrow grounds*. Others, however, are the product of an able ingenuity [set] on a larger and more interesting scale. The *Mémoires* of *Cardinal de Retz* [are] a masterwork.[14] In *Germany* similar *masterpieces* by persons who themselves participated in the events are rare, although the *Histoire de mon temps* by Frederick II[15] is a great and *notable exception*. It is [not] enough [for an author] to have been a contemporary of such events or even to have witnessed them at first hand and obtained reliable information about them. An author must be of the same *class, circle, attitude,* mentality, and culture as those whose actions he describes—[the same rank] *as those on whom | the authority of the state and the power of the government rests.* 129
Only from an elevated position does one have a proper overview of the subject and see everything in its context—not when one looks up from below, peering through some limited *moral lens* or *other bit of wisdom*. In our time it is all the more necessary [to free ourselves] from the limited point of view of the classes that are more or less excluded from direct political activity and reflection—from the life of the state. They bask in moral principles by which they are consoled and know themselves superior to the upper classes—in short, they do not stand within that sphere.[16]

(β) The *second* mode of history may be called *reflective* history—a *history* whose portrayal goes beyond what is *present* simply to the author and that depicts not only what was present in time but is *present* in the life of *spirit*; it is concerned with *the whole* of the past. Thus many varieties of [this sort of historiography] are found—indeed, including everything [written] by those whom we customarily call *historians*. Here the most important thing is the way in which the historical material is worked up, for *the worker* comes to it

14. See *Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz, contenant ce que s'est passé de remarquable en France pendant des premieres années du Regne de Louis XIV*, new edn., 3 vols. (Amsterdam, 1719). It is uncertain which edn. was used by Hegel.

15. See *Histoire de mon Temps de Fréderic II, Roi de Prusse*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1826).

16. *In the margin:* α Original [history] can encompass only a *brief period of time* – necessity of an overview of the whole –

α) αα Compendium ββ *Opposite* – imitation of original [history] only *an external* expansion

130 with his own spirit, which is | different from *the spirit of the content* itself. Here everything depends on the maxims and representational principles that the author applies both to the content (to the purposes of the actions and events themselves) and to the style of the historical narrative. *With us Germans the reflection*—and the cleverness [with which it is practiced]—differs considerably. Each historian has adopted his own style and method, however he is of a mind to do it. The *English and French* know in general how history must be written; they share the attitudes of a common culture, whereas with us each writer quibbles over his own distinctive view. Thus *the English and the French* have excellent historians; but with us, if we look at *the critiques of historians* of the past ten or twenty years, we find that nearly every review begins with its own theory about how history should be written, a theory that the reviewer sets up against the theory of the historian. We are in the position of continually struggling *to find out* how history *ought* to be written.

Various [modes of reflective history]:

(αα) There is always a demand for *surveys of the entire history of a people or country, or of the* whole world *in general*; and to satisfy this demand history books must be written. These are necessarily *compilations* from accounts already prepared by original historians as such, and from other *individual reports and accounts*. [They are] not based on intuition and the language of intuition, or on first-hand observation. This first variety of reflective history
131 comes closest to the preceding kind when it has no further | purpose than *to present the entire history of a country or people*. The type of *compilation* depends on how exhaustive the history is intended to be. It often happens that such historians try *to write* so vividly that *the reader has the impression* of listening to contemporaries and eyewitnesses. But such attempts must always be more or less unsuccessful. The entire work should and indeed must be uniform in tone, for the author is a single individual with a specific culture of his own; but the ages covered by such a history have very different cultures, as do the historians utilized by the author, and the author's spirit that speaks through them is different from the spirit of these ages. When the historian tries to depict the spirit of the ages, it is usually his own spirit that is heard. Thus *Livy* puts into the mouths of *the old kings of Rome, the consuls* and generals of ancient times, *speeches* that only an accomplished advocate (or hairsplitting orator) of Livy's own time could have delivered, and that contrast glaringly with authentic legends from antiquity (e.g., the fable of Menenius Agrippa about the stomach and the intestines). He likewise *gives us extremely thorough and detailed descriptions* of battles and *other events*
132 in such a tone and with such a specific grasp [of] | details that he appears to

have witnessed them himself, although these descriptions could not have derived from the ages in which they are set. Their features can be used to describe the battles of any age; their *specificity* contrasts with the lack of *coherence* and the *inconsistency* that often prevail elsewhere in the *main course of events*.[17] The difference between such a compiler and an original historian can best be seen by comparing *Polybius with the way* that *Livy utilizes*, selects from, and abridges his history for the periods covered by surviving portions of Polybius' work.[18] *Johannes von Müller*,[19] in an attempt to give a faithful *portrayal* of the times that he describes, has given *his history a stilted, pompous, pedantic air.* The old chronicle of Tschudi[20] related the same events in a much more endearing, naive, and natural way than Müller's *contrived, affected* archaisms.

This [is] an attempt to *transpose* us completely into *the times* [of the past, as something] quite vivid and alive—[something] we [can achieve] no more than a writer. A writer is also [one of] us; [he] belongs to his [own] world—he honors its needs and interests, the things it esteems. For example, whatever [the age] we live in, we can [immerse ourselves] in the life of Greece, which is congenial to us in so many important respects; yet in the most important matters we cannot sympathize with the Greeks [or share] their feelings. For instance, however much the city of *Athens* captures our interest, and however much we sympathize with its activities and customs—as a most worthy fatherland of a cultured people—we cannot share the feelings of [its citizens] when they prostrate themselves before Zeus, Minerva, etc., | [or when they] 133
agonize over their *sacrificial offerings* until midday on the anniversary of the Battle of Plataea.[21] [Nor do we sympathize with] slavery—just as [we] cannot share the feelings of a dog, [even if] we have a clear impression of a particular dog and can divine its mannerisms, attachments, and idiosyncrasies.

17. On the fable of Menenius Agrippa, see Titus Livius, *Historiarum libri*, ed. I. F. Gronovii (Lyons, 1645), 1.114 (2.32.5–12); on Livy's depiction of battles, 1.274–7 (4.32–4). See Livy, *The Rise of Rome*, tr. T. J. Luce (New York and Oxford, 1998), 104, 251–4.

18. Livy utilized Polybius' work for the history of the eastern half of the Roman Empire. Polybius is discernible as the source for books 21, 26–8, and esp. 31–45 of the *Historiarum*. See Heinrich Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten and fünften Dekade des Livius* (Berlin, 1863).

19. Hegel is referring to Johannes von Müller's *Die Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, found in his *Sämmtliche Werke*, xix–xxv (Tübingen, 1815–17).

20. See Aegidius Tschudi, *Chronicon Helveticum*, 2 vols. (Basel, 1734, 1736).

21. From a similar formulation in Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825–6*, ed. and tr. Robert F. Brown *et al.* (Oxford, 2006, 2009), ii. 146, it may be surmised that this description relates to the efforts at obtaining a favorable oracle by Pausanias (and by his opponent Mardonius), as reported by Herodotus in *The History* 9.36–64 (tr. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 629–40).

But there are *also other ways* by which [historians] have tried to bring the historical [past] to us—if not by [eliciting] a sharing of feelings through the tone [of writing, at least by eliciting] vividness and lively feelings [by entering] wholly into the details of events, practices, modes of feeling, and specific presentation.

Histories that endeavor to provide an overview of a lengthy period or the whole of world history must more *or less dispense with individual portrayals* of reality and [make do with] *abstractions*, epitomes, *abbreviations*. This [means] not only that *many* events and actions [must be] *omitted* but also that thought or understanding, the mightiest epitomizer, must intervene. For example, *a battle* was fought, a *great victory* was won, *a city* was besieged in vain, and so on. A battle, a great victory, a siege—all these *are general representations* that condense a *vast individual whole* into a *simple characterization* for representational thought. When we are told that at the beginning *of the Peloponnesian War* Plataea was subjected to a lengthy siege by the Spartans, and that after some of the inhabitants had fled the city was
134 taken and the remaining citizens were executed, this is a *brief* | summary—not just short in length but a merely general representation distilled (*reducirt*) by reflection—of what Thucydides describes with *so much interest* and in great detail.[22] [The same applies when we are told] that an Athenian expedition to Sicily came to an unfortunate end.[23] But as we have said, such *reflected representations* are necessary aids for an *overview*, and an overview is necessary too.

However, it inevitably makes for a *drier* account: how can it interest us when Livy, after describing a hundred wars with the Volscians, repeats for the hundredth time such phrases as 'In this year war was successfully waged against the Volscians, or the Fidenates,' etc.[24]

Against this general way [of writing history, other historians endeavor] to collect all *individual* traits and to portray them in an infinitely faithful and

22. The siege lasted for five years at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War; see Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 2.71–9, 3.20–4, 3.52–68 (Lattimore, pp. 110–14, 139–41, 154–64).

23. The expedition is described by Thucydides in *The Peloponnesian War* 6.1–8.1 (Lattimore, pp. 306–412).

24. According to Livy, war against the (Etruscan) Fidenates flared up repeatedly between 753 and 426 BC; the war against the Volscians, which lasted more than two centuries, began in 534 BC. See Livy, *Historiarum libri* 1.20 ff. (1.14.1), 1.66 ff. (1.53.2) (Luce, pp. 19–20, 61–2). Expressions similar to the example given by Hegel are found at 1.102 (2.23.1), 1.104 (2.24.1), 1.145 (2.58.3) (Luce, pp. 93, 94–5, 132–3).

lifelike manner (Ranke).[25] [They give us] a motley assortment of *details* [that are] of *little interest*—actions of soldiers, *private* affairs—and that have no influence on *political* concerns. [These writers are] incapable of [envisaging] a whole, a general *purpose*.

Such a way of writing history is lifeless—such forms and abstract representations make the content dry.

Making use of intuitional representation (*Anschauung der Vorstellung*) if not liveliness of feeling, [these writers] at least strive to reproduce past ages not by means of their *own elaboration* but by giving an *accurate and faithful* portrait of them.

A series of features—as in one of Walter Scott's novels[26]—gleaned from here and there, *painstakingly* and *laboriously* assembled—*such* features are drawn from | historical writings, correspondence, and chronicles. Such a 135
procedure entangles us in numerous fortuitous details—historically *authentic, to be sure*—however the *main* interest [is] in no way clarified by them but rather confused—and thus [it is] immaterial that such and such a soldier by the name of [so and so, did this and that]—the effect is the same. This [sort of thing ought] *to be left* to Walter *Scott's novels*—this detailed *portraiture* with all the minutiae of the age—in which the deeds and fate of a *single* individual constitute a *passing* interest and *all the particulars* are much the same. However, *in the portrayal of the great interests of the state*, all *these* particular details about individuals disappear. The features [that are included] should be characteristic of and significant *for the* spirit *of an age*. This should be accomplished in a higher and worthier manner—[with] *political* deeds, actions, and customs, [which are] matters of *universal* interest, [depicted] in their specific character.

25. This reference to Leopold Ranke is found in the margin. It is not part of the text that Hegel copied in 1828 from the earlier manuscript of his lectures of 1822–3. Rather it belongs to the subsequent expansion made in the winter of 1828–9. At this time Hegel could have been familiar with three of Ranke's works: *Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494–1535*, i (Berlin, 1824); *Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtsschreiber: Eine Beylage zu desselben romanischen und germanischen Geschichte* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1824); *Fürsten und Völker von Süd-Europa im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, i (Hamburg, 1827). The latter work and Ranke's *Die serbische Revolution: Aus serbischen Papieren und Mittheilungen* (Hamburg, 1829) were in Hegel's library.

26. It is not known with which of Walter Scott's novels Hegel was familiar. A reference to Scott is not found in his lectures on aesthetics (at least in the presently available edns.) but in a later fragment on aesthetics. Hegel owned a German edn. of Scott's works, *Ueber das Leben und die Werke der berühmten englischen Roman-Dichter*, tr. Ludwig Rellstab, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1826). In the *Morgenblatt für die gebildeten Stände* he excerpted Scott's views on the French Revolution with the remark, 'a shallow man' (*Berliner Schriften 1818–1831*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1956), 697–8).

[27](ββ) The first variety of *reflective* history leads directly to the
136 second. | This is *pragmatic* history, or [it] remains nameless [because] it is the kind that *historians* in general serve up—a developed and purer [portrayal of] the *past*. [If we] do not have [individuals] and their lives—such a totality—before us, and have no living experience of them—(αα) but rather *are dealing* with a reflected world, i.e. a *past—its spirit, its interests, its culture* . . .

[Then we have] in general a *rational* (*verständige*) history. (αα) A *totality* of *interests*—such as the totality of a *state*, the epoch-making event of a war or even of an individual—is the object.

(ββ) Here too the object is a *present* interest, but without it being the *presence of tone*, of feeling, of external vividness (*Anschaulichkeit*) in circumstantial details and the fortunes of single individuals as such. The need for *a present* exists, [but] it [is] not [to be found] in history. Such presence [is created by] the *insight* of the *understanding*, the activity and effort of spirit. The external [aspect of events is] pale and *grey*. Their *purpose* and *rationality* (*Verstand*), the state and fatherland, *their inner continuity, the universal aspect* of their inner relationships, are what *endure*, [for these aspects are] as *valid* and present *now* as in the past and forever. The first step is a *primitive*, enveloped people, [not] as such, but insofar as it reaches the point of becoming a state. Subjection to a state, a rational whole in itself, is a
137 universal end of reason. | Every *state* is an end for itself. Its *external preservation*, its inner *development* and *formation*, follow a necessary *progression* whereby rationality, *justice*, and the *consolidation of freedom* gradually emerge. [It is] a *system of institutions* – (αα) as a *system* [it is] *the consequence* and (β) the content of the same [rationality, justice, freedom], the means by which true interests are brought to consciousness and *struggle* to obtain actuality. In every objective advance [there is] not merely an external consistency and necessary continuity but also a necessity in the *thing* [at work in history], in the *concept* (*in der Sache – im Begriff*). This [is] the true thing, [present] for example in the state (German, Roman), or in *single great events* [such as] *the French Revolution*, or in *any great necessity*.

27. *This paragraph is written in the margin adjacent to the present paragraph:*
(β) *Historiography* in general. The worst kind of pragmatic [historian is one who takes up] *moral* questions [as] an amateur *psychologist*. The motives of the subject [are] derived not from the concept but from particular inclinations and passions, instead of regarding the *thing* itself [that history is about] as driving and effective. [Such a historian is] likewise a *compiler*, and, when he awakens from his weary ramblings, events and individuals are occasionally *felled with a moral flank attack* by means of edifying Christian and other reflections—[by] tossing in an edifying reflection, a hortatory proclamation or doctrine and the like.

This [is] the object and aim of the historian as well as the aim of a people, of the age itself. Everything [is] related to it.

Such pragmatic *reflections*, although highly abstract, *belong in fact very much to the present* and should *enliven* the accounts of the past, *bringing them to life* today (French, German [writers are] more satisfying; [they tell us] *how it was*).[28]

Whether such reflections are in fact *interesting* and *enlivening* depends *on the author's own spirit*.[29]

28. *In the margin*: Empires [of] great individuals – other individuals like *Napoleon* only momentary – in essentials, dependence –

29. The manuscript ends here and does not include a discussion of the remaining subtypes of reflective history (critical and specialized) or the third main form of historical writing, philosophical history.

Gentlemen!

The subject of these lectures is the philosophy of world history. About what history or world history is, I need to say nothing; the general impression of it is sufficient and we can perhaps agree on it. But that we shall be considering a philosophy of world history, that we intend to *treat* history philosophically—this is what is striking about the title of these lectures and appears to require a discussion or, even more, a justification.

However, the philosophy of world history is nothing other than the contemplation of it by means of *thinking*. Thinking is something we can never cease, for humans are *thinking* beings, and in this respect they are distinguished from animals. [In] everything that is *human*—feeling, knowledge and cognition, instincts and volition—insofar as it is human and not animal, thinking is involved. [Thinking] is involved in all historical studies.
139 However, this | appeal to the participation of thinking in all human activities, including history, might appear to be unsatisfactory because it could be argued that thinking is subordinate to what exists, the given, that it is based on and guided by it. Philosophy by contrast is assumed to have its *own* thoughts, produced by speculation from out of itself without reference to what is. With such thoughts it supposedly approaches history as a material to be treated; it does not leave it as it is but *arranges* it in accord with thought and *constructs* a history a priori.[2] History [so it is said] just has to grasp in unalloyed fashion what is, what has been—events and deeds. It gains in veracity the more strictly that it confines itself to the given, and—since what is given is not so immediately evident and requires manifold investigations that are bound up with thinking—the more that its aim is to discover simply what happened.

This aim appears to contradict the impulse of philosophy; and it is this contradiction, and the accusation that philosophy imports its thoughts into

1. *In the margin, designating the date the lectures began, 8 Nov. 1830:* 8/11 30.

2. This criticism of philosophy is directed by Hegel implicitly against Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who lays out such a program. In his *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* (Berlin, 1806), Fichte describes the opposition between a priori and a posteriori history, arguing that the philosopher works independently of all experience in identifying the concept of an epoch (see pp. 4–6). With the introduction of past experiences and future expectations, the work of the philosopher comes to an end and that of the observer of the world and humanity begins. The philosopher contributes to an a priori construction of the general plan of the world and its major epochs (pp. 303–4).

history and treats history according to them, that I wish to discuss in the *introduction*. In other words, we must first obtain a *general definition of the philosophy of world history*, and then consider the immediate implications that are connected with it. Then the relationship between thoughts and events will of its own accord be correctly posed. For this reason, and since in this introduction I do not wish to become too copious—for a wealth of material lies before us in world history—there is no need for me to spend time refuting and correcting the endlessly many misguided misrepresentations and reflections that are ongoing or perpetually reinvented about the perspectives, principles, and views | on the aims and interests of the treatment of history, 140
and especially on the relationship of the concept and of philosophy to historical matters.[3] I can omit them entirely or just mention them in passing.

A. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF WORLD HISTORY[4]

[5]The first thing I wish to say about the provisional concept of the philosophy of world history is this. As I have already remarked, the main objection brought against philosophy is that it approaches history, and reflects on it, with thoughts or conceptions (*Gedanken*). However, the sole conception that it brings with it is the simple conception of *reason*[6]—the conception that reason governs the world, and that therefore world history is a rational process. From the point of view of history as such, this conviction and insight is a *presupposition*. Within philosophy itself this is no presupposition: by means of speculative cognition it is *proved* that *reason*—and we can adopt this expression for the moment without discussing more precisely its connection and relationship to God[7]—is *substance* and infinite power. [It is]

3. *In the margin*: The preface to every new history—and then again the introduction in the reviews of such histories—[brings] a new theory

4. The section headings are editorial but reflect Hegel's own intended divisions. Note Hegel's further subdivisions of this section as indicated in the margins.

5. *In the margin*:

(α) General Concept

(β) Determinate

(γ) Mode of Development

6. *In the margin*: (α) Reason

7. The references to 'proof' and 'God' might call attention to the lectures on the proofs of the existence of God, which Hegel wrote and delivered in the summer semester of 1829, just over a year before he wrote this introduction. The two projects share some common themes and concerns. The proofs establish, among other things, that God is infinite substance, infinite power, and infinite form (or subject). See *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, ed.

itself the *infinite material* of all natural and spiritual life and the *infinite form* that activates this its content. [It is] the *substance* whereby and wherein all actuality has its being and subsistence. [It is] infinite *power*, for reason is not
141 so impotent as to yield only an ideal | or a moral ought, and only outside the bounds of actuality, or who knows where—perhaps merely as something particular that exists in the heads of a few individuals. [It is] the infinite *content*, all essentiality and truth, itself constituting the material on which it operates by its own activity. Unlike finite action, it does not require the limiting factors of external materials or a given medium from which to derive its sustenance and the objects of its activity. It feeds upon itself, it is itself the material that it labors on. Just as it is itself its own presupposition, its own end, the absolute final end, so it is itself the activation and the bringing forth, out of inwardness into appearance, into world history, not only of the natural universe but also of the spiritual realm. That only this idea is the true, the eternal, the almighty, that it reveals itself in the world, and that nothing is revealed in the world except it, its glory and honor—this is, as I have said, what is proved in philosophy, and so it may here be *presupposed* as demonstrated.

[8]To those of you gentlemen who are not yet acquainted with philosophy, I could perhaps appeal that you approach these lectures on world history with a faith in reason, with a desire and thirst for knowledge of it. And we must surely assume that a desire for rational insight and knowledge, and not just a collection of information, is the subjective need [that drives] the study of the scientific disciplines. In fact, however, I do not have to adopt such a faith in advance. What I have said in a preliminary way and have still to say is not—and not just with reference to our science—to be regarded as a
142 presupposition | but instead as an *overview* of the whole, as the *result* of the inquiry that we have initiated—a result that is known to me because I am already familiar with the whole. What therefore remains to be seen, and will make itself evident from the consideration of world history itself, is that a rational process has been taking place in it, that world history is the rational and necessary course of world spirit. World spirit is spirit as such, the substance of history, the one spirit whose nature [is] one and the same and

and tr. Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford, 2007). In the lectures on the philosophy of religion Hegel says that 'God is essentially rational, is rationality that is alive and, as spirit, is in and for itself'. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. and tr. Peter C. Hodgson *et al.* (Oxford, 2007), i. 139 (1824 lectures), also i. 170 (1827 lectures). For Hegel the proof of reason (and of God) is the task of philosophy as a whole, not just of philosophy of religion.

8. *In the margin*: (β) Faith, survey, result.

that explicates its one nature in the existence of the world. This, as we have said, must be the result of history itself.

History, however, must be taken as it is; we must proceed in a historical, empirical fashion.[9] For example, we must not allow ourselves to be misled by the professional historians; for at least among the German historians (even leading authorities who are experts in the so-called study of sources) there are those who do what they reproach the philosophers for doing, namely for introducing a priori fictions into history. Thus, to take one example, it is a widely accepted fiction that there was an original, primeval people, directly instructed by God, living in perfect insight and wisdom, and possessing a thorough knowledge of all natural laws and spiritual truth;[10] or else that it was from one or another priestly people—or, by a more specific assumption, from a Roman epic—that the Roman historians have produced their ancient history;[11] and so on. Let us leave such a priori inventions to the ingenious professional historians, who in Germany commonly make use of them. | 143

[12]We can therefore declare as our first condition that we must apprehend the historical *accurately*. But general expressions such as '*accuracy*' and 'apprehension' contain an ambiguity. Even the ordinary, average historian, who believes and professes that his attitude is entirely receptive, that he devotes himself only to the given, is not passive in his thinking and introduces his own categories as medium through which to view the available evidence. The truth does not lie on the superficial plane of the senses; in regard to everything that aims to be scientific, reason may not slumber and must employ meditative thinking (*Nachdenken*). Whoever looks at the world rationally sees *it* as rational too; the two exist in a reciprocal relationship. But it is not our task to discuss here the different modes of meditative thinking or the various perspectives for judging what is significant and insignificant in the immense amount of material that lies before us, and the most suitable categories to use in doing so.

[13]I will mention only two points concerning the general conviction that reason has governed and continues to govern the world, and thus also world

9. *In the margin*: (γ) Historical procedure

10. In Hegel's time, this notion of a primeval people was found mostly in the sphere of romantic mythology; see e.g. J Görres, *Mythengeschichte der asiatischen Welt*, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 1810), i. 11.

11. Hegel could be alluding here to the reference to a primeval people in Barthold Georg Niebuhr, *Römische Geschichte*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1811–12), i. 112 ff.

12. *In the margin*: (δ) Apprehend accurately

13. *In the margin*: (ε) Two Points – *Anaxagoras*

history; for they provide an occasion to examine more closely the main point, which constitutes the difficulty, and to indicate what we must discuss
144 more fully. |

One is the historical point that the Greek *Anaxagoras* was the first to say that *nous*—understanding in general or reason—rules the world.[14] This is not an intelligence in the sense of self-conscious reason, not a spirit as such; the two must be clearly distinguished. The movement of the solar system follows unalterable laws; these laws are its reason, but neither the sun nor the planets that revolve according to these laws are conscious of them. It is human beings who derive these laws from existence and know them. Perhaps the only thing striking to us about the conception that reason exists in nature, that nature is ruled by irrevocable laws, is that Anaxagoras initially restricted it to nature. We are accustomed to such conceptions and do not make much of them. I have mentioned this historical circumstance to point out that history teaches that conceptions of this sort that may appear trivial to us did not always exist in the world, that rather such conceptions are epoch-making in the history of the human spirit. Aristotle says of Anaxagoras, as the originator of this conception, that he appeared as a sober man among drunkards.[15]

This conception was taken over from Anaxagoras by Socrates, and—with the exception of Epicurus, who attributed everything to *chance*[16]—it became the ruling principle above all in philosophy; we shall see in due course in what further religions and peoples [it came to prominence]. Plato makes Socrates [say] of this discovery (*Phaedo*, Stephanus edition, vol. 1.
145 pp. 97–8)[17]: 'I was delighted with it and | hoped I had found a teacher who would explain nature to me rationally, who would exhibit the particular *purpose* in particular things and the universal purpose in the whole—the good, the final purpose. I was not at all eager to relinquish this hope. But how very disappointed I was,' continues Socrates, 'when I turned full of anticipation to the writings of Anaxagoras himself. I discovered that he dealt

14. Hegel is referring to Socrates' report in Plato, *Phaedo* 97b–c (*The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, 1989), 79).

15. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 985a 10–17 (*The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 1941), 696–7).

16. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ed. and tr. Robert F. Brown *et al.* (Oxford, 2006), ii. 285, Hegel draws upon Cicero for his discussion of Epicurus' principle of chance. See Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Libri tres de natura Deorum* (Leipzig, 1818), 1.36 ff., 52–4 (*De natura deorum and Academica*, tr. H. Rackham, rev. edn., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1951), 52–5).

17. What follows is not a direct quotation but a summary of *Phaedo* 97b–98c (Hamilton and Cairns, pp. 79–80). See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ii. 104.

only with external causes, such as air, aether, water, and the like, instead of reason.' We see that what Socrates found to be unsatisfactory in the principle of Anaxagoras is not the principle itself but his failure to apply it to concrete nature—the fact that nature is not understood and conceived in terms of this principle; that in general this principle remains *abstract*; more specifically that nature is not grasped as a development of this principle, as an organization produced by reason as its cause.

I wish from the outset to call attention to this distinction between whether a definition, principle, or truth is just held to abstractly, or is advanced to a more precise determination and concrete development. This distinction is decisive, and in addressing other issues we shall come back [to] this circumstance especially.[18]

Above all, however, I have referred to the first instance of the conception that reason rules the world and also discussed its inadequacy | because the 146
complete application of this conception has assumed another shape,[19] one we know full well as our own conviction—namely the form of the religious truth that the world is not given over to chance and external, contingent causes, but is *ruled by providence*. I stated earlier[20] that I did not want to presume on your *faith* in the indicated principle. I might, however, have appealed to faith in this religious form were it not that the distinctive character of the discipline of philosophy does not allow it to accept presuppositions; or, to express the point in a different way, it is because the discipline with which we are engaged must first of all furnish the proof,[21] if not of the *truth*, then of the *correctness* of this principle. The *truth* that a providence, indeed divine providence, presides over the events of the world is consistent, then, with the indicated principle because divine *providence* is the wisdom that has the infinite power to actualize its purposes, that is, the absolute, rational, final purpose of the world. Reason is *thinking* that determines itself wholly freely: *nous*.

[22]But there is a disparity, indeed a contradiction, between this faith and our principle precisely in the same way that there is between the principle of

18. The reference to 'this circumstance' (*diesen Umstand*) makes more sense in relation to material not introduced into the main text by the German editor in which Hegel indicates that the distinction will be encountered 'at the end of our world history in comprehending the most recent political condition (*Zustand*)'. These words are not cancelled although Hegel apparently intended to replace them with a passage from the margin that now comprises this paragraph.

19. *In the margin*: (ζ) *Providence*

20. See above, p. 80.

21. *In the margin*: that it is so – displays the concreteness –

22. *In the margin*: (η) Transition – Providential *plan*

147 Anaxagoras | and what Socrates makes of it. For that faith is likewise indeterminate; it is *faith* in *providence* in general and does not advance to the determinate; it lacks an application to the whole, to the extensive course of world events.[23] The determinate aspect of providence, the specific acts that it performs, is called the *providential plan* (the plan's end and the means [for its] accomplishment). But this plan is said to be hidden from our eyes, indeed it is supposed to be presumptuous to want to know it. It was natural for Anaxagoras to not know how [his] understanding could manifest itself in actuality, for thinking and the consciousness of thought had not advanced further with him and in Greece generally. He was not yet able to apply his general principle to concrete reality, to cognize the latter in terms of the former. It was Socrates who took a step toward [finding] a means of combining the concrete and the universal, though, to be sure, he grasped it only in a one-sidedly subjective way. Thus he was not hostile to such an application, although faith in providence is at least opposed to the application on a large scale; it is opposed to knowledge of the providential plan. To be sure,
148 it is allowed in particular cases, here and [there]; | and pious souls discern in numerous individual occurrences, where others see only contingencies, not simply dispensations of God in general but rather God's providence—i.e. the purposes that God pursues with such dispensations. But this usually happens only in individual instances. For example, when an individual in great difficulty and distress receives help unexpectedly, we must not hold it against him that he should at once look up to God in gratitude; however, the purpose itself is [in this instance] of a limited kind; its content is merely the particular purpose of this individual. In world history, however, the individuals we are concerned with are peoples, totalities, states. We cannot, therefore, be content with this petty commerce, so to speak, on the part of faith in providence, nor indeed with a merely abstract and indeterminate faith that concedes the general notion that there is a providence ruling the world but that does not apply it to specific [events]. Rather, we must be *serious* about [our faith in providence]. Concrete events, the *ways* of providence, are its means, its appearances in history; these lie open before us, and we have only to relate them to the general principle mentioned above.

However, in mentioning knowledge of the divine providential plan in general, I call to mind an enduring question that in our time is of utmost importance. This is the question as to whether it is possible to know God—or

23. *In the margin*: Apply [to] history – *explain* – human passions, stronger army, talent, genius of a particular individual – or that in a state none of these things happens contingently – so-called natural causes – like Socrates. Abstract merely in remaining satisfied with the general –

rather, since it has ceased to be a question, [it is a matter of] the precept now become a foregone conclusion that it is impossible to know God, notwithstanding the teaching of Holy Scripture that our highest duty | is 149
not only to love God but also to know God.[24] It belies what Scripture itself says, that the Spirit leads into truth, knows all things, and penetrates even into the depths of divinity.[25] I could have refrained from mentioning that our principle (that reason rules and has ruled the world) is expressed in the religious form that providence governs the world; in so doing I would have avoided the question about the possibility of the knowledge of God. But I did not wish to do so, partly in order to bring out some further implications of these matters, and partly also to allay any suspicion that philosophy shies away from or should shy away from mentioning religious truths, or that it circumvents them because it does not, so to speak, have a good conscience about them. To the contrary, things have gone so far in recent times that, in opposition to certain kinds of theology, philosophy has to take on the content of religion.

[I make] only these general remarks. In the Christian religion God has revealed godself; i.e. God has given it to humanity to know what God is, so that God is no longer something hidden and concealed. With the possibility of knowing God, the duty to do so is laid upon us. The development of the thinking spirit, which starts out from and is based on the revelation of the divine being (*Wesen*), must eventually increase to the point that what initially was set before spirit in feeling and representational modes is also grasped by thought. The time must finally come when this rich production of creative reason—which is what world history is—will be comprehended. Whether | the time has come for this cognition will depend on whether the 150
final purpose of the world has ultimately entered into actuality in a universal and conscious manner. This [is] the understanding of our time. Our cognition consists in gaining insight into the fact that what is purposed by eternal wisdom comes about not only in the realm of nature but also in the world of actual [human events] and deeds. In this respect our consideration [of history] is a *theodicy*, a justification of God, something Leibniz attempted metaphysically in still abstract and indeterminate categories.[26] It should enable us to comprehend all the evils (*Übel*) of the world, including moral

24. Emphasis on the knowledge of God is found especially in the Johannine writings; e.g. John 8: 32. The connection between knowledge and love is found in 1 Cor. 8: 3, 13: 12.

25. Hegel here combines John 16: 13 and 1 Cor. 2: 10.

26. See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Tentamina Theodicaeae*, i (Frankfurt, 1719); and *Essais de Theodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal* (new edn., 2 vols., Amsterdam, 1734).

evil (*Böse*); the thinking spirit is [thereby] reconciled with the negative; and it is in world history that the total mass of concrete evils is set before our eyes.

Indeed, there is no arena in which such a reconciling knowledge is more urgently needed than in world history, and we shall accordingly take a moment [to consider it]. Such a reconciliation can be attained only through knowledge of the affirmative [element in history] in which the negative passes away into something that is subordinate and overcome. It is attained in part through the awareness of what the final purpose of the world truly is, and in part through the awareness that this purpose is actualized in the world and that evil has not been able to maintain a position of equality alongside it. Reason, it has been said, rules the world; but 'reason' is just as indefinite a word as 'providence'. People speak continually of reason without being able to define it, to specify its content, or to supply a criterion by which we can judge whether something is rational or irrational. Reason grasped in its determinate form is *the-thing-that-history-is-about* (*die Sache*);
151 and the rest, if we confine ourselves to reason in general, is mere | *words*. With this declaration we make the transition to the second point that (as indicated earlier) we wish to consider in this introduction.

B. THE ACTUALIZATION OF SPIRIT IN HISTORY[27]

The definition of reason in itself—insofar as reason is considered in relation to the world—amounts to asking what the final end of the world is. To discuss the latter implies that it should be realized or actualized. Thus there are two points to consider: the content of the final end, its definition as such; and its actualization.

We must first of all note that our object, world history, takes place in the *realm of spirit*. 'World' embraces both physical and psychical nature. Physical nature also plays a role in world history, and at the beginning we shall attend to the basic aspects of this natural influence. But spirit and the course of its development is the substantial aspect [of world history]. Spirit [is] *higher* than nature. Here we need to consider nature not as a rational system

27. The manuscript gives as a heading 'b.' This corresponds to the '(β) Determinate' in Hegel's enumeration of the main points of the introduction (above, n. 5). This section considers the determinate way that reason rules world history, i.e. through the actualization of spirit in its freedom.

in its own right, operating in its own distinct element, but only in relation to spirit.

But spirit is found in its most concrete actuality in the theater in which we [are about to] consider it, that of world history. Despite this—or rather precisely so that we may comprehend the general aspect of spirit from this mode of its concrete actuality—we must begin with some abstract definitions of the nature of spirit. At the same time, these can be nothing more than mere assertions since this is neither the place nor the time for a speculative exposition of the idea of spirit. What is said needs | to be 152
made accessible to the level of education and outlook that can ordinarily be expected among the audience. What can be said in an introduction is, as already remarked,[28] to be taken generally as historical, as a presupposition that finds its elaboration and proof elsewhere or that will at least obtain its confirmation at a later stage in the elaboration of the discipline.

a. The General Definition of Spirit as Intrinsically Free[29]

The first thing that we must do is to provide an abstract definition of spirit.[30] ... In accord with this abstract definition, we can say that world history is the portrayal of the labor of spirit to arrive at *knowledge of what* it is *intrinsically*. The *Orientals* do not know that spirit, or the human being as such, is intrinsically free; because they do not know this, they are not themselves free. They only know that one [person] is free, but for this very reason such freedom is merely arbitrariness, savagery, and dull-witted passion, or their mitigation and domestication, which itself is merely a natural happenstance or something capricious. This *one* is therefore a despot, not a free human being.

The consciousness of freedom first awoke among the *Greeks*, and accordingly they were free; but, like the Romans, they knew only that *some* are free, not the human being as such. Plato and Aristotle did not know the

28. See above, pp. 80–1.

29. *The manuscript reads*: (α). *In the margin*:

(α) General definition

(β) Visible *means* of fulfilling this definition

(γ) Completed reality – state

30. The manuscript adds the words, 'With respect to this we say that...', and then leaves three-quarters of a page blank. This appears to be a reference to an earlier, no longer extant manuscript, used by Hegel in the actual presentation of the lectures. The lecture transcriptions contain material at this point that is not found in the lecture manuscript; Hegel discusses the idea of freedom as the substantiality of spirit, drawing a parallel to 'weight' as the substantiality of matter.

latter. Thus not only did the Greeks have slaves, upon whom their life and the continued existence of their beautiful freedom depended; but also their freedom itself was on the one hand only a contingent, transient, incomplete flowering of limited scope, and on the other hand a harsh servitude
153 [imposed] on [some] human beings, on [their] humanity. |

The *Germanic* nations were the first to come to the consciousness, through Christianity, that the human being as human is free, that the freedom of spirit constitutes humanity's truly inherent nature. This consciousness first arose in religion, in the innermost region of spirit; but to incorporate this principle into secular existence was a further task whose solution and application would require a long and arduous labor on the part of culture. For example, slavery did not immediately [cease] with the adoption of the Christian religion; still less did freedom immediately come to prevail in political states, nor did governments and political institutions become rationally organized and founded upon the principle of freedom. The *application* of this principle to actuality, the penetration and transformation of worldly conditions by the principle of freedom, is the long process that is history itself.

I have already drawn attention to this *distinction* between the *principle* as such and its application, that is, its *introduction* into and its *accomplishment* in the actuality of spirit and life; and we shall return to it again shortly. It is one of the basic aspects of our discipline, and we must keep it ever in mind. The distinction applies not only to the *Christian* principle of the self-consciousness of freedom, which I have mentioned here in a preliminary way, but also to the principle of *freedom* in general. World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom[31]—a progress whose necessity we have to
154 recognize. |

These general remarks on the different degrees of the knowledge of freedom—namely, that the Orientals only knew that *one* is free, that in the Greek and Roman world *some* are free, and that we by contrast know that *all* human beings are intrinsically free, that the *human being* as *human* is free—supply us with the divisions that we shall make in world history and by which we shall treat it. But these are only preliminary remarks made in passing; several other concepts must first be explained.

31. *In the margin*: Education of the human race to what? To freedom – humanity educated to it – not directly. [It is a] result –

[*Ed.*] Hegel is alluding here to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (Berlin, 1780). It is noteworthy that the typology of stages of the consciousness of freedom is already found in Hegel's 1820–1 lectures on the history of philosophy. See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ed. and tr. Robert F. Brown *et al.* (Oxford, 2009), i. 181, 195.

Spirit's consciousness of its freedom (and along with it for the first time the actuality of its *freedom*) has been declared to be the *reason* of spirit in its determinacy. The latter is the destiny of the spiritual world, and (since the substantial, physical world is subordinated to the spiritual, or in the speculative sense has no truth over against it) it is the final end of the world in general. But that this freedom, as accounted above, is itself still indeterminate, that freedom is a term of unlimited ambiguity, that since freedom is the highest [concept] it is subject to no end of misunderstandings, confusions, and errors, including every possible aberration—all this has never been known and experienced so fully as in the present age; but we must be satisfied for the moment with this general definition. We have also taken note of the importance of the immense difference between the principle as it is *intrinsically* or *in itself* and what it is in actuality. At the same time it is precisely freedom within itself that contains the infinite necessity within itself to bring itself to consciousness and to actuality—for its very concept is to know itself. Freedom is itself the end or purpose of its own operation, the sole end of spirit. The immediate question | must be: What *means* does 155
it employ? This is the second point that we have to consider here.

b. The Means of Spirit's Actualization: Passions, Interests, Ideals[32]

The question about the *means* by which freedom brings forth a world for itself leads us to the phenomenon[33] of history proper. Whereas freedom as such is primarily an internal concept, the means it employs is something external and phenomenal that confronts us directly in history. An initial *inspection of history*, however, indicates that the actions of human beings proceed from their needs, passions, and interests, from the representations and purposes to which these give rise, and from their character and talents—indeed in such a way that in this spectacle of activity these needs, passions, interests, etc., seem to be the sole *driving force*. Individuals do at times pursue more general purposes such as *goodness*, but in such a way that this goodness is itself limited in character, for example, a noble love of country, of a country that plays an insignificant role in the world and the general purposes of the world; or a love for one's family, one's friends, and one's moral rectitude in general—in a word, all *virtues*. We may well see the dictates of reason actualized in these subjects themselves and in the sphere of their efficacy; but these are only isolated individuals who make up but a

32. *The manuscript reads*: (β)
33. *The manuscript adds*: (aa)

small minority of the vast human race over against all the other indivi-
156 duals, | and the effective range of their virtues is correspondingly small. But in many cases passions, private interests, and the satisfaction of selfish impulses are the most powerful force. What makes them powerful is that they do not heed any of the limitations that justice and morality seek to impose on them; and the natural force of passion has a more immediate hold on human beings than the artificial and laboriously acquired discipline of order and moderation, of justice and morality.

When we contemplate this spectacle of the passions and the consequences of the violence and irrationality that are associated with them, and even more so with good intentions and worthy aims; when we have before our eyes in history the evil, the wickedness, the destruction of the noblest constructs of peoples and states, the downfall of the most flourishing empires that the human spirit has produced; and when we [observe] with profound compassion the untold miseries of individual human beings—we can only end with sorrow at the transience of everything. And since this downfall is not a work of nature merely but of the will of human beings, we can all the more end up with moral sorrow and with the good spirit (if such is in us) repulsed by such a spectacle.

Without rhetorical exaggeration we need only compile an accurate account of the misfortunes that have been suffered by even the finest creations of peoples and states, and of private virtues or innocence, to raise up a
157 most frightful picture—a picture | by which our feelings are intensified to the deepest and most helpless sorrow with no reconciling outcome to counterbalance it. We can perhaps fortify ourselves against this sorrow or escape from it by the thought that this is how things have happened, that it is a matter of fate, that nothing about it can be changed. And then we react against the lassitude into which our sorrowful reflections are able to plunge us and return to our [normal] outlook on life, to the aims and interests of the present, which are not a sorrow over the past but return us to our own actuality, even to that selfish complacency that stands on the calmer shore and, from a secure position, finds satisfaction in the distant scene of confusion and wreckage. But even as we look upon history as this slaughterhouse in which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtues of individuals are sacrificed, our thoughts are necessarily impelled to ask: *to whom, to what final purpose*, have these monstrous sacrifices been made? From here the question customarily turns to those general considerations from which we have begun our inquiry. From this beginning we identified those same events that offer this spectacle for gloomy feelings and brooding reflection to be the field in which we wish to see only the *means* to what we have claimed to be the substantial destiny, the absolute final end, or (what is

the same thing) the true result of world history. We have from the very beginning rejected the way of reflection as a means of ascending from this picture of [historical] particularity to the universal. Besides, such sentimental reflection has no real interest in raising itself above these attitudes and feelings, or in fact solving the enigmas of providence to which such | 158
considerations give rise. Rather it is woefully content with the empty and fruitless sublimities of this negative result. We return, therefore, to the standpoint that we have taken, and the elements we shall adduce from it will furnish us with the essential indications for answering the questions that are raised by these pictures [from the past].

[34]The first thing to be noted is that what we have called the principle, the final end, the destiny, or the nature and concept of spirit *in itself*, is purely *universal* and *abstract*. A principle, fundamental rule, or law is something universal and inward, which as such is not completely actual, however true it may be in itself. Purposes, principles, and the like are in our thoughts, only in our inner intentions, or also in books, but not yet in actuality. In other words, what is only *implicit* is a possibility, a potency, but it has not yet come out from its inwardness into existence; [it is] one-sided ([like] philosophy [itself]). A second moment is needed to arrive at its actuality, that of activation, of actualization, and the principle of that is the will, the activity of human beings in general in the *world*. It is only through this activity that the [original] concept, the implicit determinations, are realized and actualized.

Laws and principles are not immediately alive, do not gain currency, by themselves;[35] the activity that [puts] them into operation and determinate existence is that of human needs, drives, inclinations, and passions. The fact that I actualize something and | bring it into determinate existence must 159
involve me, *I* must be at hand,[36] I seek to be satisfied through its accomplishment—my own *interest* must be at stake. 'Interest' signifies 'being at hand'.[37] A purpose that I am actively to pursue must also in some way be my own purpose; I must simultaneously satisfy *my* purpose, even though the purpose for which I am working has other aspects that have nothing to do with me. This is the infinite right of the subject, the second essential element

34. *In the margin*: Connection of *particularity* with the universal, whereby the former becomes the means –

35. *In the margin*: *my* interest

36. Hegel plays on the connection between *Daseyn* (here translated 'determinate existence', literally 'being there') and *dabey seyn* ('being at hand').

37. Interest (*Interesse*) means literally 'being between' (*inter-esse*), thus less literally 'being at hand' or 'being involved'.

of freedom[38]—that the subject itself must be satisfied in [carrying out] an activity or task. And if persons are to be interested in something, they must be able to be actively engaged in it; that is, they require an interest of their own, they wish to identify themselves with it, and they find their own self-esteem confirmed by it. But we must avoid a misunderstanding here: people find fault and justifiably say, in a misguided sense, of an individual that he is an interested party, that he seeks *only* his personal advantage—that is, seeks his personal advantage[39] without regard to the general purpose on the occasion he seeks that advantage, even [acting] contrary to the purpose by curtailing, damaging, or sacrificing it. But whoever is active on behalf of a cause is not merely interested in general but is interested in *it*. Language accurately expresses this distinction. Nothing happens or is brought to completion unless the individuals who are active in it are satisfied[40] too—they who are particular [individuals] and who have needs, drives, and interests that are specific, are their own, although others have them too,
160 and that in their context—for example, my coat—are not | distinct from those of the others. Included among these [interests] are not only one's own needs and volitions but also one's own insights and convictions, or at least one's own estimation[41] and opinion—assuming that the need for argument, understanding, reason is otherwise already awakened. When people are active on behalf of a cause, they expect that the cause will appeal to them as such, that they should enter into it on the basis of their own opinion and conviction regarding the goodness of the cause, its justice, usefulness, advantage for themselves, etc. This element in particular is important for our own time when people are much less inclined to accept something on the basis of trust and authority and wish rather to dedicate their share of activity to a cause on the basis of their own understanding and independent conviction and estimation.

Thus we may say that in general nothing is accomplished without the interest of those whose activity is involved. And since interest can be described as passion (insofar as individuals wholly apply themselves to an object with every fiber of the will, to the exclusion of all other actual or possible interests and aims, and concentrate all their needs and resources on this end), we may really say that *nothing great* has been accomplished in

38. The first element could be the universal principle of freedom that is mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or it could be marked by the '(αα)' (above, n. 33) that is not matched by a '(ββ)' later in the text (see the beginning of the second paragraph below).

39. *In the margin*: says [he is] interested for his own sake – isolated, only *his* cause

40. *In the margin*: satisfaction of my spirit – mediated – stubbornly pursued

41. *In the margin*: nowadays private interests [are] connected with general interests

the world *without passion*. Passion is the subjective, and in this respect the formal, aspect of the energy of volition and activity, irrespective of its content or aim. Just as with my own conviction, insight, and conscience the specific content of my conviction matters, so also does the specific aim of my passion—whether | one aim or another is of a truer nature. But con- 161
versely, if it is the truer nature, then it is inevitable that it should come into existence and be actual as that element of the subjective will that includes all such factors as needs, drives, passions, as well as one's own views, opinions, convictions.

From this discussion of the second essential element of historical actuality of a purpose as such, it is evident—if in what has been said we consider the state—that in this aspect a state will be well-constituted and internally powerful if the private interest of its citizens coincides with the general end of the state, each finding in the other its satisfaction and actualization. This is a most important proposition. But for the state to achieve this unity, numerous institutions must be established and appropriate mechanisms invented. This involves a lengthy struggle of the understanding to become aware of what is appropriate, as well as a struggle with particular interests and passions, which must be subjected to a protracted and difficult discipline before this unity is achieved. The point in time at which the state attains such a unity marks the period in its history when it flourishes, the period of its virtue, strength, and success.

But *world history* does not begin with *some sort of conscious purpose*, as do the *particular* spheres of human beings. The simple human drive to a common life already has as its conscious purpose the securing of life and property, and once such a common life has come into being these purposes are further defined, such as upholding the city of Athens or Rome; and with every new evil or exigency the problem becomes more specific still. World history begins with its *general purpose*—that the *concept* of spirit be satisfied—but only *in itself*, i.e. as *nature*.[42] It is the inner, or innermost uncon- 162
scious drive; | and, as has already been mentioned, the whole business of world history is the labor to make this drive conscious. Thus what has been called the subjective side—needs, drives, passions, particular interests, opinions, subjective impressions—is present on its own account in the shape of *natural being* or *natural will*. The vast number of volitions, interests, and activities constitutes the *instruments* and means by which the world spirit accomplishes its purpose—raising it to consciousness and making it actual.

42. *In the margin*: Actuality first [exists] only as nature

This purpose is simply to find itself, to come to itself, and to contemplate itself in its actuality. All these expressions of individual and public life, in seeking and satisfying *their own* ends, are at the same time the *means* and *instruments of a higher* and wider purpose, which they know nothing of but unconsciously carry out. It is this that can be open to question, and indeed it has been questioned and frequently denied—decried and disdained as a philosophical fantasy.

But I have made this clear from the very beginning, and our presupposition or faith (which, however, can only be postulated as a result) makes no claim here beyond saying that *reason rules* the world and thus also has ruled and continues to rule world history. Everything else is subordinate to this universal substance in and for itself, and serves as a means for it. In addition, however, reason is immanent in historical existence, bringing itself to completion in and through it. That the *unification* of the universal that subsists in and for itself with the singular or subjective is the sole truth, is *speculative* in nature, and in this general form is treated by logic. But *in the course* of world history itself, seen as something still in progress, the subjective side or consciousness is [not] yet in a position to know what the pure and final
163 purpose | of history is, what the concept of spirit is. For the latter has not yet become the content of its needs and interests; and although the subjective consciousness is still unaware of it, the universal is nonetheless present in its particular purposes and completes itself through them. Since, as I have said, the speculative aspect of this connection belongs to logic, this is not the place for me to provide and develop its concept or, so to speak, make it *conceivable*. But I can attempt to give a clearer impression of it by means of examples.

The relationship [between the universal substance and subjective consciousness] is such that the actions of human beings in world history produce an effect altogether different from what they intend and achieve, from what they immediately know and desire. They accomplish their interests; but at the same time they bring about something additional that indeed is implicit in their actions but was not present in their consciousness and intention. By way of an analogy, let us think of a man who, out of revenge (perhaps justified in that he may have been harmed unjustly), sets fire to someone else's house. This at once means that a connection is established between the immediate deed and further circumstances, albeit external circumstances, which have nothing directly to do with the original deed. The deed as such is perhaps the application of a small flame to a small portion of a beam, and further consequences of the deed ensue on their own accord. The burning section of the beam is connected with other sections; these in turn are

connected with the timberwork of the entire house, and the latter with other houses, leading to a widespread conflagration that destroys the property of many more persons than the one against whom the revenge was directed, and indeed costs the lives of many persons. This outcome was not part of the original deed or of the intention of the perpetrator. However, the action has a further implication: the instigator only intended an act of revenge against an individual by destroying his property, although in addition it is a crime, which carries its | punishment with it. The perpetrator may not have been 164
aware of, still less intended, this result, although it is the universal and substantial aspect of his deed in *itself*—that which is brought about by it.

This example only establishes that something more can reside in an immediate action than was present in the intention and consciousness of the agent. The example has the additional feature that the substance of the action, and thus as a whole the action itself, turns against the one who performed it; it recoils upon him and destroys him. Insofar as the action is [treated as] a crime, it misfires and justice gets restored. But there is no need to stress this aspect of the example, as it applies only to a specific case; and besides I have said that I only wished to introduce an analogy.

But I would like to mention another example, which will appear later in its proper place. As an actual historical instance it involves, in a characteristic form that essentially concerns us, the unification of the universal and the particular, of a determinacy necessary on its own account and a purpose that appears contingently. Caesar, in danger [of losing] the position to which he had ascended—a position in which he was not yet superior to the others who stood at the head of the state but was at least equal to them—opposed [his rivals] in the interest of preserving his own position, honor, and security. He was in danger of succumbing to those who were on the point of becoming his enemies, but who at the same time had the formal constitution of the state (and hence the authority of outward legality) on the side of their own personal ends. | But since their power gave them sovereignty over the 165
provinces of the Roman Empire, his victory over them simultaneously enabled him to conquer the whole empire itself. Without changing the form of the constitution, he thereby became the sole ruler of the state.[43] By carrying out his originally negative end, he gained the undivided sovereignty of Rome, which was at the same time an intrinsically necessary determination in Roman and world history. Thus not just his personal

43. Hegel is following here the interpretation that Caesar himself gives of his conflict with his opponents. See C. Julius Caesar, *Commentariorum Belli Civilis*, book 3 (*The Civil War*, tr. J. M. Carter (Oxford, 1997), 76–139).

advantage was involved; rather his work was an impulse that accomplished the end for which his age was ready. Such are the great figures of history. Their own particular ends contain the substantial end that is the will of the world spirit. Their true power is this content, which is present in the universal, unconscious impulse of humanity. Human beings are inwardly driven by this impulse and are incapable of resisting the individual who has taken over the execution of such an end in [the pursuit of] his own interest. To the contrary, peoples gather about his banner; he reveals to them and carries out what is their own immanent drive.

If we go on to examine the fate of these world-historical individuals, [we see that] they have had the good fortune to be executors of an end that marked a stage in the advance of the universal spirit. However, as subjects
166 who are also distinguished from their substance, they. . . .[44] |

But although we may accept that individual persons, their purposes and the satisfaction of their purposes, are sacrificed, that their entire happiness is given up to the realm of natural forces and to the contingency of which it is a part—that we view individuals in general under the category of means—there still remains one aspect of individuals that we hesitate to view only in this light, even in the face of extremes, for it is something utterly not subordinate [as a means] but rather is in itself eternal and

44. Here a break occurs in the manuscript (between sheets 65b and 66a) where Hegel presented material orally in the lectures that is not included in the manuscript. The loose sheet 'Auch Schauspiele der unendliche Verwicklungen' ('also spectacles of endless complexities') helps to fill in the gap (see below, pp. 127–8). It is in this fragment that Hegel's famous reference to the 'cunning of reason' (*List der Vernunft*) occurs, a reference incorporated into the oral lectures. Karl Hegel's transcription of the lectures of 1830–1 contains the following passage (MS, pp. 19–20) at this point: 'In external history we have right before our eyes what is particular, namely, drives and needs. We see these particular elements engaged in mutual destruction, headed for ruin, [whereas] the idea is what is universal, and in the struggle it is free from assault and is unscathed. This is what we may call the *cunning of reason*, since reason avails itself of these instruments and shines forth untouched or, rather, brings itself forth. Rational purpose (*Vernunft-Zweck*) realizes itself by means of the needs, passions, and the like of human beings; what is personal or private is quite insignificant over against what is universal; individuals are sacrificed and relinquished. World history represents itself as the conflict of individuals; in the realm of particularity things proceed *naturally*, that is, force (*Gewalt*) prevails. In animal nature the preservation of life is the purpose, drive, and instinct, and it is this way too in that natural domain to which belong the aims of the passions; these aims are engaged in conflict with one another; they are successful but in turn are just as likely destroyed. Reason alone carries weight, pursues its own purpose within the tumult of the world, and lifts itself up.' See the forthcoming vol. ii of this edn. Different versions of this passage are found in the 1840 *Werke* edn. (*The Philosophy of History*, tr. John Sibree (New York, 1956), 32–3), and in the Lasson and Hoffmeister edn. (*Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History*, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1975), 89).

divine. This is morality, ethical life, religious piety. Something already mentioned about the activation of rational ends by individuals[45] is that their subjective aspect—their interest as a whole and that of their needs and drives, their opinions and views (as only a formal aspect)—does, however, have an infinite right to be satisfied. When we speak of a means, we represent it principally as something that is only external to the end and plays no part in it. But in fact natural things generally, even the commonest inanimate things, when they are used as means, must already be of such a character as to be suitable to their end and have something about them that has affinity with it. And the relationship of human beings to rational ends is least of all that of a means in this wholly external sense. For in fulfilling rational ends, they not only simultaneously fulfill their own particular ends (whose content is quite different from that [of the universal end]) but also *participate* in that rational end itself, and are thereby ends in themselves. [They are] ends in themselves not only in a formal sense, as are all living beings—see Kant[46]—whose individual lives are by their very nature already subordinate to human life and are rightly used as means; | 167
individual human beings are also *ends in themselves* by virtue of what their ends involve. And under this heading falls everything that we would exempt from the category of means, namely, morality, ethical life, religious piety. Human beings are ends in themselves only in virtue of the divine principle within them that we have referred to all along as reason and, insofar as it is inwardly active and self-determining, as freedom. And we assert (without being able to develop the point more fully here) that indeed religious piety, ethical life, etc., have their soil and source in this principle and therefore are intrinsically elevated above external necessity and contingency. (But it must not be forgotten that we are concerned with these factors only insofar as they exist within individuals, that is, insofar as they are left to individual freedom; in this regard, the *responsibility* for religious and ethical weakness, corruption, or loss falls upon individuals themselves.)

This is the hallmark of the lofty and absolute vocation of human beings, that they *know* what good is and what evil is,[47] and that *volition* itself is willing either good or evil—in short, that they are capable of responsibility with respect not only to evil but also to good; they are responsible not simply

45. See above, pp. 91–3.

46. Hegel is referring to Kant's distinction between organized beings as an end of nature and human beings as the final end of nature. See Immanuel Kant, *Critik der Urtheilskraft* (Berlin and Libau, 1790), 383 (the beginning of § 83); *The Critique of Judgement*, tr. James Creed Meredith (Oxford, 1952), ii. 92.

47. Hegel is alluding to Gen. 3: 5.

for this or that or for everything that is around them and in them, but also for the good and evil that are inherent in their individual freedom. Only the animal is truly and totally innocent. But to prevent or remove all the misunderstandings to which this claim usually gives rise (when, for instance, the very ignorance of evil, which gets called 'innocence', is hereby debased and
168 devalued) would require an extensive discussion, | a discussion no less extensive than a complete treatise on freedom itself.

[48]But when we consider the fate that overtakes virtue, ethical life, and religious piety in history, we must not fall into a litany of lamentations to the effect that the good and the pious often or indeed most of the time fare badly in the world, while the evil and the wicked prosper. Prosperity[49] is commonly understood in many different ways, such as wealth, outward honor, and the like. But when we are discussing an end that subsists in and for itself, the so-called prosperity or misfortune of particular single individuals cannot and ought not to be regarded as an element of the rational world order. There is more justification for expecting of the world purpose that good, ethical, and just purposes should seek their fulfillment and guarantee under its auspices and in it than to expect that simply for the happiness and good fortune of individuals. What makes humans morally *dissatisfied* (and they may take a certain pride in this dissatisfaction) is that they find a discrepancy between the present and their conceptions, principles, and opinion concerning ends of a more universal content, what they consider to be right and good (nowadays ideals of political institutions in particular); they find a discrepancy between the present and their predilection for devising ideals on which to lavish enthusiasm. They contrast [present] existence with their view of how things rightly *ought* to be. In this case it is not particular interests and passions that demand satisfaction but reason, justice, and freedom; under this banner, such demands assert themselves and not only are readily dissatisfied with the condition and events of the world
169 but rebel against them. To | appreciate such feelings and views, we should have to undertake an investigation of the stated demands themselves, of very emphatically expressed judgments and views. In no other time than our own have such general propositions and conceptions been advanced with more forceful claims. Whereas history customarily seems to present itself as a

48. *In the margin*: not that litany

49. 'Prosperity' translates Hegel's *Gut-gehen* (literally, 'going well'), used in conjunction with *schlecht gehe* and *gut gehe* in the preceding sentence. In the next sentence 'prosperity or misfortune' translates *Gut- oder Schlechtgehen*. The literal sense of 'going well' and 'going badly' perhaps conveys the meaning more accurately in this context.

conflict of passions, in the present age—although the passions are not absent—it appears, on the one hand, primarily as a conflict of conceptions striving to justify themselves to one another, and on the other hand as a conflict of passions and subjective interests, but essentially under the banner of such higher justifications. These rights, demanded in the name of what we have described as the vocation of reason—as the absolute end and as self-conscious freedom—are thereby legitimated as absolute ends just like religion, ethical life, and morality.

We shall turn in a moment to the state,[50] to which all such demands are directed. But as for the curtailment, harm, and ruin of religious, ethical, and moral purposes and affairs in general, it must at least be said—although we offer a more precise judgment regarding this matter later[51]—that such spiritual powers are absolutely justified; nevertheless, although their inward and universal aspect is infinite, their shapes, content, and development into actuality are more limited, thus meshing externally with the natural order and being subject to contingency. In this respect they also are transient, subject to curtailment and harm. Precisely as inwardly universal essences, religion and ethics have the feature, in conformity with their concept, of being truly present in the individual soul, even if this feature is not fully cultivated there and not applied to | a network of relationships. The religious piety and ethical life of a restricted sphere of life (e.g. that of a shepherd or a farmer), in their concentrated inwardness and their limitation to a few quite simple situations of life, have an infinite value—the same value as the religious piety and ethical life that accompany a high degree of knowledge and a life that is rich in the extent of its relations and actions.[52] 170

This inner center, this simple region of the right of subjective freedom, the seat of volition, decision, and action, the abstract content of conscience, that in which the responsibility and value of individuals and their eternal judgment are contained—all of this remains untouched by the noisy clamor of world history, untouched not only by external and temporal changes but also by the changes brought about by the absolute necessity of the concept of freedom itself. But in general the following may be established: that whatever in the world can justly claim nobility and splendor is subject to something even higher than itself. The right of the world spirit transcends all particular rights; it imparts itself to them

50. See below, pp. 100–7. The beginning of the section on the state has not been preserved.

51. An exposition as indicated here of the opposition between an absolute justification of spiritual powers and their historical variability is not to be found in the available sources. In a somewhat altered perspective Hegel returns to this theme at pp. 118–19.

52. *In the margin:* Ethical life in its genuine shape – in the state –

but only conditionally, insofar as they indeed belong to its substance but at the same time are burdened by particularity.

These remarks may suffice in respect to the *means* that the world spirit employs for the realization of its concept. In simple and abstract terms, the means it employs is the activity of subjects in which reason is present as their inherently subsisting substantial essence; but this ground is as yet indistinct and concealed from them. The matter becomes more complex and difficult,
171 however, when we consider individuals not merely as active | or in terms of particular purposes limited to only *this* individual, but rather in terms of a more concrete and determinate content related to religion and ethical life; for this content partakes of reason and hence also of its absolute rights. Now the relationship of a mere means to an end disappears [from view], and the major aspects that arise in regard to the absolute end of spirit have been briefly considered.

c. The Material of Spirit's Actualization: the State[53]

The third point concerns the end or purpose that is *carried out* by this means, that is, the shape it assumes in actuality. We have spoken of means, and with the carrying out of a subjective and finite end we also have the element of a *material* that is available or that must be procured in order that the end may be actualized. So the question becomes: What is the *material* in which the rational final end is carried out? [This is a] spiritual [end]. Here humanity [is]: (α) the subject of what
172 is substantial—its reason | and drive; (β) means; (γ) consciousness, a knowing and willing intelligence. [Its] specific end is a spiritual nature.[54, 55] . . .

The living power of the state in individuals is what we have called *ethical life*. The state, its laws and institutions, are theirs, are their right; so also are

53. *The manuscript reads*: γ

54. *Added at the end of the paragraph and in the margin*: Two aspects: (α) *substantial* content; (β) *subjective* will – freedom [as] subjective freedom – will – the true. Right, law, reason the subject matter. Universal will is ambiguous, not dual – false *limitation* of the will. Will of the *universal* – ought to be the will of the *individual*, which [has] a universal end [as] its own end – then it is free (α) objectively – (β) subjectively – dependent on law

55. At this point a break occurs in the manuscript, which jumps from sheet 69a to sheet 74a. In his lecture presentation, according to the transcriptions, Hegel discusses the difference between and the unification of the subjective side of history, as the knowing and willing individual, and the objective, substantial side, as the universal final end (see the outline of this material in n. 54). Here too he introduces the concept of the state, which is presupposed at the beginning of sheet 74a. The next three paragraphs are found on sheets 74a–b. In the lectures corresponding to the beginning of sheet 74b Hegel discusses the state as the actualization of the concept of freedom and as the ground for the emergence of art, religion, and philosophy. He also addresses the system of needs, the concept of law as the universal, the emergence of the *Volksgeist* (the spirit of a people), and the relationship of freedom and necessity.

their external possessions in nature—the soil, mountains, air, and waters—as their land, their native land. The history of this state, its deeds and the deeds of their forefathers, are theirs; it lives in their memory as having brought forth what now exists, what belongs to them. All this is their possession, just as they are possessed by it; for it constitutes their substance and being. Their way of thinking (*Vorstellung*) is fulfilled within it, and their will is the willing of the laws of their native land.[56] This spiritual totality constitutes a single essential being, the *spirit* of a people. *Athena* [has] a double significance[57]: as spiritual, and with all its characteristics included in a simple essentiality, [this totality] must become fixed as a single power and being. Individuals belong to it; each individual is the son of his people and, insofar as his state is still developing, the son of his age. No one can remain behind his age or even less leap ahead of it. This spiritual being is his being, he is a representative of it; he arises out of it and exists within it.

This spirit of a people is a *determinate* spirit, and, as has just been said, it is also determined by the stage of its historical development. Thus this spirit constitutes the foundation and content in the other forms of its consciousness | that have been indicated.[58] This spirit is a single individu- 173
ality. In *religion* it is represented, revered, and enjoyed in its essentiality as the essential being, the divinity (*der Gott*); in *art* it is portrayed in image and intuition; and in *philosophy* it is cognized and comprehended in thought. Because they have the same original substance, the shapes they assume, their content and object, exist in an inseparable unity with the spirit of the state. *This particular* form of the state can exist only with this religion, and likewise in this state only this philosophy and this art can be found.

These remarks are especially important in light of the foolish efforts of our age to devise and implement political institutions independently of religion. The Catholic religion, although it shares the Christian religion in common with Protestantism, does not allow for that inner justice and ethicality of the state that resides in the inwardness of the Protestant principle. It [is in fact] necessary that the political constitution and government should be divorced from a religion that has the feature of not acknowledging the *inherent* and substantial existence of right and ethical life. But if the state's legal principles and institutions are divorced from inwardness, from the ultimate shrine of

56. *In the margin:* If an Englishman is asked...

57. The goddess represents both a people (the city-state of Athens) and the spirit of this people.

58. This allusion is to parts of the manuscript that have been lost and that originally stood just before the beginning of the present paragraph.

conscience—the silent sanctuary where religion has its seat—they will not become actually central [to life] but will remain abstract and nonspecific.[59] . . .

The nature of the state has been described.[60] It will be recalled that in present-
174 day theories various misconceptions about it are prevalent | that are taken to be established truths and have become simply assumed. We will cite only a few of them here, especially those that are related to the aim of our [study of] history.

The first error that we encounter is the direct opposite of our concept that the [political] state is the actualization of freedom. This is the view that human beings are free by nature, but that in society and the state, which they enter by necessity, this natural freedom must be restricted.[61] That humans are free by nature is completely correct in the sense that they have freedom as their concept, but only in terms of their destination or vocation, that is, only *implicitly*; the 'nature' of an object just means its 'concept'. But this proposition is also taken as understanding, and referring to, human beings in their merely natural and immediate existence. In this sense a state of nature is assumed in which humans are imagined to be in possession of their natural rights and have the unrestricted exercise and enjoyment of their freedom. This assumption can scarcely claim to be historical fact. If one did seriously want to make such a claim, it would be difficult to point to such a state of nature that exists in the present or that existed sometime in the past. One can certainly point to states of savagery, but they are connected with raw passions and violent deeds; and, no matter how unrefined they are, they are connected with social institutions that supposedly limit freedom. This assumption is one of those nebulous pictures that theory produces, a repre-
175 sentation that flows | necessarily from it, and to which it then falsely ascribes an existence without any sort of historical justification.

59. Here a break occurs where the manuscript reverts from sheet 74b to 70a.

60. This is a reference to parts of the manuscript that have been lost and that originally stood between sheets 69a and 74a and sheets 74b and 70a, in other words, just before the beginning of this paragraph.

61. On the doctrine of the state of nature as a state of freedom, see especially Thomas Hobbes, *Elementorum philosophiae sectio altera: De cive* (Amsterdam, 1696). Hobbes gave the title *libertas* to chs. 1–4, which treat the state of nature. See also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat Social* (Amsterdam, 1762), book 1, esp. chs. 1–2, 6–8. Kant's idea that in a rightly ordered common life the exercise of free will is necessarily limited by the freedom of everyone is relevant here: Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre* (Königsberg, 1797) (Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin, 1900 ff.), vi. 230 ff.). Johann Gottlieb Fichte in particular emphasizes the idea, criticized by Hegel, that a necessary limitation of freedom occurs in society: *Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre* (Jena and Leipzig, 1796), esp. the Introduction, pt. 2 (Fichte, *Gesammtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, div. 1 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1966), iii. 319–22).

When we find a state of nature in empirical existence, it does indeed conform to its concept. Freedom as the ideality of the immediate and natural does not exist as something immediate and natural but must rather first be acquired and attained through the endless mediation of discipline acting upon knowledge and will. Thus the state of nature is rather a state of injustice, of violence, of uncontrolled natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and emotions. There is of course a restriction imposed by society and the state, but this is a restriction of these dull-witted emotions and raw impulses, and of preferences based on reflection too, as well as of the needs, choices, and fervor arising from cultural formation. These restrictions are part of the mediation by which the consciousness and the will of freedom in its true form, that is, its rational and conceptual form, are first engendered. Freedom in its concept is such that right and ethical life belong to it. The latter are, in and of themselves, universal essences, objects, and aims that are discovered by the activity of thinking—a thinking that distinguishes itself from and develops over against the realm of sense—and that in turn must be given form by and incorporated into the initially sensuous will, indeed contrary to that will itself. To regard freedom in a purely formal and subjective sense, abstracted from its absolutely essential objects and aims, is a perennial misunderstanding; for it means that the drives, desires, and passions that belong to particular individuals become part of the content of freedom, | [their] choices and preferences; and the restriction of any of these is 176
taken as a restriction of freedom. On the contrary, such a restriction is the absolute condition from which liberation proceeds, and society and the state instead provide the condition in which freedom is actualized.

We must mention a second representation that generally inhibits the development of right into a legal form, namely, *patriarchy*. This condition is regarded as providing, either for the whole [of humanity] or at least for some of its individual branches, the circumstances in which juridical as well as ethical and emotional elements [of life] are satisfied; and only in conjunction with patriarchy is justice itself truly practiced in accord with its concept. The patriarchal condition is based on the family relationship, which is the earliest form of ethical life, while that [of] the state is the second, consciously developed form. The patriarchal relationship is a transitional form in which the family has already grown into a clan or people, and in which the bond has already ceased to be one simply of love and trust and has become an association of *service*.

We must first indicate the ethical life of the *family*. The family is [regarded as] only a single person. The members of a family have either mutually surrendered their [independent] personhood (and hence their legal status along with their particular interests and selfish inclinations), as is the case with the parents, or else they have not yet attained to it, as with the children.

who initially are in the state of nature described above. Thus they live in a unity of feeling, in love, trust, and faith toward one another. In love an individual finds his own consciousness in the consciousness of the other and
177 is divested of himself; in this mutual divestment | each individual gains not only the other but also himself as he is at one with the other. The [family's] further interests [arising] from the needs and external concerns of life, as well as its internal structure in respect to raising children, constitute a common purpose. The spirit of the family—the Penates—is just as substantial a being as the spirit of a people within the state; and ethical life consists in both cases in a [common] feeling, consciousness, and volition, not in individual personalities and interests. But in the family this unity is essentially one of feeling and remains within a natural mode. The piety of the family is something to be most highly respected by the state, for by means of it, it has in its citizens individuals who already are intrinsically ethical (which as persons they are not), and who bring to the state a genuine foundation in their feeling of being at one with a whole.

But the expansion of the family into a patriarchal unit transcends the ties of blood relationship, which is the natural aspect of its foundation, and beyond which individuals must assume the status of [independent] personhood.

To examine the patriarchal condition in its wider scope would lead especially to the consideration of the form of theocracy, for the head of the patriarchal clan is also its priest. When the family is not yet separated from society and the state, then religion too is not yet set apart from society, and religious piety itself has not yet become an inwardness of feeling.[62] . . .

d. The Constitution[63]

The previously mentioned points have concerned abstract elements that are found in the concept of the state. But it is the *constitution* that carries out this concept and establishes the institutions that insure that whatever hap-
178 pens within the state is appropriate to the concept.[64] | If the principle of the *individual* will is taken as the sole determinant of the freedom of the state,

62. Here another break occurs where the manuscript jumps ahead from sheet 72a to 76a. At the conclusion of his treatment of the family and the state as the two main ethical powers, Hegel (according to the transcriptions) introduces the concept of right as the actuality of the universal will, then other matters that lead finally to the concept of the constitution, with which sheet 76a begins. From sheet 76b on, there are only limited points of agreement between the manuscript and the lecture transcriptions.

63. *The manuscript reads:* (δ)

64. *In the margin:* Superfluous [to say] that a state has a constitution – self-evident – being without a constitution is also represented as a constitution, like a sphere as a shape

and if each individual ought to assent to everything that takes place by and for the state, then in the strict sense there is no constitution. Only two things would be needed: first, a central body without a will of its own, which would take note of what appeared to it to be the needs of the state and make its opinion known; then a mechanism for calling together the individuals, recording their votes, and performing the arithmetical operation of counting and comparing the number of votes in favor of various propositions, at which point the decision would already have been taken.

The state itself is an abstraction, which itself has only a universal reality in its citizens; but it is actual, and its merely universal existence must become specific in the form of individual volition and activity. The need arises for some sort of government and political administration;[65] there is a need for selecting and singling out those to be heavily occupied with the affairs of state, to make decisions and determine how they are to be executed, and to instruct the citizens who are to put them into practice. If, for example, in a democracy a people chooses [to go to] war, a general must still be put in command to conduct the war. The state as an abstraction comes to life and actuality in the first instance by means of the constitution; but as it does so a difference arises between ruler and ruled, between command and obedience. | Obedience, 179
however, seems to be incompatible with freedom; and command seems to do the very opposite of what is required by the foundation of the state, by the concept of freedom. If sometimes the distinction between command and obedience is necessary because the matter could not be otherwise—and this appears to be a necessity that is merely external to freedom, abstractly defined, and indeed in conflict with it—the arrangement at least must be such that the minimum of obedience is required of citizens, and the minimum of arbitrariness is allowed to those in command. The content of what it is necessary to command should be the main thing that is determined and decided by the people in accord with the will of many or of all individuals—although the state as an actuality, as an individual unity, must have vigor and strength.

The foremost feature is the distinction between ruler and ruled, and constitutions have rightly been classified on the whole as monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. It should be noted, however, (α) that in monarchy itself a distinction must be made between despotism and monarchy proper; and (β) that in all classifications derived from the concept only the fundamental feature is emphasized. This does not mean that this very shape, variety, or kind is said to be exhausted in its concrete application, but rather that it

65. *In the margin*: *People* deceived, war waged, Goethe – Homer

admits of a number of particular modifications, not only in terms of general arrangements in themselves as such, but also of the sort that blend several of these essential arrangements, but which are accordingly amorphous, unsustainable, and inconsistent configurations. This clash of features raises the question, therefore, as to which is the *best* constitution, that is, by which arrangement, organization, or mechanism of political power the purpose
180 of | the state can be most securely attained.

This purpose can certainly be understood in different ways, for example, as the peaceful enjoyment of civic life or as universal happiness. Such purposes have given rise to the so-called *ideal* of political regimes, especially the ideal of the education of princes (Fénelon), or of rulers generally, the aristocracy (Plato).[66] Here the chief concern is with the character of those who govern the state, and no thought at all is given to the ideal form of the organic institutions of the state. The question about the best constitution is often treated as though not only is the theory about it a matter of subjective and free deliberation, but also the actual introduction of what is recognized as the best (or the better) constitution is a consequence of such a wholly theoretical decision—as though the type of constitution could be a matter of a wholly free and wide-ranging choice, not choice delimited by deliberation. It was in this thoroughly naive sense that the Persian nobility (but not the Persian people), having conspired to overthrow the pseudo-Smerdis and the Magi, after this successful undertaking and in light of the fact that no descendant of the Achaemenid dynasty[67] was still alive, deliberated on which constitution should be introduced into Persia; and Herodotus reports on this deliberation in equally naive fashion.[68]

Nowadays the constitution of a land or people is not thought to be so much a matter of free choice. The fundamental but abstractly formulated definition of freedom has led to the widespread theory that the *republic* is the only just and true constitution. Indeed, a number of men who have held high positions

66. See the novel by François de Salignac, de la Mothe Fénelon, *Les avantures de Télémaque, fils d'Ulysse* (London, 1742), esp. 18, where Pallas Athena instructs Telemachus in the form of Mentor but is not recognized. On Plato, see his reports to Dionysius the Elder and Dionysius the Younger on the purpose of his travels to Sicily, *Letters* 7, esp. 327c–328a and 328b–c (Hamilton and Cairns, p. 1577). In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ii. 179–80, Hegel says of Plato's intention to realize his political ideas through Dionysius that the idea of 'a young prince with a wise man standing behind or beside him, a philosopher who instructs and inspires him' is 'the basis for a hundred political novels'.

67. We have corrected Hegel's erroneous reference to the Pishdadians (according to Persian mythology, the most ancient royal lineage).

68. See Herodotus, *The History* 3.61–83 (on the Achaemenids, 3.65) (tr. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 238–50).

in a *monarchical* form of government, for example Lafayette,[69] have not contradicted such a view or have subscribed to it. But they have seen that such a constitution, even though it may be the best, in actuality cannot be introduced everywhere, and that, because *humans are what they are*, one must make do with a lesser degree of freedom. As a consequence, under these | 181
circumstances and in light of the moral condition of the people, the monarchical constitution may be the *most workable one*. From this perspective the necessity of a specific constitution is made to depend on conditions that are merely external and contingent. A representation of this kind is based on how the reflective understanding (*Verstandes-Reflexion*) separates concept and reality because it holds only to an abstract and therefore untrue concept and does not grasp the idea, or, what amounts to the same thing in content if not in form, does not have a concrete intuition of a people and a state. It has already been remarked[70] that the constitution of a people forms one substance and one spirit with its religion, with its art and philosophy, or at least with the representations and conceptions of its culture generally—not to mention additional external factors such as its climate, its neighbors, and its position in the world at large. A state is an individual totality from which a particular aspect, even a highly important one such as a constitution, may not be abstracted and isolated, considered solely for itself on its own terms. Not only is the constitution inwardly connected with and dependent on the other spiritual powers, but also the specific form of the entire spiritual individuality [of a state] with all of its powers is merely one moment in the history of the whole. The course [of world history as a whole] predetermines what gives to a constitution its highest sanction as well as its highest necessity.[71] . . .

C. *THE COURSE OF WORLD HISTORY*[72]

a. The Principle of Development

Historical change in the abstract sense has long been apprehended in a general way as involving a progression toward a better and more perfect

69. Hegel is probably drawing here on contemporary news accounts of the situation in France after the Revolution of July 1830 in which Lafayette, who in previous years had been a liberal deputy, led the national guard anew and in connection with the succession to the throne of Louis Philippe once again briefly gained great political influence.

70. See above, p. 101.

71. Here a final break occurs where more than two sheets of the manuscript are blank.

72. This heading is in the manuscript, but the subsection heading is editorial (a 'b' occurs below (n. 73) but not a corresponding 'a'). In this final section, beginning at sheet 80a, the

182 condition. Changes in nature, no matter how | diverse they are, exhibit only an eternally recurring cycle. In nature there is nothing new under the sun, and in this respect the manifold play of its shapes carries on in wearisome fashion. Something new emerges only through the changes that take place in the spiritual realm. Purely natural things have one and the same quality, an always stable character, into which all changes return and within which they are subject to it. The phenomenon of the spiritual as it appears in humans shows an altogether different character—an actual capacity for change, indeed, as has been said, a change in the direction of completion, an impulse of *perfectibility*. This principle, which makes change itself into a [basic] precept, has been grievously attacked by religions such as the Catholic and also by states that claim it to be their true right to be static or at least stable. While mutability is generally acknowledged with regard to worldly things such as states, an exception is made in the case of religion, as the religion of truth. Moreover, it is possible to ascribe changes, revolutions, and the destruction of legitimate rights partly to contingencies and misfortunes but principally to the frivolity, corruption, and evil passions of human beings. Perfectibility is in fact something almost as indeterminate as change itself; it is without aim and end; that toward which it supposedly tends, the better and the perfect, is completely unspecified.

The principle of *development* has a further aspect: there is at its basis an inner determination, an *implicit* presupposition, that it brings into exis-
183 tence. | This formal determination is an essential one: the spirit whose theater, property, and field of actualization is world history is not one that drifts about in the external play of contingencies but is rather a spirit that is in itself the absolutely determining [power]; its own distinctive determination stands firmly against contingencies, which it makes use of and governs [for its own purposes]. But natural organisms are also capable of development. Their existence is not simply an immediate one that can be altered only by external influences; rather it proceeds from its own inner

manuscript differs completely from the lectures. The transcription of the latter by Karl Hegel provides a much briefer alternative text, which must have been based on earlier materials, one of which is the fragment 'C. Course [of World History]' (see the Loose Sheets below). The contents of the final section of the manuscript, especially Hegel's attack on Friedrich Schlegel, the Abbé Lammenais, Baron von Eckstein, and the journal *Le Catholique* (see below, nn. 77–9)—all representatives of French Restoration politics—suggests a motive for planning a publication based on the manuscript, namely, to enter into the then-lively debate over the positions taken by the Restoration party, and by others as well, on issues relating to the philosophy of history and the principle of development. See Walter Jaeschke, 'Das Geschriebene und das Gesprochene: Wilhelm und Karl Hegel über den Begriff der Philosophie der Weltgeschichte', *Hegel-Studien*, 44 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009), esp. 40–4.

unchangeable principle, from a simple essence whose existence as a germ is at first likewise simple but then brings distinctions forth from itself into determinate being. These distinctive features engage with other things and thereby undergo a process of change; but this is a process that continuously reverts to its opposite and instead maintains the organic principle and its configurations intact. Thus the organic individual produces itself; it makes itself into what it is in itself. Spirit too is simply what makes itself; it makes itself into what it is inherently. But the development of the organic individual is such that it produces itself in an immediate, unopposed, and unhindered fashion; nothing can intrude between the concept and its realization, between the implicitly determined nature of the germ and the adequacy of its existence to its nature.

With spirit, however, it is otherwise. The transition of its | determinate 184
nature into its actual existence is mediated by consciousness and will. The latter are at first immersed in their immediate natural life; their object and purpose are at first their natural determination as such. Because it is spirit that animates them, consciousness and will [consist] of infinite demands, strength, and wealth. So spirit in itself is opposed to itself; it has to overcome itself as the genuine and hostile hindrance to its purpose. Development, which as such is a peaceful procedure because in its expression it remains simultaneously equivalent to and within itself, is, within spirit, in a hard and ceaseless conflict with itself. Spirit wants to attain to its own concept, but it conceals itself from it and is proud and full of satisfaction in its alienation from itself.

[Spiritual] development, therefore, is not just a harmless and conflict-free process of emergence, as in organic life, but rather a hard and obstinate labor directed to itself; moreover, it involves not merely the formal aspect of developing as such but rather the production of a purpose or end with a specific content. We have established from the beginning what this end is: it is spirit, and indeed spirit in accord with its essence, the concept of freedom. This is the fundamental object and thus also the driving principle of development. Such an object is that from which development derives its meaning and significance; so for example in Roman history Rome is the object, which guides the consideration of events, while the events in turn proceed only from this object, deriving their meaning from their relationship to it and having their substance in it.

In world history there have been several great periods of development that came to an end without any apparent continuation. As a consequence all the vast accomplishments of culture were destroyed, which unfortunately made it necessary to start over from the beginning in order to regain—with

some help perhaps from salvaged fragments of past treasures and with a
185 renewed and immeasurable expenditure of energy | and time, of crimes and suffering—one of the domains of past culture that was mastered long ago. At the same time there have been enduring developments, fertile and expansive structures and systems of culture with their distinctive elements. The formal principle of development as such can neither assign superiority to one [form of culture] over another nor make intelligible the purpose behind the destruction of earlier periods of development. Rather it must regard such progressions, and in particular the retrogressions they include, as outwardly chance occurrences; and it can only evaluate the merits [of a culture] by employing indeterminate criteria that are relative and not absolute ends, since the development is what finally matters.

b. The Stages of Development[73]

World history accordingly presents the *stages* of development of the principle whose content is the consciousness of freedom. This development has *stages* not only because it [occurs through] the mediation of spirit with itself rather than in spirit's immediacy, but also because it is inwardly differentiated into components or differences of spirit within itself. The more precise determination of these stages is in its general nature logical, but in its more concrete nature it is provided by the philosophy of spirit. The abstract form of the stages may be adduced here simply as follows. The first stage is that of immediacy, and, as already mentioned, in it spirit remains immersed in the natural state in which it exists in a condition of unfree singularity (*one* is free). In the second stage spirit emerges into the consciousness of its freedom, but this first breaking loose is incomplete and partial (*some* are free) because
186 it originates from the immediacy | of the natural state, is related to it, and is still encumbered with it as a moment. In the third stage spirit is elevated out of this still *particular* freedom into freedom's pure universality (the human being *as such* is free)—elevated into the self-consciousness and self-awareness (*Selbstgefühl*) of the essence of spirituality. These stages are the fundamental principles of the universal process; but how more precisely within each of the stages a further progression of shapes occurs, and how the dialectic of transition between the stages comes about, are matters reserved for the ensuing discussion.

Here we merely note that spirit *begins* from its infinite possibility, which however is only a possibility. This possibility contains spirit's absolute

73. The heading is editorial; the manuscript reads 'b'.

substance as something *implicit*, as the purpose and goal that it attains only as a result—a result that is only then its actuality. Thus in existence the progression appears as one from incompleteness to completion, although the former is to be understood not merely in the abstraction of incompleteness but rather as something that contains within itself its opposite, the would-be completion, as a germ or drive; just as possibility, at least for a reflective way of thinking, indicates something that ought to be actual, and, more precisely, just as the Aristotelian *dynamis* is also *potentia*, energy and power.[74] Thus incompleteness, which contains its own opposite within itself, is a contradiction; it indeed exists but just as surely is sublated and resolved. It is the drive, the impulse of spiritual life within itself to break through the bond, the rind of natural and sensuous life, of whatever is alien to it, and to come to the light of consciousness, that is, to itself.

c. The Beginning of World History[75]

In connection with the notion of a state of nature in which freedom and justice are, or were, supposedly present in perfect form, we have already remarked in general terms how the beginning of the history of spirit must be comprehended in terms of the concept. However, the historical existence of a state of nature was only an *assumption* made in the feeble light of hypothesizing reflection. | A pretension of a quite different sort—that is, an assump- 187
tion put forward on the basis not of thought but rather of a historical fact, and indeed one based on a higher attestation—is made by another notion that is prevalent today in certain circles. It is that of an original paradisiacal human condition, a notion that earlier was elaborated by theologians in their own fashion (for example, that God conversed with Adam in Hebrew[76]), and that is taken up again but adapted to suit other requirements. The higher authority to which appeal is initially made is that of the biblical narrative. But this narrative presents the primitive condition only in its few well-known parameters, in part, however, with various adaptations in regard to the

74. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (ii. 235–7) Hegel illustrates the concept of *dynamis* by referring especially to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1019a 32–1019b 15 (McKeon, pp. 765–6).

75. This heading is editorial.

76. Hegel apparently is alluding here to the doctrine of the divine origin of language. See, among others, Johann Peter Süßmilch, *Versuch eines Beweises, daß die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nicht von Menschen, sondern allein vom Schöpfer erhalten habe* (Berlin, 1766). Hegel would have been familiar with this discussion through Johann Gottfried Herder, *Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache* (Berlin, 1772) (*Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan, v (Berlin, 1891), 1–155). Hegel could also have drawn upon Rabbinic and especially Cabbalistic speculations about Adam's possession of complete knowledge and books written in Hebrew.

human being as such (taking it as universal human nature), or, insofar as Adam is taken as a single individual, as two in this one individual—or as only present and complete in a single human couple. The biblical account does not justify our imagining that a people and its historical condition actually existed in that primitive shape, still less that it had developed a pure knowledge of God and nature. Nature, so the fiction runs, 'originally lay open and transparent like a bright mirror of God's creation before the clear eye of humans',[77] and the divine truth was equally open to them. It is also hinted, although in an indefinite and obscure fashion, that in this primitive condition
188 humanity was in possession of a specific | and already extensive knowledge of religious truths, which indeed were directly revealed by God.[78] All religions had their historical origin in this condition, but at the same time they adulterated and concealed the original truth with products of error and depravity. In all of the erroneous mythologies, however, traces of that origin and of the first teachings of religious truth are present and discernible. Thus the study of the history of ancient peoples gains its essential interest from following it back to the point where such fragments of the original revealed knowledge can still be encountered in their greater purity.[79] We owe very

77. *In the margin with an asterisk*: Friedrich von Schlegel's *Philosophie der Geschichte*, vol. 1, p. 44.

[*Ed.*] See Friedrich von Schlegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte* (Vienna, 1829), i. 44–5 (*Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe* (= *KFSA*), ed. Ernst Behler (Munich, Paderborn, Vienna, Zürich, 1958 ff.), ix. 34–5).

78. References to an original revelation are found in passages preceding the above citation; see Schlegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, i. 39–40 (*KFSA* ix. 31). See also Schlegel's *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), 197–200 (*KFSA* viii. 295–9). In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, i. 141, Hegel refers to 'the French and Schelling' for the idea of an original condition of perfect knowledge. On his acceptance of such an original condition, see Friedrich Schelling, *Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studiums* (Tübingen, 1803), 168–9 (Schelling, *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–61), v. 287); and *Über die Gottheiten von Samothrace* (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1815), 30, 108–9 (*Sämmtliche Werke*, viii. 362, 416–17).

79. *In the margin with an asterisk*: We have this interest to thank for many valuable discoveries in Oriental literature, and for the renewed study of previously accumulated treasures relating to the circumstances, mythology, religion, and history of ancient Asia. The Catholic governments in more culturally advanced countries have ceased to resist the demands of thought and the need to ally themselves with scholarship and philosophy. In an eloquent and impressive fashion the Abbé Lamennais has reckoned it among the criteria of true religion that it must be *universal*, i.e., catholic, and the *oldest*; and the *Congrégation* in France has labored zealously and diligently that such assertions should no longer be regarded as pulpit tirades and proclamations of authority, as was frequently accepted in the past. The religion of the Buddha—a God-man—which commands so widespread a following, has attracted particular attention. The Hindu Trimurti and the Chinese abstraction of the Trinity were [however] intrinsically clearer in content. The scholars Abel-Rémusat and Saint-Martin have for their part conducted the most

much that is valuable to the interest | [that has produced] this research, but 189
the latter directly belies itself because it sets out to prove by historical methods what it has presupposed to exist historically. Neither that [advanced] state of the knowledge of God, or of other scientific, for example, astronomical, information, such as astronomers themselves, including Bailly,[80] have fancifully attributed to the Indians, nor the assumption that such a state prevailed at the beginning of | world history or that the reli- 190
gions of the peoples were derived from it by tradition and subsequently developed by a process of degeneration and deterioration, as is claimed by the crudely conceived so-called system of emanation—none of these

praiseworthy investigations into Chinese and thence into Mongolian literature, and, when they could, into Tibetan literature. And Baron von Eckstein, in his own fashion (i.e. with the help of superficial notions and mannerisms borrowed from German natural philosophy in the style of Friedrich von Schlegel, which, although more ingenious than those of Schlegel, nevertheless made not the slightest impression in France) has promoted this primitive Catholicism in his journal *Le Catholique*; in particular, he has gained the government's support for the scholarly projects of the *Congrégation*, with the result that it has even commissioned expeditions to the Orient to discover at last still hidden treasures with the hope of obtaining further information regarding more profound doctrines and especially on the greater antiquity and sources of Buddhism—thereby furthering the cause of Catholicism by this circuitous but for scholars interesting detour.

[*Ed.*] On the Abbé Lamennais, see among other writings his *Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1817–23), esp. iii, ch. 25; iv, ch. 29; and iv. 2–4, 486–7. Hegel's reference is to the Congrégation de Marie, which during the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods in France was suppressed, but which, following the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, became an ambitious political-theological organization to which a number of influential Restorationists belonged. The remainder of the information in the footnote most likely derives from an article probably written by Baron d'Eckstein, 'De la migration des peuples, et des causes déterminantes de cette migration', in the journal he published, *Le Catholique* (Paris, 1826–9), 8 (1827), 279–450. Marked by the fusion of religious, political, and Oriental interests, Eckstein was influenced not only by Schlegel's natural philosophy but more especially by the work of Joseph Görres on the history of mythology. His article refers to the research by Abel-Rémusat and Saint-Martin mentioned by Hegel. The latter is most likely Antoine Jean Saint-Martin, who in the 1820s wrote several essays on Oriental history and lectured at the Académie Française. Hegel discusses Buddhism, the Hindu Trimurti, and the Chinese signs for the Trinity in part 2 of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, where among other sources he cites Jean Pierre Abel-Rémusat's *Mémoires sur la vie et les opinions des Lao-Tseu* (Paris, 1823); see ii. 558 n. 120. He was familiar with other works by Abel-Rémusat, who was Professor of Sinology at the Collège de France. Hegel's remarks about the need for further research on the origins of Buddhism and about Eckstein and his contributions to Catholicism are supported by other articles in *Le Catholique*.

80. See Jean Sylvain Bailly, *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne, depuis son origine jusqu'à l'établissement de l'école d'Alexandre* (Paris, 2nd edn., 1781); this work also existed in German tr. (2 vols. Leipzig, 1777). However, it is not certain that Hegel read Bailly's work; it is more likely that he was familiar with the criticism of Bailly by Jean Joseph Delambre, *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1817). See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, i. 110–11 n. 15; and *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 530, incl. nn. 42, 43.

assumptions has any historical foundation, nor, when we contrast their origin (which is arbitrary and only derives from subjective opinion) with the concept [of history], can they ever hope to attain one.

The only fitting and worthy mode of philosophical reflection is to take up history at the point where rationality begins to appear in worldly existence—not where it is first merely an *implicit* possibility, but where a condition exists in which it steps forth in consciousness, volition, and deed. The existence of spirit or freedom in unorganic form—where there is no awareness of good and evil and thus of laws, whether it be an existence of savage or innocuous dullness, or, if you like, one of excellence—is not itself an object of history. The natural and at the same time religious form of ethical life is family piety. In such a society the ethical consists in the members behaving toward each other not as individuals or persons with free will; and for this reason the family in itself lies outside the development from which history first emerges. But if this spiritual unit steps beyond the sphere of feeling and natural love and attains a consciousness of personality, we have before us that obscure and arid midpoint in which neither nature nor spirit is open and transparent, and for
191 which nature and spirit | can become open and transparent only through a further labor and a protracted formation of the will that is becoming conscious of itself. Openness pertains solely to consciousness, and it is to consciousness alone that God and anything at all can reveal itself; in their true and universal form, which exists in and for itself, they can reveal themselves only to a consciousness that has become capable of meditative thinking. Freedom amounts to knowing and willing such universal and substantial objects as law and right, and producing an actuality that corresponds to them—the state.

Peoples may have had a long life without a state before they finally reach their destination [of becoming one], and they may even have developed considerably in certain directions. But, as already indicated, this *prehistory* lies outside our purpose, irrespective of whether an actual history followed it or whether the peoples in question never finally succeeded in forming themselves into states. A great historical discovery, like that of a new world, has been made twenty or more [years] ago in regard to the Sanskrit language and the connection of the European languages with it. It has given us a new insight into the historical links between the Germanic peoples in particular and those of India, an insight that carries as much certainty with it as can be achieved in such matters.[81] Even at the present time, we know of

81. Hegel does not mention here that, after the discovery of the relationship among the Indo-European languages, Friedrich Schlegel was one of the first to clarify this relationship further.

tribes that scarcely form a society, much less a state, but that have long been known to exist; and with others, although it is primarily their advanced condition that interests us, their traditions extend back before the history of the founding of their state, and they underwent numerous changes prior to this epoch. In the above-mentioned connection between the languages of peoples so widely separated [in space] and so | very different in religion, 192
political system, ethics, and in all aspects of spiritual and even physical culture (differences not only today but also in ancient times that we know about), we see as a result the irrefutable fact that these nations spread outwards from Asia and developed in disparate ways from a primordial kinship; and this is not something established by the popular method of a rationalizing combination of circumstances great and small—a method that has enriched history with so many fabrications given out as facts, and will continue to do so, since alternative combinations of the same circumstances as well as with others are possible. In themselves, however, all such evidently disparate events lie outside history: they have preceded it.

In our language the word 'history' (*Geschichte*) combines both objective and subjective aspects and signifies the *historia rerum gestarum* as well as the *res gestae* themselves, the historical narrative (*Geschichtserzählung*) as well as the events (*Geschehene*), deeds, and happenings themselves—aspects that in the strict sense are quite distinct. This conjunction of the two meanings should be recognized as of a higher order than that of external contingency: we must assume that historical narrative appears simultaneously with the actual deeds and events of history, that they are set in motion together from an inner common foundation. Family memorials and patriarchal | traditions are of interest within the family or tribe. Their 193
repetitiveness is no object worthy of memory, although distinct deeds or turns of fate may inspire Mnemosyne to retain those images, just as love and religious feeling impel the fanciful imagination to confer shape upon such initially shapeless urges. But it is the state that first supplies a content that not only lends itself to the prose of history but also helps to produce it. Instead of the merely subjective dictates of the ruler, which may suffice for the needs of the moment, a community in the process of coalescing and raising itself up to the position of a state requires commandments and laws,

But Hegel's designation of the time when this discovery was made, a good twenty years prior to the lectures of 1830–1, corresponds precisely with the publication in 1808 of Schlegel's *Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*. At the very beginning of his essay Schlegel thematizes this relationship: see *KFSA* viii. 115.

general and universally valid directives. It thereby creates a discourse [of its own development], and an interest in intelligible, inwardly determinate, and—in their results—enduring deeds and events, ones on which Mnemosyne, for the benefit of the perennial aim that underlies the present configuration and constitution of the state, is impelled to confer a lasting memory. All deeper feelings such as love, as well as religious intuition and its forms, are wholly present and satisfying in themselves; but the external existence of the state, with its rational laws and customs, is an incomplete present, the understanding of which calls for incorporating the awareness of its past [history].

Those periods—whether we estimate them in centuries or millennia—that elapsed in the life of peoples before history came to be written, and that may well have been filled with revolutions, migrations, and the most turbulent changes, have no objective history because they have no subjective
194 history, no historical narratives. It is not that narratives of such periods | have simply perished by chance; on the contrary, the reason why we have no such narratives is that none such were possible. It is only within a state that is conscious of its laws that clearly defined actions can take place, accompanied by that clear awareness of them that makes it possible and necessary to preserve them in this way. It is obvious to anyone who begins to be familiar with the treasures of Indian literature that this country, so rich in spiritual achievements of a truly profound quality, nevertheless has no history. In this respect, it at once stands out in stark contrast to China, an empire that possesses a most remarkable and detailed historical narrative going back to the earliest times. India has not [only] ancient religious books and splendid works of poetry but also ancient books of law,[82] something already mentioned as a prerequisite for the formation of history, and yet it has no history. But in this country the original organization that created social distinctions immediately became set in stone as natural determinations (the castes), so that, although the laws concern the civil code of rights, they make these rights dependent on distinctions imposed by nature, and they specify, above all, the position (in terms of injustices more than of rights) of these classes toward one another, i.e. only of the higher *vis-à-vis* the lower. The ethical element is thereby excluded from the splendor of Indian life and its realms. Given this bondage to an order based firmly and permanently on nature,

82. Hegel alludes here to the so-called *Laws of Manu*, to which he refers several times and in detail in his philosophy of religion lectures. See *Institutes of Hindu Law; or, The Ordinances of Menu* (Calcutta, 1794); and *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 346, 589–91 incl. n. 217, 597–9, 603.

all social relations involve a wild arbitrariness, ephemeral impulses, or rather frenzies, without any purposeful progress and development. Thus, no thoughtful memory, no object for Mnemosyne presents itself, and a deep but desolate fantasy drifts over a region that ought to have had a fixed purpose—a purpose rooted in actuality and in subjective yet substantial (i.e. implicitly rational) freedom | —and thereby ought to have rendered 195
itself capable of history.

As such a precondition for history, what happened is that so rich and immeasurable a work as the growth of families into tribes and of tribes into peoples—which have then expanded because of this increase, resulting presumably in many complications, wars, revolutions, and declines—only transpired without giving rise to history; and what is more, that the concomitant expansion and development of the realm of speech itself remained mute, taking place inaudibly and furtively. The evidence from monuments is that the languages spoken by uncivilized peoples have attained a high degree of development, and that the understanding has cast itself meaningfully, expansively, and fully into this theoretical region. An extensive and consistent grammar is the work of thinking, and its categories are apparent in it. Further evidence indicates that, with the progressive civilization of society and the state, this systematic completeness of the understanding gradually erodes, and language thereupon becomes poorer and less refined—a peculiar phenomenon in that a progression that is inwardly spiritual and that promotes and cultivates rationality allows intellectual elaboration and precision to fall into neglect, finds it to be confining, and dispenses with it. Language is the *activity* of the theoretical intelligence in the proper sense, for it is the outward expression of it. Apart from language, the activities of memory and fantasy are only just inner manifestations. But this whole theoretical activity, together with its further development and the more concrete process that accompanies it—the dissemination of peoples, their separation from one another, their interminglings and their migrations—remains buried in the obscurity of a voiceless past; these are not acts of a will becoming conscious of itself, of a freedom giving itself another sort of exteriority | and a proper actuality. 196
Since they do not partake of this true element, all such changes, regardless of the language development they cultivate, have not attained to history. The precocious development of language and the progress and diffusion of nations have first acquired their significance and interest for concrete reason partly as they bear upon states, and partly as they themselves begin to form a state.

After these remarks that have concerned the form taken by the beginning of world history and the prehistory that lies outside it, we must now indicate

more precisely the *manner of its course* [*of development*]—but for the present only in its formal aspects; the further determination of its concrete content is the task of the division of topics.

d. The Course of Development of World History[83]

It [world history], as we have indicated earlier,[84] presents the development of spirit's consciousness of its freedom and of the actualization produced by such consciousness. This development is of itself a sequence of *stages*—a series of successive determinations of freedom that proceed from the concept of the matter, which in this case is the nature of freedom as it becomes conscious of itself. The logical and even more the dialectical nature of the concept as such, i.e. the fact that it determines itself, posits determinations within itself and then sublates them, thereby attaining an affirmative, richer, and more concrete determination—this necessity, and the necessary series of pure and abstract conceptual determinations, are made known in philosophy. Here we need only indicate that each stage, since it is different from the others, has its own peculiar determinate principle. In history, such a principle constitutes the determinate characteristic of the spirit of a people. This principle concretely expresses every aspect of a people's consciousness and will, of its entire actuality; it is the common feature of its religion, its
197 political institutions, its ethical life, | its system of justice, its customs, as well as of its science, art, and technical skill, and the direction of its industry. These special characteristics are to be understood in terms of the general characteristic, the particular principle of a people, just as vice versa this general particularity can be found in the factual detail that history sets before us. The question as to whether a specific particularity in fact constitutes the distinctive principle of a people is one that can only be approached empirically and demonstrated by historical means.

To accomplish this, a trained capacity for abstraction and a thorough familiarity with ideas are both necessary. One must, so to speak, be familiar a priori with the sphere to which the principles belong, just as Kepler—to name the greatest exponent of this mode of cognition—had to be acquainted a priori with ellipses, cubes, and squares and with the conceptions concerning their relations before he could discover his immortal laws from

83. The manuscript reads 'b. Course of World History (*Gang der Weltgeschichte*)'. It thus repeats the wording of its major section 'C' (above, p. 107) and overlooks its previous 'b' (above, p. 110). We have designated as a separate section 'c' the discussion of the beginning of world history (above, p. 111).

84. See above, pp. 87–9.

the empirical data;[85] and the laws consist of definitions drawn from the indicated sphere of representations. Anyone who approaches such data without a knowledge of these elementary general definitions, however long he may contemplate the heavens and the movements of the celestial bodies, can no more understand these laws than he could hope to formulate them himself. This unfamiliarity with conceptions concerning the self-developing shape of freedom (*sich entwickelnden Gestaltens der Freiheit*) is partly responsible for the objections to a philosophical consideration of a science [history] that usually confines itself to empirical matters—objections to its so-called *a priori character* and its importation of ideas into the [historical] material. Such thought-determinations or categories then appear to be something alien, not present in the object. To a subjectively cultivated mind that is unfamiliar with thoughts and unaccustomed to using them, | 198
the categories do indeed appear alien and do not reside in the representation and understanding that have such a limited a view of the object. It is this that has given rise to the saying that philosophy *does not understand* (*nicht verstehe*) such sciences. Philosophy must indeed admit that it does not have the kind of understanding (*Verstand*) that prevails in those sciences—i.e. that it does not proceed according to the categories of such an understanding, but according to the categories of reason (*Vernunft*)—although it is acquainted with the understanding and with its value and position. In the procedure of scientific understanding, it is likewise the case that the *essential* must be separated from the so-called nonessential and clearly distinguished from it. But this is impossible unless we *know* what is essential; and when world history as a whole is to be considered, the essential, as we indicated earlier,[86] is precisely the consciousness of freedom and the determinate phases in its development. Orientation to these categories is orientation to the truly essential.

Some of the *instances* of the more direct kind of contradiction to the comprehension of a determinate object in its universal aspects can usually be traced to an inability to grasp and understand ideas. If, in natural history, some monstrous and abnormal specimen or mongrel is cited as an instance against clearly defined species and classes, we can rightly reply with a saying that is often used in an imprecise sense, that the exception proves the rule, namely, that the rule includes the particular conditions under which it applies, or that deficiency and hybridism occur in deviations from the

85. Johannes Kepler's first and second laws on the revolution of the planets are set forth in his *Commentaries on the Motions of Mars* (1609), and his third law in his *Harmony of the Worlds* (1619).

86. See above, pp. 87–8.

199 norm. Nature is not strong enough | to preserve its general classes and species from other elemental factors and agencies. But, [although] the constitution (*Organisation*) of the human being, for example, is comprehended in its concrete configuration, and the brain, the heart, and the like are specified as essential ingredients of its organic life, it is possible to adduce some wretched monster or freak that possesses a human shape in general or in part, and that has even been conceived in a human body, gestated there, been born from it, and drawn breath from it, but which lacks a brain or heart. If such a specimen is quoted as a counterexample to the defining properties of an actual human constitution, then all we are left with is the abstract word 'human being' and its superficial definition, from which the representation of a concrete and actual human being is of course quite different: the latter must have a brain in its head and a heart in its breast.

A similar situation arises when it is rightly maintained that genius, talent, moral virtues, moral sentiments, and piety can be encountered in every region, under all constitutions, and in all political circumstances; and there is no lack of examples to prove this assertion. But if this means that the distinctions that arise out of the self-consciousness of freedom are unimportant or nonessential in relation to the above-mentioned qualities, then [with such a view] reflection remains tied to abstract categories and waives any claim to determinate content because they provide no principle for it.

The cultivated standpoint that adopts such formal points of view affords
200 unlimited scope for ingenious questions, learned opinions, | striking comparisons, and seemingly profound reflections and declamations—ones that can become all the more brilliant the more they resort to indefiniteness, and can be ever more perpetually refurbished and modified the less they achieve great results in their efforts or arrive at anything solid and rational. In this sense, we might compare the familiar Indian epic poems,[87] if you like, with those of Homer, and argue perhaps that, since the magnitude of fantasy is the test of poetic genius, they are superior to the latter; in the same way, similarities between certain fanciful traits or attributes of the deities have led some to feel justified in identifying figures of Greek mythology with those of India.[88] Similarly, the philosophy of China, insofar as it takes *the One* as its basis, has been equated with what later appeared as the Eleatic philosophy or the

87. Hegel was familiar with the Rāmāyana and the Mahâbhârata, as is evident from his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*; see ii. 342 n. 277, 344 n. 282, 593 n. 230, 597 incl. n. 244, 603.

88. This comparison is found frequently. See esp. Schlegel, *Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 163–4 (*KFSA* viii. 263); also *Le Catholique*, 9: 5–19. See also below, n. 96.

Spinozistic system;[89] and since it also expresses itself in abstract numbers and lines, some have claimed to detect Pythagorean philosophy or even Christian dogma in it.[90] Examples of bravery, indefatigable courage, qualities of magnanimity, self-denial and self-sacrifice, etc., which are encountered in the most savage and the most faint-hearted of nations, are deemed sufficient for the view that there is as much and even more ethical life and morality in such nations as in the most civilized Christian states, and so on. In this regard, some have seen fit to doubt whether human beings have become better with the progress of history and of culture in general, and whether their morality has increased—the assumption being that morality depends on subjective intentions and opinions, on what the agent considers legal or criminal, | good or evil, and 201
not on what is considered to be legal and good or criminal and evil in and for itself or in terms of a particular religion that is regarded as true.[91]

Here we can spare ourselves from illumining the formalism and error of such attitudes, and from establishing the true principles of morality, or rather of ethical life, in opposition to false morality. For world history moves on a higher plane than that to which morality belongs: the proper sphere of the latter is that of private conviction, the conscience of individuals, and their own will and mode of action; these have their value, imputation,[92] and reward or punishment on their own terms. Whatever is required and accomplished by the final end of spirit (an end that subsists in and for itself), and whatever providence does, transcends the duties, liability, and expectation that attach to individuality by virtue of its ethical life. Those who, on ethical grounds, and hence with a nobler intention, have resisted what the progress of the idea of the spirit necessitated, stand higher in moral worth than those whose crimes may in some higher order have been transformed into means of putting the will of this order into effect. When the

89. Hegel could be referring to a work by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, *Der Pantheismus nach seinen verschiedenen Hauptformen, seinem Ursprung und Fortgange, seinem speculativen und praktischen Werth und Gehalt*; see i (Berlin, 1826), 5.

90. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* Hegel refers in this connection to a work by Abel-Rémusat that he probably has in view here as well. See Jean Pierre Abel-Rémusat, *Mémoires sur la vie et les opinions des Lao-Tseu* (Paris, 1823), 40–9.

91. Hegel alludes here to a theme that through Rousseau's first discourse became much discussed in the late Enlightenment. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discours qui a remporté le prix à l'Academie de Dijon* (Geneva, n.d.). But whether Hegel read the first or the second discourse himself is uncertain.

92. The German reads *Imputation*. In the next sentence the expression *Imputations-Fähigkeit* occurs, which is best translated as 'liability' (literally, 'capable of being charged or imputed'); and the latter is followed by the term *Zumutung*, meaning 'demand', 'expectation', or 'imputation'. *Imputation* is the Latin equivalent of the Germanic *Zumutung*, and it might be translated here as 'expectation'.

tables are turned in this way, however, both groups are subject to ruin, and this is thus merely a formal kind of justice that is upheld by the defenders of legal justification—a justice already relinquished by the living spirit and by God. The deeds of the *great* human beings—who are the individuals of world history—thus appear justified not only in the significance of what they do unselfconsciously themselves, but also from the standpoint of the [larger] world. But from the latter standpoint, demands must not be placed
202 upon world-historical deeds and | their agents deriving from moral spheres that are not pertinent. The litany of private virtues—modesty, humility, love of humanity, generosity, etc.—must not be raised against them. World history might well disregard completely the sphere to which morality and the much discussed and misunderstood dichotomy between morality and politics belong, not merely by refraining from judgments—for the principles of world history and the necessary relationship of actions to these principles already constitute the judgment—but also by ignoring individuals altogether and leaving them unmentioned; for what it has to record are the deeds of the spirits of the peoples, and the individual configurations that these deeds have assumed on the soil of external actuality could well be left to ordinary historians.

The same formalism as that found in morality makes use of the ill-defined aspects of genius, poetry, and even philosophy, and finds these in similar fashion in everything. These aspects are products of reflective thought; and *culture* consists of the ability to operate skillfully with such generalities, to get down to essential distinctions, to highlight them and give them labels, but without bringing out the true depth of their content. Culture is something formal in that its sole aim, irrespective of content, is to divide the latter into its component parts and to comprehend these in thought-out definitions and configurations; it is not the free universality that would enable it to make itself the object of its own consciousness (which is something that belongs to culture as such). Such a consciousness of thought itself and of the forms of thought in isolation from any material, is philosophy, for whose existence culture is admittedly a prerequisite; but the function of culture consists merely in clothing whatever content it has before it in the form of
203 universality, | so that the two are inseparably united within it—so inseparably that it regards its content (which, through the analysis of one representation into a multitude of representations, can be expanded to an immeasurable richness) as a purely empirical content in which thought plays no part. But it is just as much an act of thought, and indeed of the understanding, to reduce to a simple representation (such as 'earth', 'human being', etc., or 'Alexander', 'Caesar') an object that in itself encompasses a

rich and concrete content, and to designate it by a single word, as it is an act of thought to analyze it, to isolate [the qualities] contained in such a representation, and to bestow particular names on them. All this [has to be said] to avoid making ill-defined and empty pronouncements on culture.

But to return to the view that originally occasioned these remarks, it is at least clear that, just as reflection produces the universal conceptions of genius, talent, art, science, etc., and equally general observations about them, formal culture at every stage of spiritual configuration not only *can* but also must make its appearance, grow, and blossom out to the full; for each such stage must develop itself into a [political] state and, from this basis of civilization, advance to reflective understanding and to forms of universality, both in laws and in all other things. Political life as such necessarily involves formal culture and hence also the establishment of the sciences and of a fully developed poetry and art in general. Moreover, what we call the fine arts, indeed in their technical aspects, require a civilized common life of human beings. Poetry, which has less need of external means and supports, and whose medium is the voice, the element produced immediately from spirit's existence, | emerges in all its boldness and with a highly developed 204
power of expression even in the circumstance where a people does not live under a shared legal system; for as already remarked,[93] language by itself attains to a high cultivation of the understanding outside the bounds of civilization.

Philosophy, too, must make its appearance in political life. For that which confers culture upon a content is, as already mentioned, the form proper to thought itself; but philosophy is simply the consciousness of this form itself, the thinking of thinking, so that the distinctive material for its edifice is already prepared in the general culture. And in the development of the state itself, periods must occur in which the spirit of nobler natures is driven to flee from the present into ideal regions to find in them the reconciliation with itself that it can no longer enjoy in an actuality that is internally divided; for the reflective understanding attacks all those sacred and profound elements that were naively introduced into the religion, laws, and customs of peoples, and debases and dilutes them into abstract and godless generalities. Thought is then impelled to become thinking reason, and to seek and accomplish in its own element the undoing of the destruction that it brought upon itself.

Thus, in all world-historical peoples, we do indeed encounter poetry, fine art, science, and also philosophy. But these differ not only in their tone, style,

93. See above, p. 117.

and orientation as such, but even more in their import or substance; and this substance involves the most important difference of all, that of rationality. It is pointless for a presumptuous aesthetic criticism to insist that the subject matter, i.e. the substance of the content, should not determine our pleasure, and to argue that beauty of form as such, imaginative greatness, and the like,
205 are the aims of fine art | and what must be taken into consideration and appreciated by a liberal disposition and cultivated mind.[94] If the substance itself is insignificant, or wild and fantastic or absurd, a healthy common sense cannot bring itself to set aside such features so as to derive enjoyment from such a work. For even if one ranks the Indian epic poems as highly as Homer's on account of numerous formal qualities—greatness of invention and imagination, vividness of imagery and sentiments, beauty of diction, etc.—they nevertheless remain utterly different in their content with its substantial element, and in the interest of reason, which simply concerns the consciousness of the concept of freedom and its expression in individuals. There is not only a classical form [of poetry] but also a *classical* content; moreover, form and content are so intimately connected in works of art that the form can only be classical insofar as the content is classical. If the content is fanciful, not internally self-limiting, then the form becomes wild, measureless, and formless, or awkward and trivial. The rational element is what contains within itself both measure and goal.

In the same way, it is possible to draw parallels between Chinese and Indian philosophy [on the one hand], and the Eleatic, Pythagorean, and Spinozistic philosophies, or even all of modern metaphysics [on the other], for all of them do indeed base themselves on the One or on unity, the wholly abstract universal. But such a comparison or indeed equivalence is highly superficial: it overlooks the one factor on which everything depends, the determinacy of the unity in question; and this involves an essential distinction, whether the unity is to be understood in an abstract or in a concrete sense—concrete to the point of being unity in itself, which is spirit. Those who treat these as equivalent merely prove that they recognize only abstract unity; and although they pass judgment on philosophies, they are ignorant of what constitutes the interest of philosophy.

But in all the diversity in the substantial content of a culture there are also
206 spheres that remain the same. This diversity concerns | thinking reason; freedom, whose self-consciousness is this reason, has one and the same root

94. Hegel is not engaged here in general reflections on aesthetic criticism but rather, as the following sentences reveal, in a critique once again of the comparison of Indian poetry with Homeric. See above, n. 88.

as thinking. Since, in distinction from animals, human beings alone think, they alone possess freedom, and they possess it solely because they are thinking beings. Consciousness of freedom consists in the fact that the individual comprehends himself as a person, i.e. sees himself in his singular existence as inwardly universal, as capable of abstraction from and renunciation of everything particular, and therefore as inwardly infinite. A feature these substantial [cultural] differences have in common is spheres that accordingly lie outside this comprehension [of freedom].

Even morality, which is so closely connected with the consciousness of freedom, can be quite pure while still lacking any such consciousness; for it may simply enunciate universal duties and rights as objective commandments, or even as commandments that remain purely negative, by formally imposing a renunciation of the sensuous and of all sensuous motives. Since the Europeans have become acquainted with *Chinese* morality and with the writings of *Confucius*, it has received the highest praise and the most flattering acknowledgment of its merits from those who are familiar with Christian morality;[95] in the same way, the sublimity is acknowledged with which the *Indian* religion and poetry (of at least the higher sort), and in particular the Indian philosophy, express and require the removal and sacrifice of sensuous things.[96] Yet these two nations are lacking—indeed completely lacking—in the essential self-consciousness of the concept of freedom. The Chinese look on their moral rules as if they were laws of nature, positive external commandments, mandatory rights and duties, or rules of mutual courtesy. | Freedom, through which the substantial determinations of reason can alone be translated into ethical attitudes, is absent; morality is a political matter that is administered by government officials and courts of law. Their works on the subject are not books of legal statutes but are addressed to the subjective will and disposition. Similar to the moral writings of the Stoics, they read like a series of precepts that are supposed to 207

95. As a prominent example of this praise of Chinese morality, see Christian Wolff, *Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica* (Frankfurt am Main, 1726).

96. Here as elsewhere, Hegel hesitates to assign to the Indian religion and poetry the predicate of 'sublimity' (*Erhabenheit*), whose proper place for him is found in the religion and poetry of Israel. See the contrast in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 136–7, as well as in his *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, tr. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1975), 371–7. On the evaluation of Indian poetry as 'sublime', see Herder's preface to a work he edited, *Sakontala oder Der Entscheidende Ring: Ein Indisches Schauspiel von Kalidas* (Frankfurt am Main, 1803), pp. xxx–xxxviii, esp. xxxi (Johann Gottfried Herder, *Sämmtliche Werke*, xxiv (Berlin, 1886), 577). See also Schlegel, *Sprache und Weisheit*, 213–15 (*KFSA* viii. 311–13), although Schlegel does not speak specifically of 'sublimity'.

be necessary for the attainment of happiness, so that the free will that confronts them appears to decide to follow them or not. So we then have for the Chinese, as for the Stoic moralists, the image of an abstract *subject*, the wise man, as the culmination of such doctrines. And in the *Indian* doctrine of the renunciation of sensuality, desires, and earthly interests, affirmative ethical freedom is not the goal and end, but rather the annihilation of consciousness, a spiritual and even physical stagnation.[97]

97. *In the margin adjacent to the end of the text:* Love –

ALSO SPECTACLES OF ENDLESS COMPLEXITIES

also spectacles of endless complexities

– misery, misfortune, evil – transitoriness, only sorrow – displeasure, regret – looking away with dread

ββ –) this appearance combines need and passion – *means* – realm of *contingency*

providence, means – if the passions surrendered – badly ordered with the execution

which connection between final end and means

thus represent – insight [into] the universal – α) universal *final end* – not completed for itself

β) through human beings – activity – abstract law –

need, passion, interest – as *its* subjective end – interest

attaining, willing only its end

β) *virtue, morality*

α) absolute right of world spirit

β) realm of contingency

if we thus as means – spectacle of the world |

– absolute final end – morality, virtue – perish

in particular spheres –

if its right –

conflict, destruction falls into these *particular [spheres]*

this activity in general the inner means for the end

conjunction of an end with the activity in the interest of the subject –

so universal final end – reason with activity interest of human beings – but *distinction* of consciousness from it – and unconsciousness –

here inasmuch as we believe, reason rules the world – it in the deeds of human beings, although unconsciously – that through *their* actions something else is accomplished at the same time – comes forth as they know and will *immediately* – still more is in it – they have *their* particular end, *their* interest

different example in one [instance] – arson that kills – follows only *justified revenge – good intention* – – but at the same time crime

– misfortune of a city – human beings

external nexus
cunning of reason
so we must envisage [it] for ourselves as such – the *connection* not made *conceptually* – the *more particular* end in it a *universal* determination
but the singular, external – connected with the inner, *universal* – this the action – *crime* – the universal determination [of] character *and punishment*, unintentional or unselfconsciously righteous, virtuous – does not know that it virtuous – knows morally; *this* knowledge – removes *at least* half of
210 virtue – a closer | example from history – *Caesar* master over his [political] enemies, alongside whom he could no longer exist – but his personal enemies connection with the Senate – fights them in the process of making *himself* the sole ruler of Rome – but inwardly, *inherently* – not only makes himself secure but secures undivided sovereignty over Rome
211 *great human beings* in world history |

C. *COURSE [OF WORLD HISTORY]*

α) *development* in general – spirit (humanity matures)
must make itself into
come to consciousness of what it is *in itself*
to its *concept* –
labor of spirit in world history – perfectibility – development
β) world history portrays spirit's *stages* – easy, stages of this consciousness – the whole of world history employed to this end – to enjoy a specification – familiar to us, the fact that the *human being* is *free* – already introduced –
every *specific* stage – allotted to a *specific* nation – appears as a *distinctive* principle
αα) in *history* likewise as *natural* determinacy – *distinctiveness* as national – (philosophy in thoughts)
α) deep beautiful sensation
β) *uses of world history* – learn from *experience*
γ) – examples – – Greeks, Romans, North Americans
ββ) world-historical people – the mightiest – that stands at the highest stage of each era – outer
γγ) this *world-historical* people in itself, course of development of the
212 world |
– only *once* – a great many peoples not world-historical – they stand in good stead only briefly, in a specific period

γ) *type of connection* of peoples – series appears in the world – *sous terre, mole* – αα) as a totality –

inner necessity, that *existing*

so – geographical allotment of the *natural determinacy* of peoples, a whole –

they have not formed this

needless development within itself

ββ) in history – only what static –

among the developed states, *Chinese, Indian*

– principle *of rest* – unfreedom –

unrest of freedom – reflection is connecting with the other

– the former static, only presupposes itself, not an other

not turned outward

beginning thereof

Persians – against Greece –

revolutions, violence,

intelligence, gradual improvement from within outward in the Prussian state, yet also 1806 and proceedings in France –

not utility – but enjoyment of *reason*

form of beginning and prehistorical excluded

beginning with formation of *states*

philosophical consideration alone worthy – in accord with taking up history where rationality begins to appear in worldly existence – | not 213
where it is still only a *possibility in itself* – the in-itself here to historical existence – what is rational *in itself*, to know this other philosophical sciences,

unorganic, unconscious dullness or mastery

[whether] it be wild or tame, mild –

a *condition* in which reason brings itself to existence –

the [reason] of freedom, i.e., of good and evil and therewith of law

society –

natural – ethical – family piety

history *res gesta, historia* – where with consciousness and deed

history of state, and only here for the first time history even exists –

language is its highest theoretical existence – forerunner – before will forms to universality

– self-conscious freedom to infinite content –

its existence presupposes (formed) society

worth

state

law, freedom, even religion *has* a *universal* object, thus law –
and freedom wants only such a universal object – condition
will therefore the state
opposition of the *Indian* and *Chinese* – the former no history, no forma-
214 tion of the state – |
prehistory lies outside our specification –
the *highest deed* of intellect (*outward* expression of it)
amazing aspect of development – it is itself no
more recent history as such
indwelling the pure *theoretical* ground of peoples – who resorted to their understanding;
state, intelligence worthy of Mnemosyne –
Homer calls upon it in his *Iliad*[1] –
suppositions, inferences are no facta
memories, thoughts in the peoples
first genuine interest – also outer universality of recollection and preservation
loud talk insidiously silent

1. Hegel is apparently thinking here not so much of the *Iliad* as of the first ten verses of the *Odyssey* (tr. E. V. Rieu, rev. D. C. H. Rieu (London, 2003), 3).

THE LECTURES OF 1822–3

The subject of our lectures is universal world history. Our concern is with world history itself, not with reflections about it; it is with its origin and progression, not with how we might consider it as a set of examples.

We want to give a preliminary representation of what the *philosophical* history of the world is, and for this purpose we shall explore the other customary ways of treating history. This survey is only a very brief one. The types of treatment are three in number: first, *original* history (the word 'history' in German contains the double meaning of *res gestae* and the narration of them[1]); second, *reflective* history; and third, *philosophical* history.[2]

THE TYPES OF TREATMENT OF HISTORY

Original History

Writers such as Herodotus and Thucydides belong to the first or original history. They merely wrote down the events that they experienced and described the deeds of which they were aware. These writers, therefore, belonged to the spirit of their age; they participated in it and described it. What they accomplished was to transpose what took place into the realm of intellectual | representation; in this way, what was at first something at 4
hand (*ein Vorhandenes*), something existent and transitory (*ein Seiendes, Vorübergehendes*), became something represented intellectually (*geistig Vorgestellten*). The poet prepares his material for sensible more than for intellectual representation. With him the main work is his own; likewise with these historians. For such writers of original history, the reports of others that are available to them are an ingredient, but these are subordinated, suppressed, and dispersed; for the main work (the masterpiece) is the work of the historian himself. These historians bring this primary material, which was transitory and consisted of scattered memories, into a firm and enduring

1. The German word for 'history', *Geschichte*, is related to the verb *geschehen*, 'to happen' or 'occur', and thus refers to 'things that happen' (*res gestae*); but it also, like the English word, means 'story'.

2. For the first two types compare the manuscript fragment of 1822, 1828.

representation; they link together what rushes past fleetingly and set it up in the temple of Mnemosyne so that it may be immortal.[3] Legends and folk-songs must be excluded from history, for they are but obscure means of establishing what has happened. They are the representations of peoples with an inherently dim awareness, and for that reason such peoples are excluded from world history. In world history we have principally to do with peoples who knew what they were and what they desired—peoples who were thoroughly cultivated. Poems do not belong here either because they lack historical truth; they do not have as their content determinate actuality. They are not the concern of a people that has arrived at a firm identity and a developed individuality. A people first belongs to history when it possesses a determinate consciousness, a personality. The history of a people properly begins with the formation of its consciousness.

The original historians transplant the events that were contemporaneous to them from the soil of the past onto a better soil, that of a stable representation, and such is the distinctive character of their work. | Such a history cannot be very extensive because its material consists of what the historian has to some extent participated in, experienced, or at any event been contemporaneous with. Such perceptions (*Anschauungen*) and features taken at face value (*unreflektierte Züge*) are what he portrays as posterity envisages them. In such a history the cultural formation of the author and his spirit, as well as of the deeds that he narrates—[thus the formation] of his spirit and of the actions described by him—are one and the same. Therefore he does not have to reflect on them; he stands and lives in the material itself, does not elevate himself above it.

Here we shall indicate more precisely what also applies to later ages. Only in ages when the cultural formation of a people is more advanced do great differences in culture as well as in political conditions appear, which arise from the differentiation of classes. The writer of the original history must therefore belong to the same class as the one that produced the events and the deeds he intends to recount. To be an original historian, he must be a general or statesman. Reflection is excluded because the author is identical

3. Herodotus describes the purpose of his history with a powerful metaphor: 'that time may not draw the color from what man has set into being'. Herodotus, *The History* 1.1 (tr. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 33). For Hegel the 'original historians' are those who have an original, i.e. immediate and prereflective, relationship to the things that happened, transposing fleeting events into the enduring mode of representation (*Vorstellung*).

with the material. If the spirit of the material itself involves a certain level of culture, then the historian must be cultured too. The author of an age with a certain culture must be aware of its fundamental principles, for he lives in an age that is self-aware. The spirit of his age is aware of itself and of the purposes of its actions, the evidence for its principles. Thus the historian must be aware of them.

Another aspect to consider is that actions | also manifest themselves 6
as *words* (*Reden*) because they themselves operate on representation; such words are like actions and constitute an essential part of history. This includes above all the utterances (*Reden*) of individuals to peoples and vice versa. If they do not become living words, if they do not lead to deeds and are [not] likewise heeded, then they remain empty and inconsequential chatter. Thus the historian must incorporate such utterances; they contain reflections about the age and its purposes and provide information about its principles, sparing the historian any need for his own reflections. He lives in the reflections that are the reflections of the age. If he also has composed such speeches (*Reden*), they are still speeches of his age. Since he exists within the spirit of his activity and the culture of his age, what he expounds is the consciousness of the age. The historian thus presents the maxims of the age through the speeches [he composes]. Such writers deserve to be studied. Thus in Thucydides we read speeches of Pericles and utterances of foreign peoples—speeches that contain the maxims of the basic principles of the peoples and their reflections about themselves. In these presentations the writer provides the reflection of the age itself, not his own reflection about the material. These speeches too are to be regarded as something completely original. If we want to become acquainted with the spirit of such peoples, to live among the peoples themselves, then we must spend time with these writers, become familiar with them, and obtain a picture of the age at first hand. Whoever wants a quick dose of history can find that to be sufficient.

[Original historical] writers are not as common as we would like to think. Herodotus, the founder of history, is one of them. We have mentioned Thucydides. Xenophon, who describes the retreat [of the ten thousand], and Caesar's *Commentaries*, belong here too.[4] | But original historians of 7
this kind are found in our own day as well, although our modern culture also involves dealing with events by assimilating them representationally, apprehending them in commentaries, and transforming them into stories (*Geschichten*). These too can have the character of originality. In particular,

4. On Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Caesar, see the Introductory Fragment (1822–1828), nn. 4, 10, 11, 13.

the French have produced numerous memoirs, more so than have other nations. The terrain on which such men labor contains many trivialities, intrigues, passions, petty interests. But exceptions are found here as well. There are always masters who labor on a larger field, for example, the clever work of Cardinal de Retz.[5] In Germany the works of men who live in the age [about which they write] are found but rarely, although the memoirs of Frederick II[6] are an exception. It is not enough to have been present at the events; rather one must have been positioned within the spirit of large political operations and world events.

Reflective History

The second type consists of the reflective historians; their portrayals go beyond the [historian's own] present and are of several varieties.

[1.] What one expects from them above all is a *survey* of the whole of a people or of world history. These are of necessity compilations of already existing historical writings and reports of others; the language is not that of observers or of eye-witnesses. Every world history is necessarily like this. The more specific type of compilation depends on its purpose. Livy belongs
8 here, also Johannes von Müller's *Schweizer | Geschichte*.[7] If well done, they are meritorious and indispensable. It is very difficult to state a norm for this type of treatment. The historian tries to make it possible for readers to hear the voices of contemporaries to the events. But these attempts ordinarily fail more or less and come to grief because the whole should convey a single tone, whereas the spirit and culture of diverse times are not uniform; for one always remains a single individual 'mirroring the spirit of one's own time'. The spirit of the time in which the historian writes is different from the spirit of the time that is to be described. Livy describes his battles in the minutest details that either were anachronistic or could have occurred at any time. Likewise, the speeches of the ancient kings as he reports them could only have taken place in the age of Roman [law and] lawyers; they contrast greatly with the age in which they are supposed to have been given and are incompatible with its lesser maturity. In some

5. Jean François Paul de Gondi, Cardinal of Retz, was Coadjutor of the Archbishop of Paris and a leader of the Fronde. His three volumes of *Mémoires* appeared in 1717.

6. Frederick II, the Great, *Histoire de mon temps* (1746); *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la maison de Brandebourg* (1751).

7. Johannes von Müller, *Die Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1786–1808).

periods the delivery of speeches is grand, in others it is quite deficient. The fable told by Menenius Agrippa is natural enough,[8] but other speeches are rather awkward. The difference between a compiler and an original historian can be most clearly seen by comparing Polybius and Livy. A similarly unfortunate attempt to make it seem that one has lived in the age in which the events occurred is found in Johannes von Müller's *Schweizer Geschichte*, which has a somewhat wooden and pedantic quality with its artificial and affected antiquity; it is not original as compared with the original historian Tschudi.[9] A history that covers a long period of time and large epochs must by its very nature resort to abstractions and generalities: for example, a battle was lost or won, a city was besieged in vain, and so on. As a result, such a history becomes very dry and uniform, but this is in the nature of the case. | Reflective history by its very nature takes a large body of concrete 9
details and reduces them to abstract representations.

[2.] A second type of reflective history is the so-called *pragmatic* historiography. When we have to do with the past, and are concerned with a distant and reflected world, spirit finds itself in need of a present—a present that it produced by its own activity as compensation for its efforts; and this present is found in the understanding. The occurrences of history are diverse; but what is universal and inward, the relationship between events, the universal spirit of the circumstances, is something enduring and ageless, a perpetual presence that sublates the past and renders the events contemporary. These pragmatic reflections are enlivening; they bring the distant past into the present. Whether they are enlivening and of interest depends on the author's particular spirit. General relationships and chains of circumstances become, to a greater or lesser degree, the objects of description; they become themselves the events; it is the universal that appears, no longer the particular. If, to the contrary, we should want to make countless individual events the topic of these universal reflections, that would be tasteless, ineffective, and fruitless. But if general conditions are treated in such a way that the entire context of an event is comprehended, this is taken as evidence of the intellect of the author, of the mind of such a historian.

Here we should mention in particular the moral reflections and instructions that arise from history and | with which one often cloaks history. 10
Moral reflections are very often regarded as the essential purpose of the

8. On the fable told by Menenius Agrippa (consul in 503 BC) about the Belly and the Limbs, see Livy, *Historiarum libri*, ed. I. F. Gronovii (Lyons, 1645), i. 114 (2.32.5–12); on Livy's description of battles, see i. 274–7 (4.32–4).

9. Aegidius Tschudi, *Chronicon Helveticum*, 2 vols. (Basel, 1734–6).

study of history. In brief, examples of the good elevate the heart or disposition of young people in particular and are often cited because they exemplify the good more concretely. Such examples are to be employed in moral instruction as concrete representations of universal moral principles. But the fate of peoples and the overthrow of states occur on a different plane than that of morality, a higher and broader one. The methods of moral instruction are very simple and of no use [on the broader plane of history]. The biblical history is sufficient for moral instruction, which has no need for so large a plane [as that of world history]. The reference here is to experience. Statesmen, sovereigns, and generals are referred to history; but in the complexities of world history and the affairs of the world it is often seen that simple moral laws are inadequate. History and experience teach that peoples generally have not learned from history. Each people lives in such particular circumstances that decisions must and are made with respect to them, and only a great figure (*Charakter*) knows how to find the right course in these circumstances. This [figure embodies] the character of the age, which is always unique. Peoples find themselves in such an individual circumstance that earlier conditions never wholly correspond to later ones because the
11 situations are so different. The moral law applies | to simple interests and private circumstances, and these I do not need to learn from history. In the case of moral laws, the core element in all such situations is exhaustively covered by such a law. Here I am instructed once and for all.

Under the press of world events, such simple principles do not hold good because the conditions are never the same and what is taken from memory cannot prevail against the vitality of the moment; memory has no power in the new situation of the present. History is formative, but in a wholly different way. The formative power of history is something other than the reflections derived from it. Orators advocate study [of the past]; but calling upon the activity and deeds of the Romans or the Greeks with respect to modern political circumstances has always led to distortions. No case is entirely similar to another, and parity never applies in individual situations; as a result, what is best in one case is not so in another. The circumstances and conditions of different peoples are never completely similar. The intent of the *Schweizer Geschichte* of Johannes von Müller, for example, is a moral one; to this end he laid out a whole collection of reflections, and consequently his work is boring. His conceptions are superficial; he collects a mass of propositions that are then distributed at random throughout the narrative as he sees fit. Such reflections may indeed show that the author is well-meaning, but they also reveal the superficiality of his thoughts. Reflections must therefore be interesting and even concrete; only thorough

contemplation of events can make reflections interesting. The meaning of *the idea* as it interprets itself constitutes the true interest. This is the case with Montesquieu,[10] who is at once thorough and profound. However, everyone thinks himself smart enough | to be able to make such reflections, and thus 12
a superfluity of such reflective histories arises. We thus turn back to the simple proposition of merely narrating what happens with precision and truth. Precisely crafted descriptions and narratives of this kind are of great merit; but for the most part they merely provide material for others. We Germans are satisfied with that and want to live in the past. The French by contrast generate descriptions themselves and seek to treat them with ingenuity; as a consequence they are to a lesser extent thorough historians. They always see the past in terms of the present.

[3.] A third type of reflective history, which has been developed especially in our age, is *critical*. Critical history is not so much history itself but rather a history of the narratives of history and an evaluation of them. Niebuhr's *Römische Geschichte*[11] is written in that way; he treats the narratives in light of the actual circumstances and draws conclusions from them. The aspect of the present that is found here consists in the acumen of the author, who draws conclusions regarding the credibility of reports in terms of all the circumstances. The French have accomplished much that is basic and beneficial in this regard. With us the so-called higher criticism has taken possession of history and has sought to supplant the more circumspect historiography; having abandoned the soil of history, it has made room for the most arbitrary representations, | digressions, fantasies, and combinations. Attempts are 13
made to bring these most arbitrary elements into history. This too is a way of bringing the present into the past. The present that is advanced in this way rests on subjective fancies that are all the more striking the less they have any basis.

[4.] Finally there is a history that announces itself as something that is partly *abstractive*; it is indeed abstractive, but at the same time it forms a transition to philosophical world history. This type is a *special* history within a universal outlook: it is extracted from the whole matrix of universality, culled from the wealth of a people's life. But it also involves a particular aspect. Owing to today's culture, it has gained regard and prominence. Our cultured representation, as it frames a picture of a people, brings more aspects to bear than does the history of ancient peoples. Such individual

10. Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois*, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1748).

11. Barthold Georg Niebuhr, *Römische Geschichte*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1811–32).

aspects include, for example, the histories of art, science, government, law, property, and navigation. Every particular topic can be given prominence in this way. In our time the histories of law and government are especially
14 favored and emphasized. Both make sense only in connection with the | state as a whole and with history as a whole. When these histories are fundamental and interesting, and do not merely labor away at external material, as Hugo's *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*[12] does, they are admirable. A richer content is found in Eichhorn's *Geschichte des deutschen Rechts*.[13] Such general aspects and branches [of culture] can and will also be made the subjects of particular histories, and they are related to the entire history of a people. In the treatment it is a question of whether the whole internal nexus is exhibited or is merely sought or touched upon in its external circumstances. The latter, unfortunately, is more frequently the case, and as a result the aspects appear only as wholly contingent details of peoples.

Philosophical World History

Philosophical world history is closely related to the previous type of history. Its point of view is not a particular universal, nor is it one of many general viewpoints that is singled out abstractly at the neglect of the others; rather it is a *concrete* universal, the spiritual principle of peoples and the history of this principle. This universal is not restricted to a contingent appearance in such a way that the fates, passions, and energy of peoples would be the primary occasions that reveal the universal. Rather this universal is the guiding soul of events; it is Mercury,[14] the guide of individual souls, of actions and of events. *The idea* is the guide of peoples and of the world; it is *spirit* that guides
15 the world, and its guidance is what we wish to learn about. |

Philosophical world history shares with reflective history the fact that it has a universal as its subject, but this is no abstract universal; rather it is what is infinitely concrete and utterly present. For spirit is eternally present to itself; the spiritual principle is one and the same, always active and vigorous, whether as it was or will be, and for it there is no past. Thus the [concrete] universal is the subject of world history and this universal needs to be further defined.

12. Gustav Hugo, *Lehrbuch eines civilistischen Cursus*, iii. *Die Geschichte des Römisches Rechts*, 4th edn. (Berlin, 1810).

13. Karl Friedrich Eichhorn, *Deutsche Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*, 4 parts (Göttingen, 1808–23).

14. In Roman religion Mercury is the messenger of the gods, the one who communicates between gods and mortals and guides human commerce, a role similar to that of the Greek god Hermes, who is named by Homer the guide of souls in *The Odyssey* (cf. 24.1–15).

At the outset we have to consider two modes in regard to the concept of world history. First, the spiritual principle is in the first place the totality of all particular perspectives. But this is not to be understood narrowly because, secondly, the principles themselves, the spirits of peoples, are themselves the totality of the one world spirit. They complete themselves in it and stand in a necessary succession of stages. They are the offshoots of spirit (*Sprossen des Geistes*), and in them spirit completes itself to totality within itself.

All aspects and viewpoints that are salient in the history of a people are closely interrelated. It is a trite statement that the condition of the sciences, arts, legal relationships, system of government, and religion of a people is bound up most closely with its grand fortunes and its relationships with its neighbors in war and peace. This truth has often been stated. Such statements are both accurate and profound, but they fail to develop and clarify the unity, the soul involved; they do not identify the one thing necessary, which is to determine how everything is interrelated. What is normally omitted is a portrayal of [the interrelationship of] the parts, a description of the soul. | Too frequently this specification is lacking. Such reflective 16
expressions are often ventured—filling pages and entire books—but they remain superficial and never address the substance.

In general such reflections are correct; but the correctness of propositions that everything is interconnected must be specified more precisely. For individual facts often appear to contradict them. There are peoples such as the Chinese and the Indians who have achieved a high level of artistry. The Chinese, for example, were quite advanced in mechanics and invented gunpowder, but did not know how to use it. With the Indians poetry blossomed gloriously, but in the art of statecraft, freedom, and law they lagged far behind. To offer the superficial judgment that all elements of their culture should be equivalent simply demonstrates how much such a proposition represents a misunderstanding. The interrelation of cultural aspects is not to be understood to mean that each aspect must be developed to the same degree.

Each aspect relates to the others, and the various aspects of culture comprise the spirit of a people, which ties all connections together, unifying all aspects. This spirit is something concrete; we have to become acquainted with it, and we can only recognize this connection to the extent that we know it. For a spiritual principle can be grasped only spiritually, only through thought, and *we* are the ones who | grasp thought. But this spirit 17
itself is driven to grasp its thoughts, which for it have to do with its self-production: it *will* think itself, and in doing so is alive and efficacious.

Thinking is the profoundest aspect of spirit and its highest activity is to comprehend itself. Its purpose is to think itself, to engender itself for its thoughts. While it is operating, however, it is aware only of the aims of a determinate actuality and nothing of itself, [not] what it is in itself; it knows only the aims of finitude and nothing of itself. Its object is not its own interiority but a determinate actuality. Thus the *highest* goal of spirit, its truth, is to know itself, to bring to fruition the thought of itself: this it shall do and has done.

This achievement, however, is its demise and marks the emergence of a different stage, a different spirit, a different epoch of world history; then a different world-historical people comes to the fore. The individual spirit completes itself, the thought of itself, as it makes the transition to the principle of a different people; this is how higher principles come about, taking the place of the principles of peoples as the world advances toward its consummation. The task of world history is to show the matrix in which this comes about.

Philosophical world history is a world history that has universal concepts about history that extend across the whole; it is not reflections about individual situations and circumstances or individual aspects.

The first general concept that tenders itself is the abstract category of
18 *change* or *alteration*—the supplanting of individuals, | peoples, and states that arise, linger for a while, attracting our interest, gaining, losing, or sharing it with others, and then vanish.

This aspect, viewed negatively, can arouse profound sadness that is evoked particularly when observing the ruins of ancient splendor, of past grandeur; everything seems to pass away, nothing endures. Every traveler has experienced this melancholy. This is not melancholy that attends the demise of individual, personal aims, nor grief at the tomb of renowned persons, but rather the general sadness of a spectator over the decline and destruction of peoples, of a cultured past. Each new stage is built on the ruins of the past.

A feature closely linked to this category is the other side of the coin, namely that alteration and decline at the same time entail the *creation and emergence of new life*—new life arises out of death. This is the radical idea of Oriental metaphysics, perhaps its greatest conception. It is found in the notion of the transmigration of souls; more striking is the image of the phoenix, which builds its own funeral pyre but arises anew from the ashes, handsomely rejuvenated and glorious. This image relates, however, only to natural life and is purely Oriental; it applies only to the natural body, not to the spirit, which indeed passes over into a new sphere but does not rise out of

its ashes in the same shape. The Western conception is that the spirit comes forth not merely rejuvenated but rather elevated and transfigured. Indeed, spirit acts in opposition to itself | and consumes the forms of its configuration, its structure; its previous structure becomes its material—the material that by its labor it elevates to a new and higher shape. The alterations undergone do not merely return it to the same shape but rather reconstitute, purify, and elaborate it—a process whereby, through the completion of its task, it creates new tasks and multiplies the material for its labor.[15] Thus in history we see spirit indulging itself, enjoying itself, and satisfying itself in innumerable directions. But its labor has only one outcome—to increase its tasks anew and consume them anew. Each of its creations confronts it anew as material that it must rework; its labor is thus merely that of preparing heightened enjoyments.[16] The unmitigated conception of simple change becomes that of spirit, which is disseminating its energies in all directions. We learn the extent of its energies from the multiplicity of its forms and productions. In this longing for activity, it is only engaged with itself. It is, to be sure, entangled with the outer and inner conditions of nature; these do not merely stand in the way as resistance and hindrance, but also can occasion a total miscarriage of its efforts. It attempts to overcome these conditions, although it often succumbs to them and must do so. Then, however, in its vocation as a spiritual being and in its efficacy, it founders and presents the spectacle of itself as spiritual activity that seeks not deeds (*Werke*) but living activity. For its aim is not deeds but its own activity. | 19 20

Thus under this category [of change] we see in history the most diverse human activities, events, fortunes; we see ourselves in all this. Human doing and suffering everywhere attract our interest as our own experience. Sometimes phenomena appear that shine with beauty and freedom; sometimes energy, even depraved energy, creates dominion and power; sometimes summoning all one's strength produces only tiny results; and sometimes an insignificant event has the most enormous consequences. Thus we see satisfying activities and unsatisfying ones. Great efforts often produce small results and vice versa. The most variegated needs pass before our eyes; one human interest supplants another. But it is always human interests that move us, human interests above all.

15. This sentence contains a play on the words *Arbeit* (work, labor), *Verarbeitung* (reconstitution, reworking), and *Ausarbeitung* (elaboration, outworking).

16. The noun *Genuß* (here used in the plural, *Genüsse*) is related to the verb *genießen* (used in a preceding sentence), meaning in the most literal sense to enjoy and partake of food and drink, thus to 'consume' but also to 'commune'.

As appealing as these observations are in themselves, their most immediate consequence is that we grow weary from sifting through this press of details and arrive at the question: What is the purpose of all these singular events, which interest us all? There is more to them than their particular aims. This enormous cost must be for some ultimate purpose. Is that beyond imagining? We are faced with the question as to whether the din and noisy surface appearances [of history] do not conceal an inner, silent, secret working that gathers up the energy of all phenomena and benefits therefrom—something [for the sake of which] all this is happening. This is the
21 third category, that of *reason*, | the conception of a final end within itself. The question concerns an inwardness determinate in and for itself, the one (*das Eines*) whose eternal labor it is to impel and bring itself to the knowledge, application, and enjoyment of itself. It is a truth that such a final end is what governs and alone consummates itself in the events that occur to peoples, and that therefore there is *reason in world history*. This affirmative answer to the question is presupposed here; the proof of its truth can be found in the treatment of world history itself because history is the image and deed of reason. But philosophical world history is more an exposition than a demonstration of this proposition. The actual proof resides in the cognition of reason itself; the proof consists in what is cognized, reason itself, which is the stuff of all spiritual life. In world history reason simply proves itself. World history itself is but one mode of appearance of this one reason, one of the particular shapes in which reason discloses itself.

From our standpoint, we must proceed on the basis of the principle of finding nothing but a likeness of the one archetype—a likeness that presents itself in a particular element. The material, the element, for this likeness are the peoples [of world history] with their struggles and labors. In order to recognize reason in history or to know history rationally, we must surely bring reason along with us; for the way in which we look upon history and the world is how it in turn looks to us. In modern times, when knowledge of the world and experience of the truth are very difficult to come by, people
22 desire to gain conceptions by pointing to history. | History has been expected to yield all manner of information about the nature of spirit, right, etc. But history is empty; nothing is to be learned from it if we do not bring reason and spirit with us. In particular, the shallowness of general abstractions must be resisted in order that reason itself may indeed be brought to bear in the task. Reason accomplishes much in combating these abstractions, but one must know beforehand what counts as rational. Without this knowledge we would not find reason [in history]. If and when reason gives us the final result, we will know that we have already entered senility.

The distinctive quality of old age is that it lives only in the memory of what has been, the past, not in the present; this is a sign of our senility.

If we do not bring with us the conception of *reason*, then we must at least bring that of *faith*—the faith that there is an actual causality in history, and that intelligence and spirit are not given over to chance. At this point spirit steps forth into the light of the self-knowing idea—higher therefore than in nature, in which the idea is also present. It is often enough conceded that the spiritual world is not abandoned by God, that a divine will and final purpose rule in history. God governs the world. As soon as we come to more specific matters, however, we refrain from inquiring about the providential plan. What then is the plan of providence in world history? Can this plan be comprehended? Has the time arrived to examine it?

The more proximate question regarding the providential plan is answered with a confession of humility: God's providence, like God's nature, is said to be inscrutable and inexhaustible. To this humility we must oppose what the Christian religion is about: | this religion revealed to humanity God's 23
nature and essence; before that, God was the unknown. The previously concealed God has become manifest. Thus as Christians we know what God is; God is no longer an unknown. To regard God to be just as unknown after God's revelation is an affront to this religion. In doing so we acknowledge that we do not have Christian religion; for that religion lays upon us the one obligation that we should know God.[17] It has vouchsafed this benefit to humanity. So the Christian religion demands the humility of being lifted up not of one's own merit but through the spirit of God, through cognition and knowledge of that spirit. God does not desire narrow-minded hearts and empty heads but rather children who are rich in the knowledge of God and put their merit in it alone. Thus Christians are initiated into the mysteries of God. Because the essential being of God is revealed through the Christian religion, the key to world history is also given to us: world history is the unfolding of God's nature in one particular element. As a particular element, it is something specific; and the only knowledge that we have is of a specific providence, i.e. of its plan; otherwise, there is no knowledge. One can stick quite naively with the general idea that divine providence rules the world; or one can hold to this assertion self-consciously. And this general | proposi- 24
tion can, on account of its generality, also have a particular, negative connotation: that the absolute divine being is kept at a distance and conveyed to the far side (*jenseits*) of human things and knowledge. If this is done, we keep

17. Hegel is alluding to Paul's speech at the Areopagus in which he makes known the unknown God (Acts 17: 22–8).

ourselves free of that other side, indulge in our favorite representations, and distance ourselves from the requirements of truth and rationality. Every representation of God in this sense is merely empty talk. If God is placed on the far side of our consciousness, we are freed from knowing God, from troubling ourselves about God's nature, and from finding reason in world history. Then hypotheses are allowed free play, and blissful vanity has complete freedom. Humility knows well what it gains by its renunciation.

Thus our task is to consider world history and inquire about its final aim. This final end is what God has willed for the world. To this end everything is sacrificed on the altar of the world; this end is what is operative and enlivening. What we know about it is that it is what is most perfect, and God wills the most perfect; what God wills can only be God godself and what is like unto God, God's will. God's will is not distinguished from God, and philosophically we call it *the idea*. Here we must abstract from the religious
25 expression and grasp the concepts in the form of thought. |

THE IDEA OF HUMAN FREEDOM

The Fabric of World History[18]

We can thus conclude that we must consider the idea in the element of human spirit, or more precisely, the idea of human freedom. The true has diverse elements. The first and purest form distinctive to it through which the idea reveals itself is pure thought itself, and thus the idea is considered in terms of logic. Another form is the one in which the idea immerses itself, that of physical nature. Finally, the third form is that of spirit in general. Among the forms of spirit, however, we shall emphasize one in particular, namely, the element of human freedom and human will—the element in which the idea utters and externalizes itself in such a way that human will ultimately becomes the abstract basis of freedom, and the entire ethical existence of a people becomes its product. This is its more proximate soil; but we must consider not only the ethical world abstractly but also how the idea begets itself in time. Freedom is simply the way in which the idea brings itself forth, becoming what it is for the first time in accord with its concept. This bringing forth is displayed in a series of ethical shapes whose sequence constitutes the course of history.

18. The subheadings in this and subsequent sections are provided by the English editors.

Thus we have here the idea as the totality of ethical freedom. Two elements are salient: first, the idea itself as abstract; and second, the human passions. The two together form the weft and the warp in the fabric that | world history spreads before us.[19] The idea is the substantial power, but considered for itself it is only the universal. The passions of humanity are the arm by which it actualizes itself. These are the extremes; the midpoint at which these elements are bound together, by which they are reconciled, and in which they have their living unification, is ethical freedom. Further discussion will specify this more precisely. 26

Concerning the idea—the soul as guiding power—its moments or elements must be clarified. The idea has major elements. Here we must not speak in wholly abstract terms; rather we grasp the idea in the concrete shape of spirit, not as the logical [idea]. In this regard we shall speak of the nature of spirit in a formal way and then proceed to the applications.

The Concept of Spirit

Spirit as such is thinking—the sort of thinking that *is*, thinking *that* it is and *how* it is. It is knowing as such, is consciousness. Knowing is the consciousness of a rational object.[20] I have consciousness insofar as I am self-consciousness; that is, I know something over against me, something outside me, only insofar as in it I know myself, and I define the other as what makes possible my knowing my own determination in it; hence, I am not just one thing or another but am that of which I know. In other words, I know that that which I am is also object for me. Knowing myself is inseparable from knowing an object. Neither exists without the other, although the first aspect (self-knowing) often appears to be predominant.

19. Here the translation follows the reading of Griesheim (*den Einschlag und die Kette*) rather than that of Hotho (*die Kette und den Einschlag*), which is favored by the German edn. Griesheim is more likely correct. The term translated as 'weft', *Einschlag*, means literally a 'driving' or 'striking', and is related to *Schlag*, 'pulse' or 'stroke'. This is an image that Hegel associates with the divine idea, which drives back and forth across the 'warp' or 'chain' (*Kette*) of human passions, weaving the fabric of history, which gradually assumes the pattern of 'ethical freedom' (*sittliche Freiheit*). Evidence that the divine idea is associated with the *Schlag* is found in other lectures. For example, Hegel says (with reference to the state) that 'the divine has broken through (*eingeschlagen*) into the sphere of actuality' (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. and tr. Peter C. Hodgson *et al.*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 2007), iii. 342 n. 250); and that the idea constitutes a 'counterstroke' (*Gegenschlag*) that reverses the transition from finite to infinite into a transition from infinite to finite (*Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, ed. and tr. Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford, 2007), 165).

20. *Gegenstand*, normally translated 'object', means literally 'what-stands-over-against'.

Initially we know ourselves as feeling; we find ourselves constituted this
27 way or that. Objectivity is not yet involved here, | only indeterminacy. The progression is to determine myself and cleave myself so that something is placed over against me as object. I strive, then, to separate this determinacy from myself and make it into an object; in this way my feeling becomes an external and an internal world.

If we speak of feeling in this way, determinacy in general is accepted. But a distinctive mode of determinacy sets in, namely, that I feel myself to be lacking something and deficient, that I find a contradiction within myself that threatens to destroy my self-unity. In this way determinacy first exists, but at the same time it is a distinctive mode of determinacy: I feel myself to be lacking something. However, I *am*; I hold fast to this. I know that I am, and I counter the deficiency, the lack, with it; in this way I cancel the deficiency and preserve myself. So I have, and am, a drive. Everything living has drives. Insofar as my drives are concerned, the significance of objects is that they are the means of reconstituting my unity and thus of my satisfaction. (This [reconstitution and satisfaction] can be either theoretical or practical.) In these intuitions and drives we at first exist directly in external and natural things; we are ourselves external. The intuitions are singular and sensible as is the drive, regardless of content; this is what human beings have in common with animals. In this condition they are not yet thinking beings, do not yet properly exist as self-consciousness, as consciousness; for there is no self-consciousness in the drive.

What robs human beings of this immediacy is that they have themselves as their own objects; they know of and about themselves and are inwardly
28 present to themselves; this is the being of thinking. | This distinguishes them from animals. Thinking is knowledge of the universal. Human beings think only insofar as they are inwardly present to themselves. As something wholly simple and inward, I am something wholly universal; and only because I posit the content in this simplicity does it itself become simplified, i.e. ideal.[21] The unending drive of thinking is to transpose what is real into ourselves as something that is universal and ideal. What human beings are as real they must be as ideal. Because human beings know the real as the ideal and know themselves as ideal, they cease being merely natural; they

21. Hegel uses the adjective *ideell* to designate something empirically real (*reell*) that has, by the power of thought, been transposed into or given the quality of ideality (*Idealität*), which is the 'truth' of the finite. The ideal is simple undivided, onefold (*einfach*), inward, and universal. Hegel distinguishes between *ideal* and *ideell*, *real* and *reell*, *formal* and *formell*, etc. The former terms have a speculative reference, the latter an empirical reference. It is impossible to bring out this distinction in translation and it does not seem to be of importance in the present context.

cease living in their immediate intuitions, in their drives and satisfactions, and in their productions. Because they know this inwardly, they restrain their drives; they interpose representation, thought, the ideal, between the urgency of the drive and its satisfaction, and they separate their representations from the execution of the representations. With animals this is not the case because for animals there is a constant connection between drive and satisfaction, a connection that can be interrupted only outwardly, by pain and fear, not inwardly. The animal does not interrupt this connection by itself; it does not oppose an outer to an inner. The animal does not cleave itself, but human beings do; they think, they restrain the drive. Because they can either restrain their drives or give them a free hand, it becomes a question of purposes, of orienting themselves with reference to something universal. They entertain objectives that they consider prior to the execution; and which one of their many options they should choose depends on these objectives.

The specific objective can be something wholly universal if one posits what is wholly universal as one's purpose. The most boundless | universal 29
is boundless freedom. Human beings can posit this freedom as their aim or purpose. They know what is, what determines them: it is knowledge of themselves and of their will. This constitutes humans as volitional beings, and herein resides their autonomy. Animals lack will, cannot restrain their drives, because they do not have their representations in the form of ideality, actuality. Recollection[22] is the source of human beings' freedom and universality, of their determination in accord with purposes (which can be the most universal or singular); as a result, their immediacy and naturalness are broken. It is this inwardness that makes human beings autonomous. They are not autonomous because of being the source of their own animation; animals too as living beings have the source of their animation within themselves, but they are aroused to it only by their inner drives. With animals the arousal begins from within and presupposes an immanent execution; what is exterior does not stimulate them if the stimulus does not already reside within. Animals do not entertain something that does not well up from within them; what determines them, they have within. Nothing can come between drives and their execution, their satisfaction. However, what constitutes the abstract wellspring of human nature as such is thinking, the being of humans as spirit, as I; this constitutes the principle by which

22. *Erinnerung*, translated 'recollection' or 'memory', has the root sense of 'inwardizing', an emphasis that is picked up in the next sentence with the term *Innerlichkeit* ('inwardness').

spirit is spirit. This is the determinate quality that concerns us more
30 closely. |

We turn now to the concrete aspects [of the concept of spirit]. The principal thing we have determined is that the human being as spirit is not an immediate being but essentially a being that returns into itself. This movement of mediation is thus the essential element of spiritual nature; in this way human beings become independent and free. Their activity is a going out beyond immediacy, a negation of immediacy, and a return into themselves. Thus spirit is only what it makes of itself by its activity. When we speak of a return, we ordinarily picture a departure from a place and a return to the prior location. We must reject this representation because for it the subject is what is first, whereas it is the second aspect, the return into itself, that for the first time constitutes the subject, the actual, the true; in other words, spirit exists only as its result, not as what is merely initial and immediate. This is the guiding principle for the whole of world history.

The image of the seed helps to illustrate this principle. The seed is the beginning of the plant, but at the same time it is the result of all the activity and life of the plant. The plant develops in order to produce the seed. The seed is essentially the result; but the fragility of natural life accounts for the fact that the individual seed as beginning of an individual plant is distinct from the seed resulting from it, and yet a seed is both of these. For the seed is in one respect the result of one plant and in another respect the beginning of another plant. These two aspects of the seed are distinct—in the form of the seed, a simple kernel, and in the growth of the plant. But the unity is always implicitly maintained because the whole plant is already there in the individual seed.

The same is true in sentient and human life, and in the life of peoples as
31 well. The life of a people brings a | fruit to a ripened state. Its activity consists of carrying out its principle and being satisfied that it has produced its principle. The fruit that a people as a spiritual whole brings forth and displays, but that also develops a natural life, does not return into the shoot of which it is an offspring. It never gets to be enjoyed [by the people that produced it] but rather becomes for them a bitter potion. The people and its activity is this endless craving for the fruit, but a taste of this potion poisons the people's existence, destroying them; and the fruit again becomes seed—seed and principle of another people, which it vitalizes and brings to maturity.

Another and more proximate example of the fact that spirit is only result is found within every individual. Human beings initially and immediately

are only the potentiality of being rational and free; they have this potentiality only as a vocation, an imperative. By means of discipline, education, and culture they become for the first time what they ought to be, rational beings. Humans have only the potential of being human when they are born. Animals are born nearly complete; their growth is basically a strengthening, and in instinct they have straight away everything they need. We must not regard it as a special benefit of nature for animals that their formation is soon complete, for the strengthening is only a matter of degree. Because humans are spiritual beings, they must acquire everything for themselves, must make themselves into what they ought to be and what otherwise would remain a mere potentiality; they must cast off the natural. Thus spirit is humanity's own achievement.

The most sublime example of this is the nature of God. It cannot, however, be called an 'example'; rather it is the *universal*, the true itself, whereof everything else is but an example. In our religion God is spirit; God is revealed as spirit, and this is the distinctive quality of the Christian religion. To be sure, the most ancient religions | also called God νοῦς; but 32
this is to be understood as a mere name that did not explicate the nature of spirit. In the Jewish religion spirit is not yet comprehended and explicated, but only represented in a general way. In the Christian religion God is first spoken of as 'Father': the power, the abstract universal, which is still veiled. In the second place, God, as object, is what cleaves or ruptures itself, posits an other to itself. This second element is called the 'Son'. It is defined in such a way, however, that in this other to godself God is just as immediately God's own self, envisioning and knowing godself only in the other; and this self-possessing, self-knowing, unity-possessing, being-present-to-self-in-the-other, is the 'Spirit'. This means that the whole is the Spirit; neither the one nor the other alone is the Spirit. And God is defined as spirit; God is for the first time the true, the complete. Expressed in the form of feeling or sensibility, God is eternal love, the Son, knowing godself in the other, having the other as its own. This characteristic is, in the form of thought, constitutive of spirit. This Trinity makes the Christian religion to be the revealed and only true religion. This is its superiority in virtue of which it stands above the other religions and by which it is distinguished from all the other religions. If the Christian religion lacked the Trinity, it could be that thought would find more [truth] in other religions. The Trinity is the speculative element in Christianity—the element wherein philosophy finds and recognizes the idea of reason in the Christian religion as well.

We proceed now to the concrete implications of the concept of spirit, 33
implications that are of interest for our subject. |

The Beginning of History

The first of these implications concerns the beginning of history and how it is customary to portray it as a natural state, a state of innocence. In accord with our concept of spirit, the first, immediate, natural state of spirit is a state of bondage, of sensuous desire, in which spirit as such is not actual. It is customary to make of such a state an empty ideal, which misunderstands the word 'nature' since by 'nature' one often means the concept or the essence of a thing. In this sense 'natural state' means the natural right of freedom that human beings ought to have in accord with their concept, the freedom that belongs to human beings in accord with the concept of spirit. But when we see what humanity is by nature, we can only say with Spinoza, *exeundum est e statu naturae* ['it (humanity) has departed from the natural state'].[23] That state lacks freedom and is one of sensuousness. To confuse the natural condition of spirit with that state is a mistake. Spirit should not remain in this natural state because it is one of sensuous willing and desire. It belongs to the concept of spirit to be by sublating the form of its sensuous existence and in this way positing itself as free.

Earlier it was often customary to start history with traditions about a primitive state of the human race, with the narration of a natural state of the human spirit. The Mosaic tradition is pertinent here, although it has
34 no place of its own at the beginning, since it is from a time | when it had a historical existence, i.e. an existence in the being of a people. We do not begin with it, but instead refer to it in the era when the promise it contains is fulfilled; then for the first time it takes on a historical existence. Prior to that it was lifeless and had not been taken up into the culture of peoples.

In modern times the representation of a primitive condition has been underscored and verified with presumptive historical dates. The existence of a primeval people has been asserted, an archetypal people that possessed everything in science, art, and religion and has handed down all our extant knowledge in these fields. Schelling strikingly tried to validate this view, also

23. Benedictus de Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (Amsterdam, 1670), ch. 16. This does not appear to be a direct quotation. In the manuscript of 1830–1, Hegel explains that there are two meanings of the expression 'natural state' (*Naturzustand*): what human beings are in accord with their concept or intrinsic nature, and what they are in a prehistorical, natural, and immediate existence. Only in the first sense is it correct to say that human beings are free by nature. The attempt by Hobbes, Rousseau, and others to idealize the prehistorical state and confuse the two meanings is false. See above, p. 102, incl. n. 61.

Friedrich Schlegel (*Sprache und Weisheit der Inder*).[24] The hypothesis of such a primordial people is said to explain the high culture of the prehistorical world. They are said to have been another human race that preceded the peoples known in history. Such a people is said to have left behind cultural traces in antiquity and to have been immortalized in the ancient legends, depicted as gods. Disfigured vestiges of this high culture corresponding to the legends of ancient peoples are [said to be] found. The condition of the earliest peoples in recorded history would then represent a retrogression and decline from that of the high culture of the primordial people. This is a representation that has been favored in modern times with the expectation that philosophy | must construe such a people a priori and that historical 35
evidence of them must exist. The conception here is simply that human beings have not risen into consciousness and reason from instinct, from the stupor of animals, that humanity as such could not have begun in animal stupor.

What is human could not have developed from animal stupor, but it could well have developed from human stupor. If we begin with a natural state, what we find is an animal-like humanity, not an animal nature, not animal stupor. Animal-like humanity is something wholly different from animal nature. Spirit does not develop out of the animal, does not begin from the animal; rather it begins from spirit, but from a spirit that at first is only implicit, is a natural and not an animal spirit—a spirit on which the character of the human is imprinted. Thus a child has the possibility of becoming rational, which is something wholly different and much higher than the developed animal. An animal does not have the possibility of becoming conscious of itself. We cannot ascribe rationality to a child, but the first cry of the child is already different from that of an animal; from the outset it has the human stamp. Something human is already present in the simple movements of the child.

By confining representation exclusively to that initial, primeval condition—namely, that humanity has dwelt in the pure consciousness of God and of the divine nature, standing directly at the center of all things (something we attain only with difficulty), standing at the midpoint of all science and art, so that all things lay open to humanity as an intelligence that can penetrate the depths of God and nature—then the implication of this representation | is that one is ignorant of and no longer understands what 36

24. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* (1803), lecture 8 (*On University Studies*, tr. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), 82-91); Friedrich von Schlegel, *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), cf. 62.

thinking is, what the nature of spirit is. One could not know that spirit is this infinite movement, this ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια. Spirit is energy and does not remain in a state of immediacy; it is the movement and activity that proceeds from an initial state to another state, working through and overcoming the latter, discovering itself in this labor; and only by returning to the first state does it become actual spirit. It is only through this labor that spirit prepares for itself the universal, brings forth its concept as its object, brings it before itself. This production, however, comes last, not first. If we claim that the spiritual aspects of ancient peoples—their customs, laws, institutions, religions, symbols—are productions and expressions of speculative ideas, this is correct; they are actual productions of spirit, but only in an instinctive way. However, the inner working of the idea is something quite different, as is the fact that this idea has recognized itself and grasped itself in the form of the idea. That inner working can only be comprehended through knowledge of the idea. The idea in the form of the idea is not something prior from which customs, religion, arts proceed; rather it is only the final labor of spirit. The known, speculative idea cannot have been anterior; rather it is the fruit of the highest and most abstract exertion of spirit.

In addition, when an appeal is made on the basis of historical data, they
37 generally melt away, finally disappearing completely. | A Frenchman, Bailly, with a quite superficial knowledge of astronomy, sought to demonstrate the wisdom of the Indians.[25] In more recent times, when scholars were no longer satisfied with this and investigated the level of knowledge of the Indians, Lambert found for example that the Indians certainly possessed broad knowledge of astronomy.[26] He found that the modern Brahmans, who mindlessly and mechanically make use of forms the inspiration behind which is long forgotten, have preserved the traditional methods and no longer know the inspiration behind the ancient calculation of the eclipses of the moon and sun; hence the present-day Brahmans have surely declined, and the methods they use, while demonstrating great knowledge, are not as superior as people once believed. Other sorts of historical data are equally unsatisfactory.

25. Jean Sylvain Bailly, *Traité de l'astronomie indienne et oriental* (Paris, 1787); *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne* (Paris, 1775). Bailly did not merely speak in a positive way about the astronomical knowledge of the Indians; he also remarked on its defects. See the German tr. of the latter work, *Geschichte der Sternkunde des Altertums bis auf die Errichtung der Schule zu Alexandrien* (Leipzig, 1777), i. 122–3.

26. Hegel's reference is uncertain. Possibly 'Lambert' is a mistake for, or a mishearing of, 'Delambre': J. J. Delambre, *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1817). See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, i (Oxford, 2009), 111 n. 15.

The Progress of History

The second implication is the progress[27] of world history, which can only be derived from the concept of spirit.

The first thing to note is that history as the development of spirit occurs in time, which is appropriate to the concept of spirit. We shall treat only briefly the broader speculative discussion.

The cultural formation[28] of spirit occurs in time. Spirit has a history because of what it is, because it exists only through its labor, through the elaboration of its immediate form, thereby raising itself to a consciousness of itself and thus to a higher standpoint. The quality of the negative is intrinsic to time. For us it is something positive, an event or happening. But what characterizes time is that the opposite can also happen—the relationship of what has being to its nonbeing; and this relationship | *is* time insofar as we 38
do not merely think the relationship but also actually intuit it. The abstract intuition of being and nonbeing is time.[29] Time is the wholly abstract realm of the sensible. Duration is the sameness of determinate being, where the nonbeing of this being does not intrude. But cultural formation, because it is the development of spirit and also contains its self-negation, occurs in time.

Here we enter into a consideration of change or alteration (*Veränderung*), how it occurs in nature, and the alteration of spirit. A comparison of the alteration of spirit and of nature shows that the singular is subject to change. In physical nature everything is transitory, and the same is true of the singular in spirit. In nature, however, in this persistent change, classes and species (*Gattungen*) endure. So the planets move from place to place but the orbit persists; and it is the same with animal species. Alteration here is cyclical, constant repetition of the same. Nothing new is produced by all the changes in nature; this is why nature is tedious. Everything happens in cycles, and individual things change only in keeping with their cycles. Interactions of the individual cycles present no obstacle to the persistence of these

27. Hegel speaks of 'progress' or 'advance' (*Fortgang*) in the sense not only of 'improvement' but also of 'progression' or 'process'.

28. *Bildung* is a term used by Hegel in a variety of interrelated senses. It is translated as 'formation', 'culture', 'cultural formation', 'education', 'cultivation', depending on context.

29. This definition of time is drawn from the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, § 258; cf. §§ 257–9. See *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1970), 34; cf. 33–40, also 15–16. In 'natural' time, the present is the passing over of being into nonbeing (the not-yet of the future), and the future is the passing over of nonbeing into being. The past is the sediment, so to speak, deposited by this reciprocal passage, and as such it is the unity of being and nonbeing, the 'truth' of finite time. In 'spiritual' time, however, the present is the coinherence of the modes of time; and for absolute spirit this presence is eternity.

cycles. It is otherwise, however, with the shape of spirit in history. Here change affects not merely the superficial aspect but enters into the concept itself; it is a concrete alteration. The concept of a shape in history itself is enhanced and corrected. In nature the species makes no progress. But in spirit the change presses to a new stage (*Stufe*), and every change is progress:
39 yet all the individual | offshoots continue to exist. In nature every series allows its shapes to stand alongside each other. The species form a ladder of levels (*Stufen*),[30] ranging from the rudimentary, from light, from the abstract, to the highest pinnacle of life, the human being. Each successive level presupposes the others, resulting as a new and higher principle from the sublation, reworking, and destruction of the previous level. But in nature this process falls apart; the connective matrix is only interior and not apparent; the transition appears only to the thinking spirit, which comprehends it. Nature itself does not know itself; its concept does not enter as such into phenomenal form; nature does not comprehend itself, and consequently the negative aspect of its configurations is not apparent for it.

In that regard, the sphere of spirit differs from the mode of nature because the ladder of stages that spirit climbs and the labor needed to grasp its concept make it clear that the concept drives itself forward through the sublation and reworking of the previous, lower stage, which, once transformed by time, falls into the past. This previous stage has ceased to exist. The existence of a new shape that is the transfiguration of the lower, previous principle demonstrates that the series of spiritual shapes comes about in time.

It should be noted that the peoples as spiritual configurations are in one respect creatures of nature and thus comport themselves in accord with
40 nature; therefore their diverse shapes | stand alongside each other indifferently in space, perennially portraying the independence of the stage [they represent]. If we consider today the shapes as they exist concurrently, we see three major configurations in the ancient world: The first is the principle of the Far East (Mongolian, Chinese, Indian), and it is also the first in world history. The second shape is filled out by the Islamic world, which embodies the principle of absolute antithesis; present in it is the principle of abstract spirit, the simple eternal God, but over against that spirit stands the

30. Hegel, in accord with the science of his time, understood nature to be a hierarchy of interdependent, coexisting levels, not an evolutionary process with higher stages coming later in time. Spirit, however, precisely evolves through a series of temporal stages. Thus when *Stufe* refers to spirit, we translate as 'stage'; when it refers to nature, the more appropriate term is 'level'. Nature is spatial, spirit is temporal (though subject to the spatial, geographical effects of nature, as Hegel makes abundantly clear).

unbridled free will of individuality. The third shape comprises the Christian world of Western Europe, the greatest accomplishment of which is spirit's knowledge of its own depths. Thus the shapes that we see in world history as a succession in time we also see standing perennially alongside each other in space. It is essential to note, and indeed we must convince ourselves of it, that these shapes subsist alongside each other and have their own conceptual necessity. For the sole intent of philosophical history is to eliminate consideration of anything contingent and to know everything as engendered by the concept. Chance is external necessity, which indeed comes from causes, but from causes that themselves are only external conditions. One accustomed to regarding everything as contingent can find the philosophical way of considering the concept at first astonishing, and, from slipshod habits of representation, assume that such a view is itself contingent, a mere fancy. | But such a person has not yet arrived at engaging in philosophical 41
reflections, much less being able to critique them. Whoever does not value *thought* alone as the true and the highest is in no position to judge the philosophical way [of thinking].

Because we have said that the great principles also exist perennially alongside each other, one might imagine this to mean that we should find all the shapes that have gone past in time existing alongside each other in the present. Thus we could expect that a Greek people with its beautiful paganism, its pleasures, etc., still exists today; likewise, that a Roman people should still exist today. However, these peoples, these configurations, have passed; similarly, in the case of every particular people there are configurations that have passed. The ancient Germanic tribes have for example disappeared. Why these shapes and their principles have become part of the past and no longer exist physically can only be discussed in terms of the special nature of [historical] configurations. Our discussion of this matter would lack specificity if we did not consider the particular shapes themselves, and this can be done only in [our treatment of] world history itself. It follows that only the most universal elements and configurations can subsist perennially alongside each other, and that they necessarily disappear if they are in turbulent animation. This was the first consequence of the nature of spirit.

The second point concerns the specific mode of progress of the spirit of a people (*Volksgeist*) and of the transition undergone by such a spirit. First there | is the wholly general and sensible activity of change, or time as 42
such. Concrete negativity and movement constitute spiritual activity as such, and we shall want to consider these more closely in their mode and form as they relate to the progression of the spirit of a people within itself, and its transition [to another stage]. If we say initially that a people progresses,

making an advance, and, overstepping itself, declines, then the most proximate categories that strike us are those of cultural formation in general: thus development, refinement, over-refinement, and decline.[31] Over-refinement is the result or source of a people's destruction.

Cultural formation or cultivation in a general sense concerns the formal aspect and does not yet specify anything in regard to content. What constitutes cultivation is in general the formal aspect of the universal. Cultivated human beings are the ones who know how to place the stamp of universality on everything that they do, say, and think; they surrender their particularity and act in accord with universal principles. Cultivation is thus the activity of the universal, the form of thinking. Cultivation informs thinking, the universal, everything. Regarded more closely, we find that thinking, formal universality, is able to restrain what is particular. Thus humans act not merely in accord with their inclinations, desires, and particularities; rather they restrain themselves, rein themselves in, thereby allowing the object per
43 se more freedom; they conduct themselves more theoretically, | respecting the right and freedom of the object. Connected with this is an individualized treatment of the aspects of the object, a closer consideration of the concrete situation at hand, an analysis of circumstances, and a pinpointing of the aspects of the object. This individualization is directly what gives these aspects the form of the universal because they are abstracted and considered each for itself. Thus cultivated persons approach the objects and pay attention to their various aspects; the latter are available to them. Cultivated reflection has given these objects the form of the universal, takes them as particularized on their own account. With this approach cultivated persons can grant individual circumstances their rightful place, while uncultivated persons in a well-meaning way seize upon some prominent feature but thereby do injustice to a host of others. Because cultivated persons take into account and register the various aspects, they can act more concretely; moreover, this is essentially due to the fact that cultivated persons can act in accord with universal aims and perspectives. This is the nature of cultural formation in general. It has this one simple quality: that aims and reflections bear the imprint of the universal's character.

The development and activity of spirit must, however, be grasped more
44 concretely; the movement produced by cultural formation must | be grasped more specifically in its moments. As the deed and concept of spirit, we have indicated that it [spirit] makes itself to be what it is implicitly in its

31. The German reads: *Bildung überhaupt, also Entwicklung, Bildung, Überbildung, Verbildung.*

real possibility; thus we have first the real possibility, and second the actual existence of this merely possible being-in-self. The positing of the determinate qualities that it has in itself constitutes the universality of spirit. This can be translated into a subjective meaning as well: we call what spirit is in itself 'ability', 'capacity'; and when these are posited, brought forth into existence, we call them 'attributes', 'aptitudes', etc. What is posited and brought forth in the form of attributes is itself received only in subjective form; but in history we have what is brought forth by spirit in the form of act, object, work. In the latter form spirit wants to have itself as explicit act (*Tat vor sich*), to have consciousness of itself; and thus it must stand over against itself as act.

As to the relationship between attribute and act, a distinction is often made between what the human being is inwardly, one's attributes, and what one's actions are. In history, however, this distinction comes to nothing because human beings *are* their actions; they are themselves the result of their actions. We assume that intentions can be admirable even if actions amount to nothing; we think that the inner is something other than the deed. With individuals, to be sure, it is possible that they dissemble and appear to be something other than what they are; but this is something quite partial, temporary, and limited, and on the whole it cannot succeed. The truth is that the outward does not differ from what is inward, and it is misleading to draw this distinction; a series of deeds is not to be distinguished from what is inward. History is what is revelatory; therefore it is especially in history that all the specious reasoning about momentous divisions [of inner and outer] | amounts to nothing. 45
History's method is to consider the actions of individuals and peoples; actions portray what the peoples are. *Actions* are the aim or purpose.

The aim of spirit is to produce itself, make itself to be an object; in this way it has itself as an existent being; in this way it knows itself, and its being is to know itself. It is an actual spirit only insofar as it has brought its being-in-self before itself as object, work, deed. Thus the spirit of a people is a determinate spirit, and its action is to make itself into an extant world, one in space and time. Everything is the work of a people; its religion, laws, language, customs, art, accomplishments, actions, relations to other peoples—all these are its deeds, and each people is only this work. Each people has this consciousness. All Englishmen will say that they are the ones who rule the East Indies and the oceans; and so forth. A people adduces its institutions and deeds, for these are its being, these constitute the substantiality and self-esteem of a people, even though single individuals may have no share in them. This work is what lives on; and individuals appropriate the work, that is, accommodate themselves to it [and know] that their individual aspects reside in this whole. They find that

the work is there before them as a ready-made world that they must become part of.

Spirit is therefore this bringing forth, knowing that it is this work and deed. When we consider the period in which this production occurs, we see in this period a people living for the sake of its work; and from this standpoint a people is to be regarded as ethical and virtuous because it brings forth and enacts its inner principle, the inner will of its spirit. This is the period in which its purpose is brought into concrete existence; here the
46 sundering of the | individual from the whole has not yet taken place; this happens only later, in the period of reflection. When a people has objectified itself in its work, it has arrived at its satisfaction. Spirit is no longer something subjective and merely interior that does not have a correlative existence. This deficiency of merely being-in-self, the split between the in-itself and actuality, is suspended; and thereby a people has accomplished itself and is satisfied; it has erected what it itself is as a work, as its world. This is the first moment that comprises the activity of spirit.

The second moment, associated with the first, is that spirit, when it has achieved itself and has what it wants, no longer needs its activity. The substantial soul is no longer active; now it is only oriented to individual aspects, having lost the highest interest of life, which is found only with the antithesis [between goal and attainment]. I have an interest in something only insofar as it is still concealed from me or insofar as it is my purpose but is not yet fulfilled. Hence, its deeper interest disappears when a people has achieved itself and makes a transition from adulthood to old age, to the enjoyment of what it has achieved. Such a people lives in the spirit of what it has become, in the spirit of what it sought and has been able to attain. It has perhaps surrendered several aspects of its purpose or been satisfied within a narrow compass. It now lives within its habitual routine, which is what leads to natural death. (But because it is universal, a type (*Gattung*), something different comes on the scene, a different determination.) For habit is no longer alive; it is where purposes are no longer at work because they have
47 been achieved. A necessity or need did arise, but it is no longer felt because | it was satisfied by some arrangement or other. Although they once had a sound basis, such earlier arrangements are now of little interest and are discontinued as unnecessary; a present without need ensues.

However, such an undemanding perpetuation of habit leads to natural death. Natural death can show itself as political nullity: a people continues to vegetate, only the particular needs and interests of individuals predominate, and there is no longer the spirit of a people with lively interests. If true and universal interests are to arise, the spirit of a people must aspire to

something new. But from where is this to come if the principle is already produced? The new can only entail a surpassing of that people's principle, a striving for something universal in such a way that this principle will determine itself further. This is possible; for spirit does not simply die a natural death; the spirit of a people is not a natural, singular, immediate individual but rather essentially a universal life and spirituality. And thus what appears as a natural death also appears as a self-mortification, not merely as the abstract negative of simple cessation; rather this negative other will come to light in the universality of the spirit of the people itself.

The spirit of a people exists as a type (*Gattung*), as universal on its own account, and therein resides the possibility that the universal can appear within this people as what is posited over against it. Thus the spirit of a people allows its negative to make an appearance. Peoples can drag on in a vegetative life and be spiritually dead in such a way that the negative that is within them | does not come to light as division and conflict. We have seen 48
this in modernity with old imperial cities that have outwardly declined but inwardly remain without a clue of how that happened to them. This brings us to the third point, which is that spirit as spirit prepares its own downfall, which is however the coming forth of a new life.

It is not merely the habitual routine of spirit's life that constitutes its transition; rather, the spirit of a people as spirit must get to the point of knowing itself and thinking what it is. The spirit of a people is knowing, and this activity of thought in relation to the reality of such a spirit is such that the latter knows its work to be objective and universal, no longer merely subjective. This is the other principal determination that stands in juxtaposition to a natural death. In this regard we wish to return to the point that spirit produces its being-in-self as work, makes itself into an ethical, political organization. This is something external, a system of articulations. Such a work is something objective, and for this reason it has universality as its determination and foundation. As the work of the spirit of a people, it is not something particular but something inherently universal. Only as enduring and permanent is it a work.

When a people is driven to actions by mere desires, such deeds pass by without any trace, or the traces are not positive but rather destructive. Enthusiasms, impulses, and occurrences of this sort are not 'works'. The same thing is the case in the ancient myths. In the beginning Chronos ruled in an age of innocence when ethical relationships did not yet exist. This Chronos, or time, had his own works or achievements that he begot and that were only ephemeral, and he in turn devoured them. Jupiter, the political god who created an ethical and conscious work—he from whose head | 49

Minerva sprang, he who was father of Apollo and the Muses—was the first to vanquish time because he produced an enduring work, the state. So work has the quality of universality and objectivity. Universality has the nature of subsistence. Thus a work must have objectivity and universality.

The second point is that the formation of a people is necessarily accompanied by the fact that it knows its universal aspect as ethical. Objectivity is found in the work only to the extent that it is known. The people must be cognizant of the universal upon which its ethical life rests and that allows the particular to disappear. The people must therefore possess a conception of its life and circumstances; it must be cognizant of its laws as acknowledged universalities; it must know its religion and not merely possess a cultus but advance to the doctrines of religion. Spirit seeks to know this; thus it seeks to know its universality, and only by means of this knowing does it make itself one with the aspect of its objectivity that constitutes what is universal. As what is universal it seeks to relate itself to its own universal elements. Its objectivity is at the same time a world of singularities; by relating itself only to these singularities, it exists in faith, in sensible behavior, in external perception, etc. But it ought to be a thinking being, the unity of its highest and innermost being with its existent being; and this unity can obtain only when it knows the universal aspect of its work and its world. This is its highest satisfaction because thinking is what is innermost for it. Thinking involves a need and necessity that we shall have to consider further. At this point spirit knows the universality of its principles and its actual world; it
50 knows what it essentially is. It is now conscious | of its essential being. This work, this world of thinking, is initially, in terms of form, distinct from its actuality; so there is both a real and an ideal ethical life, and the individuals who know about the work of the people are different from those who live in only an immediate way within it. So at this standpoint we see the sciences flourish, as they necessarily must.

If we want to know what the Greeks were, we find out about Greek life in Sophocles, Aristophanes, Aristotle, Plato, Thucydides, etc.; in them spirit came to know itself through thought.

This satisfaction is indeed the highest, but in one respect it is ideal *vis-à-vis* the real. Thus we see a people find satisfaction in the representation of and talk about the sort of virtue that stands over against or in place of actual virtue. Spirit has produced this, and it knows to bring reflection to bear on the unreflected. Here resides in part the awareness of the limitations of such determinacy. Reasoning prompts self-consciousness to renounce duties and laws that otherwise it would immediately fulfill. Now it is the general tendency to require grounding, to require that an acknowledged [practice]

be connected firmly to some wholly universal principle. If such grounds, i.e. something wholly universal, are not discovered as the basis, the representation of virtue becomes precarious. Then duty as such becomes something that is not valid absolutely | but only insofar as the grounds of its validity 51
are known. Connected with this is the separation of individuals from each other and from the whole; for consciousness is subjectivity, and it has the need to isolate itself, to grasp itself as a particular subjectivity in the form of a *this*. This subjective inwardness, grasping itself in the form of singularity, is what produces vanity, self-seeking, etc.—qualities that are contrary to faith, to immediacy. Thus self-interests and passions are unleashed as destructive qualities, and the destruction of a people runs rampant. This is not natural death but the death of an ethical life, a death that appears in ethical life as the tearing apart of the members. Thus it came to pass that after Zeus put a stop to the devourings of Chronos and established something inherently permanent, Chronos himself and the whole race of his offspring were in any event swallowed up themselves, in fact by that very principle of thinking that requires insight based on reasons.

Time is the negative portrayed in a sensible way; thought, by contrast, is the innermost negativity in which all determinacy is dissolved and objective, existent being is superseded. Thought is the universal, the unlimited, and it puts an end to all limitation. If indeed what is objective does not appear as limited, it still appears as a given and thus as something that can set no limits to thought. Political states are the sort of objects that limit thought because thought can overcome them. To the thinking subject states appear to be a limitation. This is the path on which the spirit of a people, out of its depths, prepares its downfall. | 52

This dissolution of the ethical world by thought is at the same time, however, necessarily the emergence of a new principle with new determinate qualities. Put briefly, thought is the dissolvent of the previously healthy shapes because its activity is that of the universal. In this dissolution brought about by the universal, however, the previous principle is in fact maintained, but only in such a way that its determinate mode or actual being is destroyed. Here this is to be taken as axiomatic. On the one hand, therefore, because spirit is the comprehension of the universal, the singular becomes something precarious and foundering; but on the other hand the universal essential being is maintained—not only maintained but elevated into the form of universality; its universality is rendered prominent. The preceding principle is thus transfigured into this universality. But the mode of universality now existing is also to be regarded as something different from what preceded it, for universality then was more in the mode of inwardness and

had outward existence only as concealed within an endless number of various existing relationships.

The labor involved in processing this externality by thought means for us simply that what beforehand was singularity and merely subsisted in concrete singularity is now transposed into the form of universality, which however has a different determinate quality in preference to the others; for it is a further determination and thus appears as something different, something new. And spirit, which thus now inwardly has further comprehension of its essential being, appears as something more and different, and it now has different and broader interests and purposes. This transformation has, indeed intrinsically, arisen from a transformation of form, but this new form
53 then adds to the principle other | and further determinations, which also become determinations of content. In order to bring this into greater representational clarity, we can recall well-known phenomena. So, for example, those who are cultivated among a people have quite different expectations than those who are uncultivated and who share in the same religion and ethicality, whose substantial circumstances are entirely the same. Cultural formation at first changes nothing about the situation itself but appears only to be a formal matter. The cultivated and the uncultivated Christian have the same content but nonetheless wholly different needs. The person of luxury eats and drinks and has a dwelling place just like the simple person. The same is true regarding matters of property. On the whole, the serf also has property, but it can be bound up with encumbrances, which confer another sort of property right involving a joint proprietor. In thinking about property, we state forthwith that it is something unencumbered (*ein Freies*), that there can be but one master of it; thus thought posits the definition of property as something freely held (*freies*). The content is the same; but thought emphasizes the universal, and from the latter emerge a separate higher principle and a different need and interest.

Thus the characteristic of the transition or the changing of a people is that what is present to hand and immediate is subjected to thought and thereby elevated to universality; for the particular must be purified of its particularity and transfigured into essentiality. Only this relationship [to thought] makes for a further determination. Therefore, to the extent that we have seen a spirit striving to be with itself and to grasp and comprehend its actuality in thinking
54 fashion, | the principle has to that extent been expanded and further determined. To grasp this, we must know what thought is, namely that it is what is true and essential, what is universal. But spirit consists in grasping the universal; thus the universal is found in philosophy. This is the speculative significance of the universal, and spirit is what has this speculative significance because the

defining categories as known by philosophy are explicit to it. Merely reflective thinking has general representations too, but only as abstract and distinguished from actual being. Thus we can give a general representation of peoples and their masters, etc., but this is merely subjective and just facilitates our representational activity. Universality—grasped as it truly is—is the substance, the essentiality, that which genuinely has being.

If, for example, being a citizen of Athens includes being a citizen in a universal way, such that this person counts for something just as he now truly is, then this universal aspect simply means that the citizen is a human being; and, in face of this universality, the particularity of simply being a citizen of Athens or having some other features, melts away. Particularity of this sort melts under the light of thought, as snow melts under the sun. When, in a people, thought comprehends universality, that people can no longer remain what it was but rather must attain new and higher determinate qualities. Thus, for example, if particularity is sublated by thought in a people such as the Athenians, and if thought develops in such a way that the particular principle of this people is no longer essential, then this people can no longer endure; another principle has emerged. If higher qualities accompany such a principle, then the substantial foundation of the spirit of a people has changed. What was once its purpose now has different characteristics. A new work is at hand, one that must be accomplished. | 55

Incidentally, it must be remarked that in world history, insofar as a principle of the spirit of a people has become a higher principle, this spirit is now existing in the form of a different people; and that world history has made a transition from the people that previously was prominent to another people. For a people cannot traverse several such principles and several stages; it cannot be epoch-making twice in world history, even though it has stages in its development.

These stages are, however, merely forms of the development of its determinate principle. If the latter changes, then a different people arrives at the higher principle. This is the reason why, in the history of spirit, the principles exist as the spirits of peoples but at the same time are also natural existences; here we find ourselves not on the soil of pure thought but rather on that of existences. The stage at which spirit has arrived exists as a natural determinacy, the natural principle of a people, or rather as a nation; for 'nation' is what a people is in natural form. In history spirit appears as displayed in various sorts of natural shapes in space and time. Thus when a determinate principle takes on further determinate qualities, the new appears in the spirit of a people as the negation of what previously existed, as religions, customs, etc., therefore as the destruction of what previously existed; it appears as the

negation of its determinacy, as the destruction of what that people was in terms of its original determinacy. The higher stage in its positive existence is still a natural stage that thus appears as a new people. These are, then, the more precise moments in the process of change; herein reside the moments of the
56 concept in their necessity. These moments are the moving soul of progress. |

The End of History

Further reflection about the respects in which the spirit of a people dies a natural death but also is altered by thought presents a succession of stages that appears to be nothing other than a progression into infinity, a perfectibility that proceeds *in infinitum* without ever attaining its goal. The additional statement that the higher principle consists in the fact that what preceded it can only be grasped in universal terms makes this universal itself only something determinate once again. Just as in nature there is a progression in the series of living forms such that the higher level is a universal life but at the same time appears as something determinate, so also must the universal in history assume a determinate shape and portray itself in a determinate way; for we are standing on the soil of existent beings, of natural shapes. In any event, history has to do with actuality. But it appears to be a matter of only indeterminate progress if no determinate shape can secure itself against thought, against the concept, if it cannot withstand thought. Were there to be something that the concept cannot digest, cannot resolve, cannot idealize, then this thing would stand opposed to the concept, estranged from it; and this would be the greatest rupture, the supreme unhappiness. Thus the concept resolves everything, and it does so continually. Had something been able to hold out against thought, that would only be thought itself, since it would itself be the object such that it grasps its own self; for it is simply what is itself unlimited. In that event it would have returned into itself, and the tribunal of history (*das Gericht der Geschichte*) would be over and done with; for judgment is passed only on what does not accord with the concept.[32] In this return of thought into itself, eternal peace would be established.

Here is the place to discuss the final end of the world. If only new principles constantly emerged, world history would have no purpose leading

32. In a well-known passage in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), §340 (p. 371), Hegel refers to world history as world judgment (*die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*). Judgment is accomplished, not by retribution, but by the attainment of the universal principle of history, the concept of freedom. Hegel returns to the theme of the dawning of the day of judgment in the Germanic World (see n. 2).

to a goal; no end would ever be in sight. However, religion and reason recognize as of interest only | what is genuinely true, subsisting in and 57
for itself, only what has no limitation and is not merely transient. This brings us to the content of the absolute purpose that spirit sets forth by means of world history and that is therefore the work of world history. This too, like the first two stages, must proceed from the concept of spirit. We have thus far indicated the mode of the beginning [of history], then secondly the moments of its progress. The latter must have a goal, a final end, and it is this final end that we now consider. It resides in the already-indicated concept of spirit. If we speak of it briefly, however, it remains abstract; if we speak of it as it is for the concept, we would be too expansive, and this is not appropriate here. Thus we can give here only a general representation; history itself provides the details.

One often hears that the final end of the world is the good. But this is indeterminate, and precisely the final end posits something determinate. We call to mind the statements of religion about this matter, and we *must* do so; for we must not proceed in philosophy by failing to take into account religious and other venerable intuitions because, out of timidity, we ventured no comparisons. We find the religious final end expressed as follows: that human beings should attain eternal peace, that they should be sanctified. This is, in one respect, the proper religious aim as it concerns the individual. The subject as such has an infinite interest in this religious arrangement. However, the presupposed content of the final end, so conceived, is that in which individuals will find their eternal goal, that in which souls find their salvation. One might have the impression that the eternal goal has nothing to do with us *here*, | where we act in the world, because it is a future, 58
otherworldly end, something 'over there'. But then this world, what is this-worldly, is still the place of preparation and attainment, and so this world must furnish the basic orientation for all works. Yet the final end as thus expressed by religion refers only to the individual, subjective side; and if the interest of the individual is thus expressed as the final end, then the object, or the content of salvation, would fall under the heading of means. But this is certainly not the case. What constitutes the way to the goal is no mere means but directly the absolute thing-that-history-is-about itself, the absolute history[33] in which individuals are only single moments.

33. Hotho reads (as translated): *zugleich die absolute Sache selbst, die absolute Geschichte* Griesheim reads: *es muß durchaus als das Absolute selbst gefaßt werden* ('it must be grasped altogether as the absolute itself').

If we leave aside the merely subjective form, the substantial content that it presupposes may be grasped more precisely. Just as is the case with the purpose of natural existence, the purpose of spiritual activity is the glorification and honor of God. Here the matter is comprehended in religious terms. This is in fact the worthy aim of spirit and history. It is implicit in what we said before, and we want to think about it with more precision. We found spirit to be what produces itself, makes itself into and grasps itself as object. Only then is it result, as what is brought forth and self-produced. To grasp itself means simply to grasp itself in thinking fashion. It does not mean merely to have information about arbitrary, optional, and transient matters; rather it essentially means to grasp the true being, the absolute itself. Spirit's absolute is the absolute of everything, the divine being. Spirit's purpose, its absolute drive, is thus to gain a consciousness of this being such that it is known as the one and only actual and true being through which everything
59 happens and | proceeds—to know that everything must be arranged, and is actually arranged, in accord with it, and therefore that it is the power that guided and guides the course of world history, the power that rules and has ruled it. The recognition of this in these deeds and works is what religion rightly expresses by giving God the honor and glory, or by glorifying and exalting the truth.[34] This exaltation of the truth is to be understood as the absolute final end, and this truth is the sole power that brings forth and completes this exaltation. The individual spirit has its glory in glorifying God. This is not its particular honor; rather its honor comes from knowing that its self-feeling is the substantial consciousness of God, that its action is to the honor and glory of God, of the absolute. In this knowledge the individual spirit has attained its truth and freedom; here it has to do with the pure concept, with the absolute; here it is at home not with another but with itself, with its essence, not with something contingent but rather in absolute freedom. This, accordingly, would be the final end of world history. In this idea the antithesis that is found in the constricted spirit falls away, for that spirit is aware of its essence only within a limitation and overcomes the latter by means of thought. Here, therefore, the destruction wrought by thought is no longer something alien to it, since nothing other stands over against it [the free spirit] than thought. Here too natural death is no longer at hand, and the eternal circuit is completed. These are the major elements of the idea.

34. The terms here are *Ehre* ('honor', 'glory') and *Verherrlichung* ('glorification', 'exaltation').

Human Passions and the Divine Idea

We come now to the other aspect, the passions and their relationship to the divine idea. These constitute the element of singularity, of particularity, of the activity whereby particular purposes are actualized. It is in and through the passions that the rule, the power, and the dominion of the idea are to be recognized.

These passions include all special purposes and interests. The form of the purpose is not essential. 'Passion' is the most passive of terms,[35] but not completely so. When something is accomplished, we think of it as a purpose, as something set forth or presented (*Vorgestelltes*). Indeed passion always seeks something set before it; | but what it does is determined within itself 60
and by itself. It is the unity of the determination of the will with what the subject is as such. Passion is the determination of the whole human being; thus it is what separates and distinguishes one human being from another; it is that whereby the individual is this person and not someone else. Every human being is a specific, particular person; only so is a human being actual, for a mere abstraction of humanity has no truth. A purpose is not something selected but is precisely what emerges from the determinacy of the passion. Thus 'passion' means here the determinacy of the human being. 'Character' is already too broad a term because it encompasses all particularities and denotes the whole complexion [of the person]. We are not concerned with the merely impotent interiority that lacks the strength to realize itself, nor with merely putative purposes by which weak characters beat around the bush. In history we do not have to do with individuals who have certain intentions but then act like mice or gnats; rather we have before us the colorful din of passions.

If we compare the colorful drives of passion with the silent and simple life of the idea, which has within itself, and carries out, the absolute final end, then the next question concerns the nature of their connection. The idea of world history necessarily sets forth this connection and contains the unity of the two; it makes this unity utterly fundamental. This connection is not something to be taken simply on faith; actions are not to be the mere material or external means by which the idea realizes itself. | For indivi- 61
duals are knowing and willing beings and make no claim to carry out solely the designs of a pretty magic (*was ein schöner Zauber will*). They have the justifiable expectation not to have to serve as mere means. Nor can we say

35. The German term *Leidenschaft* is related to the verb *leiden*, 'to suffer, beat, endure, undergo'. Similarly, the English word 'passion' derives from the Latin *passio*, 'suffering'.

that the connection is something incomprehensible; rather our task is to comprehend it since we are engaged in a philosophical history of the world. Nevertheless we cannot enter into the full extent of this discussion but only indicate the path on which a response to the question is to be found. Still it can be noted that the connection of these elements employs the well-known form of the unification of freedom and necessity. It is customary in reflective representation to speak about free will,[36] the particular will of freedom, and to place over against it what has being in and for itself, the rational, as something proper to itself and as iron necessity. In fact, the relationship of spirit to what has being in and for itself, as a relationship to what is its own, is only one of freedom. Freedom in the proper sense is the rational. Free will, the particularity of interests, is only a mixture of freedom and necessity, and it belongs only to the presumptive or phenomenal freedom that stands under the influence of natural determinations.

The connection between the particularities of human beings and what has being in and for itself has two aspects: first, it is found intrinsically in the concept, it is the idea itself; second, the question concerns what the connection is in explicit terms, in its mode of drawing-out (*Erziehung*), in its workings.

First, we take note of the idea itself, of how we give an account of it. The
62 idea has within itself the attribute of subjectivity, of | self-knowing; it contains within itself the attribute of activity. For it is what posits itself as over against itself and makes this ideal object its own. This idea is the eternal life of God within itself, before, as it were, the creation of the world; it is the logical nexus. It is represented initially as inward and universal, and it still lacks the form of being in the form of exteriority, of immediate singularity. Thus this idea has within itself the moment of determination, but it does not yet have the mode of reality, of direct emergence.

The second aspect is that this idea must go forth into antithesis—which is initially, in terms of form, found only within itself, as something ideal—in order to give this antithesis its due; that is, to posit the distinctions on their own account and with the appearance of independence *vis-à-vis* each other. This is the first point, and the more precise specification is that the universal is thus found as one side, while the other side, that of immediacy, determines itself as formal being-for-self, as formal freedom, as abstract unity of self-consciousness, as infinite reflection within itself, as infinite negativity. Absolute negativity applies only to spirit. The I, which places itself over against all

36. *Willkür* for Hegel refers to a will that is free in a private or arbitrary way; it is not true freedom.

fullness as an atom [i.e. a self-contained particle], is the most extreme contrast to that fullness. The entire fullness of the idea is opposed to this abstract negativity. God, the world, or whatever form the concrete may have, is posited as something 'over there', as an object; but the I is thus defined by the fact that this other is *for* it. The knowing side, absolutely unyielding (*absolut Spröde*), is so situated that for it there is also the other. These are the initial specifications. Further conceptualization arrives, for instance, at what is called the emergence of the world of finite and free spirits. | What can be noticed as first is that this atom, which is at the 63
same time multiplicity, is the finite as such. This atom is for itself only as exclusive of the other because it negates the other and therefore is limited by the other; it has the other as a negative, a limitation of itself, and thus is itself finitude.

It is to be noted, thirdly, that this finitude, this extremity of freedom that is for itself, must (because it is formal knowing within itself) be considered in relation to the honor and glory of God as the absolute idea, and that the latter is to be recognized. In recognition reside God's honor and glory. This aspect of finitude is thus the ground on which the spiritual element of knowing rests, knowing as knowing. It is thus the aspect of determinate existence for the absolute, the aspect with only formal reality. These are the principal moments in terms of which the connection is to be found.

Inasmuch as we now make the transition to more concrete shapes, we said that there is an other for the finite I. The other is present for the I as the divine, and thus religion is present; but also in the shape of the other there is the world as such, as the universal sphere of finitude. Its own finitude exists for this formal self-knowing. It grasps itself in this aspect of itself as finite, and so it has as such the standpoint of finite being, of finite will, of free will, of finite knowing, of finite ends; this is its phenomenal standpoint. In one aspect this self-knowing wills itself as such, and it also wills itself in everything; its subjectivity is to be found in all objectivity; this is its self-certainty. Inasmuch as this subjectivity is thought of as pure and wholly without content, it constitutes the drive of knowing, it is the reason that seeks to know itself in everything. Thus the pious individual | wants to be saved, to 64
be blessed. Certainty of it is therefore a moral truth and resides here in pure subjectivity. But this being-for-self must have gone through a sequence in order to be purified. It does not want itself back as knowing; rather it first seeks itself as finite in accord with its immediacy, in its particularity; and this is the sphere of appearance. It seeks itself in accord with the specification of its finitude and particularity in that an other stands over against it.

This is the point at which the passions occur, the point where individuals place their certainty in their particularity and seek to actualize it. If we consider this point, namely that individuals seek the existence of their finitude, we see that they have doubled themselves: they are *finite* and they *actualize* this finitude. If they have achieved this harmony by reconciling themselves in this way, they are called 'happy'; for those who find harmony with themselves and enjoy themselves in their existence are called 'happy'. This is where happiness has its home. Happiness might also be considered a factor in history. In this regard it can be remarked that world history is not a soil of happiness; in history the periods of happiness are blank pages, for the object of history is, at the least, change. In world history satisfaction cannot really be called happiness because it is a question of the satisfaction of universal purposes that transcend the sphere in which ordinary and particular inclinations can be satisfied. The object of world history is those purposes that have meaning in world history, purposes that are carried out with energy, by an abstract willing that is often directed against the happiness
65 of | individuals themselves and of other individuals. World-historical individuals have not sought happiness, yet they have found satisfaction.

If we go further, the next characteristic is that of formal activity, the principle of being-for-self, of formal unity. The moment of abstract activity is to be regarded as the guiding aspect, the *medius terminus*; it is positioned as the middle term of a syllogism. Everything rational is a syllogism. If the activity is regarded as the middle term, then on one side is the abstract idea, which is found in the well of thought. On the other side is externality, matter, to which belong the particularities, the independent atoms. What is itself atomistic, however, exists as the activity of this middle term, which actualizes the inwardness of the idea, translates it from interiority to the externality of existence, and singularizes universality in immediate existence. Inwardness for its own sake would be something inert or lifeless, an abstract essentiality; through activity it loses this aspect and becomes something existent. Empty objectivity, this external material, is itself only emptiness if the activity is not elevated to universality, to the manifestation of the essential being that it is in and for itself. The singular self-consciousness elevates the empty objectivity to a thinking of the universal, a willing and knowing of the ethical; it renders the particular will commensurate with the universal will as it is in and for itself.

The connection concerned first of all the diremption of the idea. The singularity, the atom, which thinks itself, is also for another, and the other is for it. Thus the activity is to be grasped as infinite restlessness within itself, and it stands at the peak. But there is also the direct obligation to fit

everything in the material realm *into* the universal and to draw everything *out of* the universal; in this way the absolute will is known and accomplished. This infinite | drive of unity, restoration, rupture[37] is as such the 66
second aspect of the diremption of the idea. Thus it is the restoration, the universalization of the singular. If we understand the singular as singular self-consciousness, then this process is the raising up of the singular to universal ethical principles, and in precisely this way the ethical realm comes into force.

The more pertinent question concerns the form or character that the universal takes on when brought into appearance, to existence; for it is activity that actualizes the universal. This is the viewpoint of separation, of differentiation, of finitude in general. The agents who are acting from this viewpoint seek for themselves actual and finite things, higher purposes; they seek the enjoyment of their particularity. The other aspect is that at the same time a universality of purposes appears in these particular purposes, and we call these universals good, right, duty, etc. If the universal is not apparent in the particular purposes, then we are dealing with the stance of abstract free will, of brutality, which desires only the satisfaction of its self-seeking. But this latter viewpoint lies behind us.

This universal, as seen from the viewpoint of finitude, is the particular good as such, present in ethical form. It is a production of the universal, which is already the ethical. This can be called the sustenance of the ethical; it is no lifeless duration but essentially a bringing forth. What is brought forth is in the first instance ethical custom, valid right, not merely good in an abstract sense but the determinacy of the good, not just anything as good. It is a duty to defend one's native land, be it Rome or Sparta—a duty, not an option. The ethical is thus essentially something determinate. This operative ethicality | comprises individual duties, the rules of conduct for the ethical 67
activity of individuals in general, which all individuals should weave into their activity. These are the well-known duties and laws that each individual acknowledges, the objective aspect of one's status and country. There is nothing problematic about them; weak-willed persons are the ones who think they call for extensive discussion. The feature of the universal as ethical practice is that the sustenance of the ethical sphere comes about by all persons having to produce this ethical life by their own activity. Over against this universality of ethical custom there is a second universal that comes into prominence and expresses itself in the great figures of history;

37. Thus Griesheim; Hotho reads: 'The drive of restoration, of rupture to unity'.

and herein lies the point of conflict that makes it difficult to conduct oneself in accord with the ethical realm. Within an ethical community of being such a conflict cannot occur. For the latter is a necessary world of ethical life, and the universality of the ethical is not damaged by the ability of individuals to stray from it. Singular things can indeed happen; but such singular things as depravity and deceit are suppressed. Still, the [other] universal that menaces this [ethical] universal is of a different sort; it has already been noted where that universal comes from.

We remarked earlier in reference to the progress of the idea that an ethical whole is at the same time limited and as such has a higher universal above it. Inasmuch as the latter comes to prominence, a doubling or inner fragmentation occurs; the universal remains what it was but the higher power within it rises to prominence and intrudes upon it. This constitutes the transition from one spiritual shape to another higher shape; the preceding universal is sublated as a particular by means of thinking it. Thought renders the
68 particular universal by means of thinking. |

A universality that is higher than the preceding universal, higher than what is now specified in contrast to it as particular, can be referred to as the next type. It was already inwardly present in the preceding universal but had not yet come into currency, so that its actual existence was precarious and inwardly broken. It is precisely the great historical figures, the world-historical individuals, who grasp such a universal and turn it to their purposes. They can be called heroes, those who produce something universal—a universal that they create out of themselves by knowing, willing, and accomplishing it, a universal that is recognized to be a universal. They are praised for having accomplished a universal that previously was only implicit, a universal that was not invented by them but rather was eternally present and, as posited by them, also as such is honored along with them. These historical individuals grasp such a universal; they create it out of a source whose content was not yet at hand in a known, determinate existence, and thus they seem to create it out of themselves, out of their inwardness. Thus they bring about, as accomplished deeds, new conditions of the world that appear initially to be simply their own goals and specific character, their productions, their passion. It is *their* πάθος; and they *will* it as something universal. Everything is gathered under the banner of such heroes because it is they who articulate what that era involves. We can say that by dint of the passions of the world-historical persons, the universal that appears here in the form of passion is the absolute.

69 At this point we should indicate that, while such moments are higher, |
they are themselves only one moment in the universal idea. This concept is

peculiar to philosophy. World-historical individuals should have this concept. Accordingly, they know the universal and seek it; they have to do with this universal. Its hour has come; it is the truth of the age, and on this account they are world-historical persons; it is what is inwardly already prepared. Thus they have the absolute right on their side; they know how to carry it out. Spirit validates itself in this shape, and these persons are conduits of it. We remark in this regard that the world-historical persons are the most perspicacious about their age. They have the best understanding of what needs to be done; they desire and do what is correct and right, although what they do appears to be their own concern, their own passion, their own free will because others do not yet know it. They must heed it because they feel it, because it is already inwardly their own and now comes into existence for the first time. But, as we have said, it appears as the passion of the world-historical figures.

Their words and actions express what is timely, what is true and necessary. They have power in the world solely because they seek what is right, although initially this right is simply their own representation. They have the correct view of what is right. Thus Julius Caesar had the correct view of what Rome was; he knew that the Republic was only a shell (a shadow of its former self), that the rightful laws of *dignitas* and *auctoritas* had been suppressed, that (and this was the main thing) they no longer were to be granted to the people, for instead it was proper that he make the particular will subject to himself. This was a correct representation of the time, and thus Caesar could be its culmination. Lucan says: Cato favored the vanquished cause; the gods, however, the victorious cause.[38] What is right | 70
is the characteristic that promotes the idea in and for itself. This appears as the passion of those individuals who above all satisfy their own concept in their passion. What the great persons do is to act in order to satisfy themselves, not others. Were they to satisfy the others, they would have much to do, for the others do not know what is timely or what they themselves want. Hence the great individuals know what the times call for; they seek it and find their satisfaction only in doing so. They are so constituted that in their quest they satisfy their own concept, and this appears as their passion. For this reason the peoples gather around them,

38. Marcus Annaeus Lucan, *Bellum civile* 1.128. The Latin text reads: *victrix causa deis placuit sed victa Catoni* ('the victorious cause was pleasing to the gods, but the vanquished cause to Cato'). Cato the Younger (95–46 BC) sought to preserve the Roman Republic and thus supported Pompey in opposition to Caesar. The *Bellum civile* is an epic poem about the war between Julius Caesar and Pompey the Great.

and those who resist them and remain true to the old are defeated. People are powerless to resist these individuals.

This is the true connection between passion and the idea. The necessity of the idea is ethical only through the passion of historical human beings and is connected with it. Thus the purpose of the idea and the content of the passion are one and the same. Passion is the absolute unity of character and the universal. Passion appears, as it were, as something animal-like in the great individuals; for their being as spirit and their being as something natural are utterly one and the same, and this unity constitutes their strength. Because they are driven unresistingly to do what they do, they are satisfied. In this way they satisfy their passion. They have not been happy; for [their work] has perhaps become bitter to them, or at the moment they achieved their goal they have died or were murdered or exiled. They sacrificed their personality; their entire life was a sacrifice. And that they
71 were not happy is a consolation for those who need such a consolation. | Such great ones attract hangers-on, and enviers of them point to the fact that they were immoral and find this situation tolerable only if it is evident that such persons were not happy. However, free inquiry knows what has truly come about by means of them; it acknowledges the greatness and is glad that it exists and has existed. The psychological mode of inquiry commonly comes into play here; it disparages the passion of such great persons and tries to demonstrate that they were immoral. Thus Alexander is judged to have had a thirst for conquest and to have not done what is good for its own sake. Alexander's thirst for conquest was supposedly something subjective and for that reason not something good. But such modes of inquiry do not concern us.

Thus the two aspects that we have considered in their connection are, on the one side, the idea, and, on the other side, passion or the subjective will insofar as it is what activates the idea and is the sustaining principle of the existing ethical whole. Thus the subjective will has not only produced the aspect of particularity or mere change; it also sustains what is substantial, for changes presuppose something in which all changes come about. What is postulated is the absolute unity of the idea with the subjective will that actualizes it. These changes are posited by the subjective will. The unification of the idea (that is, of the will in its representation) and the subjective will is what is substantial, rational, the ethical whole. The latter, insofar as it is defined in terms of will, is the idea as volitional and thus the state as such,
72 the idea | as human freedom. This is the topic of world history, and the state as such is the more narrowly defined topic of world history as a whole.

THE NATURE OF THE STATE

The State and the Actualization of Freedom

Ethical life constitutes the midpoint in which freedom objectifies itself, maintains itself, and lives in enjoyment of itself. This ethical whole is the unity of the two extremes [the idea of freedom and human passions]. The state is the midpoint of these two aspects, which also come to the fore in it. Thus it is the midpoint of other concrete aspects: art, law, customs, the conveniences of life. When we have defined this middle more precisely as the unity of universal and subjective will, we will as a consequence be in a position to say something more specifically about our subject and about the connection of the state with religion, art, and science. Before we can go into history proper, it is important to know what is involved of necessity in the state, what the state is, and likewise how art, religion, and science are related to the state.

Thus the first topic to consider is the nature of the state. The nature of the state is developed more specifically and exactly in the philosophy of right.[39] The interest of philosophy is precisely to *comprehend* the concept [of the state], in contrast to the approach more recently in vogue, the belief that one has an immediate knowledge of its nature. Here we must for the most part presuppose this cognition and only summarize the results.

Concerning the nature of the state, it should be represented as follows: that in it freedom becomes objective to itself, that in it freedom is realized in a positive [i.e. historical] fashion—in contrast to the representation that the state is a collection of human beings in which the | freedom of all is limited, 73
and that therefore the state is the negation of freedom in such a way that for individuals only a small area remains free, one in which they might express their freedom. However, the state is freedom in its objectivity; and the constrained space within which people have, as a rule, known freedom is only arbitrary choice or free will (*Willkür*), thus the opposite of freedom. Therefore the way in which philosophy comprehends the state is that the

39. See *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1821), §§ 257–340 (Wood and Nisbet edn., pp. 275–371). Perhaps Hegel intends to refer here only to the introductory sections (§§ 257–8) (pp. 275–81), where the nature of the state is defined as ethical idea and objective freedom, since the topic of this first subsection is the nature of the state as the actualization of freedom, followed by subsections in which three aspects of its nature are addressed (its constitution, its relation to the spiritual world, and its relation to the physical world). In a broader sense, however, the whole discussion of the state in the *Philosophy of Right* treats the nature of the state, and the same is true of these lectures. The heading 'The Nature of the State' is found in the German edn., while the subsection headings are supplied by the English editors.

state is the actualization of freedom. This is its principal definition. Connected with this is the fact that human beings occupy a rational standpoint only in the state. Aristotle indeed says: 'Apart from the state the human being is an animal or a god.'[40] We remarked earlier[41] that the being of individuals, as well as law, art, and the sciences, are the accomplishments of the peoples. Individuals are offspring, representatives, of their age and people. What one truly *is*, is one's people as existing in the form of a state. Only this deserves to be called one's *being*. For better or for worse, one is a representative of one's age. Earlier we called this being the objective work of a people, and this constitutes the objectivity of each individual. Individuals are only this objective work; anything else is only their formal activity. The goal of all education is that the individual should not remain something subjective but rather become objective.

Individuals can, to be sure, regard the state as a means for the satisfaction of their own ends. This view is, however, simply a one-sided error on the part of individuals; for the state *is* the end or purpose, and individuals have meaning only to the extent that they enact within themselves the substantiality of the people. The true will wills the people's objective essence (*die Sache*), and this is what is substantial. The true artist strives to portray the
74 object or situation (*die Sache*) as | it is for itself, and in doing so his own subjectivity must disappear. Likewise, individuals must make their people's objective essence actual within themselves, and thus their subjective will and what is universal in and for itself are united also in the subject. Individuals owe everything that they are to the state; only in the state do they have their essential being. The state is the ethical whole; it is not an abstraction that stands over against the individual. Only the criminal stands over against the state as an antagonist; but he too remains in the state and has rights in it. The individual lives only in the whole.

The interest of reason is that the state, this ethical whole, should exist, and that the singular will should be united with this absolute. The legitimacy of the heroes who founded states is in terms of this absolute interest. The foundation of states is the supreme justification. The state does not exist for the sake of its citizens; rather it is the end in and for itself, not a means for individuals, who are elements of it. It is not the case that individuals are the end and the state the means. The relationship of end and means is not

40. Aristotle, *Politics* 1, 1253a (*The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 1941), 1129–30). 'Man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity.'

41. See above, p. 159.

appropriate; for the state is not an abstraction that stands over against the citizens; rather they are the essential element, the consciousness of the whole itself. In an organism everything is end and means simultaneously; in it no member is an end and none is a means. Thus the state is the idea as it is present on earth.

Regarded more closely, the relationship of the state can appear as a family relationship, a patriarchal relationship. In any event, such conditions are found in the world; states also arise in part out of the association of families. Such a relationship constitutes the transition from the family to the state. But the state can also be shaped in a nonpatriarchal form. The specific quality of the state will be clearer when we compare it with the family. The family is likewise an ethical whole, but in it love as such is the modality by which spirit and unity are present. Each family member is aware of being a member of the whole through | love. The labor and goals of each are not 75
independent, for their own sake, but rather exist for the family as a whole, and this whole takes precedence over one's own particularity. So here too there is ethical life, actually existing spirit, the spirit of the *penates*.[42] But the spirit of states is different from these *penates*.

The state is [a willed and known] unity: it is spirit not in the form of love or sentiment but rather in the form of willing and knowing the universal. Members of the state confront universality as a force of nature because, for the individual, customs and habits exist as the immediate mode of the ethical and in an immediate way. But in addition *laws* belong to a state, which means that custom does not exist merely in immediate form; rather the universal is known also in the form of universality. It is these laws that are the universal in the form of knowing; they are what elevate the state to a spiritually existing community, whereas in the family sentiment is the dominant force. In the state individuals obey the laws and know that in this obedience they have their freedom, their objectivity; for the laws are the rational. Thus in the laws individuals are related to their own being, their own will. This is, accordingly, a known and willed unity. Thus the independence of individuals is found in the state; for they are knowing individuals, and knowing constitutes the being-for-self of individuals, i.e. it posits their 'I' *vis-à-vis* the universal. Here, therefore, personal identity (*Persönlichkeit*) enters into play. This personal identity is not found in the family; instead only a natural drive binds the members together, a drive heightened to spirituality and thus ethicality. Only in the state do individuals know the

42. The *lares* and *penates* were household gods of the ancient Romans.

76 universal and are | reflected into themselves, have independence. The universal, the laws, stand over against individuals in the state, are posited over against them. Individuals are set apart from these laws; as singular they are over against the universal. The independence of individuals constitutes the division in the state, the antithesis; this antithesis is the element of rationality, constituting the state as a concrete whole.

Thus what appears in the state is the element of knowing and thinking. Connected with this is the fact that precisely all religion, art, science, and therefore culture as such, can emerge only in a state. For they all have thinking as their principle. Absolute being is represented in religion. In the state the absolute is still limited [and takes the form of a] specific folk spirit—so the Athenians had Pallas Athena, and they worshiped their folk spirit as a divinity. Absolute knowing, however, is something distinct from this externality. Art likewise portrays the substantial. Thus all these aspects have as their object the thinking and knowing of the universal, and the latter is able to become actual for the first time in the state.

The more precise correlation is as follows: in every state, indeed in every relationship of master and servant, it is already the case that the subjective will obeys an other. Even in rudimentary states the subjection of one will to another occurs. The subjection of the will means that the particular will does not count. This does not mean, however, that the individual has no will; [rather, it means that] fancies and desire do not count. Thus what takes place is a working oneself free from the particular will and natural desires. It involves the habit of directing oneself to an other. The habit of acting in accord with the universal will, of knowing a universal and affirming its purpose, is what counts in the state. Thus the state is the knowledge of the
77 universal | that comes about in this external way (and in history we stand on the soil of externality). In such a rudimentary condition there is already a renunciation of the particular will. There is at least a suppression here of the particular will such that it retreats into itself. This retreat into self, this inward being-with-self, presupposes that a power is brought to bear upon the merely sensuous, natural will. And it is only when this happens that art, science, and religion can form. But we should not suppose that they can appear in insular fashion, or, speaking generally, simply in isolation. All great human beings have indeed shaped themselves in solitude, but only inasmuch as they reworked for themselves what the state had already created. Such formative activity presupposes the state and society. In the former instance [i.e. in solitude], the universal is pressed back into oneself, as inwardness; in the other, the universal must be there (*da sein*). The universal as an existing being (*ein Seiendes*) must be posited within me as the inwardly

universal. The universal must be posited as a universal that is an existing being, not as something that is merely intended, represented, or inward. The universal, what has being (*da seiend ist*), is present in the state. To it corresponds the inwardness that surmises that what ought to be for it is a being that is there (*Dasein*), and that its task is to make this being its own. Here inwardness is simultaneously actuality. Actuality is an external manifold that is embraced within universality. This existent universal must be comprehended, and it can only be comprehended insofar as it *is*; and it *is* only in the state. Thus religion, art, and science can only be present in the state. These are the abstract aspects of what is involved.

The Constitution of the State[43]

Having examined the nature of the state, we still face the question as to the essential character of its constitution.[44] What is to be regarded as an advance, and what is not? | 78

The main point about the essential character of the constitution of the state in its myriad aspects is that the best and most complete state is the one in which the greatest degree of freedom prevails; for the state is the actualization of freedom. But thus far not much has been said, and it is a matter of determining wherein rational freedom is found. The question follows as to what constitutes the reality of freedom.

The first proposal is the representation of freedom as subjective will, as free will (*Willkür*); people think of freedom in the state as free will, as the subjective will of the individual; and they think that this subjective will plays a part in the most important affairs of state. What is called the subjective will is regarded as ultimately the decisive factor. But we have already set aside this principle of free will with the remark that the nature of the state is precisely the unity of subjective and universal will such that the singular has raised itself to universality.[45] The subjective will is elevated so that it renounces its particularity. In this way the notion that the free will of the individual should be the principle is already set aside.

43. This subsection is the first of three in which Hegel explores aspects of the nature of the state as the actualization of freedom: its constitution; its relationship to the spiritual world (religion, art, science, and culture); and its relationship to the physical world (geography). See below, n. 47.

44. The German term is *Staatsverfassung*. *Verfassung* means 'constitution' in the sense of the principles by which a system of government is organized. Hegel is not referring principally to a written constitution, i.e. to a document.

45. See above, pp. 170, 177–8.

When we have the state and its well-being in mind, we often represent it [as having two aspects]: one is the government, as the concentrated individuality of the state, the activity of the universal; the other is, in contrast to this, the people as many individual subjective wills. Then we set forth the proposal that the best political organization of the state would be one in which both sides are posited and secured: the government in its universal operation, and the people in their subjective will. Both sides must then be limited. If we have this very common representation (and it appears often in
79 history), | but now ask what the *concept* of the state is, precisely this opposition between the government (i.e. the universal, the self-acting of the universal will) and the subjective will is suspended in the concept and disappears. There is something malignant in the opposition between the people and the government. As long as this opposition endures, there is not yet in fact a state, and what is at stake is the very existence of the state. The idea of the state is the unity of the universal and particular wills, and the opposition that we have been dealing with is an abstract one. In the state this opposition must have disappeared. The rational concept of the state has already left such an abstract opposition behind; those who speak of this opposition as a necessity and still assert it know nothing at all of the nature of the state and have not yet recognized the concept of the state. The state has as its very foundation the unity of these aspects. This unity is its being as such, its substance; but in this regard it is not yet an inwardly developed substance.

In this regard it is not yet rational. As a living entity, the state is to be thought of essentially as something developed, as an organic system consisting in spheres or particular universalities that are independent on their own account, but only in such a way that their independent operation produces this whole, that is, sublates their independence. In the organism it is absolutely no longer a question of the opposition between universal and singular. For example, in regard to an animal it is not a question of its animal nature in general and of its particular animal components. Rather, the unity of the universal and particular already resides in the animal nature, where the universal quality of life is present in each component; when extracted from
80 the living thing, the component becomes something unorganic. | If the unity is destroyed, an organism no longer exists. So too the state is to be grasped as this totality; and what is distinctive about a constitution is the form of this totality.

The first form is the one in which this totality is still enveloped and the spheres [comprising the state] have not yet arrived at their independent subsistence, their autonomy. The second form is the one in which the spheres

become free, and along with them individuals become free too. The first form is compulsory unity; the second is a loose unity of liberated spheres in which the unity is a secondary factor (*eine neue*). Finally, the third form is the one in which the spheres, subsisting independently, find their efficacy only in the production of the universal.

Reminding ourselves of concrete representations, we see that all states, all realms, pass through these forms, and the whole of world history can be divided according to these forms. First we see in each state a type of patriarchal kingdom—patriarchal or militant—and here the unity is still inherently compulsory. Then singularity, particularity, come into prominence, and thus aristocracy or democracy arises, depending on whether particular spheres or individuals rule. In democracy an accidental aristocracy crystallizes, based on talent or some other contingency. This makes a transition to a second kind of kingship, a monarchy, which is finally the ultimate and true form of the state. World history has passed through this condition. Thus in Germany there have always been kings, who first ruled patriarchally. The later [Holy Roman] empire is to be seen as the demise of kingships; individual parts of it—Holland and others—even totally seceded. | So it was only an empty formula and not yet the second kind 81
of kingship.

On the whole the same progression occurs in world history. In world history we find first the Oriental empires in which universality appears in a massive, undivided, and substantial unity. The Greek and Roman empires, at the point of their highest flourishing, i.e. the development of their world-historical significance, split into aristocracy and democracy. The modern European or Germanic world portrays, by contrast, the [second] monarchical constitution,[46] where the particular spheres become free without endangering the whole, where instead the very activity of the particular produces the whole. And this is the presentation of the idea, which grants freedom to its different elements, brings them into prominence, and takes them back into its unity.

Nothing can be learned from history about the constitution of the state because the state is rationality in the world, concretely existing rationality. For this reason the various constitutions succeed one another in the differentiation of their principles, and always in such a way that the earlier

46. The 'second monarchy', as Hegel makes clear in *The Philosophy of Right* (§§ 275–319), is a constitutional monarchy in which the sovereign has limited although important powers *vis-à-vis* the executive branch, the representative assembly, and the courts. On the term 'Germanic' and its equation with 'European', see below, n. 79.

principles are sublated by the later ones. The rationality of the state is this principle of inward unity that stands over against those [previously mentioned] abstract aspects. It is a wholly different matter in the sciences. In the sciences, once something has been brought forth it holds good for all times; the earlier principles are the absolute foundation of the later ones. It is a different matter with the constitution. In the case of the constitution of the state, the later principles are not yet present in the earlier ones. For that reason we can learn nothing from ancient history; in ancient history there were distinctive principles that ultimately were inherently static. The princi-
82 ple of the rational | state is precisely that such principles are not ultimate but, on the whole, perish. Moral principles can, to be sure, be extracted from history for the constitution, but not for the concept of freedom, which is what matters for the true constitution of the state. What matters in the state is the rationality of freedom, namely, that the whole is like a Gothic building, free-standing and having for its foundation and material the unity of singularity and universality. Its truth is that the singular exists only to bring forth the whole. It is here too that the concept of the true constitution of the state is found, which the ancient states knew not but the modern Christian world first discovered.

The State and Religion, Art, Science, and Culture

The second aspect[47] to be included here concerns the connection of the spheres of religion, art, and science with the state. The state is the idea in the element of worldliness, of human freedom. The state is the whole of spiritual and actual actuality. This concrete whole has particular forms in which it is and must be comprehended. These forms constitute, then, the particular content. There are three types of forms. In the first, the content is the universal in and for itself, the infinite; this is the content of religion, art, and [philosophical] science. The second is a finite content as it relates to needs. The third is the natural aspect of the state, climate, land, etc. These three aspects are thus forms of the state, and systems of exteriority with respect to it. The first is the state in its being-in-and-for-self, the second the

47. See above, n. 43. The second aspect, according to the present paragraph, divides into three forms, of which the first two concern the state's relations to the spiritual and cultural world, in both infinite and finite aspects, and the third its relations to the natural or physical world. These relations are 'exterior' as compared to the interior relations of the constitution. Thus the discussion of the state's natural relations (i.e. geography) forms a third element in *two* triads, an outer and an inner. Our subsection headings trace the outer triad (constitution, spiritual-cultural relations, natural relations). The inner triad (infinite spirituality, finite spirituality, nature) comprises the two parts of this subsection plus the next subsection.

state's exteriority for itself, the third the whole immediate determinacy of nature. These three aspects form a rich chapter.

[1. Religion, Art, Science.] Only the first aspect can be discussed here more fully. The content of the state that subsists in and for itself is the spirit of the people itself; comprehended in and for itself, we have the state in this form. The actual state is animated by this spirit. In the determinate existence that occupies this spirit, singularities certainly enter into play; for in the actual state determinate interests are at stake. As thinking beings, however, humans | must know the universal, the essential being; they must represent 83
this being to themselves. But they must not merely know it; in doing so they must also know themselves. The singular consciousness must therefore have knowledge of both the being-in-and-for-itself of spirit and its unity with the individual.

The center point of this knowledge, the actual spirit of this consciousness, is religion as such. Art and science can be viewed as forms and aspects of religion. Art shares a content with religion, but the element of art is sensible intuition. Art renders religion sensible and objective to representation. Science also has the same content—the science that is simply science, science κατέξοχήν, namely philosophy. Philosophy treats the same object, but in the form of thought. The finite sciences do not have an absolute content, and thus they are found in the second form [as the relationship to the finite].

The substance of the state comes to consciousness in religion, as it did in Athens. So the *penates* were portrayed as the spirit of the family. Therefore religion is the first topic that we have to consider. We can adduce only the chief elements that are involved in religion, those that can be demonstrated by philosophy alone. The essential characteristics of religion, the idea of religion, must be presupposed on the basis of the philosophy of religion.[48]

We begin with the assumption that the nature of the state is the life of ethical activity that unifies within itself the will of the universal and the subjective will. This is the essence of the state. Now, when we grasp the will as the foundation | of the state and take up this characterization on its own 84
account, it receives a further specification. The principle of will is being-for-self. Will is activity and has its antithesis in the external world as such; to this extent it is limited, its principle is finite, and so it is thwarted. The human being is infinite in cognizing, limited in willing. This is the direct opposite of the talk about the human being as unlimited in willing and limited in

48. The discussion of 'The Concept of Religion' in the lectures of 1821 (delivered a little over a year prior to the present lectures) is what is presupposed here; see *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, i. 185–256.

thinking.[49] Intelligence alone liberates the will from its limitation, and the thinking free will is what is universal. The will as essentially in and for itself must now be thought of as liberated from its antithesis to an outer world. It is to be thought of as altogether universal in this aspect too. Indeed cunning[50] always finds means for the attainment of its ends; but the will as universal is determined in and for itself by the antithesis, is in itself power; and essential being is to be thought of as universal power.

This power can then be thought of as the lord of nature and the spiritual world. The word 'lord' expresses the power in the form of subjectivity; but this subject, 'lord', is itself only something formal; for an other stands over against the lord: the lord is active *vis-à-vis* an other. But the lord as spiritual power is lord not only over an other, but also over itself; it is reflected into itself. Thus this power must be thought of as the being that is at rest within itself, not as the universal negativity *vis-à-vis* the other. Power is not the sole aspect of the universal. This reflection into self is simple relation to self and is thus a subsisting being (*ein Seiendes*), individuality, subjectivity. Reflection into self is for the first time personality. Thus reflected into itself, power is actuality, and indeed immediate actuality. The immediate actuality of this
85 reflection in its spiritualized | shape is, however, knowing (*Wissen*), and more precisely the knowing one (*das Wissende*). This is self-consciousness, human individuality. The universal spirit is essentially present as human consciousness. The human being is knowing's being-there (*Dasein*) and being-for-self (*Fürsichsein*). Thus we have a universal spirit as self-knowing and inwardly reflecting—as which it posits itself as subject, as immediate, as subsisting being. The subsisting spirit is human consciousness.

These elements are to be apprehended within the divine idea in such a way that it is the unity of the universal and the subsisting spirit. Abstractly, this means nothing other than that spirit must be apprehended as the unity of finitude and infinitude; when the two are separated, the understanding's version of infinity prevails. In another form this is the mystery that the Christian religion has disclosed and revealed, namely, that God is the unity of human and divine nature. This is the genuine idea of what religion is about. The cultus is also part of religion, and the cultus is nothing other than the singular consciousness securing this unity of itself with the divine. The unity, therefore, of the divine and the human is the genuine idea of religion.

49. Hegel alludes to Kant's critiques of theoretical and practical reason: theoretical reason is limited; practical reason, on the basis of its postulates, is unlimited.

50. A reference to the 'cunning of reason' (*List der Vernunft*) is found in the lectures of 1830–1 (see above, p. 96, n. 44, and vol. ii of this edn.) in a context that differs from the present one.

The understanding (*Verstand*), as it is found in modernity, has made the divine idea into an abstraction, into a being that is beyond the human; it has made it into an impregnable battlement, looming starkly, against which human beings run headlong when they approach it. Reason (*Vernunft*) has a form that differs completely from the abstraction of the understanding. Since we regard this unity to be already posited as rational, it shows itself directly | when it is a matter of considering religion. The object of religion 86
is the truth itself, the unity of the subjective and objective.

In general, two types of religion occur. The first is a religion of separation in which God stands on one side as an abstract being outside us, thus a religion not positing the singularity of consciousness, with the result that what it perhaps calls 'spirit', its so-called 'spirit', is but an empty name. This has been the religion of Judaism, and it is still that of Islam; and so also it is the religion of the present-day understanding, which in this respect has gone over to a Turkish mode of representation.[51] This is the religion of separation, which can have in turn a diversity of forms since a universal in the form of natural being can be represented in a natural, elementary way as air, fire, etc. But it can also be represented as a universal being in the form of thought, as it is in Judaism, etc. (When we represent the universal as nature, that is pantheism, but nothing exists in this pantheism. God disappears as the subject because nothing is distinguished any longer. Human beings do not recognize themselves positively in such a universal but instead relate to it negatively.)

The other type of religion is the unity of infinite and finite, the unity of God and the world. This religion again has several forms. For example, the incarnations of the Hindus belong to it, likewise Greek art, which portrays the divine in human shape. This type is found more purely in the Christian religion, where the unity of divine and human nature appears in Christ, and which allows God to appear in his Son, and so brings human beings to a consciousness of the unity. This anthropomorphic nature is not, however, portrayed in an unworthy fashion but rather in such a way that it leads to the

51. This depiction of Judaism is similar to that found in the 1821 philosophy of religion lectures. However, by the 1824 lectures and thereafter Hegel's portrayal undergoes a transition to a more favorable interpretation, which emphasizes not only the sublimity but also the goodness, wisdom, and subjectivity of the God of Israel. Also in the 1821 and 1824 philosophy of religion lectures, Hegel briefly refers to Islam in a way similar to that found here. At the same time he expresses appreciation for the unitary vision of the Muslim mystic Jalāl-al-Dīn Rūmī. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 100, 134–41, 152–60, 261, 423–54, 728; iii. 242–4. The typology 'religion of separation', 'religion of unity', is not found in the philosophy of religion.

true idea of God. The true idea of God entails that God is not a beyond, over and against which stands consciousness. With religion, therefore, it is a
87 matter of these forms. |

The existence of art is directly connected with religion. The understanding can have no art, or at best it can have an art of sublimity, where figure (*Gestalt*) is so distorted and disconnected that subjectivity seems to disappear, inasmuch as figure becomes boundless. But art is essentially an art of beauty or fine art (*schöne Kunst*) and had to have occurred among the Greeks.[52] It is to be represented as the sensible intuition of the divine, and the form of subjectivity belongs to it. Therefore the Christian religion too has art because the divine has appeared in it too and does not remain something above and beyond—because the divine is not the abstraction of the understanding.

Whether philosophy can occur among a people is also a function of religion. Thus only among the Greeks and Christians could there have been genuinely concrete philosophy. The Orientals have philosophy too, but an abstract one, not a unity of the finite and the infinite. These are the main factors of religion.

There is a necessary connection of religion with the principle of the state; for religion sets forth the principle of the state in its truth, in unconditioned universality, but in such a way that in it actual spirit has divested itself of external contingencies. Conscious freedom can only exist where individuality is known as positive in relation to the divine, i.e. where subjectivity is envisaged as present in the divine being. Thus conscious freedom is found among the Greeks, and, in more developed form, in the Christian world because it is there that the characteristic of subjectivity comes to be known
88 as a divine characteristic. |

In this respect it has been rightly said that the state rests on religion. The principle of the state must be an absolute justification; finite interests are relative matters. The absolute justification of the universal principle is that it is known as an element of, a determination of, the divine nature itself. The principle of the state, the universal, what it requires, is known as absolute, i.e. as a determination of the divine nature itself. This is more precisely what it means to say that the state rests on religion. We have often heard this said in modern times, but we must not suppose it to mean that the existing state needs religion, and that religion is not present there and must therefore first

52. The contrast here follows that between the religion of sublimity (Jewish religion) and the religion of beauty (Greek religion). See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 152–89.

be imported into the state in bowls and buckets. Human beings are formed only into what exists, and not into what does not.

Thus we must not believe that the state existed beforehand and had to introduce religion into it; rather the state derives from religion itself. Only a state that is determinate has derived from a religion that is determinate; such a state has derived only from the Christian religion, Catholic or Protestant. Thus the state always derives from religion; the principle of the state, the consciousness of the sacred, is found in religion.

[2. Finite Aspects of Culture.] Still to be considered is the fact that, *vis-à-vis* its ideal aspect, the state has the aspect of outer appearance and life, of external material in general. Thus the content here is the particular as such, the finite, but the universal shines through this particular content. However, this particularity is so manifold and rich that we cannot go into it here. These are the elements that are involved in it.[53] | 89

The first material of this sort is what is reckoned among the customs and practices of peoples. Here above all belongs natural ethical life or the family relationship; its characterization is very important. Both [customs and practices] are determined by the nature of the state. The first aspect here is marriage, the question as to its type, whether it is polygamy or is monogamy, the marriage of one man and one woman. The modern world can have only the latter (thus also not polyandry), for the modern state is where each side receives its full right. Marriage, in accord with its concept, now receives its full right as the relationship of one man and one woman. A second aspect is the relationship of children to parents. Likewise, in the third place, family property is important. Definitions of the law of inheritance are connected with the principle of the state, depending on whether persons are slaves or free property holders. A further relationship is the behavior of individuals toward each other, even to the point of what shows itself as courtesy or civility. Other customs include those involved in the necessary epochs of an individual's life, for example, birth, marriage, death. Such practices express the conceptions that a people has about these matters. They show the specific sort of representation that a people has of spirit. Such conceptions present themselves in practices that are symbolic, whether incidentally or expressly so. Incidental features often play a large role in practices. Thus the meaning is not to be sought in all their individual components. So these are

53. Hegel briefly summarizes some of the matters addressed in detail in *The Philosophy of Right* prior to the treatment of the state (law, property, family, civil society, etc.). These are finite aspects of human culture as distinct from the relationships to the infinite represented by religion, art, and philosophical science.

aspects that are connected with the universal dimension of the state—to
90 which courtesy | and conduct also pertain, as, for example, the manner in which Europeans and Asians behave toward the authorities. Asians, for example, prostrate themselves before their rulers, while Europeans merely greet them. So such differences are characteristic too, though only a few are purely incidental.

The second point that comes under consideration regarding the aspect of appearance is the practical conduct of human beings in relation to nature—therefore, culture[54]—and how they act with respect to means for the satisfaction of their needs. Here luxuries come into the picture, also the weapons that human beings use against animals and each other. Weapons are in any case an important element. According to ancient Asian legends, the discovery of iron seems to be such an element; the impact of the discovery is still felt today. The invention of gunpowder is to be regarded as nothing more than accidental, but it could have been invented and used only at precisely this time and in this culture. Equally important elements are writing, printing, etc. Such elements comprise influential stages. A great many of these things are free-standing, such as luxuries that could appear in any age and under any condition. Others, however, are bound to a specific standpoint.

The third important point concerns the rights or basic principles in regard to finite needs: private rights as distinct from statutory law. This requires in part personal freedom, the exclusion of slavery, and in addition property (namely, freely-held property). Full personal freedom, full free property, can emerge only in states with a specific principle.

Finally, the fourth matter concerns the science of the finite: rights, free-
91 dom, relations to finite objects. | Knowledge of the finite forms the content of the sciences that are not philosophy: mathematics, natural history, physics. These, too, require a certain cultural standpoint, also a theoretical interest, and can emerge only after the period in which sensuous drives prevail. If individuals are inwardly free, have attained inner freedom for themselves, then objects are also allowed to be free and are engaged no longer simply in terms of desire but rather theoretically. The freedom of individuals belongs to the fact that they are curious. The ancient world could not yet be acquainted with the objects of nature, or examine the finite objects of nature, or have an interest in nature and its laws in the way that we have had. The ancient and the modern worlds are distinguished here too. It

54. The term used here is *Kultur*, not *Bildung*. The Latin *cultura* derives from *colere*, to 'till', 'cultivate', 'turn (soil)'. Thus the Latin as distinct from the German term expresses an original relationship to nature.

belongs to a higher and more concrete security, a greater energy of spirit, to take the objects of the life-nexus and occupy oneself with their superfluous and limited features. That spirit arrives at this abstraction involves a higher intensity on its part. These, then, are the aspects that have a connection with the universal shapes of spirit.

The State and Geography

The third aspect[55] to be discussed concerns the connection of the state with its external natural setting. World history, we have said, is a series of spiritual shapes that lead to the actualization of the principles of spirit and that end in such a way that spirit grasps itself. A necessary principle is allotted to each world-historical people. These principles have a necessary succession in time, and likewise a concrete spatial specificity, a geographical position. So we speak here about geography in world history.

The first thing to note in this regard is that climate is a wholly abstract and general element in relation to the shape taken by spirit. History indeed lives on the soil | of the natural; but this is only one aspect, and the higher aspect 92
is that of spirit. Therefore nature is an element of lesser influence; the natural aspect, climate, does not account for the individual. Thus it is tedious to hear about the mild Ionian sky and its influence on Homer; for the sky is still mild, and the Turks have no Homer.

The second thing to be noted is that neither the frigid nor the tropical zones create world-historical peoples, for these extremes constitute such a

55. See above, n. 47. The German editors of this edn. point out that geography has a systematic position in Hegel's conception of the state, a fact that is obscured by the earlier edns. Eduard Gans and Karl Hegel placed the discussion of geography between the introduction and the division of topics, while Georg Lasson and Johannes Hoffmeister moved it to an appendix. See *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, p. viii. As a concise confirmation of the place of geography in world history, see Hegel's remark below (p. 198) that 'world history is spirit in the element of worldliness; thus we must also recognize the natural and the corporeal in it. The natural and the spiritual form one shape, and this is history.' It is not surprising that Hegel's perspective on world geography and world history is Eurocentric. His sources for Africa and the Americas were principally travel and missionary reports by Europeans, which gave a very prejudiced and limited picture. What *is* surprising, considering his Eurocentric perspective, is the large amount of attention devoted to the Oriental world in these lectures (in 1822–3, nearly half the work following the introduction). The sources for Asian history, art, religion, and philosophy were much more adequate than those for Africa and America, and Hegel began to absorb this growing literature in the early 1820s. His only explicitly mentioned source for geography is the work of Carl Ritter (see n. 62 below). He must also have been familiar with the writings of the naturalist and explorer Alexander von Humboldt (whose brother Wilhelm was one of the founders of the University of Berlin). Through the contributions of Humboldt and Ritter, geography became one of the more advanced of the natural sciences in the early 19th cent. Hegel's view of geography and nature is organic but pre-evolutionary.

powerful natural force that human beings there are unable to move about freely or acquire adequate means by which to pursue higher spiritual interests. The peoples who belong to such extremes persist in a state of torpor. They are under the thumb of nature and cannot separate themselves from it. The natural force is so great that the spiritual aspect remains in identity with it and thus cannot position itself over against the natural; this separation and self-composure are inherently the first condition of a higher spiritual development. Other peoples who are less bound to natural forces and who are favored by nature are more open to spirit; but they have not yet raised themselves to spiritual activity and are not yet free enough from nature to advance beyond feeding themselves from the crumbs of the master, to advance further than other tribes, by gaining the impulse to attain a higher existence.

On the whole it must be noted in the third place that the temperate zone,
93 and indeed the northern temperate zone, forms the stage | of the world theater. In the north the earth is continental in scope, with a wide breast, while in the south the shapes taper into points, so that here there are quite distinctive human beings and animals, and in the south animals and plants generally predominate. These are also elements of necessity. Here too the general conceptual distinction holds good and is conspicuous. Land divisions parallel the division into several classes of animals.

A fourth and necessary division is that into the new world and the old world; we do not make the division, but the world itself does it.

The new world is new not only relatively [in regard to its relationship to the old world]; it is [also] new in regard to its physical and spiritual properties. Without speaking disparagingly of the new world, its geological age is not our concern, it being of comparable origin with the so-called creation, although islands of the South Seas such as New Holland[56] are evidently of recent formation. Nothing can and should be said about whether America had been in contact with Europe.[57] Nor does it matter that Mexico and Peru did indeed have significant civilizations, since they were of a feebler stock and are long gone.

56. Hegel is referring to Australia. The Dutch named this island-continent 'New Holland' in 1644, and the name was not officially changed until 1824 although the English started settlements in 1788. Hegel's brief description of 'New Holland' below (see n. 64) fits the east coast of Australia. The term 'South Seas' was the name given by early explorers to the Pacific Ocean. Thus Australia and the Pacific islands are part of what Hegel describes as the 'new world'.

57. Is this is a reference to Viking expeditions (if Hegel knew about them) and/or Spanish and Portuguese colonies prior to the English and French settlements?

The new world has shown itself to be much feebler than the old world, and it lacks two resources, iron and horses. America is a new, feeble, powerless world. Lions, tigers, and crocodiles are feebler there than in Africa,[58] and the same is true of human beings. The original inhabitants of the West Indies have died out. | Some of the tribes of North America have 94
disappeared and some have retreated and generally declined, so that we see that the latter lack the strength to join the North Americans in the Free States (*die Freistaaten*). The same is more or less the case with Mexico and South America. Those who assert themselves there and sense the need for independence are Creoles, just like those in the Free States. When we read the description of the time before Europeans arrived, it is easy to understand why the Creoles are the dominant people involved. The Brazilians are of a wholly feeble nature and narrow spirit. In the East Indies the English utilize a policy to prevent growth of a Creole population, that is, a people of European ancestry who are indigenous to Asia. There Englishmen are not allowed to pursue any occupation they like, or become indigenous themselves. Also a child born of an Englishman and a native cannot hold any official post and is relegated to lower status, just like the child of a native.

America can have the aspect of a new land, a land of the future. Napoleon is supposed to have said that the old world wearied him. Emigrants to America have on the one hand an advantage in that they bring with them the whole treasure of European culture and self-awareness without the burdens that the European states impose on individuals, without re-encountering the hardships they have left behind, such as the lack of free land, the division and surplus of labor, or indeed being without any livelihood at all. None of this is characteristic of America. The new Free States of North America are often cited as an example that even a large state can exist as free, i.e. as a republic. But in general there is nothing less apt than the comparison of states | with one another in regard to specific conditions. 95
As an example that free states can exist, we can even point to Hamburg and Switzerland, but the inappropriateness of comparing them with large states is directly evident. In any event North America is a still-forming state, a state in the making, which does not yet have need of a monarchy because it has not yet developed to this point. It is a federation of states. Such states are the worst when it comes to foreign relations. Only its peculiar location has saved the federation from total destruction. If large states were closer to it, its

58. The only 'lions' in the new world are mountain lions; the jaguar is the closest approximation to a 'tiger'; and the 'crocodiles' are principally alligators. These are smaller animals than their African counterparts, so perhaps this is what Hegel means when he calls them 'feebler'.

precarious situation would essentially come to light. This was indeed evident from the last war with England.[59] The federated states could not conquer Canada, and the English even occupied Washington. The militias did not arrive, or they fled; and such tension existed between the southern and the northern states that, had the war continued longer, a complete division of the state would have resulted.

In general, the [North American] state is only in a process of becoming. The coasts facilitate transit trade between China and Europe. As for the rest, wave upon wave of people migrate from the coastal regions to the hinterlands of the Mississippi River valley where they farm; when pressed [by more migrants], this self-sufficient class clears new land. But when all the land has been occupied so that there are internal social pressures and the
96 need for trade arises, | the state must necessarily develop to the point of having to maintain a different system of government. The beginnings there are European in nature. So this country is presently a country of becoming, of the future, and thus it does not concern us further.

We return now to the old world, for it is the one that concerns us in more detail, and we shall examine its condition more closely. This world is divided into three continents (*Welteile*); antiquity was already aware of that natural feature. These differences are necessary because they correspond to the concept of thought. These three continents stand in an essential relationship and constitute a rational totality.

They are so situated in relation to one another that communication between them is easy. The Mediterranean Sea sunders the old world, but in such a way as to facilitate communication. An aspect of the beneficence of water is that it makes communication possible.[60] It is a French point of view that rivers and water are natural boundaries because they are what most bind together. The stretches of land along both banks of a river are necessarily united, and they connect inhabitants more readily than would otherwise be the case. The sea accomplishes the same thing. Britain and Brittany belonged together; likewise Norway with Denmark, but not with Sweden. However, Livonia, Estonia,[61] and Finland have belonged to Sweden. Thus

59. The War of 1812.

60. Hegel lived in an age in which transportation by water (rivers, seas, oceans) was still easier than by land; thus he paid special attention to the role of water in human history.

61. Livonia is a former Baltic state, comprising present Latvia and parts of Estonia, founded in the 13th cent., contested over by Poland, Sweden, and Russia. The German text then reads *Ahtland*, which must be an erroneous transcription of *Estland* (Estonia). Estonia too has been controlled by several nations, including Sweden. The lectures of 1830–1 at this point have *Churland* (Courland), a former duchy and part of present-day Latvia.

the foremost aspect of the sea is that it binds together. One of the distinctive features of the Mediterranean Sea is its many gulfs; therefore it is not an ocean that offers an empty and endless journey into the unknown, to which human beings can only relate in negative fashion. One of the great differences between peoples is whether they go to sea or | avoid it. The Mediterranean Sea of itself invites and calls upon human beings to take to the sea because on the whole it presents such a friendly face to them. 97

Thus the three continents are situated advantageously for their connection with one another. As to their geographical properties, the following is to be briefly remarked. Our task is facilitated by Ritter's fine book,[62] which has thoroughly examined the physical properties of these continents. There are three main features.[63]

The first element is the highland, where there is a massive formation, a land that rises high above the sea and is encompassed by a girdle of mountains. The second is that there are breaks or gaps in this great mass. Without them, these areas are not well-suited to human needs. Thus the second element is the precipitous flow of rivers down from these mountains, and what matters is whether this is close to the sea or not, whether they encounter only a narrow coastal strip or some impediment that causes an extensive delta to form. In [South] America in western Chile and Peru there are narrow coastlines and no culture. On the other side, in Brazil enormous rivers discharge, such as the Amazon, [or in Argentina] the Rio de la Plata, rivers fed by the mountains. New Holland[64] is an immature land, having in the east a narrow strip of coast, and, beyond the blue mountains, rivers, which however flow out into marshes and so have no banks. The rivers of the highland are the second feature, and, if their plunge to the sea is impeded, they have a longer course and flow in valleys. The third feature is a more or less absence of highland, where there are only mountain ranges that can indeed have flat areas but only a few, and from which only small streams flow; here meadows form and valleys are found, and the alternation between mountain and valley constitutes the main feature. | 98

62. Carl Ritter, *Die Erdkunde im Verhältnis zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen, oder allgemeine, vergleichende Geographie, als sichere Grundlage des Studiums und Unterrichts in physikalischen und historischen Wissenschaften*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1817–18). Ritter (1779–1859), a founder of modern human geography, was professor of geography at the University of Berlin starting in 1820.

63. As the following paragraph shows, these features apply to the new world as well as the old.

64. See above, n. 56.

The three continents are distinguished in accord with these three aspects. In Africa proper the highland is the main feature; in Asia the fertile, abundant plains and alluvial valleys; in Europe mountain ranges are found, alternating with valleys, hills, and plains, with no single element predominating. The character of spirit differs in the three continents in similar fashion. In Africa proper it is the sensuous nature at which human development is arrested: sensuous enjoyment, great muscular strength to sustain labor, childlike good nature, but also unreflective and unfeeling ferocity. Asia by contrast is the land of spiritual antithesis, which arrives at an ethical life but sticks with a natural, substantial ethical life, whereas the other aspect of the spiritual antithesis remains individual self-seeking, infinity of desire, and boundless extension of freedom, wholly abstract freedom. Europe is the descent out of abstract freedom into self, out of this boundless freedom into the particular; it is the deepening of spirit within itself, its diversification, and the elevation of the particular into the universal.

Our closer task is briefly to examine the continents in succession. In physical terms each continent divides in turn into three parts physically—a division that more or less can stand, although the distinct parts are mutually related in such a way that their relations reveal the distinctness of forms and thereby become the bases for drawing new distinctions.

[1.] We can consider Africa as comprising the following three parts; these differ such that distinctions in spiritual character remain bound to this
99 physical characterization. The | three parts comprise Africa as it is in itself (*an sich*). A more precise characterization of the division is that the parts exist fundamentally on their own account, and only then in relation to the others. We have to disregard what they are on their own account (*das Für-Sich*).

The first part of Africa is therefore Africa proper, which we can leave aside since its points of contact [with history] are minimal. It is bounded essentially as follows: in the west, by the Gulf of Guinea; in the east, also not by a straight line but by the Gulf of Arabia; in the north, by the south side of the Niger River. This land is fashioned in accord with our first characteristic. It is a highland whose mountains form a narrow band around the interior. Within this band is a belt of rich vegetation but pernicious humidity (*giftige Ausdünstung*). Adjacent to it are the mountains of the highland. The plateau proper is round with a narrow strip of level coastland. In between lies a swampy area whose atmosphere is almost always pernicious. To the north is principally the Sahara Desert. The Europeans have established settlements and colonies on the other three sides, which touch the sea, but they have not yet penetrated into the highland, where riches are to be found in the most

inaccessible conditions. The Negroes display great strength of body and a highly sensual nature along with affability but also a shocking and inconceivable ferocity.

These peoples have never emerged out of themselves, nor have they gained a foothold in history. In the sixteenth century, to be sure, | wholly 100
unknown peoples irrupted from the interior; but these hordes were merely destructive and of no cultural significance. These bands displayed the most frightful savagery and barbarism. But encounters with them in peaceful circumstances found them to be as affable as any others. This Africa remains in its placid, unmotivated, self-enclosed sensuality and has not yet entered into history; its only further connection with history is that in darker days its inhabitants have been enslaved.

As to the general condition of slavery, it is said that slavery ought not to exist, that it is intrinsically unjust in terms of its very concept. But this 'ought' expresses a subjective wish; it is not a historical 'ought', for what ought to be exists, and what exists ought to be. What this deficient 'ought' regarding slavery lacks is substantial ethicality, the rationality of a political state in which it can have reality. There is no slavery in the state that is rational; slavery is found only where spirit has not yet attained this point, thus only where the true idea in some aspects is still just an 'ought'.[65] Slavery, therefore, is necessary at those stages where the state has not yet arrived at rationality. It is an element in the transition to a higher stage.

The second part of Africa is north of the Niger River and the Sahara Desert—this dry, burning sea that more completely separates than does the sea itself. This part runs from the Atlas Mountains in the west along the Mediterranean coast to the Nile. Here there are mountain ranges and isolated deserts, but in part it contains the most fruitful and many-hued stretch of land, including, for example, Morocco and | Fez. This part as a 101
whole forms a coastal region and has only a subsidiary role in world history; it is not independent on its own account and does not stand on its own two feet. Spain is said to belong to Africa. But it is just as correct to say that this part of Africa belongs to Europe. The third part of Africa is Egypt, a part in its own right and one interesting in terms of world history. Egypt is a river basin; it has the river to thank for its existence, and it is isolated in the west and south. The three different parts as such are distinctive in Africa, which is the first, immediate continent. Egypt adjoins Asia.

65. We follow here the reading of Griesheim rather than of Hotho, which is preferred by the German edn. The Hotho version reads: '... thus the true idea still has aspects in terms of which it merely ought to be'.

[2.] The second land is Asia, the world of dawning (*Aufgang*).[66] Thus far we have viewed natural conditions as having a more negative and constricting impact on world history. In Asia they become positive, thus the great intuition of nature, which must become the natural foundation for our intuition, as it is for history. World history is spirit in the element of worldliness; thus we must also recognize the natural and the corporeal in it. The natural and the spiritual form one shape, and this is history. Asia constitutes the dawning [of world history]. Every country is east for another. Asia, however, is the continent that is the East as such, while Europe is partly the center and partly the endpoint of world history. In Asia the light of self-consciousness dawns as the state. Here we have first to consider physical locales, which, in the way that they appear immediately, do not constitute historical distinctions; rather Asia is the land of antithesis. Here distinctions must be posited concretely as the relation of antitheses. The first differences
102 here are abstract but not isolated as in Africa. | Only in their concrete differences do the relationships play a part in history.

Here in Asia the relations of the distinctions are necessary ones. To begin with, the entire northern slope must be regarded separately from the ranges of the Altai [Mountains] of Siberia. The apparent advantages gained from rivers emptying into the sea are offset by the climate, and thus this area holds no interest for world history. The remainder is divided into three topographies.

The first, as in Africa, is a massive highland, encircled by an enormous girth of mountains, the Himalaya Mountains, the highest in the world. These have the highest peaks. But this highland does not remain enclosed within itself like the one in Africa; rather it is intersected and stands in reciprocal relation with the second topography. This terrain comprises the river basins, which lie outside the highland and are different from those in Europe. There are no valleys but enormous alluvial valley plains (*Talebenen*) and river basins. The rivers, which rise in the highlands and flow through these valleys, are the connecting arteries between the two locales, but they only connect after cutting through the mountains. Within the mountains the rivers are wild; but there are rapids that interrupt the flow within the mountains and into the valleys. Rapidly flowing waters such as waterfalls hamper interchange. The Zaire [River] is like this too in Africa, where the flow surges through mountains and is interrupted by waterfalls. Mountains

66. The reference, of course, is to the dawning or rising of the sun in the east; *Aufgang* also means 'east' or 'Orient'. Hegel has in mind the dawning of world history, which is the rising of spirit into self-consciousness.

as such generally form watersheds, as it were free-standing areas. But rivers cut through such mountain ranges. Thus it is | not strictly correct to call 103
mountain ranges watersheds. The rivers are the sources of fertility. The fertility in these valley plains is wholly different from that in the mountainous country. In the lower parts of these valleys the fertility comes from sediment, etc. The vast plains are especially characteristic of Asia and Egypt. To be sure, we note them also in Europe, but they are only a minor element, like the lowlands of the Vistula and those in Lombardy. In Asia these plains are the focal point of the culture. The first of these river basins is China with the Huang Ho [Huang He] and the Yangtze [Chang Jiang], the Yellow River and the Blue River. These rivers are cut off from the southern section by a mountain chain. The Ganges and the Indus form the second valley. The Indus however lacks a characteristic valley; its upper part runs through mountains and is fertile, while in its lowlands it flows through sandy plains. The third valley or basin is that of the Tigris and the Euphrates and also encompasses grazing land. The fourth basin is formed by the Caspian Sea, along with the rivers that flow into it: in the east the Oxus, also the Jaxartes, now the Syr-Darya (which flows into the Aral Sea but formerly also into the Caspian Sea); and further west the Cyrus and the Araxes.[67] To the west too there are flat valleys, but less important ones; noteworthy are those formed by the present-day Araxes.

Thus the chief antithetical elements in Asia are highlands and enormous wide plains. These two topographies are necessary: they are a source and ground for wholly antithetical human dispositions, antithetical human activity. In this respect the distinctive feature is the essential interaction between them, the mountain dwellers with their inner restlessness, the valley dwellers with their rootedness; and they are not isolated as in Egypt. What is characteristic is precisely the connection between these wholly antithetical dispositions. | 104

The third topography of Asia, running along the coasts, is of a mixed character.[68] Here we encounter Arabia, and the coastal regions of Syria and Asia Minor.

These are the three principal terrains of Asia. These differences are not to be taken abstractly; for they are reciprocally related and concretely grounded.

67. Hegel refers to the rivers by their ancient names. The Oxus is the Amu-Darya (which, like the Syr-Darya, flows into the Aral Sea, not the Caspian), the Cyrus is the Kura (or Kür), and the Araxes is the Aras. The Aras, which forms part of the northern border of Iran, flows into the Kura, which empties into the Caspian Sea south of Baku.

68. That is, the coasts of the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea.

Here two elements are to be distinguished: the one is the rootedness of human beings in the plains, the other is the wandering of the inhabitants of the highlands. These are the predominant differences.

The first terrain involves the principle of the river plains. Here the predominant factor is the peaceful formation of substantial ethical life, which indeed contains within itself the awakening of spirit but has not yet arrived at inner antithesis; [it is] a patriarchal kingship. These are the regions principally of the Far East, to which the western mountainous country is also adjoined, but in such a way that the principle of the plains continues to be dominant with the highlanders. The inhabitants can be called Mongols. The Far East belongs to them. China, although subjugated by Manchu-Mongols, remains what it was; the Kalmucks and other tribes are found here. The Indians too are part of the whole area.

The second part is the Middle East, where mountain peoples predominate, and which also comprises the Arabs. It is, as it were, a highland of plains: it has the character of the highland, but in plains. This is the sphere of antithesis, and here the antithesis has arrived at its greatest freedom in the form of light and darkness, Orientalism, splendor—where the abstraction of pure spiritual intuition, of this One, Islam as such, breaks down (*hinfällt*).[69]
105 Foremost here is Persia. |

There is nothing [notable] about the third part, which is the Near East, consisting of multiple coastal areas, the side of Asia where it is related to other regions. This section is connected with the Mediterranean Sea. It includes the Syrian coast: Palestine, Judea, Tyre and Sidon. Colchis,[70] through which the Phasis flows, this Ionian colony, and the plains of the Don and the Volga up to the Ural River—these are regions that are oriented toward Europe.

[3.] In regard to Europe, we can be brief. Here a massive highland is not a factor, although one is found in Spain. The main features, however, are mountain ranges that surround deep valleys, and the diverse landscape of hills, streams, plains, and valleys, etc. The mountains are quite different from those in the highland countries. In Asia we saw the antithesis between the highland and the vast plains, but in Europe there is no overriding principle; rather everything is individualized: just as Spain, oriented to Africa, is home to a highland, so Russia with its [rivers] is to valley plains.

69. Hegel seems to be suggesting that on the soil of Persia the abstract monotheism of Islam takes on a dualistic character, similar to that of Zoroastrianism. In the case of Islam it is not light versus darkness but the absolute opposition between the one God and everything in the created world.

70. An ancient country (and former Greek colony) south of the Caucasus Mountains, on the Black Sea, in present-day Georgia. The River Phasis is now called the Rioni.

In Europe we have to distinguish between two aspects: first, its turning outward toward other areas, toward the Mediterranean Sea; second, Europe on its own account. The first part is south of the Alps. As the Alps cut Italy off from France, Helvetia,[71] and Germany, so also the mountains south of the Danube, continuing further east from the Alps, separate the Haemus[72] from Greece. The other part, the northerly slope of these mountain chains, constitutes the whole of Europe proper. | Here eastern and western Europe 106
are to be distinguished: the western part includes Germany, France, and England *cum annexis*;[73] the eastern and northeastern part includes Russia, Poland, Hungary, etc., where the dominant element is the connection with Asia. The heart of Europe is the western part, which was opened up above all by Julius Caesar, who broke through the Alps, occupied Britannia and Germania, and linked this new world with the old. This was truly a manly deed as compared with the youthful exploit of Alexander, who opened up the Orient. The ideal of elevating the Orient to Greek life was merely a dream, and as a dream it was not realized. The midpoint of the ancient world is the Mediterranean Sea.[74] Around it lie Jerusalem and the chief area of the Ishmaelites, Mecca;[75] likewise Delphi, the navel of the earth,[76] Rome, and finally Alexandria, which is of great value and has more significance than Constantinople because it was the link between Asia and Europe. It is the spiritual point of union between east and west. This sea is very influential (*charakteristisch*); if the center of the ancient world were not a sea, world history would be powerless; for as a sea this center gives life to and connects everything, and without it there could be no world history. Just as Rome and Athens could not exist without a forum and without roads, so also the ancient world would be nothing without the sea.

We have thus designated the tripartite geographical division of world history, from east to west, from southeast to northwest, from rising to setting. World history has arisen (*aufgegangen*) in the southeast, and it has subsided (*niedergegangen*) into itself to the northwest. Spirit is such as to create itself out of itself, as its own world.

71. The Latin name of Switzerland.

72. An ancient term for the Balkans.

73. i.e. including Scotland, Wales, and Ireland.

74. Here as elsewhere in these lectures Hegel uses the term *Mittelländische Meer*, 'Midland Sea', rather than the more customary *Mittelmeer*, thus giving a literal German rendering of the Latin *Mediterraneus*.

75. Ishmael was the traditional progenitor of Arab peoples.

76. According to ancient Greek tradition, Delphi, seat of the famous oracle and meeting place of the league of Greek city-states, was at the very center of the universe, hence its navel.

This geographical ground must not be taken to be an external occasion for history; rather it has a specific property, is of a distinct type, to which the character of the peoples who emerge from it corresponds. Since they emerge from such a ground, the peoples have specific characteristics that are
107 connected with their environments. Peoples have a spiritual locus, | but the determinacy of their principle corresponds to the natural aspect of the soil on which this principle appears.

The connection of nature with the character of human beings appears initially to contradict the freedom of the human will because humans should have raised themselves above natural determinacy. We call the latter the sensible; and we could indeed represent the situation to be such that thinking takes place on its own account, that human beings have the truth within themselves and do not attain it from nature but rather from themselves. We must not think of the spiritual determinacy of peoples as dependent on the natural determinacy of the soil [on which they live] in such a way that we think of spirit as an abstraction that then acquires its content from nature. Rather the connection is as follows: the peoples in history are particular, determinate spirits; and we ought to know from the nature of spirit that particularity does not obscure the universal, that rather the universal must particularize itself in order to become true. Because peoples are spirits of a particular type, their determinacy on the one hand is a spiritual determinacy, which then on the other hand corresponds to a natural determinacy; and the relationship is reciprocal. Spirit is in itself this determinacy, and what is simply in itself exists only in a natural way and thus has a natural aspect; for the particular too must exist, and it has this existence in its natural aspect. The child as mere in itself, as possibility, as inwardness, is a mere natural being at first, a natural human being with unrealized
108 capacities. |

We shall only briefly enumerate the major forms of connection between natural features and spiritual beings.

[1.] In regard to the valley plains, we note that they serve as fertile ground for the transition to agriculture. Agriculture involves a mental aspect, an understanding of provision for future needs. Agriculture must be oriented to the seasons. It is not a one-time, immediate satisfaction of needs; instead satisfaction adopts the general mode of provision. In addition, it establishes a situation involving tools and storage, which means being limited to one specific place. Determination of private property and ownership rights is based on the fact that this ground is a cultivated, external reality. The natural singularity, the family, is more or less disrupted by this exceptional

autonomy of the individual. Then something universal enters more into play, a condition that calls for something universal beyond this exceptional singularity, one that protects it for the first time; in this way there emerges the possibility of a ruler and, essentially, of laws. What comes on the scene is the necessity of a self and later of spirit. In such natural conditions [i.e. the valley plains] lies the counterpart to outward striving [i.e. nomadism], namely, limitation or confinement to a restricted locale, one maintained within a general framework [of law].

[2.] The second topography, the highlands, involves plains without rivers and soil of lesser quality; or there are streams with no tributaries, some of which disappear by drying up in certain seasons. Here | there is only 109
continual wandering in a constant circuit—a nomadism that simply remains formal, repetitious, and restricted in scope but is only de facto so and does not preclude leaving this region, because this life involves no agriculture or private property, but only nature's bounty that can be discovered elsewhere. There is always the possibility of moving on. The soil is not cultivated, and one can exploit it everywhere. Thus an impulse both external and internal can drive such peoples forth. They do not have a characteristically unruly spirit; they are even of a peaceable nature. In individual cases such nomadism can result in pillage. Some peoples of this sort are driven to pillage, but only in the lower plateaus because these border on peaceful lands. The highlands are bounded by lofty mountains where a robust and wild people dwell; but the tribes further down abut on peaceful inhabitants, who come into conflict with them. Thus these nomads are hostile to other groups and so are typically at war with outsiders, resulting in splinter groups and isolation, which leads to an antisocial personality and an unruly, fruitless autonomy, despite the abstract freedom that remains to them.

[3.] The third environment is that of the mountains. Here there are no nomads, but rather a pastoral life. The diversity of the soil even permits agriculture, hunting, etc. The climate is | changeable, winter and summer, 110
as is all else. There are dangers here, so warrior strength and courage are called for. The whole of life, however, is circumscribed by its locality. By becoming so narrow in scope, this life for that reason simply turns into an enclosed community and remains so. When the locale becomes too confining, such a mountain people calls upon a leader, not an army like the valley peoples; and the mountain people descend upon these fertile valleys. Their exodus is not abstract, not a matter of restlessness, but is determinate, the price of choosing a more comfortable life. In Asia conflicts arising from nature are based on these characteristics and persist within this kind of opposition.

[4.] In Europe no single type of typography stands out; here, rather, one form of nature is offset by the others. The land here is such as to bring with it freedom from the forces of nature; here, therefore, universal humanity can emerge. Human beings can live in all [climatic] zones, but some zones exert a natural force over them, which, as compared with their general character, seems to be a force *within* them. Thus European people are indeed by nature freer beings because here no particular environment is predominant. In
111 Europe the essential contrast is only between inland and coastland. |

[5.] For Asia the sea has no significance. On the contrary, the Asian peoples have shut themselves off from the sea. China proper has no navigation. Only those provinces that are cut off by mountains from the great river basin have a minor degree of navigation. In India, religion positively prohibits going out to sea. The Egyptians, too, at the time of their greatest flourishing, had no navigation on the sea, although river navigation was very lively. Thus seafaring is excluded from the Asian principle, while in Europe it plays a large role.

[6.] In Europe the relationship to the sea is precisely what is important. This distinction still holds good. States whose territories do not include the mouths of rivers are essentially different from those that possess them. Holland, for example, is different from Germany, Venice from Lombardy; and thus the sections of rivers that flow into the sea are inhabited by different peoples than are the inland rivers. A European state can be great only in connection with the sea. The sea, to be sure, separates lands but connects peoples. Seafaring—going forth on the sea—is the entirely distinctive feature lacking in Asian life.

This is the going forth of life beyond itself. Subjects have particular purposes that we call needs. Labor for the satisfaction of needs has the byproduct that individuals immerse themselves in this limited area, this sphere of acquisition. Human beings also benefit from the connecting aspect of the sea. Nevertheless,
112 the instrument[77] of satisfaction has here the reverse effect: property and | life are put in danger, and thus the instrument immediately contains its opposite. Thus, this trade or occupation, this involvement with [the sea], becomes something courageous and noble. From it arises a peculiar awareness of individual independence, of greater freedom *vis-à-vis* the constraint of the occupation. Courage is part of the very aim of seafaring; here courage is essentially bound up with the understanding, with the greatest cunning. For the sea is this great expanse that seems innocent. But precisely the weakness of this element,

77. The term here is *Mittel*; later Hegel uses *Instrument*, and the reference is to the ship.

its compliant and permeable nature, is a danger to which human beings oppose their instrument—the instrument by which they direct to their own purposes the powerful effect of the sea and the sea breezes, and take their world with them. The ship, this swan, so easy in its movement, is an instrument that pays tribute to the audacity of the understanding. This audacity of the understanding is what is missing from the splendid edifice of Asian ethical life. Although seafaring is an occupation too, it is liberating to individuals, gives freedom to their lives. So the principle of the freedom of individual persons has become [foundational] to the European life of the state.

These are the basic differences in physical features and the connections of self-conscious life to them. We must, however, stop with the general characteristics, for the soil of nature is at the same time that of contingency. Only in its general characteristics is this soil a determining factor, one corresponding to the principle of spirit. But the connection may often be tracked in specific ways. The character of Greek life comes forth from the soil—a coastline that produces individual isolation. Thus the land of Greece is a reflection of the splintering within Greek | life. Also, the Roman Empire could not have been 113
established in the middle of the continent; Roman world dominion could rather exist only on the sea, and indeed on the Mediterranean Sea, the center of the ancient world. These are simply the overall features of the connections, but ones with which we must be acquainted, just as we must know about their major place in history.

The preceding discussion has now brought us closer to the principles that underlie world history. We want to proceed to these principles of world history themselves. At this stage, therefore, the big picture lies before us.

THE DIVISION OF WORLD HISTORY

In regard to the division—and we have already remarked that it is the idea itself that drives itself, that the idea creates and comprehends itself in its own ways—what we must proceed from is the state as such, the universal spiritual life in which individuals have before themselves their will, their purpose, their being, while at the same time they maintain themselves as particular through it, are active on behalf of it, and give themselves value in it.

The question principally concerns the form of the state: whether precisely this ethical life (*sittliche Leben*) for the sake of the universal end is only custom (*Sitte*) as an unreflective habit (*reflexionslose Gewohnheit*); whether custom is the authority for individuals, constituting the unity that determines individuals; whether actual life is one of custom, be it present in faith

and trust, or in habit. Within this immediate unity exists the other principle, the reflective power (*Reflexion*) of personality, the principle of subjectivity subsisting for itself. Abstractly considered, the latter is in general the infinite form, the activity of self-distinguishing and of the distinctions and development of | unity. Substance remains at the basis. Subjectivity, the form, merely develops the unity of substance in its distinctions.

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Conceptually speaking, where we have to begin is the state that is still internally oppositionless, where subjectivity is not yet for itself and the subject has not yet come into its own. Thus the first state is the more immediate form of ethical life, the infancy (*Kindesalter*) of history, the ethical life devoid of law that does not advance to the singularization of subjectivity. The childhood (*Kindheit*) of history splits into two aspects because the antithesis [between state and subjectivity] is still there, it cannot be absent. To the extent that the antithesis has not yet developed in this shape, it falls outside of it and plays out on its own.

The first aspect is the state. We have to regard it as based on family relationships—an organization based on paternal oversight and maintaining the whole by punishment, admonition, discipline. This is a prosaic realm, a realm of permanence, an unhistorical history; it lacks this antithesis, the ideality, within itself, and such a condition does not change internally but only from without. True change, however, lies only within, and only when this condition changes does something external make inroads into it. The shape of such a state is found in the Far East and is essentially that of the Chinese Empire. The spatial dimension is of no consequence here.

But, secondly, the objectivity of the state exists also in the form of time, in such a way that the state does not inwardly change and is only in conflict outwardly; states that rest on the same unchanging principle | are essentially occupied with themselves and so are in continuous decline. The new state that appears in place of the one that collapsed also sinks into decline, into the same downfall. No true advance occurs in this restless alteration, which ever remains one and the same. This ongoing unrest is an unhistorical history.

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This second shape, that of restless alteration that produces nothing, the shape of time, occurs in the Middle East. Just as we call the first shape the infancy, we can name the second one the boyhood (*Knabenalter*) of the world in which the states are at constant odds with one another. But inasmuch as the state is outwardly directed, a premonition of the individual principle appears. Conflict and struggle cause a self-concentration (*Sichzusammenfassen*) into individuality, an internal self-comprehension (*Insichfassen*). But this premonition first appears as powerless individuals, as a

universal, unconscious principle, as something natural, as light, which, however, is not yet the light of the self-knowing personal soul. The latter grows into the age of youth (*Jünglingsalter*); here the realm of Greece comes to prominence.

Realm and state are distinct here, for at the beginning the essence of Greece was not a state; rather a multitude of states is its characteristic feature. This is the realm of beautiful freedom. The principle of this shape is that of naive, natural ethical unity, but ethical unity as individual personality. The single person feels himself to be free as an individual unity with universal substance. Thus it is the realm of beauty, the most cheerful and most graceful realm, but also the utterly ephemeral one, the quickly wilting bloom, the inwardly most restless shape since it itself must overturn its solidity through reflection. For beauty unites the opposed principles, and the principle of individual | freedom is precisely the opposite of natural 116
ethical life. Thus constant unrest is found here. The reflective power (*Reflexion*) of personality can be sustained in unity with immediate ethical life for only a moment; reflection tears it apart. Here substance is present only as beautiful individuality. The reflective power of personality, through the power that subjectivity exercises *vis-à-vis* naive universality, must elevate immediacy to thought, to universality.

The Greeks intuited their unity, the Romans reflected it.

So we step into the Roman world, into the adulthood (*Mannesalter*) of demanding labor—a labor that hearkens to duty, serves a universal purpose, a state, in universal principles, the laws, and that is operative neither in the free will (*Willkür*) of the master nor in its own beautiful free will. Here is the sacrifice of individuality to universality, a universality in which the individual is submerged. Individuals attain their purpose only in the universal. Such an empire seems to be eternal, especially when it is joined with the labor of the subjective principle of satisfaction in its truth—when it has become subjectivity reconciled with substance, i.e. with religion, or the Holy Roman Empire. But we saw the latter perish two decades ago.[78] As abstract universality it is the labor of the Roman world to incorporate individual peoples and to subjugate them in its abstract universality.

The transition to the next principle is to be seen as the internal struggle of abstract universality against the principle of particular subjectivity. | 117
The struggle must end with the victory of subjective singularity because abstract universality as legality (*Gesetzmäßigkeit*) does not assume inwardly

78. A reference to the renunciation of the imperial title by Francis II, the last of the Habsburgs, in 1806.

individualized form and has to have a purely arbitrary, subjective singularity as its impetus. As abstract, this legality must therefore perish in complete subjectivity. The subject, the principle of infinite form, has not yet substantialized itself and must therefore appear as arbitrary dominion. That is how, in this realm, the suspension of the antithesis, its worldly reconciliation, takes place. But in the meantime spiritual reconciliation is also produced: individual personality is transfigured into self-subsistent universality, into self-subsistent universal subjectivity, into the divine personality. The latter appears, then, in the world. Were it not to appear in the world, it would not be the self-subsistent universal, for such a universal includes subsisting actuality. From here on, a spiritual realm stands over against the worldly one. The realm of self-knowing subjectivity, of subjectivity knowing its essence, is the principle of actual spirit.

At this point the fourth realm is attained, which we can compare with old age (*Greisenalter*). In a natural state this is language at its prime; in spirit it is the full maturity of spirit. Old age in a natural sense has left behind the stage of development; but spirit is an infinite power to maintain within itself the moments of earlier development and thus to know itself in its totality. This fourth realm is the Germanic because the Germanic peoples[79] stand at the pinnacle of this change. This realm begins with a reconciliation that is completed only implicitly; because this reconciliation is just starting, at
118 first the most enormous antithesis is exhibited, which then | appears as a wrongful condition and an antithesis to be sublated; it emerges therefore precisely in the supreme conflict [of the spiritual] with the worldly.

The principle of this realm is free spirit subsisting for itself. The principle of the spirit that is for itself is freedom in its distinctive quality. On the one hand, it is subjectivity—wherein one's own mind or heart (*Gemüt*), the subject, ought at the same time to be present in what it recognizes. On the other hand, it is not a matter of validating simply anything; rather, what

79. Hegel uses the terms *germanisch* and *Germanen* to designate the European peoples whose ethnic and linguistic heritage is Germanic. The Germanic peoples comprised one of the great ethnic complexes spreading over much of ancient Europe. Germanic is one of the language families of Indo-European, but in German the terms *indogermanisch* and *indoeuropäisch* are used synonymously. To distinguish *germanisch* and *Germanen* from *deutsch* and *Deutschen* ('German'), we translate these terms as 'Germanic' and 'Germanic peoples'. In the ensuing discussion of the Germanic World, the term 'Germanic' really becomes synonymous with 'European' because in Hegel's view the Germanic principle has pervaded Europe (see also above, n. 46). The principle ultimately has nothing to do with ethnicity or language but with the reconciliation of worldliness and spirituality, substantiality and subjectivity, state and freedom, actuality and rationality, etc. The process of reconciliation is described in highly condensed and abstract terms in the following paragraphs.

ought to be validated is mind or heart in accord with its essential being and in its truth. Christ reveals this truth of spirit to us in his religion. His own truth, which is that of mind and heart, is the placing of oneself in unity with this objectivity [of truth]. Mind and heart are valid only when the true lives within them and takes its immediacy from them. This is the principle of this realm. Here is reconciliation, the reconciliation completed in and for itself. Spirit has found itself.

But because this reconciliation is at first implicit, and because of its immediacy, this stage begins with the antithesis of the principle in itself; it begins with the spiritual principle to which the worldly realm is simultaneously opposed. This worldly realm, however, is not the preceding realm; rather it is a Christian realm, which as worldly recognizes the truth, and therefore as worldly desires to be commensurate with the truth. On the other side the spiritual principle wills to know itself as realized in the world. Inasmuch as the two sides emerge as distinct, the worldly realm has not yet cast off subjectivity, nor on the other side has it yet recognized the spiritual. For the two sides are at the beginning and are not yet done with immediacy: | spirit must first have worked off its subjectivity, and worldli- 119
ness must first have rid itself of its own internal conflict.

Because this process is not yet completed, spirit and world still confront each other. Thus the advance is not a peaceful, resistance-free development; rather it involves an enormous conflict of the two sides. Spirit does not advance placidly to its actualization; rather spirit strives to produce itself in its actuality. But the advance consists in both sides struggling to rid themselves of their one-sidedness, this untrue form. Thus it is an empty worldliness that strives to be commensurate with spirit; but it is not yet commensurate and ultimately is crushed by the spiritual power. Therefore it must perish. At the outset the power of worldliness in its vast shape cannot yet be at one with spirit. On the other side, the spiritual realm is immersed in external worldliness, is merely clerical and ecclesiastical (*geistlich*), appears in immediate worldliness. Just as the worldly power is outwardly suppressed, so the spiritual power is inwardly corrupting, losing its inner significance. This corruption of the two sides causes the standpoint of barbarism to vanish—the barbarism where worldliness is immediately just the spirit of this immediate worldliness. The disappearance of barbarism results from the corruption of the two sides; and at this standpoint spirit, reflected within itself, finds the higher form of the reconciliation worthy of it. This form is rationality or thought.

The spiritual principle cannot remain in its subjective immediacy; rather, insofar as it has attained its objective form, the universal shape of thought, it

can truly encompass external actuality; and the latter, as having become
120 thought, | can come to be the genuine aim of the idea of spirit. In this way, the aim of the spiritual is able to be realized in the worldly realm. Then the thought of the spiritual exists in the form of thought, which brings about the fundamental reconciliation. The depth of thought alone can be its principle. This depth of thought will thus appear to have come forth on the side of worldliness. Subjectivity as such has its place here. The side of [thought's] appearance is the subjectivity of the singular as such. On this side knowledge as such breaks forth in this subjectivity, and its appearance takes place in existence. So thinking assumes this form in appearance, and the principle of higher reconciliation, the reconciliation of church and state, is found here. The antithesis is overcome in and for itself because spirituality and freedom have, and find, their concept and their rationality in worldliness.

These are the principal moments. The process of overcoming this antithesis constitutes the interest in history. The point at which the reconciliation that subsists in itself assumes its being-for-self is found, then, in knowing and thought; here actuality is transformed and reconstructed. Because this [point] is found for the existence of reconciliation, the conditions and abstract elements of this reconciliation are there.

These are, therefore, the moments to be considered. The first was the substantial immediacy of ethical life; the second the antithesis of subjectivity and abstract universality; the third the unity of the subjective with
121 universality. |

THE COURSE OF WORLD HISTORY

The Oriental World

So we begin with the East. The dawn of spirit is in the East, in the [place of the sun's] rising. Spirit, however, is but its setting.[1] So we begin with the Asian principle. The valley plains are the terrain of life here, not the mountain ranges and ravines. There may well be historical records of a prior existence of tribes on the mountain slopes leading to the plains; but ethical existence just is historical existence, and we are only interested in an ethical people. Such a people is first found on the valley plains and alluvial plains.

We go first to the Chinese river valleys, and from there to India, to the two rivers, the Ganges and the Indus; in this connection we mention the Tibetans and the Mongols. The third topic is Middle Eastern life in the river valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates, where the valley comes into conflict with the mountains; on the other side lies the easterly alluvial plain along the Caspian Sea, running up against the mountain ranges. This sets the limits of the Oriental world.

CHINA

The Historical Records of China

What is first, then, is the Oriental world in the Far East, namely, the history of China, of the Indians, Tibetans, and Mongolians. Accordingly, our point

1. The imagery in these first two sentences is of sunrise (*Aufgang*, which can also refer to the place, for Europeans, from which the sun appears to rise, namely, the East or the Orient), and sunset, which involves a 'going down' (*Niedergang*, which can also mean 'downfall' or 'decay'). For the third sentence Griesheim reads: 'Spirit, however, is this going-down within itself' (or: 'descent into itself', *in sich niederzugehen*). The Hotho version of the third sentence, as given in our text, with *ihr* (feminine) having 'dawn' as its only possible antecedent, suggests that spirit comes on the scene only at the conclusion of this 'dawning', namely, upon the 'downfall' of the East ('after' it, or 'replacing' it). What follows here in the discussion of China, and in the ensuing accounts of other civilizations too, is, as we pointed out in the Introduction, not so much a history in the sense of a chronological account, as it is a cultural and political portrayal of these 'worlds', of what is distinctive about each of these civilizations, and why Hegel thinks they constitute a meaningful succession in the emergence and development of spirit. Except for the main divisions, the section headings are provided by the English editors.

of departure will be China.[2] China is this wondrously unique empire that
122 astonished Europeans, and has continued to do so, | ever since it became known. Self-contained, it reached this level of culture quite apart from foreign ties; its ties with other peoples are only recent, and they are of no

2. This is an appropriate place for a few remarks about the section on China in the framework of this edn. In providing the editorial notes it is especially important to be clear as to which sources Hegel can have used and, in particular, which ones he certainty utilized, rather than retrospectively correcting erroneous judgments. The edn. of Hegel's first lectures on the philosophy of world history makes it possible as well to cast a specific light on Hegel's fundamental engagement with China. To give the reader a sound orientation to these lectures, the following indicates the essential sources.

Two works are of overriding importance. The first is the *Mémoires concernant l'Histoire, les Sciences ... des Chinois*, by the missionaries of Peking, in 16 vols. (Paris, 1776–91 and 1814). The second is *De la Chine; ou Déscription générale de cet Empire*, by Abbé Grosier, 3rd edn., revised and expanded, 7 vols. (Paris, 1818–20). This 3rd edn. of Grosier has until now been wholly neglected by researchers, although it can be shown from several passages that it must be viewed as Hegel's second principal source.

In addition, Hegel certainly also utilized the *Histoire générale de la Chine*, by Joseph de Mailla, in 13 vols. (Paris, 1777–85), although it cannot be given the same significance as the previously mentioned sources. The 1st edn. of Grosier's *De la Chine* is vol. xiii of de Mailla's work, and so Hegel was familiar with it too; a German tr. of it in 2 vols. was published in 1789 (Frankfurt and Leipzig). Hegel did not use the 2nd edn., 2 vols. (Paris, 1787). These facts are evident from a letter of Hegel to Duboc, in *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1953), ii. 367.

With the aid of the aforementioned works the basic framework of Hegel's account of China can be reconstructed. Whether or not other possible sources are actually significant for him is open to question. Hegel obviously relied more on the more recent works than he did on the numerous travelers' accounts and missionary reports of the 17th and 18th cents. The *Allgemeine Historie ... oder Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen*, 21 vols. (Leipzig, 1748–74), had already made the extant literature available, foremost the reports of Trigaltius, Samedo, Martinius, Magellan, Rau, and others; its vol. vi (Leipzig, 1750) concerns China, and begins with the information that its compilers followed the lead of du Halde in judging which works are most reliable; it includes the previously unpublished reports of many missionaries: Verbiest, Couplet, Fontenay, Bouvet, Gerbillon, Noel, le Comte, Visdelou, Regis, Premare, Dentrecolles, Hervieu, Contacin, Parrenin, Mailla, Gaubil, *et al.* Jean Baptiste du Halde is the author of *Déscription geographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise ...*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1735). The work of du Halde and the *Allgemeine Historie* can be taken as a point of departure, as representing the status of China studies at the middle of the 17th cent.; Hegel only occasionally draws upon the two of them to fill out his presentation.

The *Mémoires* and the *Histoire générale* provided a new foundation for Europeans' information about China. The concurrence of Grosier's 3rd edn. with the *Mémoires* supports the view that Grosier presents a summation of all previous work on the topic. In contrast, the earlier important volume by Athanasius Kircher (for which, see the Bibliography on Hegel's Sources), as well as the works on China by Leibniz, Wolff, Voltaire, Herder, and others, scarcely influenced Hegel's presentation, although he may have been familiar with them. The same must be said about various handbooks and presentations of Chinese history and religion. Also, Hegel did not utilize the comprehensive anthology of Chinese law, the *Ta Tsing Leu Lee*, by George T. Staunton (London, 1810). Staunton's accounts of his own diplomatic

significance for this empire. It is the only empire in the world that has lasted from the most ancient times up to today. We have already remarked upon its truly vast expanse. Today the population of the Chinese empire as such is, according to the average estimate, some 200 million souls; the lowest estimate is 150 million, the highest 300 million. Every few years there is a census based on very precise tax rolls. So the data are correct. The Tatars of China are excluded from these counts, as are the many surrounding princes ruling their own lands under China's direct control. This enormous population of China proper stands under a government that is well-regulated to the highest degree, that is most just, most benevolent, most wise. Laws are elaborated, and agriculture, commerce, industry and sciences flourish. There are cities with more than a million inhabitants.[3]

What is even more astonishing is that this people has a continuous, well-ordered, and quite well-attested history from its earliest times onward,

journeys (as Lord Macartney), and those of Amherst, in 2 vols. (London, 1797), and Pierre Sonnerat's 2 vols. of more recent travelers' accounts (Zürich, 1783), are less important for Hegel than sometimes previously supposed. However, Hegel did occasionally draw upon *Die Erdkunde*, by Carl Ritter, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1817–18) and made use of the reprinted literature, as well as Johannes von Müller, 'Versuch über die Zeitrechnung der Vorwelt', in his *Sämtliche Werke* (Tübingen, 1810), viii. 195–230. But these writings, and possibly others too, are not important for the overall concept of Hegel's lectures; he just turns to them to augment his treatment of individual problems.

Another issue is the extent to which Hegel made use of Chinese texts in translation. His information about the *Shu-jing*, the *Yi-jing*, and translations of Confucius (Kongzi) and Lao-tzu (Laozi), must not be based on his own reading of them. We can take up this issue in connection with individual passages, where we will also indicate difficulties with numerical data and various expressions, some of which are unfortunately not resolvable. There is also the role of newspapers (more important when we come to India than it is here), specifically the suspicion that Hegel occasionally drew upon newspapers (for instance, when he discusses reviews of Marshman's book, n. 94 below). Not much light can be shed on this, given the problem of locating the pertinent newspapers and particular articles. In any case such a quest would yield no essentially new information about Hegel's major sources. The notes refer not only to Hegel's most likely sources but also to their literary parallels, namely, other possible sources which the reader who is so inclined may wish to examine for himself or herself.

The English tr. adds (and then uses) pinyin romanization for Chinese names and terms.

3. Hegel draws upon Grosier, *De la Chine*, for these numbers. Citations in these notes are from the German tr. of 1789, i. 313–40. There it is stated that, according to P. Amiot, China has 200 million inhabitants (p. 313). He obtained this number in the following way. A 1743 roll of taxable persons totals 28,524,488. Each is thought on average to have five dependents. So, five times the roll total equals 142,622,440 people. Father Amiot says it would not be wrong to double this number, so as to include other populations not on the tax rolls. Peking (Beijing) alone is said to have two million people (p. 327). Other census tables (pp. 333–40) give the total population of China in 1761 as 198,214,553. Cf. *Mémoires*, ii. 374–5 and iv. 127; Ritter, *Die Erdkunde* (i. 664), has different figures.

covering at least 5,000 years[4] with the greatest exactitude and certainty; it is not like Greek and Roman history but instead is more fully attested. No other land in the world has such a continuous, authenticated ancient history.[5] This empire ever remained autonomous, ever remained what it was. At times it was conquered—in the thirteenth century by Genghis Khan, and later, after the time of the Thirty Years War, by the Manchu-
123 Tatars—but it was not changed by these conquests.[6] | In all these circumstances it always retained its character, for it remained wholly an autonomous empire. And so it is an empire untouched by history (*ungeschichtlich*), for internally it developed undisturbed; it was not destroyed from without. No alien principle came to displace the ancient one. To that extent it has no history. So, in speaking about the most ancient history of this empire, we are not speaking of something past but instead of the shape that it has today. (The same is the case in India.) The principle of this empire, which has not departed from its concept, was set forth in universal terms; the amazing thing is that this principle is simply the natural concept of a state, the elaboration of which has not altered this first, immature principle. And yet we find here culture at its height.[7]

So we cannot speak here of a proper history as such. We intend to consider briefly not only the *res gestae* [deeds] but also the *narratio rerum gestarum* [narrative of the deeds].

4. The *Histoire générale* (i, p. xxiv) and Voltaire, *Essái* (p. 82), both say 'more than 4,000'; on Voltaire, see the Bibliography. Griesheim has 'four thousand'. Just below in our text Hegel puts the beginnings at 2400 BC, which makes the sources cited in this note closer to the resulting total of 4,200 or more years prior to Hegel's own day. Yet a bit further on Hegel repeats the number 5,000.

5. This assessment is taken from Grosier's introduction to the *Histoire générale*, i, pp. xxi–xxii.

6. Genghis Khan and his Mongol army entered China in 1211 and devastated it methodically, conquering Peking (Beijing) in 1215; see the extensive account in the *Histoire générale*, ix. 41–129. The Manchus, who conquered China in 1644, are a Mongol people from Manchuria who are related to the Tungus people of north-eastern Siberia, not to the Tatars (or Tartars), a Turkic people of Central Asia. None of these peoples are ethnic Chinese. The Manchus established the Ch'ing (Qing) dynasty (1644–1912), which replaced the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), setting their capital at Mukden (Shenyang) in Manchuria. Despite being foreigners, the Manchus assimilated to the dominant Chinese culture. Perhaps Hegel's term *Manschu-Tartaren* could be taken as referring more broadly to these two large assimilated populations that were not ethnic Chinese. The Thirty Years War in Europe, mentioned in connection with the Manchu conquest, ended in 1648.

7. See the discussion of change (*Veränderung*) above, pp. 155–6. There Hegel states that with a change in spirit (as contrasted with change in nature), the concept embodied by a historical shape 'is enhanced and corrected', through progress to a new stage. He holds that no such change takes place in the case of China.

[This empire] dates back to 2,400 years before the birth of Christ. According to conventional chronology, this is the era in which Noah and the flood are placed. After this time historical figures emerge, for prior to it is the age of myth. Contrary to the conventional opinion that places the flood at this time, Johannes von Müller, in agreement with several recent or earlier historians, puts the date at 3,473 years before Christ (and others pick a different number) based on Old Testament statements and the Josephus translation of the Septuagint into Greek; this is in his [Müller's] first book as well as in part eight of his *Werke*.[8] This hypothesis dates the flood one thousand years before Abraham, while others | put it three hundred years 124
earlier than him. The discrepancy is owing to the fact that according to one account only three hundred years passed between Abraham and Noah, whereas according to another, a thousand years are said to separate these two eras. A notable factor in favor of the latter hypothesis is that, given how the world looks in Abraham's day, it is improbable that only three hundred years should have passed since the flood. It would obviously be impossible for the world to have been so developed three hundred years after such a deluge.[9]

The Shu-Jing

Now we come more specifically to the Chinese themselves; we intend to go over briefly a few points about their 5,000-year history and then to look at the character of this form [of civilization] itself. In addition to its original historians, each people has original books that contain its myths, the ancient elements of its intuition set down in a sensory mode, which explicate the existing circumstances. Homer is such a book for the Greeks, as the Bible is for us. The Chinese named such books *Jing*. The first is called *Yi-jing*, another is *Shu-jing*. The latter is a basic source (*Grundbuch*) of original

8. Hotho gives the number as 3,173. By Hegel's time Müller's writings had appeared in various edns. and trs. Possibly by his 'first book' Hegel means the critical edn. by Haverkamp (Amsterdam, 1726). This work, *Versuch über die Zeitrechnung der Vorwelt*, is repr. in the *Sämtliche Werke, Achter Teil: Kleine historische Schriften*, ed. Johann Georg Müller (Tübingen, 1810), 195–230. The Septuagint is a tr. of the Hebrew scriptures into Greek, made in the 3rd and 2nd cents. BC by Jewish scholars in Egypt. Flavius Josephus (AD 37/38–c.100), author of *The Antiquities of the Jews* and not himself one of the Septuagint translators, made use of the Old Testament historical books in their Septuagint version.

9. Müller does not provide the numbers Hegel mentions. He says (p. 210) that 1,232 years passed between the flood and the birth of Abraham. For support he cites Josephus, Clement of Alexandria, and others. On p. 201 Müller writes: 'How could he [Moses, traditional author of Genesis] think that, three hundred years after such an upheaval as the great flood over all known lands of the earth, the world would be as he portrays it in the time of Abraham?'

contemplation for the Chinese. We must become familiar with such original sources if we would be informed about the types of representation employed by the ancients.[10] The *Shu-jing* has been translated into French,[11] as we are indebted to missionaries, in particular French missionaries, for all these reports concerning China. Formerly the priests did this in a lifeless manner.[12] But since the eighteenth century very scholarly men have taken up the task of learning about China, those who knew the spoken and written language and are at the same time leaders of the European calendar deputation there.[13] For two hundred years the highest tribunal at the court consisted of Christians. Up until the end of the previous century these clerics made translations, and subsequently Chinese converts were sent to Europe to complete their studies
125 here, with the result that we are | on the whole familiar with China.[14] Thus our information about China is not unreliable, for we have a basic acquaintance with its literature and its life as a whole, as well as with its history.

As for the specifics of the *Shu-jing*, it commences, according to the report of Kang-mu [Gangmu] (the most famous of the Chinese historians), with Yao of the Xia dynasty, 2,356 years before the birth of Christ.[15] Yao was the

10. This information may come from the account of P. de Premare, 'Le Chou-king Discours Preliminaire', repr. in the *Mémoires*, viii. 193.

11. Hegel is likely speaking of the tr. by Antoine Gaubil, publ. by De Guignes as *Le Chou-king* (Paris, 1770). There was no new edn. before 1822. There was the earlier Latin version by Gaubil (Peking, 1755), and du Halde is said to have brought back a few excerpts from the book made by the Jesuit Premare (*Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 324); but we cannot identify Hegel's source at this point with certainty. See also n. 26 below.

12. Here Hegel expresses a widely held view. See Pierre Sonnerat, *Reise nach Ostindien und China*, 2 vols. (Zürich, 1783), ii. 3–4; also, *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 349.

13. On the calendar deputation, see n. 98 below.

14. These remarks concern the origins of the *Mémoires*. Two young Chinese had studied in France, and were sent back to China with various inquiries for the missionaries resident there. This initiated a correspondence giving rise to the materials for the *Mémoires*. See vol. i of the *Mémoires*, as well as W. T. Krug, *Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, 2nd edn. (Leipzig, 1833), iii. 758. We can take these remarks as an indication of the great prominence Hegel attributes to the *Mémoires*.

15. Hegel's figure of 2,356 years diverges from all of his available sources. Grosier, *De la Chine*, iv. 35 has 2,357; see *Histoire générale*, i, p. lii; *Mémoires*, ii. 181, vi. 311, xiii. 262, xvi. 12. There are of course problems with exact dating. The *Mémoires* states that the time of Yao cannot be determined precisely (xiv. 183). Revealing are statements in the *Shu-jing* edn. of Gaubil that Ssu-ma Ch'ien (Sima Qian), the father of Chinese historiography, could not date Yao's time precisely, but calculated that he ruled about 2000 BC in our calendar; but that others placed Yao variously in 2303, 2300, 2200, and 2132 BC (pp. xxxiv, xxxvi); see also pp. xxvi ff. It also says Gangmu put Yao's rule within the period 2357–2256, whereas Tsou-chou (Zouzhou) says 2205–2105 (pp. 5 ff.). So Hegel's divergent dating is understandable. However, the Xia dynasty actually began with Yü (see n. 31 below), not Yao. This sentence of our text, untypically, has the pinyin 'Xia' rather than the older 'Hsia'. Perhaps 'Kang-mu's report' refers here to the translation of the 'Tong-Kien-Kang-Mou' in the *Histoire générale*.

first of that dynasty. The *Shu-jing* begins with him. Moreover, it must be noted that later Chinese history has still other credible annals. In earliest times the rulers already had at their right hand a historian who recorded the ruler's deeds, and at the left hand one who recorded the ruler's words, for early on the custom was to have two kinds of historians at the court. In later times the number of historians was increased to four. These annals were preserved in locked chests. The custody of history as such is an affair of the state in China, in that the rulers are not obliged to compile their own biographies, and several historians from each of the two branches work together.[16] The historians are not set any limits in their narrative.

With regard to the *Shu-jing* and ancient history in the Hsin [Qin] dynasty, it is notable that in a time of disorder the imperial history fell into disarray and was not continued with precision. The main factor is that a ruler of the fourth dynasty [Qin], one Shi Huangti [Shi Huangdi], some two hundred years before Christ, had all the historical writings burned.[17] The *Shu-jing* had in fact been edited by Confucius [Kongzi] in 551 BC. It too was burned, but it was reconstructed in fragments from the oral version of an aged mandarin. There are also extant traditions. The *Shu-jing* | of Kongzi is 126
said to consist of one hundred chapters, although only fifty-nine chapters have come down to us.[18] The Chinese also have from earlier times narratives of the beginnings of the empire, partly from traditions, partly from fragmentary materials. On the whole these narratives resemble the way in which people in recent times have given psychological accounts of the history of humankind.[19] Those [modern] narratives begin with a crude human condition in which people live in the forests like animals, without shelter, and they are set apart from the animals only in virtue of having a soul, which is averse to such crudity. One of their leaders taught them to construct shelters out of

16. For this picture of court historians and their roles, see *Histoire générale*, i, pp. xii and xxxii, as well as the preface to vol. iii, and *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 317–18.

17. The burning of historical writings (including the *Shu-jing*) under Shi Huangdi is generally dated in 213 BC. See: *Mémoires*, xvi. 64; Grosier, *De la Chine*, iv. 346; *Histoire générale*, i, p. viii; Gaubil, *Le Chou-king*, 356–7; *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 323.

18. Kongzi is generally said to be the editor (in 482 BC), although his birth is placed in 551 BC. (See Grosier, vii. 410 and 432; *Mémoires*, iii. 43 and xii. 379; Gaubil, *Le Chou-king*, 256.) The sage Fou-cheng (Fouzheng) is said to have dictated the ancient text *c.*176 BC. (See: Gaubil, pp. 356 ff.; *Histoire générale*, i, pp. viii ff.; Grosier, iv. 344–5.) Hegel's number of 59 chapters is inexplicable, for all the sources have 58 as the number transmitted (Gaubil, p. cxliv; Grosier, iv. 344; *Mémoires*, i. 440 and viii. 193; *Histoire générale*, i, pp. ix and xiv). Perhaps, then, Hegel did not utilize the French edn., or perhaps the discrepancy is just a slip.

19. This is perhaps a reference to *Philosophische Mutmassungen über die Geschichte der Menschheit*, by Isaak Iselin (Zürich, 1764). See Ernst Schulin, *Die weltgeschichtliche Erfassung des Orients bei Hegel und Ranke* (Göttingen, 1958).

tree branches, and to make fire, cook meat, observe the seasons, and the like, and later to build 'Hoangti' [Huangdi], or houses, out of tree trunks. So this history commences like [that of] almost all ancient nations.[20] Renowned among those sovereigns in particular is Fo-hi or Fu-hi [Fuxi], who made his selection as leader conditional on their making him lord and emperor. He took on counselors, then instituted ministers, priests, and the like, established customs, and so forth.[21] He is to be distinguished from that Fo, a divine figure, whom people in eastern India call Buddha.[22] The invention of the Gua, certain arrangements of lines, is ascribed to Fuxi. In fact he saw a dragon climbing out of a stream with a tablet that had these lines on it.[23] They consist of simple arrangements of lines. Fuxi found eight Gua. The first was three straight lines, ☰, the second a straight line and a broken line
127 beneath it, ☶, and so forth. This is the wisdom of the ancient Chinese. This table is the foundation of the *Yi-jing*, consisting of nothing but meditation on these lines. Kongzi constructed the *Yi-jing* from them. These lines are utilized with a substructure of thoughts, such that by means of them one thinks universal, abstract characteristics. Thus the straight line, —, is the simple material from which all things are constituted. The broken line, – –, is the distinction of this simplicity. Light, fire, and the like they thought of in different arrangements among these lines. Thus abstract characteristics underlay these figures as symbols. So the *Yi-jing* is the speculative philosophy of the Chinese.[24]

20. In this account Hegel follows the content and sequence of the extensive discussion in the *Histoire générale*, i. 1–4 and 21. His other sources (*Mémoires*, iii. 11, vii. 109, xvi. 9; *Le Chou-king*, pp. cxxx ff.) for the most part differ from it. The *Histoire générale* (i, p. xxxi) speaks of these narratives of beginnings as 'ridiculous fictions', an assessment with which Hegel concurs.

21. The source for these statements about him must be *Histoire générale*, i. 5–10, where he is called 'founder of the monarchy' (i, pp. vii and xiv). See also *Mémoires*, iii. 8–9 and xiii. 215–17; Grosier, iv. 343; *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 322.

22. Ritter, on the contrary, advances the view that this 'Fo-hi' and Fo the Buddha are the same heathen deity (*Erdkunde*, i. 694). See n. 121 below.

23. The *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Oxford, 2006, 2009), i. 108, describe this event as the discovery of a turtle with the patterns of lines etched into its carapace.

24. The *Mémoires* furnish this account of Fuxi and the dragon from the river (xiii. 216; also ii. 20). It is evidently based on a widespread tale (see *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 323), one that Hegel retells tersely. Kongzi is said to have produced a commentary on the Gua, and it is bound together with two more ancient commentaries to make up the *Yi-jing* (see: Grosier, iv. 343–4 and vii. 446; *Mémoires*, xvi. 77). The *Mémoires* refers to a Latin tr. of the *Yi-jing* by French Jesuits (xvi. 81), but no such edn. can be found. Hegel could have drawn his information about it from secondary literature mentioned in n. 2 above; or he could have utilized Gaubil's *Le Chou-king*, which includes a discussion of the *Yi-jing* by Claude Visdelou (pp. 399–436). The brevity of Hegel's account, however, counts against his use of the latter.

The *Shu-jing* has the form of single fragments, portrayals of singular elements, poetic romances, without any historical sequence, lacking connections, and so it is not a proper book of history.[25] The content consists, for instance, of a command of this or that ruler to someone by which he makes that person a minister, or instruction given to a servant, or else it is teaching of a priest imparted to his disciple, to a younger prince, or the appointing of a general together with the orders issued to him, or else it involves reports, especially reflections on military events. The historical dimension plays only an incidental part, one fleshed out from other traditional elements. So this book has a quite different aspect than do those of other peoples, which recount the deeds of their heroes. Here the content is principally speeches and exhortations of princes and ministers, ones for the purpose | of securing the successful performance 128
(*Glück*) of subordinates. So in this case too the moral aspect is the main element. One of the most ancient princes is Yao, who in the first chapter is reported to have asked: 'To whom shall I assign the task of protecting the land from flooding?' The minister proposed someone, but the prince rejected him and said: 'You are mistaken, for this man presents himself modestly, remarkably so, but he is filled with pride!'[26] A ruler ordered a mandarin to observe the five duties, that of father and child, of prince and subordinate, of children to elders, and so forth.[27] The *Shu-jing* is compiled in such a fashion.

The Main Elements in Chinese History

We can only make general remarks about the historical element in the narrower sense. This ancient history has its grounding, indeed in its essential part, in Shansi [Shanxi] province on the upper Hoangho [Huang He] River, which flows first to the north-east and then to the east. All the earliest

25. This assessment echoes the view of Grosier, iv. 346–7.

26. This passage is puzzling and needs an explanation. It appears that Hegel has conjoined two separate elements in Gaubil's *Le Chou-king* (pp. 8–9): the question about a person qualified to combat flooding, combined with the reply of a noble to Yao's question about someone qualified to be his successor. The issue is less about details than it is about the portrayal in this text. The *Histoire générale* presents the conversation in a similar way. So Hegel could have drawn upon either one. Hegel's word choice more resembles Gaubil's, his sequence more the *Histoire*. More likely he utilized a third source, not yet identified. In any event, this passage makes it doubtful that Hegel utilized Gaubil's 1770 edn. (see also n. 11 above). It is noteworthy that Mailla, author of the *Histoire*, died in 1748, and so this work was written long before its publication by Grosier (i, p. xxvii). Evidently there are several commentaries on the *Shu-jing*, as well as Chinese original sources, that report on Yao and floods. Mailla mentions a passage in Meng-tse (Mongzi) (*Histoire*, i, p. cvi); see 'Lettrès du P. de Mailla à M. Freret, Premiere Lettre' (i, pp. lxxv–cxxxi).

27. The *Mémoires* mention the following five duties (v. 28): those of father and child, of prince and subject, of husband and wife, of child and his brothers, and of friendship.

traditions pertain to this sector of China. Dominion extended at first eastward to the ocean, and then nearly to Canton [Guangdong] province. This locale is one point. A second point to note is that later the Yangtse [Chang Jiang] River constituted the boundary for centuries. This river produces significant flooding and marshland, and the principal city of Nanking [Nanjing] is located on it. Only later did northern princes establish themselves beyond this river. The south was said to have been populated last of all.[28] Inasmuch as what is called Chinese history in the ancient period refers more to the western region, it is difficult to discern whether what is meant is the whole empire or just this one specific sector. Very likely the empire was made up of many separate kingdoms, which waged war with one another. Several dynasties sprang from such empires since, upon their demise, fathers passed the crown on to their sons or to important persons.[29] Only later was the empire unified into its present shape under one emperor, and yet during
129 several | centuries individual princes regained their freedom.[30]

Only the main elements in Chinese history can be of interest. Chinese history involves few external relationships, and accordingly these relationships offer little in the way of anything universal. An ancient traditional history constitutes the beginning. What is factually historical (*das Historische*) commences with Yu in 2201, with the Xia dynasty.[31] From the Tschou [Zhon] dynasty in the twelfth century onward the history becomes clearer, more definite; this is in the fourth part of the *Shu-jing* and has a more determinate character.[32] It is striking that it begins with Yu, and its

28. Elements of Hegel's account of the spread of the empire can be found in the *Histoire générale*, i. 1, and in Ritter, *Erdkunde*, i. 520, 655.

29. See below, n. 36.

30. Ritter (*Erdkunde*, i. 656) says the union into one dominion occurred in 213 BC, and only afterward were the plains south of the Chang Jiang River populated.

31. In place of this sentence, Griesheim reads: 'In the seventh book of the *Shu-jing* [it says that] Yao lived 2,205 [years] after Kangu and 2,256 years before the birth of Christ . . .' Hotho, like Griesheim, has 'Yao' instead of 'Yu', which is indeed a mishearing or a written error, or else a mixup of names. The intent is 'Yu' ('Yü' in German), not Yao. The *Histoire générale* says that Yu ascended the throne in 2205 BC and so founded the Xia dynasty (i. 119–23 and 250). The problem with the dating rests on the fact that there are other, rather different, attested annals that may have influenced Hegel, possibly indirectly. For instance, August Ludwig von Schlözer, in his *Weltgeschichte nach ihren Haupttheilen im Auszug und Zusammenhange* (2nd edn.; Göttingen, 1792–1801), follows the annals of Sematsjen (Sima Qian?) in dating the beginning of Chinese history to 2207 BC (p. 225).

32. The *Histoire générale* dates the beginning of the Zhon dynasty at 1122 BC and describes its dominion very fully (i. 261–ii. 362). The fourth part of *Le Chou-king* has the heading 'Tcheou-Chou' and gives the year 1122 BC. In agreement with Hegel's 'more determinate character' is the fact that it involves the largest division of this text (pp. 144–318 in Gaubil's edn.).

development coincides with what can be viewed as the historical beginnings of other empires: Egypt (2207), Assyria (2221), India (2204), all begin at approximately this time, according to solar and lunar calendars (*Linien*).[33]

Already in the time of Yao[34] a major issue is the government's struggle with the rivers and marshlands. This struggle is one of the largest and most important tasks of the empire even today, as it is in Egypt with the Nile. The physical life of the Chinese is conditioned by agriculture and in particular by the cultivation of rice. Dikes hold the rivers in check. Maintenance of the dikes is therefore the greatest task; a breach has the most significant consequence, since millions lose their lives and famine is the lot of the survivors. Pertinent here too are the canals, which are given the greatest attention. From earliest times onward the canals have been laid out and maintained with the greatest care. The main one is the imperial canal, which links Beijing to Guangdong, by linking the Huang He and Chang Jiang rivers. A third feature of the canal system | is that the royal capital was often 130
relocated to facilitate the transport of provisions. That required canals. Wherever the emperor set up his residence, thousands gathered there. The imperial capitals were principally in the north, along the upper Huang He; only later was Beijing the capital. The Asiatics [i.e. foreign invaders] brought about the relocation of the capital city. It is typical of conquering Asiatic peoples that new dynasties also founded new cities,[35] remaining together at one central point, and establishing themselves as new foreigners on their own in order not to dwell among the rest as foreigners, with the result that the natives must come to their masters. The founding of such cities by foreign conquerors thus appears to be necessary. So today Cairo is the fourth capital city of Egypt. The same thing took place in Babylon. For the Chinese the relocation of the capital city was more the prince's decision. An additional major factor in a new dynasty necessitating a new residence was also that the ancestors must be given a place of honor in the palace, with its halls consecrated to them. Relocation of the residences was also connected with the layout of the canals.

The Chinese were also occupied with wars and conflicts. In part these expanded the Chinese state beyond its original extent. The annexed regions had their own princes, who were continually at war. Another cause of the

33. Müller, in his *Zeitrechnung* (p. 209), expresses a comparable view, putting the common date at 2200 BC.

34. Here 'Yao' (not 'Yu') is correct. See n. 31 just above. Also see *Mémoires*, xii. 7, about the flood during Yao's reign.

35. Ritter (*Erdkunde*, i. 662) mentions the relocation of the capital upon a change of dynasty, as well as the canal system (i. 644 ff.), and in particular the imperial canal (i. 655 ff.).

wars was weakness at the center, because the governors acted independently of it. A third cause of war was the instability of the political succession, which became more secure only in more recent times. In earlier times the
131 emperors were able to select the worthiest ones as their successors.[36] | So then what indeed happened was that the emperor often was induced by the second wife to disinherit the children of the first wife. A further cause [of war] was insurrection, instigated by the oppression of the governors or mandarins. Yet another was warfare with foreign lands, with Mongols and Tatars. China was conquered by descendants of Genghis Khan, thus twice by Mongols and Tatars, but was not long under their dominion. This dynasty lasted for eighty-one years,[37] after which a Chinese person seized power once again. A naval battle was decisive in bringing about the regime change whereby the Chinese empire came under its [i.e. the Mongol dynasty's] control. The emperor cast himself into the sea.[38] The canal extending 300 leagues was created under this dynasty.[39] The wall of some 3,000 kilometers in length was built to keep out the Tatars;[40] it sufficed in some instances but did not fulfill its proper purpose, for it could not protect against the incursions and conquests of the Manchu-Tatars, and in 1644 China came under Manchu-Tatar rule, under prince Chun-chi [Shunzhi].[41] Previously the Tatars were under Chinese rule; oppression caused them to rebel. They

36. The *Allgemeine Historie* states (vi. 415) that early emperors chose the cleverest of their sons as their successors, or even those of their subjects who were deemed most worthy.

37. Hegel's number here is problematic. The *Histoire générale*, which he certainly used, puts the Mongol period from Kublai Khan in 1279 to the Ming dynasty in 1368, thus at eighty-nine years (ix. 401–x. 1), which agrees exactly with more recent authorities.

38. Ritter states (*Erdkunde*, i. 657) that the cowardly southern Chinese retreated before Kublai Khan to their fleet of 800 vessels, were cut off from their anchorage, and 100,000 of them drowned, blanketing the sea with their corpses. See *Histoire générale*, ix. 398–9.

39. Hegel's vague remark here, which seems to say the canal was constructed under the Mongols, can confuse the reader. The *Histoire générale* says (ix. 450) that in 1292 it was the vestige of an ancient canal. According to Ritter (*Erdkunde*, i. 666) the Manchus said it was built in the 13th cent., but the Chinese say the Mongols merely restored it. Ritter gives its length as 600 English miles (i. 665). The German *Meile* is an obsolete expression for a league, a variable distance that can range from 2.4 to 4.6 miles.

40. The German reads '600 *Stunden*', which we render as '3,000 kilometers'. According to Wahrig, *Grosses Deutsches Wörterbuch*, 'Stunde' (a duration of one hour) is an obsolete expression for a distance of 4–5 km (presumably the distance that could be traveled in one hour). The wall was not extended during the Mongol period, but rather under the Ming dynasty. Vol. x of the *Histoire générale* is entirely an account of this dynasty. See also n. 68 below.

41. The date of 1644 for the regime change, from Hotho, is generally accepted today. Griesheim's date of 1649 is possibly based on the account in the *Histoire générale* (x. 257 ff.), which has the Ming dynasty persisting until 1649, while acknowledging Manchu dominance prior to that year. It commences the Manchu dynasty with Shunzhi.

installed their own prince. An insurgent in China called for their assistance. They came, defeated the Chinese, and took over the throne. The nature of the empire was such that Manchus took over the government but did not change it. On the contrary, a series of the most excellent emperors ascended the throne. The series of these Manchu emperors was the best, and gave new life to the whole.

In the wake of Manchu rule the whole Tatar region became subject to China, so that China's boundaries reached to the Caspian Sea, also to Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, and Bengal, where China today borders on the English colonies (*Staaten*), to the mountain slopes that extend, as plains of the Oxus [Amu Darya] River, to the [Aral] Sea. On its other side the empire runs up to Siberia, to | the Kalmucks of the Volga. The Russians had 132
pushed as far [east] as the Amur River, but had been supplanted by the Chinese in 1770. This is the extent of the Chinese empire.

A major part of the history is the personal history of the emperors, their directives, bureaucracies, and palace intrigues involving the emperors' wives and sons. The eunuchs especially carried on these intrigues, but today they no longer exercise power. There are still eunuchs at court today, but they are no longer, as before, in offices where they had many opportunities for stirring up conflict.[42] So the history is a history of emperors and their households. These are the chief elements in Chinese history.

Characteristics of the Chinese State

Our more particular concern is to characterize the shape [of Chinese civilization] more specifically as a shape of the state, as ethical. Upon examination, the distinctive feature of this shape is that, in one aspect it has, for the most part, the greatest similarity to European institutions—for example in ethics and the arts, such that the initial high point (*Extrem*) of the East resembles that of the West in later times. The difference lies simply in the fact that China has formed itself internally in an undisturbed process of cultivation, owing nothing to foreign peoples, whereas in the history of European states there is an ongoing linkage of traditions. The Chinese have brought everything about on their own. Chinese political institutions do not differ as much from ours as do those of states in between, such as India and Turkey. So a European in China is on the one hand more at home, on the other hand

42. Only the 3rd edn. of Grosier, *De la Chine*, links the eunuchs with palace power struggles (v. 220). Cf. *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 21; *Mémoires*, ii. 412 and vi. 319–20; *Histoire générale*, xi. 36; the German edn. of the account by George Staunton (on which, see the Bibliography), ii. 140–1.

more alien, than elsewhere. Thus China, along with its greater similarity, is extremely different.[43]

The principle of the Chinese state rests wholly on patriarchal relationships; they determine everything. This is what is most elementary and, as the life of a great people, it inherently involves maintaining, in this vast empire, a formation that makes orderly provision for the innumerable multitudes.
133 The | organization of the state is cultivated such that the family relationship is the foundation. It can be more precisely characterized as a moral foundation. The basic element of this shape is that it is a patriarchal relationship, a family relationship.[44]

[1.] No duty is so strictly commanded as that of children to elders. Children have no possessions of their own, are perpetual minors, must serve their elders, care for them, be deferential to them, and must mourn them for three years and during this period may not hold any office, marry, or attend public gatherings.[45] Even the emperor may not rule or marry during the period of mourning. The mother is honored as well as the father. Upon the death of his father, the emperor must thereafter visit his mother every fifth day, and in doing so he is not even allowed to ride beyond his palace gate; for the carriage must remain in the outer courtyard and the emperor must make his way through snow and rain to the mother's residence. Thus the former emperor, Kien-long [Qianlong], received his mother's permission only at age 67 to ride forth from the gate. This fact was made known to the entire realm. When someone is summoned to be emperor, he cannot receive homage until he himself has acknowledged his mother as the dowager empress. He receives his mother's advice on all matters of clemency.[46] The parental relationship was held in this high

43. On this point, and others yet to come in this presentation, there is an intellectual affinity between Hegel and Johann Gottfried Herder. In his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, 4 vols. (Riga and Leipzig, 1784–91), Herder cites many admirable features of Chinese ethical life and culture (pp. 7–9), and summarizes accordingly: 'It is as if the whole empire is a household of virtuous, well-brought-up, diligent, ethical, happy children and brothers.' Hegel shares Herder's efforts to play down the favorable portrayal of Chinese political institutions by the missionaries, and his call for a happy medium between excessive praise and criticism of the Chinese. The two agree that the mechanical way that ethics is taught restricts the spirit's free development, and that China lacks 'free spontaneity on the part of spirit'.

44. The terminology of patriarchy, of 'filial piety', occurs in *Mémoires*, v. 32 (cf. iv. 1–28 and xi. 547). See also: Grosier, v. 90; *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 319; Voltaire, *Essai*, 263.

45. Various of these duties and restrictions are mentioned in *Mémoires*, iv. 11, 13–15, 160, 162, and v. 50; Grosier, v. 448–9. See also n. 49 below.

46. This information about the emperor's obligations to his mother comes from Grosier (v. 104–5) who, however, gives the age of Qianlong in the story as 63. The *Mémoires* concur

regard. Parents arrange the marriages of their children.[47] In China polygamy is not allowed, just one wife. The husband, however, can own several concubines who are servants to the true wife. Their children were viewed as legitimate children of the legitimate wife. These children too must mourn the legitimate wife, not their own mother.[48] The father is responsible for the misbehavior of the children. The harshest punishments are decreed for wrongs committed by family members against one another or for those of children against the parents. If a son speaks disparagingly of his elders he is | strangled, and the same applies if he raises his hand against them. If he 134
injures them he is grabbed with pincers and torn to pieces. Younger brothers are subject to older brothers in the same way. If they justly accuse of wrongdoing some person who outranks them, then they themselves are unjustly exiled or beheaded.[49]

In Chinese families it is important above all for the head of the family to have children. If he has none from his lawful wife, he takes a concubine or even adopts children of outsiders. The father alone has possessions; the children have none.[50] The father has the legal right to sell the children as slaves. Doing so, however, is tolerated to some degree only among the lower classes. The son as well has the right to sell himself. Actors are a disreputable group, so sale of their children is forbidden.[51] A father has the greatest interest in having children to arrange for his burial after his death, to honor and adorn the gravesite. The relatives mourn for months at the graves of distinguished persons. Often a son keeps his father's remains in the house for three or four years and lives in strictest mourning for that length of time.

with Grosier's version of the episode, while describing it more fully (iv. 142–3). Perhaps Grosier is drawing upon the *Mémoires*, or perhaps both are utilizing a common source (possibly du Halde, although the *Allgemeine Historie* does not recount the episode; see above, n. 2).

47. On arranged marriage, see Grosier, v. 272; cf. *Mémoires*, iv. 14–15; and *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 157.

48. On concubines and the status of their children, see Grosier, v. 42. The *Allgemeine Historie* has a similar account (vi. 159), while that in the *Mémoires* (vi. 311 and ix. 377) is rather different.

49. This description of family responsibilities and of punishments for infractions combines statements from Grosier (v. 48 and 61) with ones from the *Mémoires* (iv. 161–2). That this punishment is 'unjust' is evidently the opinion of Hegel, not that of the Chinese themselves.

50. Grosier is the source for these statements about adoption (v. 48) and about the father as sole owner of property (v. 50). He also says (v. 227–8) that taking a concubine is allowed in order to obtain a male offspring; cf. *Mémoires*, iv. 136 and ix. 377.

51. The term in our text for 'actors' (*Komödianten*) directly reflects the French *Comédiens* of *Mémoires*, iv. 159–60, a passage that names various disreputable groups among the poorer classes for whom sale of one's offspring is a punishable offence. The account is similar in Grosier, v. 49–50. To 'actors' Griesheim adds 'illusionists' (*Gaukler*).

For example, during this time he sits on no chair, but only on a footstool. Just as important as the burial is the upkeep of the gravesite and the annual visit to it. This demonstrates one's respect, sorrow, and gratitude.[52]

In addition to maintaining and adorning the grave there is a third major obligation, to honor one's ancestors. For that purpose each family has a hall of its forebears in a large structure ringed with benches on which stand small plaques bearing the names of the deceased, or pictures if they were distin-
135 guished persons. In spring and autumn entire families assemble, often | six to seven thousand individuals, with the eldest in the forefront. Age takes precedence and the wealthiest one provides the hospitality.[53] If the emperor wishes to honor someone, as the mark of honor for the living person he bestows a title on that person's forebears.[54] A grave is so highly honored that a mandarin who became a Christian and then no longer held the grave in honor was attacked by his own family.

[2.] The second topic for our consideration is the emperor and his power. [a.] He has the status of father, of patriarch, and holds unlimited power. The empire is no theocracy like that of the Turks, where the Qur'an is the book of divine and human law. It is also unlike the Hebrews or Jews, whose sovereign only expresses the will of God. Chinese governance is not that sort of theocracy. Likewise it is no feudal state having, for instance, an inherent order of ranks or in which the countrymen are subject to the owner of the land and soil. In China there is no such aristocracy in virtue of birth any more than one based on wealth, nor one based on commerce (*Handelszustand*) as in England. There are no relationships of those kinds, for the emperor alone wields every controlling, highest, and all-pervasive power.[55] There are laws according to which he rules, but these are no laws that conflict with the will of the monarch, but instead the kind of laws by which all things are maintained in accord with his will. The government has a wholly paternal outlook. The emperor is accountable, has all matters reported to him, and sharpens or softens judgments by giving an account of

52. These burial and mourning practices are recounted in *Mémoires*, vi. 325–6 and Grosier, v. 443 and 448–9. Hegel comes close to adopting Grosier's very words (in v. 449). The account in the *Allgemeine Historie* (vi. 164–74), based on du Halde, is different.

53. Grosier (v. 458–9) describes in detail the hall of the ancestors and the rites that occur there. See also *Mémoires*, v. 30–1.

54. Grosier (v. 99) says the bestowal of titles on people's ancestors is one of the most powerful means the emperor can employ to uphold the practice of filial piety.

55. Various of these remarks on the general nature of the Chinese approach to government come from: Grosier, v. 10; *Mémoires*, v. 32; *Histoire générale*, ii. 446, iv. 302, 312–13, 324, 5.2[7] and 42, and vol. xii. See also n. 43 above.

his own reasoning. He frequently makes very wide-ranging declarations about his actions to | his people, ones that are published in the court 136
newspaper of Beijing. The previous emperor was entreated to name a successor. He made this matter widely known. So he always explained the reasons for his actions, with wisdom, gentleness, understanding, and consideration. When the last English ambassador came to Beijing and was soon sent away, the emperor issued a declaration about the matter. These declarations are constructed most carefully, in the best style. They are stylistic masterpieces.[56] So the emperor counts as the most learned man of the empire.

[b.] The second [point under this heading] is the fact that the emperor of necessity must have officers of government, for he cannot govern by himself. These officials are of two kinds, both called mandarins, and they number some 15,000 scholars and 20,000 military personnel. One must study extensively to become a mandarin scholar. The scholarly mandarin has risen three levels by passing three difficult examinations. The foremost of them have a place in the royal palace, and the one who has proven himself to be first among them receives a robe of honor and entry to the palace [area] where only the emperor sets foot; he is honored, and given gifts by the emperor. The higher official posts are filled by these mandarins, of which there are eight levels. The empire is administered by these officials. The administration is highly organized; everything is subject to the emperor's review; reports always proceed from below up through all the levels, and they are presented to him for his approval. The officials are honored by the people as is the emperor, and they have the right to make written or oral representations to him.[57] In each governing body there is a mandarin as censor, who does not participate or speak but who is present at all meetings, who says and imparts nothing to the meeting but all to the emperor, and who brings complaints to him. Such a | censor is greatly revered and feared, and cannot be removed. 137
These are called Ko-laos [Kelaos]. They in concert constitute in turn a tribunal and can present their views about all matters to the emperor. There are stories about the great energy expended in fulfilling their duty. This fulfillment alone is their guiding principle. There are instances given in which such Kelaos presented views even at the risk of their own lives.

56. Grosier (v. 226) mentions this function of the court newspaper. The *Mémoires* cite the issue of 26 Nov. 1778, as discussing the matter of a successor to the throne (xi. 502–8 and xv. 297–315). On the English ambassador matter, see below, n. 82.

57. These numbers of mandarins are in Grosier (v. 10, 17, 127). Other figures are given in *Mémoires* (v. 34–5), *Allgemeine Historie* (vi. 435 ff.), and Sonnerat (ii. 37). The honor in which they are held is mentioned in Staunton (ii. 62), *Mémoires* (iv. 133, vi. 282–3), and Grosier (v. 14).

Notwithstanding the consequences, they often, by their views, made themselves objects of the emperor's great displeasure. In doing so they entered the palace to reiterate their views, while bearing their own coffins. Others who incurred the emperor's wrath and were torn to pieces have nonetheless written on the earth with their own blood what they sought to say to the emperor.[58]

Also noteworthy is the fact that every five years each mandarin must submit a written confession of the errors of which he knows himself guilty and for which he will then be punished.[59] A mandarin may not exercise authority in the province where his family lives.[60] Likewise he may not acquire property where he holds office. The punishment is demotion and results in reduction in title. In office, the mandarin is responsible for all that takes place. He does not escape responsibility for anything, as if no blame at all could rest on him. Lapses of responsibility incur the harshest punishment. The most trifling matter can lead to the greatest punishment. The mandarin has a sword hanging over his head. Often they are demoted and must mention this with every subsequent decree [they issue].[61] The emperor rules over all things. Everything in the whole empire is organized to the highest degree. The lower level officials need not be mandarins, but instead are the local patresfamilias.

The strictest police are in the cities.[62] Throughout the empire there are
138 granaries | situated under the strictest supervision and always only one hour [of travel] apart. The granaries are opened when the harvest is poor in a province.[63] In Chinese travel narratives it is striking that infanticide is very common, in particular by exposure. In Beijing, however, every morning carts pass around to collect abandoned children and bring them to foundling

58. Hegel bases this account of mandarins as censors upon Grosier (v. 34 ff.), from a passage first added in the 3rd edn. of *De la Chine*, and then included in *Mémoires*, viii. 242–3. The version in *Mémoires* has fewer similarities to Hegel's presentation (cf. also iv. 164 ff.). The *Mémoires* does not use the term 'Kolaos' where Hegel does, but instead speaks of 'ministers of the state' (v. 35). It says this tribunal examines the recommendations of that other tribunal (of censors) and in turn passes them on to the emperor; the account in the *Allgemeine Historie* (vi. 419, 436–7) is similar on this point. According to Grosier's fuller account (v. 38), the hierarchy includes 'mandarins' (the general title for officials), with the censors ('Cotaos') as a group subordinate to the most highly qualified, scholarly mandarins, who are the Kelaos.

59. See Grosier (v. 233), where the time interval is said to be every three years (in agreement with *Mémoires*, iv. 132 and v. 419). There is no explanation for the discrepancy.

60. See *Mémoires*, iv. 313 for this restriction; cf. *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 444.

61. On the responsibility of a mandarin (even for the actions of his subordinates), and his vulnerability, see *Mémoires*, iv. 328 and 166. Grosier (v. 232) reports that a demoted mandarin must declare that fact on his subsequent decrees.

62. On the police, see: Grosier, v. 107–12; *Mémoires*, v. 37 and viii. 218–19; *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 452–3.

63. On these provisions for famine, see: *Mémoires*, viii. 218; Grosier, v. 211; *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 216; Ritter, *Erdkunde*, i. 259; Staunton, ii. 58.

hospitals where they are very well cared for and conscientiously raised. The dead among children so discovered are cremated. The closest supervision governs all these matters. A Chinese must be very impoverished to abandon a child, since he loves his children so dearly.[64] This, then, is the feature of the administration.

[3.] As for the rights of citizens, it is noteworthy that there are no castes and no birthrights other than that regarding inheritance of property. Whoever seeks admission to the class of mandarins must distinguish himself by his aptitude. The foremost mandarins alone have the right to insist that their sons occupy a post. But these are very minor posts. So there is no class of officials to which only certain families belong. Thus there is no preference based on birth. The institution of private property was introduced in China. So there is private property and definite legal right with operative laws concerning it. Laws and courts are of course in place for its protection.[65] In the history of right, landed property undergoes the same sequence as in Europe. In the most ancient dynasties landed property was not private property but instead the state's public property, which it apportioned to the patresfamilias for annual tithes or some other share of its production.[66] This arrangement lasted for three dynasties. Under the last dynasty six hundred to nine hundred acres provided for ten patresfamilias.[67] History says that was the arrangement for two millennia. Later on, under Shi Huangdi | (238 or 221–210 BC), who built the Great Wall of China and 139
had books burned, the powerful landowners and the people became serfs. For that reason his regime was detested. His subjects were compelled to construct the wall.[68] Free landed property had been introduced only at a very late date. Today, however, there is free private property and landed property. A third factor pertaining to rights of citizens is that slavery is still

64. Hegel is not drawing directly upon travelers' accounts. The *Mémoires* and Grosier both review pertinent reports, those of Cornelius de Pauw, 1773, and John Barrow, 1805; see *Mémoires*, ii. 365 ff., vi. 320 and 323–4, as well as Grosier, v. 75–81. See also the favorable judgments of Sonnerat (ii. 19) and Staunton (ii. 64) on Chinese practices.

65. On rights and laws, see: Grosier, v. 239; *Mémoires*, iv. 127 and 312–13; *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 414.

66. On the tribute or tithe, see *Mémoires*, vii. 65.

67. The German reads: 'hatten 1000 Morgen zehn Familienväter'. A *Morgen* is a variable land measure of six-tenths to nine-tenths of an acre. The term 'morning' comes from the idea of how much land a team could plow in a morning.

68. On this forced labor, see *Mémoires*, iv. 35–6. The *Histoire générale* reports on the reign (246–210 BC) of Tsin-chi-hoang-ti (Qinshi Huangdi) of the Tsin dynasty (pp. 369–405), including construction of the wall (373) and the book-burning (401); cf. Ritter, *Erdkunde*, i. 528; and Staunton, ii. 75 ff. See also above, n. 40.

practiced. Anyone can sell himself as a slave, and a father can even sell a son. Also, the courts have committed into slavery the women, children, and concubines of criminals, especially in cases of high treason. Women, however, commit suicide [rather than live as slaves].[69]

It remains for us to fathom and evaluate the principle of the state. The whole rests upon the person of a monarch, on his officials, whose activity derives from him, and on oversight of these officials, ranging from top to bottom. This hierarchy (subordination) of officials from bottom to top constitutes a cohesiveness, and its main feature is that the reins are tightly held. Every inferior is overseen by his superior. What matters, then, is the moral personality of the superior; for there are no spheres at all that, acting independently on their own, take care of their own domain as do social classes and the like [elsewhere]; rather, everything derives solely from the emperor. At the apex is an individual person with unlimited power. What matters is the moral condition of the emperor. In the long series of these emperors, over four to five millennia, China has had a great number of virtuous, excellent rulers. The sterling qualities of the Oriental emerge in
140 the form of moral excellence and propriety.[70] |

The image of Solomonic wisdom and governance is a familiar one. Quite recently people set forth a portrait of the ideal ruler, as in Fénelon's *Télémaque*,[71] and said that the well-being of the people depends on this individual personality. If they wanted to cite examples, they could have taken them from Chinese history, above all from the princes of the Manchu dynasty. Especially distinguished are the emperors Kangxi and Qianlong; Macartney himself was received by the latter.[72] We find them uniting a simple way of life with the highest scientific culture. They reviewed the operations of the

69. The *Mémoires* too link slavery in China with Shi Huangdi (xv. 142–3); see also ii. 410–11, and vii. 37, on judicial commitments into slavery. Grosier (v. 73–4) remarks on female suicide.

70. On the emperor as father-figure for the empire, see *Mémoires*, v. 32–3, and xi. 547. See also above, n. 43, and, on the time span, n. 5.

71. Hegel takes the reference to Fenelon's *Télémaque* from the *Mémoires*, which mentions it in connection with the topic of slavery (ii. 410) in a passage cited just above in n. 69, and so he brings it into his own discussion as well. The volume by Fénelon (see the Bibliography), concerns the ancient Greek character Telemachus from the *Odyssey* of Homer.

72. Lord George Macartney led an English legation to China, in 1793–4. For his reception by emperor Qianlong, see Staunton (who is himself Lord Macartney), ii. 94–122. Other participants wrote about China and their published accounts were widely known. The *Bibliotheca Sinica* by Henri Cordier, 5 books in 3 vols. (2nd edn.; Paris, 1904–6) includes entries on George Leonard Staunton, Aeneas Anderson, Samuel Holmes, John Borrow, J. C. Hüttner, and W. Alexander. In Hegel's day all these accounts were available in several edns. and in German trs. (see Cordier, cols. 2381–2393). There is no clear evidence that Hegel used one of

government themselves and, over the lengthy duration of their government, they were indefatigable and had a thoroughgoing sense of justice and benevolence.[73] [The ideal rulers are portrayed as] moral, plastic shapes that are all of a piece like the artworks of the ancients, in the way that we represent to ourselves the ideals of the ancients; they are figures who express in their every feature a unity or harmony of character, dignity, circumspection, and beauty. This plasticity or simple unity is not so suited to European culture, which is more diverse; our particular features have their own multifaceted aspects and satisfactions. Princes and other persons have pastimes and pleasures outside the sphere of their occupations, in their roles as private persons. In plasticity, on the contrary, the idea pervades all the features and aspects of life.

It is not a given that an emperor's personality be so constituted. Thus the educating of royal princes is very much directed to inculcating this morality into their character, for all depends upon it. Their mode of life is in one respect strictly regulated, while in another respect it involves being treated with pronounced deference; but it is not a given that they will become moral in character. | If this effort miscarries and vigilance is not exercised from 141
the center, if the emperor does not watch over the state, then the whole comes apart, for there is no lawful power, no explicitly formed conscience of the officials; for what ought to be law is something determined from the top down. So the laws depend more or less on the individual personality of the emperor.[74] And this loosening of the reins can readily occur even without the throne being occupied by a tyrant who has unruly desires (as indeed French tragedies portray tyrants). There only need be a certain indolence, a faith or confidence of the monarch in his associates, ministers or courtiers, or in his spouse or mother, in those who are perhaps highly unworthy of it, and so the slackening sets in. And such confidence is quite possible in tandem with a moral education. It is even insisted on morally. In that case this moral virtue is not linked to energy of character that sticks only to itself, disavows all confidence in others and keeps an eye on those close to it. In this way private, personal interests range freely. When the monarch has favorites so dear to him that he places his trust in them, and these favorites have private interests

these edns. The same is the case for reports arising from the Amherst legation of 1816 (on which, see below, n. 82).

73. Others generally share Hegel's favorable opinion of the Manchu emperors. The *Memoires*, for instance, is full of praise for them.

74. The proper education of emperors is referred to in *Mémoires*, iv. 67, 81; and in *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 413.

that gain force and exert influence on the government, then, owing to mutual
142 jealousy, these favorites descend further into private interests. | So then the empire, under entirely noble sovereigns, falls or transforms into a condition of injustice, of arbitrariness, of bureaucratic domination. We find this most often in the Orient, with the result that, under the government of well-intentioned, noble sovereigns, corruption pervades all classes and consequently there is revolution. For the whole only stands firm in virtue of the monarch's strict vigilance. The destruction of the Ming dynasty apparently fits this description; it was overthrown by the Manchus, only to be torn apart. In particular the last Ming emperor was said to be hostile to adulation, devoted to the sciences, patron of Christians, and so forth. But when, through no fault of his own, uprisings and revolts broke out in response to pressure from the mandarins under him, he did not take charge energetically but instead sought the advice of his ministers and took his own life. His character exhibited greatness and complete moral beauty.[75] On the whole there are in general scarcely any limiting factors when the character of an emperor has brought the empire to ruin. An easy slide into moral slackness can engulf everything.

The Moral Sphere, Subjective Freedom, and their Violation

The drawback of the patriarchal principle lies, on the whole, in reliance on the personality of the emperor. Its distinctive feature is that there is no separation of the legal aspect from the moral aspect. A rational political institution must have produced and must uphold both aspects, each for its own sake, each according to its own necessary position. The characteristic
143 Oriental feature, however, | consists precisely in the fact that these two principles are still in immediate unity, which is the case in the ethical sphere and in the condition of a state where the ethical sphere still rules. So the entire state rests on ethical custom. In any event custom rules, and the laws are in part insufficient, or else they base themselves on custom.[76] As soon as the element of reflection comes into play the legal aspect splits off from custom, and the latter in part passes over into the moral realm. Then the political institution rests upon legal right, and this is given expression by the laws. The ethical sphere is in fact the province of the individual, just as

75. The *Histoire générale* (x. 491–2) recounts the words of the last Ming emperor, Hoai-Tsong, to his ministers, prior to his suicide in 1644.

76. According to *Mémoires*, v. 26 and viii. 236, the political system, and a wide range of social practices, are based on custom or tradition.

are the moral and the religious spheres. But the ethical sphere too must be the object of law, although not directly but instead indirectly as the object of fulfillment and practice. It ought to be upheld, but in its own characteristic way. Laws, in contrast, deal with what is right as the concrete existence of free volition, albeit not within itself, whereas the moral sphere is the concrete existence of free volition indeed within itself: morality determines itself internally according to intentions, purposes, plans, and points of view. The legal sphere is the external concrete existence of free volition; will gives to itself its existence in an external sphere. Will gives itself material expression; a person is only free as a possessor of property. Property is external matter. So it is not permissible for a person to be a slave. Legal obligations toward other private individuals, the laws of the state with respect to private rights, concern external circumstances and the kind of issues and behaviors that can indeed be based on sentiment but also arise apart from it. | Morality, 144
however, is quite a different domain. Laws can compel because they apply to an individual's external being. Morality, on the contrary, is the domain of inwardness, the area of my own insight, my own self-determination commensurate with my aims, intentions, and so forth. This inner domain can take the form of respect, reverence, or affection. This internal disposition of the individual, this inwardness, cannot be commanded, cannot be made the direct object of laws. Civil or political legislation pertains to external existence. But the moral domain has its own expression too. It is a source of the action or conduct of persons with reference to the state and to individuals. These expressions have matters of legality as their content. The other aspect, however, is that there are also expressions that arise solely from moral sentiments, such as signs of respect or affections among relatives or between married couples. There is indeed a point at which legality plays a part; yet that point is difficult to specify, inasmuch as legality is not allowed to intrude into matters pertaining to the individual as such. Legality may not intrude into matters of sentiment. If some moral point is commanded, the laws doing so can have an excellent resonance, can be in Solomonic language, although this in turn opens the door to a despotism that is all the greater in proportion to how excellent the law sounds.

In the Chinese state what is ethical is made to be the law. What has value only as a sentiment is supposed to have the force of law, as its object. What by nature is moral, namely what belongs to inward self-determination,[77] is thus commanded by law. It is commanded by those who hold the reins of

77. Griesheim reads: 'What is to be left completely to the free spirit . . .'

145 government. In introducing the laws of families, we saw several examples | of this. An endless number of civil laws bear upon the conduct of citizens *vis-à-vis* one another and their superiors, the officers of the emperor. One of the ancient *Jing*, the *Li-jing*, contains only customs, which are very comprehensively stipulated, and the neglect of which incurs very strict punishments, and [by following them] life runs smoothly.[78] So what concerns outward decorum is thus necessary and is commanded, although as a system of legal ordinances it loses its essential meaning. Thus the fundamental characteristic of Chinese political institutions is that the moral domain is posited as strict legality. A government of the kind that issues such legislation takes the place of my own inner being, and by doing so the principle of subjective freedom is annulled or goes unacknowledged.

And this principle of subjective freedom is what is foremost, is what is above all understood as freedom. This subjective freedom, the intangible sphere of inwardness, is a characteristic proper especially to the European principle. Thus all that is fine and true proceeds from this formal source. So, when governments make the moral domain into their principle, this characteristic in the subject goes unacknowledged; it is no longer present as what is proper to the particular subject. Morality seems indeed to be the principle of the whole state; but linked to it is the failure to acknowledge the morality that must be in the inwardness of the subject. Accordingly this system lacks the free soul, the source from which arise free, self-supporting ethical life, free science, free religion. Nothing is
146 allowed to emerge that is the subject's own creation. | For that would be a second enterprise in opposition to that of the government. The government has made itself the master of morals, has seized control of inwardness. So the ideal enterprise of freedom cannot flourish. What is inwardly free, what has its concrete existence in the subject, is permitted no entree into the laws.

In the shape in which we represent it, subjective freedom is ordinarily considered to reside in our demand that this inwardness ought to be respected in human beings. By making this demand as such we stand on this principle, and it expresses itself chiefly in the form of respect. Respect fundamentally involves an inviolable zone that ought to exist for me. I have subjected myself to this zone by my own volition; I exist in it through my own volition. What I am through my own volition belongs to me and is inviolable. It is an infinite harm for me if someone infringes on this sphere. I have my own existence in what I have decided for myself. Respect presupposes such a being-for-self, and its inviolability; and it is its formal aspect. This being-for-itself is not respected

78. The *Mémoires* says this about the *Li-jing* (vii. 193–4), as also does Grosier (iv. 350–1). Some of these elements fall under the heading of what Hegel regards as 'sentiments'.

among the Chinese, since there I am subject to moral governance; for that reason there is no room for respect in this case, nor for what this inner freedom produces. These are the abstract characteristics [of the Chinese principle]. It remains for us to consider this abstract principle in its concrete features, albeit not in all of its detail.

[1.] The first thing to mention has already been brought up, the fact that in China there is slavery. People can sell themselves, and parents can sell their children. In addition, being sold into slavery | becomes a punishment. 147
The Manchu-Tatars regarded everyone as slaves of the emperor.[79] So here there is no acknowledgment of the primary respect a human being has, that of being a free person, this abstract inwardness.

[2.] The second point concerns punishment as such. When a crime is committed the entire family—wife, children, parents, brothers, friends—undergo the punishments. This is wholly contrary to the recognition of moral freedom, to imputation of wrongdoing, to moral autonomy as such. For the Chinese this punishment in which, for instance, all the children are put to death, is all the more horrible because the family relationship is supreme and owing to the punishment the family's ancestors will no longer be honored now, because there are no survivors capable of honoring and avenging the deceased.[80] The punishments include confiscation of goods regarded as questionable, as stolen, as unlawful, and this has the effect of punishment because someone whose goods are confiscated is viewed henceforth as a slave since the whole of his property is taken from him. A further punishment is flogging, to which even the highest mandarin is subject. Such flogging is incompatible with our sense of respect. Any mandarin can have any citizen flogged. It is not as a rule done sparingly with a cane.[81] When the last legation from England departed after visiting the supreme mandarin, the householder used a whip to clear a path for all the imperial dignitaries.[82]

79. On slavery as punishment, and on all as slaves of the emperor, see *Mémoires*, ii. 410 and vii. 16.

80. The *Mémoires* mentions the punishment of family members (vii. 37), although none of Hegel's possible sources state explicitly that the children of criminals would be put to death. These penal practices are regarded as deterring potential criminals from carrying out their intended acts, for no one would be left who is capable of honoring and avenging them (on which, see *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 486–97).

81. On corporal punishment, see *Mémoires*, iv. 157 ff. On all mandarins as authorized to inflict punishment, see Grosier, v. 58, and Sonnerat, ii. 17–18.

82. The legation to China in 1816 was led by William Pitt Amherst. Many reports appeared about it, prior to 1822, including ones in German translation. Cordier's *Bibliotheca Sinica* (ii, cols. 2393–6) includes those of Henry Ellis, Clark Abel, Robert Morrison, and J. F. Davis. It

Corporal punishment can in one sense be considered something utterly
148 insignificant, | since the human being is only injured in his lesser aspect, merely outwardly, in mere mortal existence. But corporal punishment is the most humiliating for the very reason that a human being so afflicted is supposed to be coerced with regard to his inner being. This presupposes the absolute connection between inner and outer aspects, for human beings know themselves as morally independent of this connection. Hence the humiliation is greater. An assault on such a subordinate aspect of a person serves to label it as one's highest aspect, an aspect that is supposed to coerce one's inner aspect. The educated or cultivated person has more important aspects, and views a subordinate aspect of that kind as of no importance whatsoever. To the educated person the punishment that is as a rule most extreme expresses the nullity of his will before the law. So punishment that is not corporal acknowledges the educated person as a moral, inward being, as the kind who acknowledges the law as what is supreme. The latter punishments are for this reason more creditable, since the one punished is respected as a moral being. The greater the cultivation, the greater the sensitivity to corporal punishment. So a mandarin who acknowledges the laws and holds them in honor is degraded by corporal punishment, since it robs him of moral standing.[83]

[3] A further point is that the administration itself relies upon oversight by the higher officials, of which the emperor is the highest. Every superior always has in turn the highest, uncircumscribed authority within his own sphere. The emperor's oversight can be exercised only by his also entrusting such power to the various governors. Each mandarin is the chief justice in
149 his city. A viceroy can pronounce a death sentence.[84] | In that way officials are given broad jurisdiction, which depends upon their morality, and as soon as oversight is relaxed, oppression and arbitrariness increase greatly. In that way the inner feeling of moral dignity is lost. Citizens have no recourse against the mandarins, have no inherent moral consciousness of their own.

cannot be proved that Hegel utilized one of these reports; he could have gotten his information as well from newspapers or from discussions. See also above, nn. 2 and 72.

83. Herder (*Ideen*, 15) points to the link between corporal punishment and, for mandarins especially, the resulting loss or lack of respect. On Herder, see above, n. 43.

84. Grosier states (v. 231) that a viceroy can pronounce a death sentence, but the execution must await ratification by the monarch.

Ethical Customs

The next point concerns the ethical customs of the Chinese people. The customs too of this people have the inherent character of not arising from their own inwardness.

The Chinese were governed as an underage people; so their ethics too has the character of dependency. The Chinese are pleasant and mild-mannered, extremely courteous and ceremonious. Everything involves its own specific etiquette. They become regulated in the most exacting way by precepts, even in more or less insignificant matters.[85] So in China the human being has an external existence, not an internal one. A Chinese person is externally moved above all by vengeance for an injury, especially one done to his father, or to an elder brother. He takes the injury to be something absolute, and has no internal restraint regarding it. The entirety of his individual personality reacts against this injury. He is extremely vengeful and reacts quite vehemently because he feels himself powerless in face of the injury. The same is evident in other Asian peoples. It is evident, for instance, in the killing of oneself in order to cast blame on others by the act, as was formerly done in our culture by soldiers. Among the Chinese it is common for someone hostile to another to kill himself, in this way precipitating a thorough investigation of the matter and leading to the torture of the other person, for torture is practiced in China. The | other person will 150
be executed himself, as being to blame for the death of another person. For blame is so widely spread that, in the case of death, I need only have been its cause even without willing it, in order to be executed myself.

Individual responsibility (*Imputation*) for crime is not a consideration in China. The suicide who wishes to revenge himself on another will plunge that person's entire family into ruin; so he takes his own life because by doing that he plunges into ruin the other as well as the other's family too. What the Chinese person gains from such a revenge is that a penalty cannot be imposed on him and his family together, nor can there be confiscation of his goods.[86] The Chinese thus continue this vengefulness right up to the present day. The people of Ceylon [Sri Lanka] do the same, revenging themselves in this way [by suicide] while bathing. In addition, the Chinese are extremely cunning, thievish, and deceitful, like the Indians. (They have great flexibility of their limbs, are supple in body and versatile in sleight-of-hand tricks and artifices.)

85. Grosier remarks (v. 462) on the affability and scrupulosity of the Chinese; cf. *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 139–56.

86. Grosier (v. 464) says the Chinese are vindictive, and he describes in detail (v. 73–5) how one's enemy and his family are destroyed in this way. See similar statements in *Mémoires*, iv. 289–90, 439, and vii. 37.

They are especially deceitful toward the Europeans because they [the Chinese] lack inner integrity.[87]

The Sciences

The next point concerns the sciences, art, and religion.

Lack of proper inwardness extends also to the sciences. There is no free, liberal science. When the topic is Chinese sciences, we hear of their great reputation. They are highly valued and honored in China.

[1.] In ancient times the Chinese were very famous for their science and were actually held in high regard. The emperor stood at the apex of the sciences; he was most fastidiously educated and, especially during the Manchu dynasty, he was also actually taught and instructed in science. The emperor is held to be the
151 final judge of scientific | value. In the court newspaper the emperor criticizes erroneous expressions in the decrees of the mandarins and often composes his own editorials, essays, and poems.[88] There is even a high tribunal at court, composed of the most learned men, which has no other business than the development of science and, above all, of history. The emperor himself selects the members of the tribunal, Han-Line, based on strict examinations. They have a suitably scientific life, laboring in particular on general works under the emperor's supervision, and he writes the prefaces for most of them himself. From these men the emperor chooses his secretaries, who provide his brush strokes [i.e. are his stenographers]; from them the highest state officials are appointed. The compilation of great works and new editions there are handled by the state. In his last years [from 1772 on] the previous emperor saw to a new edition of the collected literature, consisting of 168,000 volumes. It was decreed that the edition should be error-free in its entirety. One volume of this sort does not contain as much material as our books do. The accounts in the state newspaper declared how many printing errors particular mandarins left uncorrected, and how many lashes had been the punishment of each for doing so.[89]

87. This passage shows that Hegel is not adopting without exception the positive judgments of the *Mémoires* about the Chinese, for this otherwise so important source for him says nothing about deceitfulness or thievery. Grosier indicates these complaints in saying (v. 462) that 'they take advantage of strangers and deceive them'. Older accounts (such as *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 131–2) nevertheless appear to be full of negative judgments on this issue.

88. The *Histoire générale* praises the skill of emperor Qianlong in his various published works (ix. 609–10). Ritter too praises the Manchu emperors Kanghi (Kangxi) and Qianlong as being philosophers, poets, and skilled in various branches of literature (*Erdkunde*, i. 527). See also Grosier, vi. 58–9.

89. Hegel bases this account of these imperial court bodies and their publishing activities mostly on Grosier (vi. 66–71), with additional material from the *Mémoires* (xv. 351–6) drawn from the court newspaper. See also above, n. 56. Hegel mistakenly speaks of the one behind the

So the sciences seem in one respect to be greatly esteemed, and yet the main thing is lacking, namely, the free soil (*Boden*) of inwardness, the intellect that comprises a wealth of thoughts within itself, that makes all of concrete existence the object of thought. The interest of science thus lies in its own internal satisfaction, its inner life in possessing a world of thought. This grounding (*Boden*) eludes the Chinese, who pursue the sciences but not in the free interest of science. So science and culture, | the compiling of 152
information, is in the main empirical in nature, not theoretical, not a free interest of thought as such; instead the sciences essentially stand to serve the utility and benefit of the state. The state has the sciences under its control, as means, and for that reason a purely scholarly life, or pure interest in science for its own sake, is neither encouraged nor patronized by the state. When we consider the condition of the sciences themselves, then the exalted reputation of Chinese science vanishes before our eyes.[90]

[2.] As for the written Chinese language, it is distinctively Chinese and is in many respects something admirable. There are two aspects to it. The one that concerns us is that the written language is viewed as a great obstacle to the development of the sciences; one can put the point differently by saying that because there is no science as such, the medium for it is so poor. The written language is hieroglyphic in form; it is not the expression of sounds. For us sounds are representational signs (*Zeichen der Vorstellung*), and we have in turn signs for these signs. Letters are thus signs of representational signs. The Chinese do not take this roundabout way of signifying sounds by letters and representation by sounds. The signs for letters are equally so signs for representation. That feature impressed eminent men, so they have held it to be universally desirable.

What we can say with regard to the spoken language (*Tonsprache*) of the Chinese is that it is meager and monosyllabic. Our spoken language is structured by the written language. Our spoken language involves little more than is found in the writing. That is not the case with the Chinese. Their spoken language is meager. Many words of the spoken language | 153
have twenty-five wholly different meanings. Distinction among these meanings arises from the fact that the words are accented differently, are spoken

literary collection as 'the previous emperor', for he has in mind Qianlong, who actually had two successors prior to 1822.

90. Herder says something similar about Chinese science (*Ideen*, 12); he says it lacks the 'free autonomy of spirit' (p. 21). He also parallels Hegel's remark about its subservience to the state's needs, in *Allgemeinen Betrachtungen über die Geschichte dieser Staaten* (pp. 45–8); see also *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 318–19.

slower, faster, softer or louder. The Chinese have very sensitive ears. This [aspect of the language] is therefore a major defect.[91]

The fact that the written language is the greatest obstacle to the advancement of science is one of its conspicuous features. Our written language is extremely simple. Its multiplicity of sounds is limited and specified by the small number of our written signs. Unlike ours, their written language does not limit the variety of sounds. On account of the intermediate sounds, an unstructured language does not lend itself to writing. Structured language is specific in its sounds and letters, and these are readily learned. The rest involves the combining of sounds, and nothing further about them needs to be remembered. The Chinese do not have twenty-six letters, but instead many thousands of characters (*Zeichen*). The number of them necessary for ordinary purposes is 9,351, and in the opinion of some more than 10,000; scholars need 80,000–90,000.[92] Still to be learned are the combinations of words, combinations some of which are conventional (*symbolisch*) and some are wholly arbitrary. So one must also learn the combinations themselves. Therefore not much is gained from the fact that many characters are only juxtapositions. People have declared the utility of hieroglyphics to reside for us in the fact that many peoples can learn and understand the same characters without understanding one another's spoken language. This advantage is of no avail to the Chinese, because from time immemorial they
154 have kept to themselves.[93] |

[3.] As for the science itself, it has received much praise. The most renowned scientific man is Confucius [Kongzi]. He is for the most part a moral educator. He was a moralist as such, not actually a philosopher; for in his case we do not find theory that occupies itself in thought as such. For a few years he was a morally virtuous minister, and then he traveled about with his disciples. His teachings are expressed like the proverbs of Solomon; and yet, more than this is required for scientific knowledge. We have one of

91. For these aspects of the Chinese language, see: Grosier, vi. 5, 8–9; *Mémoires*, viii. 145–6, 202.

92. Grosier states (vi. 15–16) that knowledge of 8,000 or 9,000 suffices for one to read many books. His 3rd edn. adds, according to a letter of de Mailla to Etienne Soucet, the more specific range of 9,535 to 10,516 for ordinary usage. If Hegel is not utilizing a source unknown to us, he may be basing his numbers on Grosier, despite the minor discrepancies. In any case these exact numbers are found in Gaubil, *Le Chou-king*, 380–98, esp. 393–4. For other accounts, see: *Mémoires*, viii. 146–7; Staunton, ii. 132; Herder, *Ideen*, 11; *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 334–49. In any event, 80,000 appears as the upper limit.

93. Either Hegel is reinterpreting for his own purposes a passage from *Mémoires* (iv. 168) that is on the whole negative about the possibility of translating Chinese poetry, or else he is referring to an actual discussion in his day about the translatability of the characters. The latter alternative is supported by the way our text is expressed.

his books [the *Lün yü*] in a modern translation; according to the reviews, however, it does little to enhance his reputation. He is not to be compared to Plato, Aristotle, or Socrates. He was about the same as Solon, if we understand by this that he was the lawgiver of his people. His teachings are the foundation for moral instruction, especially that of princes.[94]

We wish to remark only briefly about the specifics of this topic [of science]. Early on the Chinese did indeed make great strides in particular sciences, although this point has often been disputed. In modern times people have become better acquainted with the condition of their science and so are in a position to evaluate it. Physics is regarded as their most developed science. They knew about magnets and the use of the compass needle before we did. They say that the magnet points to the south, and this is equally correct. They first learned about the thermometer, barometer, pneumatic pump, pendulum clock, and lever from Europeans, as well as the theories behind these too, the actual scientific theories. So it seems that they did not advance very far even in physics.[95] | 155

The Chinese have become most renowned for their astronomy. Delambre and Laplace have reported on it specifically, and credit them with a series of long-term, ancient observations by which they calculated the duration of the year rather accurately, observed a solar eclipse in 1100 BC, and also quite accurately noted the procession of the equinoxes.[96] So they are credited with

94. In Hegel's day there was good published information about the life and work of Confucius. Vol. xii of the *Mémoires* contains an account of his life (pp. 1–403), one that more recent authorities regard as accurate. Following it is a chronological table (pp. 406–30) of events in his life. According to it, he lived from 551 to 479 BC, was an official at the age of 20, and at age 30 began to attract disciples and to travel about. He is deemed 'the sage par excellence' (*Mémoires*, xii. 6; Grosier, vii. 409). The translation of the *Lün yü* referred to is by Wilhelm Schott and is contained in *The Works of Confucius*, by Joshua Marshman (see the Bibliography), publ. in 1809. Cordier refers (in *Bibliotheca Sinica*, col. 1404) to a French review of it by Jean Pierre Abel-Rémusat (in *Extrait du Moniteur*, 36 (1814)) that became widely influential. Wilhelm Lauterbach (pseud. for Heinrich Julius von Klaproth) publ. a critique of Schott's German tr. (Halle, 1826); see *Dr. Wilhelm Schott's vergebliche Übersetzung der Werke des Confuzius aus der Ursprache, eine literarische Betrügerei* (Leipzig and Paris, 1828). Possibly Hegel is reacting here to still other reviews in newspapers. It is doubtful that his reference is to other and earlier translations, by Couplet, Noël, Intorcetta, *et al.*

95. These comments about the physics of the Chinese are found in Grosier (vi. 80).

96. Hegel clearly relies on Grosier (vi. 129 ff.), who cites testimonies in the *Shu-jing* whereas Hegel just summarizes the results and does not mention that text by name. Apart from it he does cite Grosier's informant, Pierre Simon de Laplace, author of *Exposition du système du Monde*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1796), ii. 266, discussed by Grosier (vi. 131 ff.). Hegel's dependence on his sources is also evident in his adoption of connections between points found there. For instance, Grosier (pp. 133–4) mentions closely together the observation of the eclipse and the calculation of equinoxes. As his second authority Hegel mentions (but Grosier does not!) Jean Joseph

very long-term observations, but this by itself is no science. They have also made meteorological observations for over 2,000 years, although not with barometer and thermometer but by noting rain and wind.[97] Europeans can learn nothing at all from them. A proper astronomical science must not be sought from the Chinese. One reason is that its mathematical component, the calendar, has for the past two to three centuries been drawn up by European missionaries who give regular lectures there, because the Chinese are ignorant in such matters. The Chinese furnish the astronomical component. The other reason is that from ancient times the Chinese have indeed made use of tubes for observation of the stars, but employed no telescopes and pendulum clocks (which they first learned about from the Europeans). The finest European telescopes and pendulum clocks are found today in the imperial palace in Beijing, ones that the emperor has received as gifts from the English. And yet, on the astronomical towers of Beijing they do not make use of them as innovations.[98]

The other sciences are pursued in comparably empirical fashion. The circulation of fluids is the foundation in medicine. So the principal cure
156 consists in the bodily postures of | the sick. Little is to be said about mathematics in China. Their mathematics consists of geometry. It is claimed that they know the Pythagorean theorem; but there is no evidence of that, even less so the proof. The Chinese understand how to calculate very well indeed, but by using mechanical devices. Algebra, in its higher forms especially, is not found there. Their system for counting is not the decimal system like ours, but is binary; they write all numbers with one and zero, which proves how inferior the Chinese generally are in comparison with other peoples. Also noteworthy with regard to algebra is the fact that they are completely unaware, for instance, of logarithms, sine, and tangents. They do have knowledge of chemistry, but only for its immediate application. It is the same with mechanics and hydraulics, a field where they are ingenious in the

Delambre, author of *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1817); i. 347–400 discusses ancient Chinese astronomy. Even more noteworthy is that, of all the previous edns. of these lectures, none but Lasson even mentions Delambre.

97. *Mémoires*, xi. 2, introduces this topic (including mention of earthquakes, droughts, and floods), followed by detailed chronicles from individual cities that refer to such events.

98. Grosier states (v. 225) that the Chinese use the calendar for administrative purposes and for prediction of eclipses and other celestial phenomena, but rely on the European missionaries for their precise mathematical measurement and verification. Cf. *Mémoires*, ii. 369 and v. 44, and *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 291 ff. Grosier also is the source (vi. 145–6) for this account of Chinese failure to utilize these modern astronomical instruments that Europeans have made available to them. Cf. Sonnerat, ii. 23, and Staunton, ii. 239 ff. See also n. 96.

invention of simple machines, often cleverer than Europeans; that, however, is not science. In addition they are skillful in a number of things having to do, for instance, with insects and copper metalworking (*Sammlungen von Kupferblechen*).[99]

Art

In the field of fine arts the consequence of all this is that ideal art cannot flourish among the Chinese. The ideal seeks to be conceived from the inward, free spirit, not prosaically but in such a way that it directly dispenses with something bodily. The Chinese are, to be sure, skilled in the mechanical arts, but they lack the creative power of spirit, the free inwardness. They have no lack of productivity. They have beautiful landscape painting and portraits, but they never attain the brilliance that is produced in ours by means of shadows and light. They are very precise in sketching, for instance, the scales of carp. Their floral painting is well-executed in this respect. In all these ways they are extremely precise, but the ideal is extremely alien to them. Only in horticulture | do they excel. Their gardens are quite beauti- 157
ful, not rigid and formal.[100]

Religion

Finally, information with regard to religion is difficult to come by because the Europeans could only obtain it in the role of missionaries, although as missionaries their own religion was an obstacle to their doing so.[101]

99. Grosier remarks on the empirical nature of Chinese medicine and its focus on bodily fluids (vi. 190, 192). Voltaire refers to the demonstration of the Pythagorean theorem to the Chinese by a French priest (*Essai*, 262). Grosier (v. 154–7) describes their binary system and calculating machines; see also Staunton, ii. 40–1, and *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 285–312 (with illustration of an abacus, p. 237). No source refers to logarithms, etc. Grosier mentions Chinese chemistry (vi. 94), and describes their skill in mechanical arts (vi. 80–1), cf. *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 241 ff. Herder says (*Ideen*, 21–2) that some of their skills and artifacts are earlier than their European counterparts. These passages say nothing about insects or metalworking, although another Grosier passage (see n. 104) mentions the effects of a locust plague.

100. These appraisals of Chinese fine art occur in Grosier, vi. 388–90, 393; cf. *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 241, and Staunton, ii. 138. Grosier (vi. 321–68) has a very full account of Chinese horticulture; see esp. p. 346. Hegel's positive assessment of Chinese gardens reflects the changing taste of Europeans, who had formerly taken the formal French garden as exemplary, but in his day inclined more to the style of the English garden. See e.g. Ursula Aurich, 'China im Spiegel der deutschen Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts', *Germanische Studien*, 169 (Berlin, 1935), which says that Kew Gardens in London, with its Chinese pagoda and natural landscapes designed by William Chambers, became the model for all of Europe (pp. 50–1).

101. Hegel is expressing the skepticism, current in the latter part of the 18th cent., about missionary reports on China. The *Allgemeine Historie* (vi. 349) says the Jesuits' reports are

In China the state religion must first of all be distinguished from private religion. The main thing is that the state religion here is in one aspect patriarchal religion, although it has still other aspects distinguishing it from patriarchal religion. We can express this ancient, simple, patriarchal religion briefly in the following way: Human beings pray to God as the ruler of earth and heaven, who is one (*einfach*), eternal, benevolent, and just, and who rewards goodness and virtue, and punishes evil and crime. This pure, simple religion is essentially the state religion of the Chinese. It is pure and simple on account of its abstraction. This sort of view excludes the richness and profundity of nature and of spirit. Justice and benevolence are modes of activity of the absolute; but what the absolute is does not get expressed. In this patriarchal view, human beings are in the condition or abstraction in which they have not yet plumbed their own depths or the depths of nature, nor will they find the problems of nature and of spirit resolved in the divine. This simple view thus comprises the state religion of the Chinese.

[1.] They call their supreme being Thien [Tian] or heaven, and also
158 Schang-ti [Shangdi], the supreme lord.[102] The Jesuits have alleged | that Tian or Shangdi is our God, the one we too recognize as God. Other missionaries, however, declared the religion of the Chinese to be paganism and in no way Christian. A second point of controversy was that the Jesuits allowed the Chinese to honor their ancestors, whereas the other missionaries forbade it. Some have placed these ancestors on a par with the saints; others have decreed that only the saints of the Catholic Church are intercessors. The kind of reverence that the Chinese have is evident in most ancient peoples. 'Tian' literally means 'heaven', and so there was dispute as to whether it is supposed to be heaven in its natural aspect, or else what we call God.[103] This dispute occurs in the case of all ancient peoples, for

incomplete, erroneous, and in some respects untruthful, owing perhaps to their perfunctory inquiries or to a hostility to religions other than their own. See the fuller discussion of Chinese religion in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford, 2007), ii. 299–303, 547–62.

102. See Grosier, iv. 367–8, and *Mémoires*, iv. 90 (cf. v. 53 and *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 350–1).

103. Hegel treats the controversy over religious accommodation to Chinese rituals rather tersely; cf. Rudolf Merkel, *Leibniz und China* (Berlin, 1952), 20. He probably can presuppose that his auditors are informed about it, since he remarks further on in our text: 'This controversy with respect to all mythology continues right up [to] the present day.' He does not expressly mention the details, such as the controversies between Jesuits and Dominicans, or the stance taken by Leibniz and Wolff (cf. *Europa und die Kaiser von China*, 212, 243, 306–7). His sources have much fuller explanation. The *Histoire générale* (ix. 300–4) publishes an appeal (*placet*) of several Europeans resident in China, made in 1699 to the emperor, imploring him to take a position on the controversy mentioned by Hegel. The *Mémoires* contain an edict of Kangxi, making known the imperial religion in this connection (v. 54–5). It is unclear whether Hegel is

instance, with the Persians pertaining to light: Did they mean by it natural light or the light of thought? It is the same with the Egyptian Osiris: Is it the Nile, or is it a symbol of something inward? So people ask themselves if heaven, light, and Osiris are supposed to be signs of something purely spiritual and inward, or if it is the natural things themselves that these signs are supposed to signify. A third opinion holds that deceased individuals were revered under these images. This controversy with respect to all mythology continues right up to the present day. If a sharp distinction between these views is drawn, then they are opposed. It is surely correct, however, that no people can be said to have taken what is simply sensible to be the divine, since it is necessarily spirit's nature not to stop short with its natural aspect, but to proceed to something inward. All pure religions involve a metaphorical transposition (*Hinüberspielen*) from the sensible into thought. When the thought (*Gedanke*) in the object makes itself more profound, then it is something conceived (*ein Gedachtes*), something universal.

We could say a lot about the more specific implications in how the Chinese speak of their Tian. Nevertheless we only wish to recount this one episode. | In 1711, under Kangxi, the Jesuits built a church, on the pedi- 159
ment of which the reigning emperor himself had three inscriptions placed. The first reads: 'The true principle of all things'. The second is: 'It has no beginning and it will have no end; it created all things and sustains all things.' The third is: 'It is infinite, is infinitely good and infinitely just; it governs everything with supreme power.' The Chinese speak in this way about their god, similar to what we read about Jehovah in the Old Testament. Kangxi's successor issued a declaration when several mandarins wrote to the emperor about a stunted growth of plants. They told that there was no stunted growth where the likeness of an ancient general had been erected. The emperor replied that it had not been his intention to erect the image for that purpose. There is an ongoing relationship between human beings and Tian. When a misfortune occurs, people must pause and ask whether their failures, and which ones, have brought these punishments upon them. The emperor does this himself when he hears of such misfortune, by asking himself how he brought it upon his empire. If the people do what is right, then Tian will even come to their assistance; for empire and people would be overthrown or overwhelmed only if the people were to neglect what is right

drawing directly from one of these passages for, despite the agreement in contents, he is obviously summarizing in few words an already familiar discussion. For a fuller account in his own words, in 1827, see *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 548–50. See also *Mémoires*, v. 57–8.

and good. If human beings shirk their duty, then Tian changes his favorable disposition into one of chastisement.[104] These are the thoughts about the supreme being, and these views are wholly compatible with what one finds
160 in the Old Testament. |

So we can call this aspect of the religion patriarchal. Thus for the Chinese this simple, abstract being stands at the apex. Learned Chinese, whom the missionaries call atheists[105] in the state religion, take this abstract being as the primary element (*das Primitive*) of the understanding, as the innermost essence of the world with the significance one can give to fate, approximating to the laws of nature as what nature produces. Everything is supposed to have come forth from this primary element. The Chinese have in general the representation of a just sovereign over nature and human action. The corollary is that the emperor alone is called 'son of heaven', of Tian, and he alone presents the offering on behalf of his entire people. The emperor alone presents the offering; he alone carries out the act of worship. The Chinese have several festivals at which the emperor makes the offering in a public procession. The principal festivals occur at our Christmastime, at the winter solstice, and the second ones at the spring equinox, at which time the emperor tills the soil, not so as to honor this site politically but as worship. The empress for her part tends the silkworms. A third festival is at midsummer, at the summer solstice. A fourth would take place at the onset of autumn but is in any event celebrated earlier, because the emperor issues a declaration stating that he will not wait until autumn to thank heaven for its fruitfulness. So the principal festivals correlate with the four seasons of the year. In earlier times the emperor made the offerings on high mountains that are called Yo [Yue]. There are four of them, corresponding to the four cardinal directions. Later, however, the location of the festivals was transferred to the palace. Here the emperor paid homage to Shangdi. There is a grand procession. In such a festival procession there are often two thousand

104. Hegel draws upon Grosier for the accounts of the church inscriptions (iv. 387) and the likeness of the ancient general (iv. 487–8). Grosier says the first inscription is on the pediment, and each of the others is on a separate column. In Grosier the second reads (in part) 'it governs them [all things] and is their true lord'. The third reads: 'It is infinitely good and infinitely just; it illumines, it sustains, it regulates all with supreme authority and with sovereign justice.' Voltaire too mentions this inscription, based on du Halde; see *Essai*, 87; cf. *Europa und die Kaiser von China*, 139, which cites the German tr. of du Halde that has a nearly identical version of the inscriptions. In Grosier's account the malformation of plants occurred as the result of a locust plague.

105. The *Allgemeine Historie* (vi. 349–50, 387) says that, according to the missionaries, the Ju-kyau sect, which they accuse of atheism and has scholars in its membership, carries on its own form of worship as an apparent 'tidying-up' of the prevailing religion, to counter the accusations. See also *Mémoires*, v. 54.

mandarin scholars and an equal number of mandarin military. Especially large festivals are still observed at the onset of a solar or lunar eclipse, at which time the people prostrate themselves. But the mandarin scholars observe the eclipse. In all these practices that we cite there is a very precise link between religious intuition and specific features of nature.[106] | 161

[2.] A second element of this religion is that while Tian is indeed the one lord, the religion is not so exclusive (*polemisch*) that he alone is honored, for many others find a place under this One, with the result that there are many sects in China—Jews for more than a millennium as well as many Muslims.[107] The spread of Christians too is not prevented when their religion does not seem to involve incitement against the ordinances of the Chinese empire. In addition to Tian, the Chinese revere Tschen [Shen] or spirits (*Genien*), similar to Greek dryads and the like,[108] the souls of natural things, represented as distinct from the objects of which they are the essences.

It is rationally essential that the absolute not be something indeterminate but instead particularize itself, and that the particular or the determinate even be posited within the absolute and be recognized, known, and envisaged in it. Our thoughtful understanding grasps the solar system in its motion as self-determining according to laws. These laws are the soul of the solar system. So law is something universal, although only as particularity elevated to the universal. This particular is thereby linked to the One. This universal is to be known in God, in the one universal, and so we say that God has made it so. Thus we speak of this [particular] universal as posited by the one universal, but we do not yet know the former in the latter, because we grasp the one universal as power, whereas this particular universal lies outside it. | This absolute is still not comprehended as itself thus deter- 162
mined within itself. Inasmuch then as the Tian of the Chinese lacks determinacy, it thus falls outside the absolute, and this universal status to which the particular is exalted lies outside it. In this way we have, in the Old Testament, Jehovah set on one side, the Elohim on the other side.[109]

106. All of Hegel's possible sources are in substantial agreement about the ritual offerings of the Chinese. On the emperor as chief priest who alone may present the offering, see: *Mémoires*, ii. 39, xi. 535, xiii. 105, and xv. 215; *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 351.

107. Grosier (iv. 484) says Jews have been in China since the Han dynasty, which commenced in 206 BC; *Mémoires*, v. 58, concurs. See also Grosier, iv. 507, which says there are a great many more Muslims in China than there are Jews; cf. *Mémoires*, v. 68 and *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 391–407.

108. A similar comparison occurs in the *Histoire générale* (xi. 303). The *Mémoires* calls them 'wandering spirits' (xv. 219).

109. In this difficult and unusual paragraph, Hegel draws a distinction between the particular universal (instantiated in the laws governing the motions of bodies in the solar system) and the

The initial exaltation, which does not yet grasp the universal itself in its determinacy, is one of bestowing universal status on the souls of particular things,[110] as we find with the spirits of the Chinese. All things have such spirits—sun, moon, stars, time, the years and hours—each with its own Shen. The Shen love human beings and are arrayed in ranks as are the mandarins.[111] Each province and each city has its own Shen. There are superior and inferior spirits, ones beneficial to human beings and ones that are evil. The evil spirits are called Gui, and these are in conflict with the Shen.[112] Some Shen are fully occupied, others not; the latter can then transform themselves into human beings or animals. As human beings, they are immune to physical deterioration.[113] The emperor, the son of Tian, can even assign the Shen their places and instructions and offices; he does so through the court calendar. In Chinese history there are narratives, always lengthy ones, concerning a dynastic change, whereupon the emperor in fact rearranges the invisible world as well as changing all the state offices. Also appointed as Shen were the deceased who had been loyal to the state. The Shen have their temples everywhere. People turn to them in the conviction that all natural events depend on them. If a misfortune befalls a
163 province, then the Shen are | reviled and the chief mandarin can strike

one universal (the absolute, or God who establishes these laws). After excluding Tian (which does not comprehend itself) from such an absolute, Hegel then concludes with a reference to Jehovah and the Elohim of the Old Testament. So 'Jehovah' is presumably the particular universal, the one who discloses himself to Moses in the burning bush (Exod. 3), whereas 'Elohim' is a generic term for God. The paragraph suggests that a *concept* of the absolute must unite determinate or particular, and universal or absolute, elements, and that Chinese religion fails to do so.

110. Griesheim reads: 'The initial exaltation of particularity into the universal [is such] that the representation of such particularities will be given particular shapes . . .'

111. For his treatment of the Shen, Hegel relies essentially on *Mémoires*, xv, as occasionally augmented from Grosier. As a result his presentation, perhaps owing to the pressure of time, seems to be a bit of a grab bag. See *Mémoires*, xv. 214; cf. *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 350 where, however, the 'spirits' are not precisely designated.

112. On good and evil spirits, see *Mémoires*, i. 468. It is striking that none of the available edns. speak of 'Gui'. This expression has its counterpart in the 'Kouei' of *Mémoires*, xv. 219, to which Hegel turns (see the three following notes). Grosier speaks about these evil spirits only in connection with an episode in which a successor to Kangxi is reported to have opposed the erection of specific statues for the prevention of wrong. There (iv. 389) Grosier calls them 'coeui-chine'. See also *Mémoires*, xv. 221.

113. Hegel bases these statements on a passage in *Mémoires*, xv. 219, which he severely abridged, and which is lifted out of its context within 'Extract from a letter of M. Amiot, missionary' (*Mémoires*, xv. 208–59). Actually the contents of the extract concern the Daoist sect and its teaching on metempsychosis, a topic our text takes up only later.

them from the next year's calendar as punishment.[114] The Shen were not actually honored as deities, but instead as subordinates to Tian.[115] The Chinese have idols or graven images of these Shen. In their temples frightening graven images are installed. Temples of the Shen have priests. There are a great many monasteries of these bonzes, where they live in celibacy, and there are convents too. In Beijing there are 10,000 temples.[116] The monasteries have increased in such numbers that the emperor must limit them. One emperor had twenty-five men or bonzes return to civic life and closed 5,000 monasteries.[117] The great superstition of the Chinese relates to this point about the Shen and monasteries. Upon any misfortune they turn to bonzes and idols. These bonzes are constant givers of advice, as well as being soothsayers and the like. One of their main concerns is the arrangement of houses and even more of gravesites, for they are convinced that the fortune or misfortune of a family hinges on these things. Nooks and crannies (*Winkel*) are exorcized by means of dragons, and auspicious burial places located by them.[118] And this superstition presupposes the subjugation of the inner spirit that we saw among the Chinese.

[3.] We now take note of particular sects. One is that of Lao-Tse [Lao-tzu, or Laozi]. These sects mark the beginning of a quite different order. Through withdrawal into self, through study and the like, they represent themselves as attaining a mastery over the Shen. In addition, the more profound devotees become Shen themselves, through strenuous discipline. So here there is a beginning of the elevation of human beings to the divine, of the absolute identification with the divine absolute.[119] A second point is that the worship

114. See *Mémoires*, xv. 213–14. Hegel adds from Grosier, iv. 395, the point about honoring the deceased as Shen.

115. See *Mémoires*, v. 55 and xv. 219. See also *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 350.

116. Only the 3rd edn. of Grosier agrees with Hegel's account (iv. 416), and refers to the proliferation of temples as owing to the government's tolerance 'of novel sects and popular superstitions'. In this connection Grosier (iv. 423 ff.) cites Hüttner's report on the Macartney legation and its description of the temple of Gehol. See also Staunton, ii. 142. Today the term 'bonze' is usually applied to a Buddhist monk, not to those of other sects. Its derivation is from Japanese, through Portuguese, to French.

117. Several times in Chinese history such measures were taken against the bonzes, for instance in 845 and 955 (see *Histoire générale*, vi. 489–91 and vii. 445, as well as *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 394–5). No statements have been found that agree with the numbers Hegel provides.

118. The *Mémoires* (iv. 290–1) reports on faith in idols in connection with the bonzes of 'Tao-tsée and the lamas' in a context similar to this one. Hegel, however, draws upon Grosier (iv. 443 and 481 ff.).

119. Based on du Halde (i. 665), the *Allgemeine Historie* (vi. 356–8) casts Laozi in a very poor light. So Hegel's contrastingly positive opinion must therefore be influenced by different sources. It seems that in Hegel's day more was known about Laozi and his writings than is

of lamas is very widespread. The imperial families, in particular those of the
164 Manchu line, rely on the lama. The emperor's private religion is | Lamaism, with its regard for a living human being in whom, at the present time, divinity has its concrete existence.[120] This belief is linked to the religion of the Buddha. The religion of Fo is quite renowned, although it is doubtful that this religion is the same as that of the Buddha. One of the main views held by the religion of Fo is that of metempsychosis, according to which all shapes—human beings, stars, and so on—are only forms or revelations of the One, the absolute. In addition, followers of this religion locate what is supreme in nothingness (*das Nichts*), such that human beings then elevate themselves to God when they renounce all sensations of what is particular and make themselves into abstract intuition, reaching a point where good and evil, as well as all differences, vanish; [these people] immerse themselves wholly in emptiness, in impassivity (*das Unbewegte*). Thus what should be sought is utter emptiness.[121]

From this presentation of the first patriarchal empire we pass over to the second, to India.

usually thought to be the case. See, for instance, the Preliminary Discourse in Gaubil's *Chou-king* edn. (pp. xlix–c) and Grosier's remark (iv. 380–1) that this text has been known in Europe for a long time. No comparable edn. is known. In his treatment of the sect of Laozi, Hegel bases himself on the most recent available version of vol. xv of the *Mémoires* (pp. 208–59), published in 1791, because it conforms to the state of research about 1820; or perhaps because he is pressed for time. In vol. iv (1779) the teachings of Laozi and his followers are linked with superstition and idolatry, although the account also speaks of 'commerce with spirits' and presents a positive evaluation; nevertheless Hegel does not use it; nor does he utilize *Mémoires*, iii. 41 and v. 56–7, also on this topic. Instead he employs *Mémoires*, xv. 209–10, while disregarding references there to occult sciences, magic, and the like. Also, he defers the topic of metempsychosis (mentioned in xv. 211) to later in these lectures (see also n. 113).

120. See Grosier, iv. 418, on the imperial ties to Lamaism.

121. Hegel is surely influenced by his sources in setting up a link between Lamaism and Buddhism, although he is dubious about the identity of Fo with Buddha. See *Mémoires*, v. 58–9, which says that emperor Ming-ti (Mingdi) sent envoys to India, who brought back to China the religion of Fo, together with various Indian fables and superstitions. Hegel's sources are not in agreement on this issue. *Mémoires*, i. 408 says the religion of Fo is foreign to China. Sonnerat (ii. 291) and Staunton (ii. 43) have little to report about the religion of Fo. Perhaps Hegel's skepticism about the identity of the two figures is influenced by an actual discussion he learnt about from periodicals. Wilhelm Traugott Krug says some take Buddha to be the same as the Tibetan teacher Lo, others the same as the Chinese figure Fo; see his *Allgemeine Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften, nebst ihrer Literatur und Geschichte*, 2nd edn. (Leipzig, 1832), i. 403. There Krug cites 'Nachrichten über die Buddha-Religion aus englischen Zeitschriften', in *Miscellen aus der neuesten ausländischen Literatur* (1816), viii. 292 ff. and 404. As for the more specific content of the religion of Fo, Hegel turns to Grosier, iv. 447–8; see also *Allgemeine Historie*, vi. 359–60.

INDIA[1]

India comprises the river valley of the Indus and that of the Ganges. Here commences a more specific involvement with the mountains. India has been receptive toward the rest of the world, and thus it appears as an effective link in the chain of world history. The Chinese Empire, in contrast, lies outside this history; it is an initial point that, however, still has not gotten under way or moved outside itself. India presents the very image of a world-historical people. It has been a source of wisdom, science, and culture, as well as of natural treasures. There is nothing that it does not have to offer. Thus all peoples have turned their attention to India, to find a route to it | in order to access its treasures. All peoples 165
without exception seek to gain for themselves a connection with this source. There is no great nation that has not to some degree acquired a foothold in India.

The Principle of India

[1.] First we shall attempt to grasp the Indian principle in contrast to the Chinese principle. As opposed to China, India appears to be a land of fantasy (*Phantasie*), a land of wonders. In China everything was understanding devoid of fantasy, a prosaic life in which even a person's disposition is externally determined, established, and regulated, by law. In India, conversely, no object is inaccessible to poetry and fantasy, for fantasy transforms each one and makes it wondrous. In China morals constitute the content of the law. In India there are of course set regulations and laws, indeed an enormous number of stipulations regarding conduct, albeit ones whose content is devoid of what is ethical, sociable, or moral, for their content instead consists of superstitions. These superstitious actions are lacking in spirit and are unfeeling, in both form and content. The lives of the Indians are comprised of spiritless and unfeeling forms of this kind. Inasmuch as one

1. In contrast to the section on China, Hegel's presentation of India is based on English sources. In Hegel's day the front rank of research on India belonged to the English, as was only natural given the historical and political circumstances. Hegel gives priority to English presentations over German ones because the English acquired their information first-hand from their own experience in India. While the English concerned themselves with all the topics of Indian history and society, German authors confined themselves to presenting the language, art, religion, and philosophy, and for that reason arrived at a strongly idealized image of India. That Hegel adopts the largely negative judgment formed by the English is based not only on his sources but also on his own historical-philosophical stance. For Hegel, political organization is the actual bearer of history. Hegel saw in India a total inability to organize life politically.

aspect of the Chinese is their prosaic prudence and another is that the sovereignty of their rulers extends over all things, they have an abiding superstition as opposed to intelligence. The Indians do not have the same sort of superstitions that the Chinese have, for their entire condition can be summed up as one of dreaming or fantasy. Rationality, morality, and subjectivity are nullified or cast aside, and thus the human being is simply self-absorbed and arrives at something positive through the vagaries of the imagination. The extremes are, respectively, wild imagination involving sensuous enjoyment, and a totally inanimate abstraction of inwardness;
166 the Indian vacillates between them. | So the Indians are like wholly debased persons who, devoid of all spirituality, empty and in despair, acquire for themselves a dream world by the use of opium, a world or bliss of insanity.

For the Chinese, historical knowledge is the most developed science. We saw Chinese history ordered and arranged over some five thousand years, in chronicle-like, prosaic narratives of external matters, deeds, and events, embellished now and again with practical applications. In the case of the Indians, in contrast, there is no thought of history, of chronology or the presentation of an actuality. For them all that subsists in the present evaporates into colorful dreams. So for them no authentic history is possible. Their grasp of things is affected by a weakness or irritability of the nerves that makes objects, a fixed and determinate existence, unbearable to them; instead, when concrete existence makes itself felt it turns into a hallucination for them. They cannot endure any determinate actuality, and so must dream and deceive. Nor are they in any better position to deceive with knowledge. Their scriptures are no more reliable than are their narratives. These are the most pertinent features. A dream or a lovely atmosphere has pervaded views of the nature of things Indian. More recently, however, after people became acquainted with the Indian spirit, this aura was destroyed or dissipated. The verdict today is quite at odds with how the fantasy of this wonderland represents itself.

[2.] Now we need a more specific grasp of the Indian principle. With the Chinese we encountered the patriarchal principle that governs dependency. The Chinese lack fulfilled inwardness, for their inwardness still has no content. For them the content of self-determination is given in an external regime, in
167 external laws that define that content. This is the most abstract | inwardness. The next step is a necessary advance, one that indeed generates a world of inwardness; hence the fulfillment is the coming into being of an inward world. For the Chinese the world of thought exists only in relation to the state and to utility. The next step is for the determinacy, heretofore

posited externally, to become inward, to configure itself into a spiritual world such that what is inward not be merely abstract, such that spirit construct from itself a world of its own and the world be configured into an idealism.

We see this advance with the Indians, although here the idealism is one of sheer imagination devoid of reason and of freedom, a mere dreaming in which there is only a simulation of truth and in which the preponderance of the content is abstract imagination. What is objective appears as spirit's imaginative construct, but as nonconceptual and accordingly as unfree. Thus Indian life is a life of dreaming. Precisely the case in dreaming is that a person's actuality, which exists on its own account, which is one's own personality for itself, is not distinguished from what is external to it, and thus the entire connection to externality, the understanding of the external world, drops out. In the dreaming life of the Indian there is no free being-for-itself of the subject nor of the objects, and no subject's distance from them and theirs from the subject. Furthermore, although the profoundest depths of spirit express themselves in dreams too, in another respect dreams are nonsensical and the greatest silliness. So with the Indians we see the consciousness of the highest idea, the most sublime characteristics, but intermingled with the most arbitrary, cloudy shapes (*Wolkengestalten*).

There is a well-known, characteristically feminine beauty in which the face possesses not the rosy complexion of health | but instead a more 168
delicate rosy glow like a spiritual emanation from within, one in which all the features possess a gentleness. Women have this gentle beauty for a few days after giving birth. We also see this beauty in a sleepwalking state, a beauty in the dying [Virgin] Mary as depicted by a great painter such as Scorel.[2] We see this beauty of nervous exhaustion take shape in India as the beauty of the sensitive soul that, however, suffers from weakness, the soul that lacks a free spirit, a spirit grounded within itself.

[3.] In our clearer grasp of the Indian condition in light of this comparison, the underlying idea of Indian life is the oneness of the concrete existence of what is external with what is internal. Indian intuition has as its foundation the absolute substantiality that is not yet internally separated by the understanding; accidental phenomena are not separated from essential being. Separation of that sort depends on the understanding. And we find an absence of understanding in India. Understanding calls for a secure

2. Dutch artist Jan van Scorel (1495–1562).

subject distinguishing itself from a manifold that, within itself and by the same token, is securely defined and stands over against the one understanding it. The manifold standing over against the individual exists itself in an understandable interconnection. This division of subject from object, and of
169 objects from their interconnection, does not obtain for the Indians. |

The way things exist in their interconnection is that they are, above all, singular, but they have laws governing their deeper interconnection; they have something inner, something universally essential that is distinct from their singularity. The most universal expression of this essential character is the abstract God of the Chinese; the Indians do not distinguish the singularities of things from their interconnection or their essential being. For that reason the Indians are pantheists. Theirs is no polytheism, for their intuition is one of universal pantheism; it is not the pantheism of thought, as in Spinozism, but the pantheism of representation. Spinozism, which considers what is itself singular to be null (*nichtig*) and holds fast only to what in it is abstract substance, thinks that only what is universal is substance.

Among the Indians, then, the universal is not thought, for sensible stuff is directly and crudely imported into what is universal; this stuff is not made ideal by the energy of spirit, not elevated to free beauty in such a way that what is sensible would be only the expression of what is universal; instead the Indians just take up sensible stuff into the universal, and this stuff is expanded so limitlessly that the divine is bizarrely swallowed up by it and itself made to be ridiculous. That is because the divine is grasped in finite form, the finite spun out extravagantly. For the Indians this is no mere game; they are not making up fairy tales or standing above and beyond imagination; instead these dreams are intended seriously. The divine is not individualized by this construct but instead is just wholly debased by such lowly
170 shapes; it is completely defiled and | absurd, like the finite just set out in miniature, in the miraculous, and it is cast wholly into an abyss. This is the divinizing of the finite and the finitizing of the divine. Thus our representation of God's becoming a human being, the incarnation of the divine, cannot impress them. For it is not a particularly important thought, inasmuch as *everything* is the incarnation of God—the ape, the parrot, as well as the cow, and so forth; the divine is incarnate in everything. The divine universal, its inner being, is imaged in what is sensible, which was not the case for the Chinese.

There is an extant world of representation for the Indians, a replete inwardness, but not one shaped by reason, by the concept, for what is brought about is simply a crude uniting of the two extremes. The basic thought is the representation of the unity of the singular with the universal.

So what is sensible is the particular element that is posited in unity with the universal. This unity, regarded in and for itself, constitutes the foundation of all truth; however, taken here in singularity, thus merely given for representation, this unity becomes bizarre, absurd, and contemptible.

This rendering of God in sensuous form can have either of two meanings. In one, that of pantheism, the representation of this unity is thoroughly universal, and the entire sensible realm, without exception, is thus divinized, is completely inclusive of the finite, which must count as God. In the other, the rendering of God in sensuous form concentrates or confines itself to an immediately present focal point. This distinction accounts for the distinction between peoples. The universal dispersal of pantheism belongs to the Brahmanic Indians [the Hindus]; the second type is that of the Buddhist principle, or Lamaism. The peoples of the latter principle are mainly the Tibetans, Mongols, and Kalmucks, and also the Ceylonese | and those of the eastern 171
peninsula on the far side of the Ganges. Lamaism is the most widespread of all religions. First we have to speak of the Indians proper [namely, the Hindus].[3] Reverence for the Buddha is also known in India. To the Hindus, Buddha is the ninth incarnation of God, although Brahmanic pantheism is on the whole the universal principle.

The Region of India

[1.] As for the region of India proper, its fundamental features are the floodplains of the Ganges and the Indus Rivers, as well as what the English call 'Hindustan' and the Deccan peninsula. In the north is the river basin of the Ganges, a region looked upon as the actual focal point of Indian Brahmanism, the region of Bengal, Kashmir, and so forth. The other river basin is that of the Indus, the southern part of which consists mostly of sandy deserts interspersed by solitary oases. The northern part, the Punjab, subdivided by five rivers, is fertile. Alexander the Great came as far as the Indus, and the English came in turn, some 2,100 years later, in 1805.[4] The name 'Indian' derives from the Indus River. It is not known whether they called

3. Hegel regards Hinduism as the religion of the Indian people, and thus sometimes uses 'Indian' and its variants (*Inder, Indier, indisch*) when the position under discussion is Hinduism as such. Up to this point in the present section this has not been an issue, and so we have let 'Indian', etc. stand. But from now on when it is clear that his remarks are specific to Hinduism and not so applicable to Buddhism or other positions, we translate his German terms by 'Hindu' and its variants.

4. In 1805 the East India Co. reached as far west in India as Delhi, on the Jumna River. The English did not arrive at the Indus until the final defeat and annexation of the Sikh kingdom in 1849.

themselves 'Indians' or we called them that, nor whether they in fact had a common name for themselves. The term 'Hindu' was wholly unknown there. There are no sizeable highlands between the Ganges and the Indus. Farther south, however, to the east of the Indus, there are extensive mountain ranges, linked to the southern highlands of Hindustan. South of the mountains is the Nerbudda [Narbada] River, the boundary between Hindustan and the Deccan, the peninsula. The coastal regions to the west and those near Ceylon are very narrow and are only an edge between the highlands and the ocean. Behind them rise high mountains, as we saw in the case of Africa. The other coasts are more varied. Ceylon lies opposite Cape Comorin, quite close to it. So Hindustan and the Deccan are separated from the two vast
172 river basins. In | the highlands dwell utter barbarians such as the Depladen,[5] a savage tribe wholly lacking in culture. In the river basins dwell mainly Brahmanic people characterized by the aforementioned principle, although intermingled with other individual peoples.

[2.] Their political life, ethical life, and religion are very closely interconnected. We should delineate the basic tenet of life in the state more precisely as follows: The state as such is supposed to be the unity of the particular will with the universal, thus the actualization of the universal will. So the state presupposes consciousness of free will. The objective will in China is law; objective will, however, is beyond the purview of the world of the Indians. With the Chinese we saw what is moral made into the content of civil law, so that what is internal is handled as something external. For the Indians there is indeed a unity of external and internal, but one in which neither does nature constitute an understandable whole, nor does what is spiritual stand as free will over against this natural domain; instead there is still immediate unity. Lacking is spirit's withdrawal into itself, whereby it recognizes the law of freedom as subsistent for it. So the principle of freedom is lacking, and so lacking too is will subsistent in itself as well as in the form of subjective will. So everything necessary for a state is lacking. Therefore in India there can be no state whatsoever. In China the state is everything; in India there is just a people but no state.

As shall become evident, there is a governing element in virtue of the existence of a social, communal life, and indeed a very structured life, inasmuch as this life has focal points. But for determination of what is said

5. No mountain folk with this name is to be found in any of Hegel's sources. Possibly the transcriber misheard Hegel's term for them. In any event there is a report of a savage mountain folk in John Rawlins, 'On the Manners, Religion, and Laws of the Cu'ci's, or Mountaineers of Tripura', *Asiatic Researches*, 2 (London, 1799), 187–93.

to be ethical, right, and moral in this life, | there is no basic tenet of ethical 173
life and no piety as conscience and the like, because the principle of freedom is lacking; for spirit as freedom is the principle for all of these things. So to the extent that there is government here, it is a despotism, a wholly unprincipled, lawless despotism. Thus in India the determinative feature is the most degraded despotism. There is plenty of religion but no piety (*Religiosität*). China, Persia, the Turks, and Asia as such are the breeding grounds (*Boden*) of despotism. If the ruler, the one holding power, is an evil ruler, despotism becomes tyranny. But then tyranny is known to be an objectionable condition, something individuals detest, an extraordinary state of affairs. In India, however, there is no feeling of one's own freedom, no consciousness of what is moral; so tyranny is in order and is not detested. The Indians are left with nothing but the feeling of the sensible domain as a given for them.

[3.] The third point, then, is that the Indians are a people of an ancient culture. The greatest fertility exists in the Ganges river valley in particular, and likewise in the Narbada valley; in the alluvial soil crisscrossed by so many fine streams—in this warm, moist soil, in this luxuriance of sensual nature—all needs may easily be satisfied, and from early times it produced a communal life and its elaboration. Here emerges a most noteworthy feature of absolute importance for the concept of the state, a feature opposed to that of the Chinese. What China lacks is the feature according to which the idea of the state is concrete in subdivisions internally determined and organically articulated as distinct domains; there is no abstraction [as in China], for what there is instead is the being of the distinctions posited on their own account, albeit in such a way that they exist by means of the whole, and the whole by means of them. These distinctions are something universal; they are universal | particularities. The entirety of the state is something sub- 174
stantial; however, in particularizing itself it divides itself into multiple particular occupations that constitute the organic branches of the state. These are the distinct elements that we see emergent in India.

The Castes

Individuals and families are distinct elements as singular particularities, not as universal ones.[6] Insofar as these distinct elements are individual

6. In the somewhat unusual terminology of this passage, 'singular particularities' (*einzelne Besonderheiten*) are self-contained units such as individuals or families, whereas 'universal particularities' (*allgemeine Besonderheiten*) are distinctive elements of a society, each consisting of many members who share the same characteristic and are present throughout the society. In India they are called castes.

personalities, they involve the further distinction that some individuals can be free, while others can be slaves. This distinction regarding personal freedom cannot be found among the Indians; in their case we cannot speak of personal freedom. We likewise see no inner, subjective freedom of individuals for their own sake, no conscience. We have not observed this feature in China, and it is even less to be sought in India. The genuine state must have moral subjects too; it must allow an inner moral freedom to its individual members.

We saw the universal particularities arise in China with the organization of the occupations of the state. Now we have to remark about the extent to which these branches are permitted to organize themselves. China does not reach the point at which these distinct elements develop into actual, particular branches, into communities within the whole, for in China they are just different ways of meeting the state's needs. In India these universal particularities emerge, to be sure, in the characteristic determinacy of castes. The first occupation of the state involves intelligent, spiritual, religious, and scientific life. The second is practical life, the occupation of power, the external and internal defenses, the occupation involving bravery and leadership. The third occupation is that of the skilled trades designed to satisfy the needs of society. This one subdivides in multiple ways, just as ours does into urban and rural, the former manufacturing and the latter producing. The fourth occupation, attaching itself to the others, is that of the servants as individuals assigned to the personal service of the aforementioned occupa-
175 tions, servants who cannot have | a standing of their own. The distinction of occupations is determined rationally, in accord with this concept. Then we have the question as to the form that these distinctions take in India. Distinction and classification of individuals into general occupations is necessary in every state. In India it emerges in a specific way. The feature distinctive to the Hindus is that these determinacies of the concept become natural distinctions, ones based on birth. Our practice involves subjective freedom, in that people can settle upon any one of these specific roles for themselves, commensurate with their own views, intentions, and circumstances. For the Hindus, however, these distinctions are completely tied to a naturally determined status.

Plato's political constitution recognizes these distinctions too, but he rules out free will. With the individual's own choice ruled out, the ones in charge, according to their own informed and ethical will, assign individuals to their social classes. So then, even for Plato there is still a human will that makes the assignments to classes. In this case the subjective freedom of individuals is not respected even though the determining factor is not based on nature as

it is for the Hindus. For us, social class is generally a subordinate matter. The spiritual, religious, ethical, and legal sphere is something higher in which everyone has or can have equal, universal rights. The social classes belong to the particularity of civic life, from which the universality of volition is explicitly independent, as a sphere in which each one can be at home. For the Hindus, however, the distinctions are, as we said, natural ones, and they encapsulate the entire institution of Hindu life. All the religious and legal precepts hinge upon them. Hence in India they also have absolute significance. Since each individual bears the label of such a class or caste and is bound to it, a widely held opinion about their historical origin | is that 176
these distinctions derive from racial distinctions (*Stämme*), such that initially they would have been distinctions based on nationality, with the occupational distinctions being linked to them. This opinion has no historical evidence for it, and thus no explanation for its basis. There cannot be a priestly people, for a people has need of all occupations. The main thing is that each one of the distinct groups develops only in conjunction with the others. A division of labor is a mark of culture, the beginning of a people. So the castes are not to be explained by an external convergence of nationality groups; instead they presuppose a whole that has developed its own distinctions. What is characteristic of India is then simply that these distinctions are strictly determined in this way based on birth. How that took place, whether directly or unconsciously or through external despotism, is another question. Despotism can decree that someone pursue a specific occupation and pass it on to one's descendants, which is indeed a natural way of doing things. There is also the major consideration that these distinctions can emerge and become firmly established only within a whole that is indeed a whole, as they have with the Hindus. We find castes among the Egyptians, and further traces of them among the Medes, the Persians, and a few other peoples. In Persia some cities had to supply attar of roses to the court of the despot, and others silk garments. The despot decided that and made it a permanent arrangement. This permanency is the same thing as what we see in the case of the Hindus. | 177

All the ethical and religious determinations are a function of these Hindu caste divisions. The main principle with regard to religious intuition is the oneness of the individual with the universal, of the sensuous with the divine. We, however, distinguish the sensuous from the spiritual, distinguish essential being from contingency, and unite them by means of reflection. For the Hindus, the oneness is no consequence of reflection; instead for them the unification is immediate. The distinction is only slight, to the extent to which the divine has what is universal as its point of departure, or else begins from

what is sensuous—by first setting out from the sensuous and ending up, to a greater extent, with the universal, or else by beginning from the universal and passing over, to a greater extent, into the sensuous realm. Hence the Hindus count as divine the sun, moon, mountains, rivers, animals, and individual human beings—immediately sensible things. In another respect, moreover, they have representations that belong indeed to thought but are entertained not as thoughts but instead as immediately sensuous. Thus the gods become immediately sensuous. This also applies to the division into castes, which is a kind of cultus in which one part of the people appears as divine. Now since what is divine, what has validity, has become something earthly and fixed, the caste distinctions too are firmly set in the Hindu intuition. Here people relate themselves to the divine and to other people as they do to natural things. From this perspective human beings are in the kind of relationship with the divine in which their daily lives appear as a divine service. Here it is evident how the most extreme superstition finds its place under the banner of such a general proposition as 'God is in all things'. We, however, see how things stand with such a manner of speaking when it is
178 not subject to closer | examination. So, like the religious sphere, the ethical life of Hindus also comes within the scope of caste distinctions. Subsequently we will speak more specifically about how the Hindu religion has for its object not only human beings and natural things, but also universal being.

The first topic in a consideration of the castes concerns their rights. We find that four castes stand out for the Hindus. The first comprises the Brāhmans, the second the Kshatriyas or warriors, from which come the rulers. Nevertheless, the last peshwa or head of the Marathas was a Brāhman.[7] The third caste is called the Vaishyas. These people are in the main the landowners and landlords. The fourth consists of laborers, artisans, peasants, and servants, the Shudras. Appended to these is a fifth or ignoble caste of disdained people, the Nischadas or Pariahs.[8] In addition to this general

7. The peshwa was not the king of the Marathas but instead the prime minister who, however, held the actual power in the state after the Maratha kings had to submit to Mogul domination at the beginning of the 18th cent., and to become mere figureheads. The office of prime minister was hereditary in a certain Brāhman family.

8. Hegel's abbreviated account of the castes is erroneous, confusing two distinct circumstances. The *Laws of Manu* is the traditional and authoritative text setting forth the caste system. See *Institutes of Hindu Law; or the Ordinances of Menu*, tr. Sir William Jones (Calcutta, 1794), a German tr. of which was publ. in 1797 in Weimar. In ch. 10 of the English original the passage mentioning 'Nischada, Paria' has the heading: 'On the mixed classes; and on times of distress', whereas ch. 1, paras. 87–93, contains the classical account of the four main castes and their mutual relations. Describing the 'mixed classes' is complicated by the fact that they are quite numerous. Hegel's attribution of the lowest level to the 'Nischadas or Pariahs' does not

classification, there are many subcategories that differ greatly from one another in various regions. They number between twenty-seven and thirty-six. The Brāhman and Kshatriya castes are strictly defined, whereas those of the artisans or Vaishyas, and the Shudras, are quite broad in many respects. Everyone has a particular occupation of one's own.[9]

The Hindus themselves assign a historical origin to the majority of the castes, since by the indulgence of princes men and women of different castes intermarry, with the result that particular castes must be constituted from their children. So those without a caste were formed into new castes with their designated occupations. The arts and sciences originated in this way.[10] This account is surely correct except for its attribution of the origin of arts and trades to this cause; for the specific features of the arts and trades brought about the specific caste distinctions. So there are a great many castes, and each one has its own trade: fisherman, tanner, barber, barrel maker, porter, palanquin bearer, mat weaver, | and so forth. No caste 179
departs from its designated occupation. Europeans have great difficulty with these caste distinctions, for instance, in military service where the individual must do everything but where the Hindus are disinclined to do anything above and beyond their caste occupation. Because of more long-standing association, this capricious restriction has begun to diminish somewhat. Soldiers from the military caste are unwilling to dig trenches, transport anything, or move the cannon; others must do those things. They are of even less use for other tasks. Hence when an English army of 20,000 in India takes to the field, it is accompanied by an entourage of 100,000 men. A lieutenant has thirty servants and a captain fifty, for each of them has his very own role. Lally-Tollendal, a French general who in his fifties was dispatched to India—and subsequently was guillotined in Paris—sought to force

square with this source (ch. 10, paras. 8 and 12), which places it somewhat higher and most often uses the term 'Chandala' for the very lowest class of persons (ch. 10, paras. 51 ff.). Accounts of the Chandalas and the restrictions imposed upon them also include: James Mill, *The History of British India*, 2nd edn. (London, 1820), i. 173; H. T. Colebrooke, 'Enumeration of Indian Classes', *Asiatic Researches*, 5 (London, 1799), 53–67; Abbé Dubois, *Description of the Character, Manners, and Customs of the People of India* (London, 1817), 454–5. The last of these refers to them as 'Pariahs', not 'Chandalas'.

9. See Colebrooke, 'Enumeration', 54 and 61. The number 27 cannot be found in Hegel's sources. Colebrooke counts the 'mixed classes' variously as 36, 39, and 42. Cf. Abbé Dubois, pp. 1–2.

10. Mill (pp. 171–2) tells of an evil and corrupt king who allowed intermarriages, and his good successor who devised a classification system and occupations for their offspring, from which various arts and manufactures sprang.

Hindus into different combat roles, but they deserted, with the result that he brought about his own downfall by the rigidity of his plans.[11]

Each caste, then, has its own laws or rules concerning the minutest matters of daily life. One must have bathed before eating, and if not, then one does not eat and often goes several days without eating until one has bathed. The different castes do not eat together, a practice that, owing to circumstances, is of course largely disregarded on the battlefield. A European or a horse drinking from the Hindus' pool renders it unclean. A Hindu may not touch a dead bird nor possess its feathers, nor wear leather made from cowhide. Hence one must see to one's own provisions. So each caste
180 has its own specific occupation, | and particular rules to follow; as such it has the most distinctive civic rights.

The Brāhmans are at the apex, elevated above the others, particularly the Shudras, in the way that, for us, human beings are higher than animals. Brāhmans alone are allowed to pursue scientific knowledge and to read the holy books, the Vedas. A Shudra (from the fourth class) is not allowed to memorize passages of these books or learn any prayers. A Shudra who knows such things will be punished by death. According to the *Laws of Manu*, Brāhmans cannot advise, or teach prayers to, a Shudra.[12] A Brāhman who finds a Shudra troublesome goes directly to the authorities, who condemn that person to death. Any contact with Shudras makes a Brāhman unclean, and so they avoid contact with Brāhmans on pain of death.[13] A Brāhman as such has the status of a god. Any Hindu can fall down before a Brāhman and declare that person to be one's god. Brāhmans wear a three-part cord about the neck. Upon seeing it the ordinary Hindu falls down and prays to it.[14] A Brāhman may receive something only from a Brāhman. The Brāhman is called 'twice-born' and occupies a position so exalted that a king can in no way attain it no matter how high he ascends.[15] Learned Brāhmans can of course be distinguished from uneducated ones, and yet the

11. Thomas Arthur, Count von Lally and Baron von Tollendal, a French general, in 1758 drove the English from the Coromandel Coast. Lacking suitable support from France, he was surrounded at Pondicherry and in 1761, after a prolonged siege, was forced to surrender. Unjustly condemned, he met his end on the scaffold in Paris.

12. On these restrictions about teaching and advising, see *Institutes*, ch. 4, paras. 80–1.

13. On these punishments, see *The Code of Gentoo Law*, ed. Nath Brassey Halhed (London, 1777), ch. 21, § 7; see also Mill, p. 169 with n. 1.

14. Abbé Dubois (pp. 91–2) gives a full account of the sacred cord bestowed at the Upanayana ceremony to make a young male a Brāhmachari, thus beginning the student stage, the first of the four traditional stages of life.

15. See Mill, p. 163.

uneducated ones are nevertheless equally exalted.[16] Punishments for the lower castes are harsher than for the higher castes, except for theft, where the reverse is true.[17] An ancient poem tells how a prince sought to attempt by force to become a Brāhman. The cow, however, stood up for the Brāhmans, striking down one hundred thousand men. Then the king did penance for ten thousand years, though he was still unable to become a Brāhman. | That is 181
because, in virtue of birth, the Brāhman indeed stands as God *vis-à-vis* all the other castes.[18] According to the *Laws of Manu*, from birth the Brāhman is chief of all creatures and is installed as guardian of all civic and religious duties. Whatever exists is the abundance of the Brāhmans, which is theirs by right in virtue of their higher birth.[19] So a Brāhman stands higher, at the apex of all the castes. Although the other castes are mutually distinct, and in each case the lower is responsible for showing deference to those above it, none of them has this exalted status except the Brāhmans.

Caste distinctions also determine the general civic rights, and even come into play here so as to result in these rights being unequal. Commensurate with their relative levels, the lower castes are punished more harshly for the same crimes than are the higher castes, with the sole exception of theft, for which the punishment intensifies as the caste position becomes higher. In general the principle governing punishments is that of abstract reprisal. For instance, whoever slanders someone will be punished on his tongue, and so forth.[20] The *Laws of Manu* stipulates ten places for physical punishment of the lower castes: tongue, ears, eyes, hands, feet, head, body, nose, genitals, and possessions. However, a Brāhman who commits a crime, which in the case of another caste makes one subject to exile and corporeal punishment,

16. See *Institutes*, ch. 9, para. 317.

17. See Mill, pp. 161–2 and 225.

18. Hegel is retelling an episode from the *Rāmāyana* entitled 'Visvamitra's Penances', as in the German tr. of Franz Bopp in his *Über das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache in Vergleichung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1816). Hegel's retelling is erroneous. Prince Vishvamitra, born a Kshatriya, attained Brāhman status through penances, and became the teacher of Rama, central figure of the *Rāmāyana*. The cow Sabala belonged to Vashista, who was at war with Vishvamitra. Hegel's numbers cannot be substantiated; various penances of varying duration are reported, including a thousand years without breathing and another thousand without speaking. Sabala the cow utters the statement about the superiority of the Brāhmans' power. Cf. Bopp, pp. 175 and 189 ff.

19. See *Institutes*, ch. 1, paras. 98–100. In Griesheim the Brāhman is 'guardian of the abundance of nature'. Griesheim also makes clear that the Brāhman is superior in virtue of birthright or natural birth (i.e. not simply in virtue of the 'second birth' received at the initiation ceremony as a youth).

20. See *Institutes*, ch. 8, para. 279, where punishment of a lower caste person who harmed a higher one is a slitting or cutting in proportion to the injury caused.

is supposed to be exiled but not punished physically.[21] In contrast, a Shudra who, by hand or foot, injures a Brāhman or a person from another higher caste, will have his own hand or foot cut off. A 'once-born' person who insults a Brāhman with harsh invectives shall have injury done to his tongue; if he inveighs against the entire caste a red-hot rod shall be thrust into his
182 mouth.[22] | So castes also differ in their civic rights.

Caste status can be lost by one who is neglectful of the duties of one's caste. Such a person is an outcaste and beyond all protection of the laws, and is then shunned by everyone. But caste status can be reacquired, and indeed in various ways. In the case of minor infractions this is accomplished without difficulty. The outcaste gives money to a Brāhman and a meal to several other members of the caste; then reinstatement occurs. It is more difficult in the case of more severe crimes. A post is erected and a crossbeam attached, from the end of which hangs a rope with iron hooks. These hooks are stuck into the back of the one to be reinstated, and the crossbeam is swung around in a circle a certain number of times. Clemency is gained by this penance. Penitents even impose this upon themselves. There is a particular method by which Brāhmans can be reinstated. A cow or a woman must be fashioned from gold; in addition, many gifts must be given. In order to regain his principality, an Indian prince dispatched two Brāhmans to England, and they were then ejected from their caste because they had crossed over the sea, and in particular because, on the return journey, they had crossed over the Indus River. The prince ordered the making of a metal cow with a golden birth canal. The Brāhmans were enclosed in the hollow abdomen and in turn drawn forth through the birth canal, thus undergoing a 'second birth'.[23]

21. *Institutes*, ch. 8, paras. 123–5, names these ten loci (the 'whole body' for capital crimes) together with the Brāhmans' exemption from physical punishment.

22. These statements as to punishments come directly from *Institutes*, ch. 8, paras. 270–1. A 'once-born' person is one who receives no formal religious instruction and initiation, namely, a Shudra or an outcaste.

23. See Francis Wilford, 'On Mount Caucasus', *Asiatic Researches*, 6 (London, 1801), 455–536. Wilford links the prohibition to crossing over the Indus, but not (as does Hegel) to traveling across the sea (pp. 529, 535). He states, however, that the prohibition only applies to the Attock, a tributary that enters the upper Indus from Afghanistan, and it does not include simply being in countries beyond the Attock. Wilford names the prince, to which Hegel refers, as Raghu Na'th-Ra'ya, or Ragoba. He cites the two offenses of the Brāhmans in the story as journeying in lands where 'impure tribes' live, and crossing the Attock. The story as Hegel tells it cannot be extracted unambiguously from Wilford's text. It is also mentioned in Friedrich Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, pt. 1 (2nd edn. Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819), 614. Abbé Dubois has a very full account of the procedures for reinstatement in a caste (pp. 28 ff.).

Civil Legislation

The second topic we now come to concerns legal specifications. Abstract freedom, existence as a person, is the foundation for all ethical freedom. The civil legislation is contained in the *Laws of Manu*, and is found in collections and | compilations that have been translated by the English. This legisla- 183
tion is very incomplete, deficient, and confused.

[1.] An initial and very important point concerns whether or not those farming the land are its owners, and so whether they are property owners or day laborers. This is a very difficult question to answer. When the English first came into possession of Bengal with its 20 million inhabitants, and ultimately ruled the whole of India (in part directly, in part indirectly) with its 100 million inhabitants, the majority of whom are direct subjects of the English, it was of the greatest importance to determine whether the farmers are the landowners. Resolving the question became so difficult on account of the extensive encumbrances and levies on the land. There was no set regimen of taxation, for there were also many other imposts besides the particular property rents. If the encumbrance involves half the value of the property, then such a farmer is regarded equally as a day laborer because he is then to that extent supported by the owner, in that he receives remuneration for his labor. Since in many regions of India the landed estates have become even more severely encumbered, the owners have thus disavowed their role because day laborers have deemed themselves better off. So a condition can arise in which the owner is worse off than the one working for pay.

The English government and the Parliament in England have considered this issue from many angles, but have come to no actual decision. It is evident that in the most ancient times the rajah or prince was originally the sovereign owner of all the land, although the farmers had a hereditary and continuing | right that was an ownership too, with the result that there 184
were two ownership rights: the rent that must be paid to the prince, and what remained to the farmer above and beyond this rent. Ancient manuscripts in India contain inscriptions about bequests of princes' land to temples, and documents of the sale of land to private individuals. Colonel Mackenzie has collected over 2,000 documents.[24] When the prince relinquishes land to those who farm it, he is relinquishing only his right to rent,

24. See Colin Mackenzie, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Manuscripts and Other Articles Illustrative of the Literature, History, Statistics and Antiquities of the South of India* (Calcutta, 1828). Our text refers to him as 'colonel' (*Oberst*) rather than 'Colin'.

just as private individual sellers relinquish only their right, which remains distinct from a right to rents.[25]

Each village constituted a community. In ancient times the villagers were all firmly united against the outsider (*das andere*) and against thieves, because property was not secure. Only in most recent times, when confidence in the English government increased and property had become more secure, have the inhabitants dismantled these defenses. Lord Hastings stated this in a speech to Parliament two years ago. Such villages were entirely isolated; they were indifferent to any political changes and often felt the effects of regime changes only after much time had passed. Such a village would have its magistrate, a Brāhman, and an astrologer who has to determine favorable and unfavorable days, and someone to see to the water supply. Also present and necessary were a potter, physician, baker, barber, laundryman, dancers, a seamster, musicians, and finally a poet.[26] Each of these persons received a percentage of the entire income. The remaining
185 proceeds went half to the agricultural workers and | half to the government.[27] An authorized collector levied the government's share. This was the only tie with the government. These circumstances led to the conclusion that the government was the landlord.

The English have accepted this unsatisfactory system inasmuch as they looked upon the collector of the revenue as the landlord and demanded from him a specific declaration to the effect that the system was empowered to dispossess the farmers from their property, such that they came to be viewed wholly as day laborers, whereby it came to pass that a few years ago more than a million Hindus died of hunger. Today there is once again more respect for property. So it is difficult to reach a decision about this capital.

[2.] The second point to note concerns testimony in court, thus the question as to who is capable of giving legal testimony. The king cannot, nor the cook, nor public dancers and singers, nor can reputable persons who have no sons but only daughters; women can testify only against women.[28]

25. See Mill, ch. 5, which discusses this issue and distinguishes three levels of 'ownership': the sovereign, who is the ultimate owner; the farmer; the sovereign's collector of revenue, an intermediate figure. See pp. 256, 265, 272, 274.

26. Many of the village occupations mentioned here, as well as some others, are described by Mill, pp. 266 ff., who cites the 'Fifth Report of the Committee on India Affairs', produced in 1810. He also describes the relative isolation of villages *vis-à-vis* a central government.

27. Mill (p. 265) mentions this allocation of the remaining proceeds.

28. Hegel does not distinguish being not competent to testify from being free from an obligation to testify; nor does the text from *Institutes*, ch. 8, paras. 62–8. It makes clear that men with sons (who also meet other requirements) are competent. The status of the others

The *Laws of Manu* allows the rendering of a false testimony when doing so can preserve the life of a man who otherwise must die. This also applies when the death of a severe offender, be he a Brāhman or someone from another caste, would be brought about by a truthful testimony. Insofar as the harshness of kings is well known, falsehood is preferable to truth. The same applies if a wedding can be arranged by false attestation, or if falsehoods are spoken from impulsive desire for a maiden, or also against those who use torture in the quest for valuables; finally, in many other cases, if false testimony proves advantageous, for instance, to a Brāhman.[29] | 186

[3.] Yet a third characteristic to bring in here concerns debts. Notable in this regard is that the amount of interest, the very amount itself, then and thereafter too, is a function of caste distinctions. According to the law the regular interest with collateral is as follows: for a Brāhman, a monthly rate of 1¼ percent, or 2 percent without collateral; for the second caste, the Kshatriyas, it is 3 percent, or 3½ percent without collateral; for the third caste it is 4 percent; for Shudras the interest is 5 percent monthly.[30] These are specifications of the *Laws of Manu*. As to the manner of debt collection, the specification is that one ought to be pressed for payment. A further recourse involves transfer of the collateral to the authorities and authorization of the creditor to confiscate the property of the worker—to discover whether he will pay. Also, the wife, children, livestock, and clothing of the debtor can be confiscated. Furthermore, it is lawful for the debtor to be compelled forcefully, even by the cudgel. Finally, one may sit at the debtor's doorstep, to see whether that moves him to payment. If the debtor is of another caste he must pay by his service.[31] A notable exception is that if a Brāhman is the creditor, he goes with a dagger or with poison to the debtor and threatens to take his own life if he is not paid. The debtor lets himself be coerced by this threat. If that does not happen, the Brāhman can sit in front of the house of the debtor, who is then not permitted to eat if the Brāhman does not eat, because he is not permitted to eat in the Brāhman's presence, and so a competition in fasting is begun. If the Brāhman dies of hunger, the debtor imposes on himself the harshest of capital punishments involving

mentioned is vague, although one would think that the king and distinguished persons are ones that have immunity. Hotho's version more clearly suggests the immunity of the king.

29. For these (and other) cases where falsehood is allowable, see *Institutes*, ch. 8, paras. 103–12; Mill, p. 239. However, contrary to our text, *Institutes* states that falsehood is allowable when a person is *not* a serious offender (para. 104).

30. These rates (with one exception) are found in *Institutes*, ch. 8, paras. 140–2.

31. For these means of recourse, see Mill, pp. 206–7.

frightful tortures, because he is guilty of the death of a Brāhman. This very thing
187 has taken place under the English government, such that, when the | court denied the Brāhman's claim, he made his appeal of the decision in such a fashion.[32]

As for justice and personal freedom, there is thus no glimmer of it. The female gender is wholly excluded from a right of inheritance, and even debarred as such from making a will. When there are no male heirs, the goods go to the rajah.[33]

[4.] Furthermore, the fourth of the legal specifications pertains to marriage. What is stated about the circumstances of wives is that they are incapable of testifying in court, may not even make a will, and are in general subordinate and in a state of degradation. They are not allowed to eat in the presence of the husband,[34] just as a lower caste person is not allowed to eat in the presence of someone of higher caste. It is further the case that wives are more or less purchased by the bridegroom from the parents. This is traditional, an ancient custom, although the laws forbid it. For a formal, legal marriage the bridegroom must give a cow and an ox, the ancient form of purchase. Generally, however, a contract is drawn up regarding the gift supposed to be given to the parents. But the arrangement nevertheless consists of a formal sale.[35]

The young woman has no choice regarding a husband, for the father makes the decision. The father's duty is to marry off his daughter, just as it is the duty of every Hindu to marry. If the father neglects to do so, then she is left to choose a spouse for herself. This is what happened in the story of Nala.[36] It only applies if the father is thus neglectful in the first three years of her
188 womanhood.[37] If the parents do not find a spouse, | then the young woman can be provided for in another way since polygamy, for instance, is allowed.

Only monogamy, however, gives the wife her rightful place; only in monogamy is she of equal status to the husband. Without it her wifely

32. For these strategies of a Brāhman creditor, see John Shore, 'On Some Extraordinary Facts, Customs, and Practices of the Hindus', *Asiatic Researches*, 4 (London, 1799), 331–50, esp. 332. See also Mill (p. 209), regarding the reaction to a legal decision.

33. See *Institutes*, ch. 9, para. 189, which, however, makes Brāhman property an exception to this rule.

34. See Mill, p. 388.

35. Ibid. 391–2; also, Abbé Dubois, p. 137.

36. The story of Nala is an episode in the *Mahābhārata* epic. See n. 45 below.

37. Mill (p. 388) states that, with few exceptions, marriage is a religious duty. The *Institutes* (ch. 9, paras. 3, 4, and 90) and Mill (pp. 391 ff.) both mention the three-year period after which the daughter is free to choose for herself. The background assumption is that women are routinely subject to, and cared for by, men throughout their lives.

prerogatives are lost. There are regions in India and Tibet where there is also polyandry, and others where the female sex is treated even more contemptibly, where, for example, several brothers keep one wife as servant and shared instrument of their desires.[38] A father can readily provide for his daughter by means of this Indian polygamous relationship, by giving his daughter as wife to a reputable Brāhman; the result is that many a Brāhman has thirty to forty wives, half of whom he has never seen, for the parents have merely informed him that they have given their daughters to him as wives. All these circumstances exhibit the lowly condition of women in India.

In what we read of ethics we find that marital duties are often neglected and are viewed as of lesser importance. At the great festivals, for example, the Brāhmans pass among the people and seek out wives pleasing to them, take them along into the temple, and retain them there for several years until their beauty has faded, thereby making their husbands feel very honored. Then they are returned.[39] Every household and every wife is thus available to the fakirs. These people travel about naked, individually or in crowds of as many as 10,000–12,000 from all castes, with the privilege of being fed. Women are at their disposal. They are held to be holy, and were known to the Greeks by the name 'gymnosophists'.[40] Moreover, there are regions on the Malabar Coast in India where marriage relationships do not exist at all.[41] The beginning of a political condition involves the recognition of marriage, and above all of monogamy. In many regions of India, | however, 189
families reside together. The brothers, who reside together with their sisters, do not take into the household the wives with which they wed. A young woman can marry a young man without becoming part of his family, with the result that the sisters' children make up the children of the household. These characteristics of marriage demonstrate how imperfect even this relationship is in India.

38. See Jonathan Duncan, 'Historical Remarks on the Coast of Malabar with Some Description of Manners of its Inhabitants', *Asiatic Researches*, 5 (London, 1799), 1–36; see esp. 13–14. On Tibet, see Samuel Turner, *An Account of an Embassy* (London, 1800); see pp. 391–2 in the German tr. (Hamburg, 1801).

39. Abbé Dubois (pp. 416 ff.) has an extended account of this practice at the temple of Vengata Ramana in Tirupati, in south India. He depicts the husbands who give up their wives 'to the god' as gullible, since they are actually handed over 'to the knavery of the Brāhmans'. In any event, after their release these women are respected in, and supported by, the community.

40. Detail about these 'Senasseys' (sannyasins) is found in Alexander Dow, *The History of Hindostan*, 2 vols. (2nd edn. London, 1770), i, pp. xxxvii–xxxviii. Abbé Dubois (p. 330) mentions the term 'gymnosophists'.

41. See Mill, p. 395, as well as Duncan, p. 13.

[5.] An important and fifth aspect is then the religious practices insofar as they determine the daily lives of the Hindus. Hindus, the Brāhmans in particular, stand under a yoke of the most external practices, which are repeated daily in the course of the most insignificant occupations. In human life elsewhere the actions of meeting daily needs are viewed as ethically neutral and are carried out without undue emphasis. For the Hindus, however, all the actions that pertain to daily needs are carried out subject to a host of rules that are of themselves quite senseless, rules that make one's life into a sequence of senseless practices, with the result that the Hindus conduct their lives in a senseless bondage.

The Brāhmans have to keep in mind the most complex matters in this regard. Throughout the day a person has to perform specific ceremonies; upon arising, one must subject oneself to certain rules. Upon awakening one has to recite prayers, to stand up using a specific foot, to clean the teeth with the leaf of a specific plant, to go to the river, taking water into the mouth and spitting it out again three times, and so forth, all the while reciting particular formulas. One may not sneeze or cough while drinking water. For instance, one who sneezes while sipping water may not go on drinking but must pluck at one's right ear.[42] A host of things can contaminate a person. For instance, when eating one must be wearing not one garment, but two. One must not
190 be naked while bathing. In urinating a person has | much to take into account. One may not urinate in the direction of wood—that is forbidden—nor in rivers, nor turned toward the sun; instead one urinates toward the south in the evening, toward the north in daytime.[43] There are thus some eighty rules. Someone who disregards one of these circumstances must perform a purification. All castes are forbidden to walk upon ashes, hair, flax seeds, or potsherds.[44] There are similar prescriptions of this kind. Already by a few hours after sunrise a Brāhman can have committed thirty to forty transgressions.

Pertinent to the point about such contamination is the quite famous story of Nala in the *Mahābhārata*, which turns upon a purification following such a transgression he committed.[45] Nala, a prince, set out to marry a princess

42. See H. T. Colebrooke, 'On the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, and of the Bra'hmens Especially', essay 1, *Asiatic Researches*, 5 (London, 1799), 345–68, esp. 345–8.

43. See *Institutes*, ch. 4, paras. 45–50, for these regulations.

44. See *Institutes*, ch. 4, para. 78.

45. The *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana* together form the national epic of India. The story concerns the struggle between two branches of one dynasty, the Kaurawas and the Pandavas, for rule. The title of the work as *Mahābhārata* is found already in the 4th cent.; it attained its final form at the latest in the 4th cent. AD. The Nala episode of the *Mahābhārata* is named for the

who was herself allowed to choose a spouse. Her other suitors were genies. She was clever enough to pick out the human being, for Nala alone stood on the ground. So Nala married the princess and lived blissfully and contentedly. A vengeful genie, in association with a playful spirit, lay in wait for the prince. It waited for a long time. At last the king allowed one lapse to make him guilty, by stepping on the spot where he had urinated. Now the playful devil had power over him. The prince gambled away fortune and realm and was ruined on account of this sin. So the whole interest of the story turns on this absurd circumstance.

In this way the Hindu lives dependent on external matters. Inner freedom, morality, one's own intellect, can find no place here. The Hindus exist in this domination by externality, with the result that they can have no inherent ethical life. There was a time when Hindus were held to be exemplary human beings. In particular an Englishman, William Jones, drew attention to them and disseminated very favorable assumptions about them.[46] All the other Englishmen, however, framed a depressing account of the ethical depravity of Hindus in all social classes. These individuals | are credible, 191
for they are high-minded and come from all classes and occupations, one being the Frenchman Abbé Dubois,[47] who lived among them as a missionary for twenty years, as well as the English officers who served there for a long time, and others. The best sources of information for evaluating the ethical relationships of the Hindus, however, are the judicial responses to government inquiries about ethical matters. These are submitted to Parliament, and the judgment in all cases concludes that in every sector Hindus live in utter moral degradation. But this must give one pause. This portrait very much contradicts the earlier views that people had of the Hindus.[48]

This phenomenon is in one respect connected with what we already stated. The most inane things are forbidden to Hindus. The Hindu institutions rule out all that rests upon one's own free will. Everyday conditions are most closely linked to the principles of the castes and their entire way of life. Hindus refrain from slaying any animal. Their hospitals for sick cows and their abhorrence at killing animals can be set wholly apart from any

prince. The princess, and later the wife of prince Nala, is Damayanti. After lengthy false paths and separations, Nala and Damayanti find themselves and one another again.

46. In 1783 Sir William Jones was a judge in the high court in Calcutta. He and Colebrook were founders of the discipline of Sanskrit studies.

47. Abbé Jean Antoine Dubois lived in India as a missionary for twenty-three years and published a book about his experiences. As Hegel mentions here, his judgment about the ethical life and morality of the Hindus is decidedly negative.

48. See Mill, pp. 399 and 402, on their 'dissimulation and falsehood'.

sympathy for life or any compassion for human life in particular; for this too is an external affair, as seen from many phenomena. The horrible way they treat their draft animals demonstrates just how external it is. The English do not spare their livestock, and yet they are put out at how the Hindus mistreat their beasts of burden. They do not refrain from killing them out of sympathy, but instead because it is forbidden; so even the English are appalled at this.[49] The Hindus are not yet very advanced in animal husbandry or crop production. So when drought ensues, the livestock die off or else lead miserable, enfeebled lives, without arousing pity. Thus in a certain month of the year Hindus are obligated to provide water in their huts to any thirsty
192 person; | yet a day later that person receives not one swallow, in particular not from Brāhmans, in whom any distress of others arouses no feeling whatsoever, especially since Brāhmans are quite without feeling, are proud and haughty. When parents, wives, husbands or relatives become ill, they are placed in the hands of an astrological physician who provides sympathetic remedies. If the illness is life threatening, however, they are brought to the Ganges or to another river and left or abandoned, alone in their final hours.[50] Thus all these are not features of human sensibility.

People must not say, to the contrary, that there are beautiful, gracious portrayals of human sensibilities and situations in the *Shakuntalā* and other poems, for they must know what these features involve.[51] These portrayals involve an idyllic sphere into which nothing intrudes that concerns principles of ethical life or morality, of freedom, of politics—namely, behavior toward their fellows (*Gespielen*). Where engagement in civic life ceases, as in Indian poetry, there pleasantness prevails. But where the prince and court life enter in, this pleasantness is over and done with. In the case of this disinterested state, with this lack of the feeling of freedom and of one's own independence, in the total unawareness of a universal purpose that has determined actions and has come from within, we can surely conclude that there can be no proper political life, no freedom of a political state; instead that only capricious despotism—sometimes cruel, sometimes milder—must prevail.

49. Ibid. 403.

50. Mill (p. 404) attributes this abandonment at the river to the Bengalese.

51. Fredrich Schlegel says 'the friends of poetry' hope that many other portrayals of the Asian spirit will prove to display grace and love as found in the *Shakuntalā*. See his *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), pp. iii–iv. Shakuntalā is the main female character of a play by Kālidāsa (probably 3rd cent. AD); hence the play (*Abhijñānaśakuntalā*) is usually just referred to as the *Shakuntalā*. The story on which it is based occurs in book 1 of the *Mahābhārata*.

Before we go into the political sphere we have first to mention the religious sphere.

The Religious Sphere

The topic of religiosity poses the difficulty as to which presentation one should take up; for Hindu mythology is | extremely vast, and the other 193
aspect is that its images are very diverse. We see that what the *Laws of Manu* contains about God and the creation thus diverges from any other portrayal to be found in the Vedas and other books.[52] The portrayals are therefore extremely dissimilar and do not concur at all. One can escape their confusion only by culling out the universal spirit of religion.[53]

The question is how a people so devoid of spiritual substantiality, of independence, can themselves become conscious of the highest life, of what is truly substantial. We concede that the One is of course given to the Hindus as absolute substance, albeit as subsisting world-soul, as a subsisting stuff in which both spiritual and material aspects are annihilated. This one substantiality constitutes the foundation of Hindu representation, and everything determinate is only something dreamed, is nothing secure. The basic representation lies in this One and All; everything else is just a modification or vanishing form of the One. The world is its transitory revelation or manifestation. So pantheism constitutes the foundation. These configurations into which this One passes over, within which this One manifests itself, are something indeterminate, are self-dissolving. There is no unity present in the manifold. The human being is in no way posited in it. For someone who rises above this bondage, these distinctions principally become something fluctuating that deteriorates into this utter nonsense. | 194

For the Hindus there is nothing miraculous, because they have no set natural law; so everything is as such something miraculous. The Christian missionaries are faced with a difficulty when they tell of the miracle of Christ, because miracle is the Hindu's daily fare.[54] The Hindu's representation is this ceaseless whirl, this dreaming, and the more specific interest of religion is to secure something essential in this dreaming. One aspect is the contentless ground, the other the fact that multiplicity enters into it. Interest

52. The Vedas are the most ancient religious literature of the Aryan Indians, which is composed in a more ancient form of language (Old Indic) than the later Sanskrit literature. There are four Vedas, or Vedic collections of texts.

53. Mill remarks (p. 283) that no coherent system of belief can be extracted from their vague language, multiple fictions, and discrepant ideas.

54. See Abbé Dubois, p. 421.

lies in apprehending what is essential in this dreaming, in these incipient shapes. This apprehending cannot come to fruition, however, because apprehension would preclude the dreaming. For the truth of consciousness is found[55] where human beings freely know themselves as infinite self-consciousness within itself, from which they distinguish the world as something inherently self-establishing. Just as they acquire freedom and internal stability, so too the objects acquire boundaries and stability; they receive a solid grounding for the first time through the waking state (*Wachsein*). Hindus do not arrive at this waking state. Their religion, their endeavor to attain consciousness, is a struggling with this dreaming, a dreaming struggling, a seeking or longing that only gets to the point of tossing oneself about from one antithesis to another.

Now that we thus know the general character, we have to consider its more specific forms. We see two sorts of aspects, since the struggle of their dreaming is a buzzing about from one extreme to the other. Two aspects are in turn found in each extreme. One is the representing of the object, the other
195 the consciousness | that strives to raise itself up to the essentiality of the object; the latter aspect is the cultus.

The first extreme is then the sensuality of Hindu religion, the fact that it is a religion of nature, that it directly reveres natural objects as divinity, and that human beings relate themselves to these natural objects as they relate themselves to their own essential being.

Among these natural objects is first of all the sun.[56] The principal prayer of the Brāhmans is a prayer to the sun that they must recite numerous times during the day, but which they do in great secrecy from the English.[57] In addition, the stars and mountains, and particularly one part of the Himalayas from which the Ganges has its source, are divine, as also are the rivers as such, foremost the Ganges but other streams too. To possess water from the Ganges can cost Hindus a lot of money, and it is most desirable for each Hindu to have some, just as it is then that a particular elephant bearing Ganges water lead the way for a nabob.[58] Ganges water is brought to Tibet

55. The German editors, surely correctly, have changed the reading here from 'not found' to 'found'.

56. Mill says (p. 333) that Brahman is the sun, and that Brahmā, Vishnu, and Shiva are its heat, light, and flame respectively.

57. Colebrook describes the standing posture of one offering this prayer ('On the Religious Ceremonies', 355).

58. A 'nabob' is a Muslim prince, as Hegel correctly states later in our text, and one would not expect Muslims to regard Ganges water as holy. The term 'rajah' (for a Hindu prince) might better have been used here.

and into the peninsula. Furthermore, particular animals are revered: bulls, cows, elephants, and particular monkeys, for the ape-prince is a great ally of Rama in the *Rāmāyana*.[59] Often these are mere images. There is, however, a city inhabited by monkeys, with fakirs there to serve them. These monkeys are highly vicious. A living thing as such is respected by the Hindu to the extent that it may not be killed even though it has indeed gotten out of control.

This respect for animals is connected to the Hindu assumption about transmigration of souls, which is not, however, the sort of transmigration that we envisage. We envisage soul as a consciousness, the consciousness of oneself as this person. So our soul has consciousness of its own self-identity (*Diesselbigkeit*). Hindus represent transmigration of the soul | as the soul 196
being unaware of its previous condition and living on in a different body. For Hindus there is no personal continuation of the soul. There is a becoming one with the universal soul. There is a contradiction in holding at one time to maintenance of the individual in a different body, then to merging into the universal, the One, as what is highest. So here there is confusion too. They even take it so far that they regard their blind or crippled persons as though they are afflicted by these natural incapacities as punishment for crimes from a prior life.[60]

So natural objects, sun and stars, are objects of worship. At least according to some views, fire, air, and sun are regarded as the three main gods, those said to constitute the foundation of all the other deities, which reduce into these three gods. There is no consistency whatsoever in all these matters. To these natural objects that emerge as deities there then belong universal, natural powers, especially the powers of procreation, which are worshiped in the most disgraceful fashion. Male and female genitals are worshiped. The lingam and the yoni are the forms of male and female procreative powers. There are pervasive symbols for these powers.[61] Mount Meru, from which all streams flow, is also just the male organ. Masts of ships are symbols for it too.[62] The English maintain that Hindus are so brazen and bawdy in this

59. In the epic, Sita, the beloved of Rama (an avatar of Vishnu) was held captive in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) by the demon king Ravana, and the monkey-king Hanuman aided Rama in rescuing her. See Creuzer, *Symbolik*, pt. 1, 608–9.

60. On this punishment, see Abbé Dubois, p. 481.

61. On lingam (symbolic phallus) and yoni (symbolic female organ, depicted as a triangle), see Mill, p. 365.

62. 'Meru' is the name of a mountain in Hindu mythology. See William Jones, 'On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India', *Asiatic Researches*, 1 (London, 1799), 241. See also Francis Wilford, 'On Mount Caucasus', *Asiatic Researches*, 6 (London, 1801), 491. Wilford presents (pp. 488–9)

worship of theirs, as they are in their conversation, that even the English
197 sailors are shocked and embarrassed by it. |

Linked with this worship is a cultus that is, from this aspect, an unbridled, licentious sensuality. A group of young women, the only ones to enjoy an education, is kept in the temple for the purpose of arousing the sensuality of anyone who comes there. They are instructed in the art of giving pleasure, partly for its own sake, partly to acquire valuables for the temple from strangers who come there.[63] Likewise they have celebrated the most licentious festivals in which the essential thing is the utmost lack of restraint.

As the Hindu religion is but a giddy whirl from one extreme to the other, we also find in it an ascent to what is most abstract, and the most abstract relation of self-consciousness to that abstraction. Insofar as the universal is abstract, self-consciousness does not freely relate itself to it; for only in knowing itself in relation to God does self-consciousness know *itself* in that relationship and is it free. Since self-consciousness is not free in Hinduism, it also cannot relate itself freely to the absolute. As devoid of freedom, Hindu self-consciousness lacks the inwardness to stand before God; instead it can only relate itself to God as negating itself within God. This absolute negating of oneself is the highest point of Hindu self-consciousness. This complete renunciation must then count as what is supreme. The way of speaking here does not consider that God is something concrete, is a concretion of reason. A more concrete definition involves at a minimum the point that God is wise and has determined the world according to rational decrees. The concrete representation of God must have as its foundation the human being as one who acts purposefully, and self-consciousness must then itself be moral. But this definition according to the opposite aspect of God's wisdom, or a
198 determining of the individual according to these laws | of a universal will, is not found in Hindu consciousness, which reaches its highest point only in this abstract negating, in coming to God in this unhappy state (*Unglück*) only via its own self-surrender. Since it relates to this culminating point as something negative, this [self-surrender] is thus to be regarded as unhappiness.

In this abstraction self-consciousness indeed comports itself in thinking fashion, and in this proximity to the supreme point the speculative echoes of

a description of Mt. Meru drawn from the Puranas texts. See also Abbé Dubois, p. 40. Wilford also links Mt. Meru to the primeval lingam and yoni, and the latter two to the mast and hull of a ship (p. 522). See also Wilford, 'An Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West', *Asiatic Researches*, 8 (Calcutta, 1805), 273–4.

63. Abbé Dubois has a very full account (pp. 401–2) of these temple prostitutes. See also Mill, pp. 235–6.

representation emerge; but they are confused and obscure, and are only fathomable by someone who knows the speculative as such. Only a few of the details from Hindu mythology can be mentioned, for it is extremely diffuse.

As for the Hindu representation of God, we do find God represented as One, and they call it 'Brahmā' as distinct from 'Brahman', which is the One.[64] This representation of Brahmā is in a sense quite sublime, although for them it is found only alongside others. Brahmā is not the enduring, sovereign One; it is of course to be distinguished from the 'One' of monotheism. It is nothing enduring or independent into which everything perishes. The distinctions to which we proceed from this 'oneness' are no predicates nor are they persons, for they introduce once again the confusion of multiplicity. The Hindus have worthy views of the One. They say that this One is beyond all concept, beyond all understanding, is invisible, eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent. This is stated in the religious books.[65] This One has no temple, no public | worship. Human beings have no positive rela- 199
tion to it. Were the worship truly monotheistic, representation would have to function freely within this One, to abide there. But Brahmā is not worshiped and has no temple, just as in the Catholic religion individual saints are worshiped, not God, as Canova himself says.[66] Hindu temples are dedicated to particular figures. In addition to Brahmā, the Hindus have an endless number of gods; a Brāhman replied to an Englishman's query as to how many gods there are, by saying there are 33 crore of gods, each crore having 100 lakhs, and a lakh has 100,000 parts.[67] All of them reduce to three. But this multiplicity does not amount to anything.

64. In Hindu religion Brahmā is one of the most important deities (the others are Shiva and Vishnu); together the three constitute a trinity, the Trimurti ('three forms'). There is also Brahman, which embodies the world-soul; some say Brahman is the one reality underlying all else, the Trimurti and the world too. Hegel's interest focuses on Brahmā, as 'the highest individual deity'. Later Hinduism actually gives a greater prominence to Vishnu and Shiva than it does to Brahmā as an individual deity. In Hegel's day there was less precision among scholars in distinguishing the various written forms and their attendant meanings that derive from the Sanskrit root *brahman*. For Hegel's sources, see Jones, 'On the Gods' (p. 242) and Abbé Dubois (p. 367).

65. See Dow, *History of Hindostan*, i, pp. xli–xlii. Dow presents his accounts in the form of a lengthy literary narrative in which the characters and deities have names with extremely nonstandard spellings; it would serve no purpose to present them here or in subsequent notes.

66. Antonio Canova (1757–1822) was an Italian sculptor who abandoned the baroque style and developed his own classically fresh style. From 1802 on he was superintendent of artistic monuments for the Papal States.

67. See Mill (p. 285), who presents the grand total as 330 million. These terms for monetary values derive from Hindi. A crore amounts to 10 million rupees, or 100 lakhs; a lakh amounts to 100,000 rupees. Hotho reads: '... there are 33 million [gods]'.

In addition to Brahmā, the foremost figures are Vishnu and Shiva. We find then the characterization of Brahmā as the Creator, Vishnu as the Preserver, and Shiva as the Destroyer. On this score, however, there are in turn many sects; each holds a different god as supreme, and there is perpetual confusion. The main view involves Vishnu, who is, however, also called Krishna; but others worship Shiva and opposite [characteristics]. In the same fashion Buddha, or Gautama, is God for the Buddhists, but the Brahmanic Hindus have him too. The typical Hindu affirms all of these gods, with only one of them as supreme; in any event, for others a different one is supreme. We cannot say that there are Hindus for whom Brahmā alone is the one god. They always have all the other gods as well. The typical worship is just idolatry. The god is worshiped in a specific sensual shape. Just as Brahmā is
200 called the Eternal, the One, so the same is ascribed to other gods too. | So no distinction is secure; instead everything is fluid. Typically they regard the One, what they call Brahman or even Parabrahman, as still not what is first, fixed, and at rest, even though it is what is supreme. The unsteadiness and irrationality in this representation is advantageous for the Hindu. Many representations that sound wholly absurd have at the same time the feature that the One or the abstract is considered to be one element, something derivative. When God as spirit is called 'father', this is itself only one element.

From this perspective we discover among the Hindus much that is fundamental to the speculative domain. Thus for them the One or the abstract is nothing fixed itself, but instead only insofar as they call Brahmā, Vishnu, and Shiva, these three, the whole; the triad alone constitutes the true unity, such that for them an inkling of the trinity seems to be fundamental.

The one that the Hindus call Brahmā is therefore itself an element of the whole, although this in part comes out only in very sensuous representations. In the *Laws of Manu* it says: 'The first cause, Brahman, does not exist for the senses, is no sensible characteristic—it is and is not, is without beginning and end, is eternal; divine power is generated from it, the divine, the male, which is represented in all worlds as Brahmā. As inactive, this one rested in water, in an egg, for a thousand years, or one year of creation.' At the end of this time, through its own thought alone, it brought about the dividing of the egg, and from that division heaven and earth have emerged.[68]

68. See *Institutes*, ch. 1, paras. 11–13; Mill, p. 287. Both refer to 'a whole year of the Creator', neither to 1,000 years. Mill adds that such a 'year' equals 1,155,200 millions of solar years.

In another representation, Brahmā has lived eternally. Love lay dormant together with him, and it produced the power.[69] | The particular deity 201
Brahmā existed in the form of the endless expanse, and in his thus going hither and yon he became frightened for himself. For a thousand years he wandered about to complete his expansion, the setting of his dimensions. Then he prostrated himself and the Almighty said: 'You have done well, Brahmā, to prostrate yourself before us, for you cannot conceive of me. Go and create the world.' Brahmā asked, 'How can I do that?' Brahman replied, 'I will give you the power!' Brahmā produced within himself the ideas of things in such a way that the ideas of things only shimmered before his eyes but then vanished from them; so Brahmā called out, 'How shall I maintain these shapes?' Then there emerged from Brahmā's mouth a blue exhalation that said, 'I will'. This was Vishnu, who gave reality to Brahmā's merely ideal things. These things then possessed nothing but reality, without knowledge or thought; they were idiots with fat bellies. Distressed by them, Brahmā destroyed them and generated from his mouth four persons as regents whom Brahmā designated to complete the mastery over the world. But they were unable to do it—for glory belongs to God alone—since they had nothing destructive within them. Then Brahmā created Shiva as this destroyer.[70] Shiva, who for the first time unites both aspects, is also called Isa, Ishvara, Rudra, Hara, Sambhu, Mahādeva, and Mahesha.[71] In such representations there are thus fine echoes of the speculative, many admirable ones, although such depictions are merely subjective, individual personages pertinent only to individual sects foreign to the popular religion. These are just intimations. Besides, such features are confused and intermingled with sensuous representations that are incompatible with the universal religion of the Hindus. | 202

Another issue is then the Hindu's relation to God in the cultus. The cultus is a commonplace idolatry. The most interesting thing to investigate is just what to them seems supreme in the relation to God. This supreme factor is the ordeal (*Qual*) or the slaying of the natural state, the self-mortification via abstraction that leads to actual loss of life. Hence we find continual sacrifice, in particular even human sacrifice. Sacrifice is in part relinquishing of what is earthly, in part recognition of its nullity, such that recognition of the

69. See Dow, *History of Hindostan*, pp. xliv–xlv.

70. This lengthy account is taken from ibid., pp. xlviii ff., with minor variations on Hegel's part and with additional detail omitted.

71. This list of names for Shiva comes from Jones, 'On the Gods', p. 243. The last in the list may refer to either of the more common names, Mahesāna or Maheshvara.

worthlessness of the earthly is evidenced by divesting oneself of these worthless possessions. Such sacrifice is something external. The higher sacrifice, the true one, is for a human being's free choice and subjective particularity to be overcome by the universal. Hindus have only sacrifice of the former kind, and these sacrifices extend to the point of relinquishing all feeling for life, as well as relinquishing life itself.

In the relationship to thought, however, the Hindus themselves only ascend abstractly; in doing so they do not arrive at their freedom, do not maintain themselves in it. To be sure, abstraction from natural existence is necessary for this ascent. So human beings have to break through the negative aspect of mere natural freedom, of mere natural existence; however, this standpoint must then be a positive standpoint; their relationship to pure thought must be something positive. Hindu ascent then indeed breaks through the natural, but in such a way that natural existence cannot maintain itself at this peak, cannot make itself concrete, cannot fulfill itself. So this standpoint is only a hindrance, and its phenomena are the ordeals that Hindus impose upon themselves, penances they undergo, tortures and
203 suffering. So it is an ascent that remains negatively disposed toward | the natural state, that cannot revert to life, that in this return cannot maintain what is absolute. So its phenomena are the ordeals in which human beings exhibit themselves as worthless in their natural existence but ones they cannot convert into the positive apprehension of the absolute.

These phenomena are extremely diverse. Often whole groups of Hindus cast or plunge themselves into the Ganges, not from being tired of living or depressed from ill health, but in order to sacrifice or dedicate themselves to God. Thus they even cast their children before crocodiles; they suspend them from trees in baskets.[72] Hindus often take their own lives or allow them to be taken. In the procession they allow the carts of the deities to crush them to pieces. What takes place at the festival is that the idol in the temple is transported about, for instance, in the Jagannātha festival. The extremely ponderous cart, drawn by some one thousand people, is outfitted all around with lights. Many hundreds of people are upon it. The procession around the temple lasts for three days. Often at that time many penitents cast themselves in the path of the cart, in order to be crushed to pieces by its wheels, for Hindus are very ingenious in their penances.[73] An Englishman encountered

72. See Mill, pp. 357–8, who, however, speaks not only of people drowning themselves but also of self-decapitation, and of children thrown to sharks (rather than crocodiles).

73. See the accounts in Mill (p. 357) and Abbé Dubois (pp. 413–14), which present the devotees' deaths as voluntary self-sacrifices. Jagannātha is a local name of Vishnu at the temple

one such person who for twenty years had forced himself to sleep exclusively in a standing position, and to that end had in the beginning tied himself to a tree, and other such things. Others force themselves to have their arms perpetually raised, or their hands constantly clasped so that their fingernails grow out through the opposite hand. They are beggars and must be fed by others. One Hindu slept on a bed of sharp nails for thirty-four years; others sit motionless, gazing at their noses and in anticipation of being fed. If they are not fed they die of hunger.[74] There are a great many austerities and states of abstraction like this. | 204

So this is the only way that Hindus know how to place themselves in unity with the One. To them the One is what is abstract, and the placing of oneself in unity with it is in any case this pure negation. The image is of being one with Brahman through such austerities. Those born as Brāhmans are already one with Brahman in virtue of their birth. Hindus suppose that members of other castes become Brahman only through this endless abstraction, through this mortification, this negation, the sheerly negative, the thought of the onefold (*Einfach*). Abstraction from all fulfillment is the means for becoming one with Brahman.[75] The universal soul, the lifeless, abstract soul—this is the supreme exaltation of the Hindu; it is a liberation that has merely a negative significance. It proceeds from the state of withdrawal from self, and this withdrawal exalts itself only through absolute abstraction. They do not know how to take hold of a fulfilled value. The whole of Hindu character is comprised in this feature.

The State and its History

Now that we have seen the fundamental features in their concrete form, the ultimate knowing of oneself as being something empty, we pass over to our last topic, to the state and its history. As far as the state is concerned, we have defined the Hindu principle as complete lack of freedom. The view of freedom is not fulfilled freedom, but is instead empty abstraction. Everything ethical determines its volition and actions from this standpoint; it elaborates itself from this point. But with this withdrawal from self and

of Puri in Orissa. More likely the deaths resulted from accidents in pulling the enormous festival carts, although the colonial authorities interpreted them as religious suicides. From these reports of the Jagannātha festival comes the English word 'juggernaut'.

74. On these self-inflicted austerities, see Mill, pp. 352–3; Dow, *History of Hindostan*, p. xxxviii; Jonathan Duncan, 'An Account of Two Fakeers, with their Portraits', *Asiatic Researches*, 5 (London, 1799), 37–52 (see pp. 37, 46).

75. On this route for non-Brāhmans, see Mill, p. 355.

this lack of freedom that marks the Hindu's concrete life, what we call the state, purpose, wholeness, rational law, or ethical life can have no place,
205 cannot be present. For the freedom of the Hindu remains utterly | indeterminate, abstract. So nothing is left for concrete relationships but contingency of willing or caprice, which cannot arrive at a political constitution. The patriarchal principle of the Chinese also can have no place; there is no room for it. Its defect was having its moral content as civil law. For the Hindu freedom is only something negative, the withdrawal of self from all that is determinate in life and consciousness. So the Hindu principle of political life is caprice and contingency.

The political condition, examined more closely, presents itself as the Europeans found it. We wish to mention its general features and then to inquire whether this is the enduring condition, or whether it has been preceded by something different with the present condition only its final dissolution, perhaps only the residue of a prior condition of splendor and prosperity.

So our first concern is this condition as the Europeans found it. They found it to be a host of larger and smaller principalities ruled by Muslim and Hindu dynasties. In both kinds of principality internal conditions were the same. Hindu princes were called 'rajahs', Muslim princes 'nabobs'. These lands of course had ruling families, some ancient and some more recently so, with the ancient ones mostly from the warrior caste but also occasionally from the Brāhman caste, as is the peshwa of the Maratha kingdom.[76] We see at once that the succession within these families is utterly uncertain, is entirely a matter of chance. Even though we consider the distinction between determinate succession and chance succession to be merely an empirical issue, we are familiar with the importance of determinacy of succession and only learn to prize a definite line of succession when we have become
206 acquainted with the history | of oriental despots. Secure succession involves not merely the law of succession, but in general an ethical, legal condition; only where such is the case can the royal sequence be definite. We have attributed the succession in the Indian states to chance. The children are of course the successors, though it is unspecified as to which will be the one. It is the same in private rights; according to the *Laws of Manu*, brothers shall inherit in accord with their relatively good or bad qualities.[77] This text provides all the specificity there is to the law. So nothing is fixed even with respect to dynasties.

76. See above, n. 7.

77. See *Institutes*, ch. 9, paras. 114–17, and also Mill, p. 212.

Hence the history of that Indian realm is a ceaseless interplay of uprisings, conspiracies, and brutal episodes of princely family members *vis-à-vis* one another, the poisonings of princes, as well as a series of conspiracies of generals and public servants as such. The main history consists of these upheavals and intrigues, these murderous deeds, these atrocities. As soon as a minor child was supposed to rule, these circumstances came into play. A prince who wants to maintain the royal succession for himself and his descendants can accomplish it only by violence, by constant distrust of his surroundings in every way, and not through strictness of punishment but through harshness. Orderly conduct and statutory punishments are not the norm here. The main spectacle of Indian history is this atrocious and wearisome drama.

To be more specific about the internal constitution of the state, about its inner condition, it can best be characterized by, or compared to, a feudal arrangement, subdivided among a host of minor masters, | elders from the 207
warrior caste. This warrior caste is master of the land; the warriors employ against one another and against the prince the same means of uprisings and atrocities as he employs himself. The powerful form an aristocracy and constitute the prince's council. They must pay a tax and provide military service; but their counsel in all matters must be sought, and they obey only when they feel under compulsion by the prince or some other authority. So the prince's chief means of maintaining himself is his own character or the power of gold. So long as princes have money to pay the soldiers, they have power. All comes apart; the chieftains carry on independently; they conquer and oppress. This was the condition that the Europeans found following the exhaustion of the Mongol princes who had held the whole together in unity. After its decline the realm fell apart into this multiplicity of rulerships maintained by force, attained by cunning or strength, in that a pack of thieves seized power. But sometimes too a stronger despot formed a larger realm, for instance the Maratha kingdom, which then exacted tribute from the others.

So India was continuously up in arms, with warfare between adjacent districts or with internal conflict. The violent pressed upon weaker neighbors, compelling them to hand over a fourth of their aggregate income. In this setting the Marathas were the most violent. The fourth part was often increased to a half. Even so there was still no peace, for the legacy of coercion was the neglect of payment, and so constant strife, pressure, and counter pressure. In this fashion the government was marked on the one hand by constant court intrigues, on the other by constant contentiousness.

208 The question is then: Was this an age-old condition or | was it the final state of dissolution of an earlier, flourishing realm, of a beautiful, rational, earlier condition, of a more magnificent, more prosperous world—a dissolution preceded by a beautiful whole, by an ethical condition?[78]

The next topic before us involves the foreign conquerors, who can be viewed as the cause of the dissolution. What is noteworthy so far as the foreign conquerors, the Muslims, are concerned, is that they inserted themselves as a wholly alien world and so changed the condition of the Indians; they did so not in the way that the northern barbarians altered the Roman world but instead in the way in which the Manchus pressed into China. What is more, a large number of Indian states remained free. So foreign rule did not produce any wholesale change.

The next point is what we discover of historical features of an earlier condition, in works containing traces of an earlier, splendid condition—that it is nothing but a condition of stupefaction, of warfare and the political controversies of the dynasties. A great expert on the Indians says that revolutions, massacres, barbaric conquests, and atrocities mark the history of this beautiful realm that to the casual observer seems to be a paradise. Only in the poems, with their panegyrics, are there traces of earlier splendor. The Brāhmans dream and spin tales of a formerly existing and pure Indian realm that preceded the Muslim conquests. Upon closer examination, however, this realm collapses into a dream world or a poetic construct; it crumbles away entirely.

Indian epic poems have no historical foundation. They entirely lack a
209 relationship like that of Homer to the | Trojan War. (See the *Rāmāyana*, the second and third volumes of which we have in Europe.) From the 'histories' one gleans nothing for history. The primordial setting in India seems to be the interactions of many states. The tradition of religious wars between Brāhmans and Buddhists finds its place here. These wars, as well as those of the devotees of Vishnu or of Shiva in opposition to the Brāhmans, take place continuously and still go on today.[79] The bloodiest conflicts, in which thousands perish, occur at festivals and in marketplaces where several millions are gathered.

78. This passage refers to the Hindu division of history into four periods or 'yugas'. The first is the golden yuga, the second silver, the third copper, with the fourth and final one being 'earthen'. This terminology is according to Jones, 'On the Gods', p. 236.

79. On these conflicts, see Mill, p. 309, as well as J. D. Paterson, 'Of the Origin of the Hindu Religion', *Asiatic Researches*, 8 (Calcutta, 1805), 44–87 (esp. 45–6).

India's image today is largely still that of an earlier condition. Of course individual kingdoms do necessarily have splendid eras and flourishing conditions, especially the principality of Ayodhyā, farther inland.[80] As we said, however, these are only passing moments. For what they show is that the chance personality of the ruler is everything, and all hinges on it. Under despotism a weak prince can be the cause of greater internal conflict, whereas under a stronger master as successor the land, with its luxuriant soil, directly restores itself anew to splendor and brilliance. The condition of states in that setting is like nature when it exhibits constant oscillation between total desiccation and the most luxuriant vegetation; so India is in general the scene of the greatest contrasts. Because this was in the main the ancient condition in India, thus earlier ages and religion were simpler. The ancient books, the Vedas, are mostly prayers to the gods and hymns to princes, from all eras. These books exhibit greater simplicity than does the present day. Some incarnations of deities were not yet mentioned in them. | 210

The entire condition—the political and religious condition in general, and so forth—is determined by the caste distinctions that seem to have been already in place at the time of Alexander the Great, although then there were still exceptions to the ban on intercaste marriages. Strabo, Ptolemaeus, Pliny, and Arrian indicate as much.[81] The Hindus have traditions of a prince who prescribed these distinctions, although these castes were established prior to historical times. The Brāhmans, for instance, are said to be an immigrant people but not a priestly people, so an external coming together of different racial stocks does not account for the situation. That is because castes are occupational distinctions, and these of course presuppose the unity of a state, in which these distinctions later come to be set in stone.

The fact that these distinctions have spread throughout all of India (although no period is indicated in which the whole of India was one kingdom) can readily be explained when we see how the whole has a single principle for its foundation, with the result that when, in a shared stage of

80. See Jones, 'On the Gods' (p. 259) and Creuzer, *Symbolik* (pt. 1, 599). Ayodhyā was an extremely large, ancient, and sacred city. Regarded as the birthplace of Rama, its location is in Uttar Pradesh, in the vicinity of Lucknow.

81. On Ptolemaeus, or Ptolemy, see n. 89 below. For Arrian's report, see his *Indica*, pts. 11–12, an account based on earlier writers that speaks of seven castes but in fact says intermarriage is not allowed. English tr. P. A. Brunt, *Arrian*, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1983); the *Indica* is in ii. 306–433. Arrian says (ibid. ii. 336–41) that the seven castes consist of: sophists, farmers, herdsmen, artisans and shopkeepers, soldiers, overseers, and 'those who deliberate about public affairs with the king'. See also Strabo, *Geography* 15.1.29 ff. (*The Geography of Strabo*, vii, tr. Horace Leonard Jones (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1930), 48 ff.).

culture, at one point such an ethical condition arises, the less refined neighbors are easily converted to what the cultured people show them. They willingly adopt what appears to them to be something superior. By the way, the caste distinctions are not all-pervasive in Indian states, for there are still many quite unrefined, savage peoples who have not yet arrived at this distinction of castes. No cultivation has begun for them. Their commerce consists in the salt trade, although apart from it they remain in their mountains, from which they just make single, wild forays. This is now what can be said in general terms about the ancient condition of the Hindus. Noteworthy in this context is a publication of Nikolaus Müller (Mainz,
211 1822).[82] This man | holds the ancient Hindus in high regard. He seems to be entirely unfamiliar with *Asiatic Researches*. He seems to know only the work of William Jones, and says that the golden age in India blossomed with these ancient Hindus. He seems to have a fairly low opinion of lieutenants and captains, and yet these men are the ones who often have spent the greatest part of their lives in India and are knowledgeable about the ethics, language, and religion of the Hindus.

Now we wish to go over briefly the situation of the historian. We have already remarked that the Hindus have no historical perspective and are incapable of any historiography; this point serves to complete the picture of their characteristics. In order to portray the distinction to us, we need only look to what the Old Testament says about the condition of Israel's forebears. Hindus cannot comprehend this at all. Hindus are wholly incapable of such an intelligible designation. For them everything blurs into extravagant images. They are incapable of anything intelligible. Improbability and impossibility are categories that do not occur to them.[83]

The *historia rerum gestarum* constitutes a necessary middle term in the ongoing development of a people; for a people must look upon its past in historical terms. It has something firm and enduring in these images. This becomes something by which caprice and contingency are dispelled. An established condition can secure itself only empirically. Only through history does a character fix itself in the case of a people, in that they have the image of an established prior condition whereby something firm also enters into the
212 political aspect, in part undergirds a political constitution, in part | is

82. *Glauben, Wissen und Kunst der alten Hindus*, i. Hegel's remarks about Müller in the following sentences of our text show that he had not read this book. Müller explicitly mentions *Asiatic Researches* (see pp. 11 ff. and ch. 3) in the course of expressing his negative assessment of the scientific value of those reports from Englishmen. Müller cites a publication that puts the contributions of soldiers on the same level as those of scholars (p. 18).

83. See Mill, pp. 142 and 144.

continually built up. Because the Hindus have no history in the subjective sense, they also have none in the objective sense. Precisely because the Hindus have no *historia*, they have no authentic history.

The vast numbers that we find in the case of the Hindus for the reigns of rulers and the periods of history are remarkable. Many names are linked to these numbers, although the numbers are totally arbitrary, entirely lacking in historical significance. Examples include one king reigning for 70,000 years and another prince undertaking penances for 10,000 years.[84] We see that we are not to think of history (*Historie*) in these cases. The situation is comparable with the numbers of chronology. These huge numbers have an astronomical sense, but not one as though the Hindus had such ancient observations that the numbers would have become so huge.

To provide a brief perspective, we wish to compare our year with the Hindu numbers. When we calculate our year at 365 days and a few hours, to express such numbers exactly we need to express them in relation to a determinate unity, to a day, to hours, and so forth, and to express such relationships in terms of intervals (*Brüche*). But if we do not do it with intervals, then the numbers become all the more decisive, all the larger. Thus the moon completes its cycle relative to the earth twelve times and then some in one of our years. There is then, however, the Metonic system,[85] according to which the moon completes 237 cycles over nineteen years, such that after nineteen of our years it finds itself once again at the starting point. So the Hindus sought to indicate when all the planets, as seen from earth, would have been in conjunction, | and they expressed the intervals by huge num- 213
bers, supposedly commensurate with such relationships. This is thus how their huge numbers came about. The Hindus have a distinctive astronomical system, the accuracy of which depends upon the precision of the one doing the calculating. The main thing is that such numbers are nothing historical, but instead have astronomical meaning and express exactitude not via intervals but by large whole numbers.

Another remarkable feature is that the best sources for Indian history are not the Hindus themselves, but the Greeks and Muslims. The Greek accounts do not indicate that the Indians had been subject to the Persians. Alexander conquered only one part of India; he did not press on to the

84. See above, n. 18.

85. Meton (5th cent. BC), an Athenian astronomer, devised the Metonic cycle, a period of nineteen years after which the lunar month returns to an original position of calibration with the solar year.

Ganges, but only as far as the Punjab.[86] Successive Greek monarchs also had possessions within India. The Seleucids held the Bactrian realm under their dominion. Only by AD 1000 does the narrative become more precise, when Muslim princes seized the Indian throne: Ghaznavids, Afghans whose dominion had its seat in Ghazni. Later, Timur and his followers conquered India and founded a Mongol empire.[87] But these Mongol princes, becoming soft, eventually met their downfall when the Europeans finally took control of almost the entire empire.

More important as a historical source are the documents of the interior of India, the inscriptions on stone monuments, copper plates, and the like, some of which are in very ancient written characters similar to Sanskrit and provide specific dates, but only dates of these specific monuments. Furthermore, an indigenous source is the collection of lists of kings. Captain
214 Wilford in particular has collected and studied these lists, a few of which | are of the greatest consequence.[88] These lists are accepted in India as more or less accurate although, according to the testimony of Wilford, who possessed one of them himself, they are very discrepant from one another. Lately the English have devoted a lot of effort to such matters. The geographical statements of Ptolemaeus were found to be exact.[89] Known to him were Allahabad, a region of the Ganges, as well as many others.

The lists of kings, then, are mutually contradictory in the extreme. The Brāhmans deal with the lists in such a way that what is most important is arranging and establishing epochs partly in astronomical terms, partly historically. They fill out these expanses with names of kings, which are often imaginary. They omit important kings and ascribe their periods of reign to others, transposing kings and dynasties into a wholly different time, based on prejudice or confusion. It is not uncommon for them to pass over from distant predecessors of one year to the latest descendant, omitting those in between. What is then indicated about these kings is completely mythological. Wilford provides us with these reports. He says that an Indian historian

86. See Arrian, *Anabasis* 5.28 (Brunt, ii. 92–5). After debating with his leaders, Alexander decided not to cross the Hyphasis (Beas) River that flows through the Punjab, but instead to withdraw and return to the West.

87. The Mogul dynasty (consisting of Mongol, Turkish, and Persian groups) was founded in 1526 by followers of Timur (Tamerlane), and lasted until 1857. The earlier empire of Tamerlane (1336–1405), a Tatar, extended across southern and western Asia, with its seat in Samarkand.

88. Captain Frances Wilford served in India and furnished several important contributions to *Asiatic Researches*.

89. Claudius Ptolemaeus (fl. AD 127–48), better known as Ptolemy, the famous ancient astronomer of Alexandria, was also a geographer who wrote a treatise on the geography of Europe, Africa, and Asia, complete with maps.

imparted to him that he quite casually filled in the expanses with names and conjoined realms, and that his doing so is justifiable because his predecessors, the authors of the chronicles, have done likewise.

Another remarkable circumstance that contributes to the confusion of Indian history is that the Indians have also incorporated into their history the histories of foreign peoples. The best-known to appear in those lists is Vikramāditya, who is reckoned to have lived about fifty years before Christ. It is highly uncertain who this person was. As the English investigated more precisely, | they found nine individuals having this famous name; one was 215
king of a small realm, another king of all of India.[90] One of them is said to have presented a great offering in order to attain a long life. Upon receiving an unfavorable response, he wished to kill himself, and the deity then promised him a thousand years of untroubled rule. Then a son was born to a virgin and a carpenter, and this son dethroned Vikramāditya. This child is obviously Christ; for what Christ has done is found in this history, reworked in Indian fashion.[91]

We find that the books of the Apocrypha were distorted in wholly Indian fashion, and the Talmudic writings as well. In the same way too the story of Solomon is found interwoven into the Indian narrative, as well as the stories of the Muslim and of other Islamic kings.[92] The detailed story of Muhammad is told and indeed so that he was born in India. The story of how he is then said to have come to Arabia is so shamefully sordid that it is not to be recounted.[93] In particular, even the story of Noah and his three sons appears in Indian history too, but so that the sons' names are unrecognizable. Indian 'history' consists of such connections. Bentley, who carries out the most exacting investigations, supposes that this Vikramāditya could only fall in the eleventh or twelfth century after Christ.[94]

90. On the multiple bearers of this name, see Wilford, 'An Essay', *Asiatic Researches*, 9 (Calcutta, 1807), 117.

91. Ibid. 118, for this account, drawn from several Hindu scriptures.

92. Wilford (ibid. 118–19), says these disparate materials include an apocryphal gospel of Christ's infancy, various Jewish writings about Solomon, as well as items about Muhammad (Hegel's 'the Muslim') and Sassanid Persian kings.

93. Wilford (ibid. 159–60) presents the story. In brief, a Brāhman concealed a garment soiled by his wet dream. A maiden in the house he was visiting found the cloth, unknowingly applied it to her own body, and subsequently became pregnant. She and the resulting male child were ultimately dismissed from the household, like Hagar and Ishmael sent away by Abraham in the Bible. The son went abroad to start a new religion (namely, Islam).

94. J. Bentley is the author of 'On the Hindu Systems of Astronomy, and Their Connection with History in Ancient and Modern Time', *Asiatic Researches*, 8 (Calcutta, 1805), 193–244.

Astronomy and Art

It is noteworthy concerning the writings on astronomy that, because they are inscribed on palm leaves, they do not last long, for which reason there are no ancient codices; instead the works must be recopied, and it has come to light
216 that the copyists | were not ashamed to make the most capricious alterations. So the greatest uncertainty prevails in this regard.

Wilford himself was a proof of what deception the Brāhmans generally get away with. A learned Brāhman was supposed to cull from the Puranas features bearing similarity to Greek myths and Egyptian elements. After utilizing this Brāhman for a year and then having a look for himself, Wilford found that different time periods were appropriate for certain words; in this way Wilford discovered that the Brāhman had altered such dates in the originals to what Wilford could have wished them to be. The Brāhman, thus discredited, took a solemn oath and brought thirteen Brāhmans who were said to attest likewise to the accuracy of the dates.[95]

As for the works of art in India, those found in Elora at the latitude of Bombay, and those in particular on the Coromandel Coast, have now been described and studied most precisely. Niebuhr was the first to call attention to them.[96] Entire mountains were hollowed out, and temples, columns, huge figures, and a host of other objects, were carved in the rock—feats of admirable diligence. The walls contain mythological depictions. Great antiquity is ascribed to these works; yet the images show that they involve nothing beyond the mythological system current at that time; for these images are the same shapes as we find even today among the Brāhmans. The neglect of such temples is easily explained by Muslim fanaticism, which has polluted and desecrated them, and bombarded the interiors so that Hindus no longer come to serve these temples. The newer representations above their altars are ones produced since the birth of Christ; the Hindus mainly used Abyssinians
217 to fashion them, and these artists simply imitated | what they had seen in temples in Egypt, images partly of Greek origin, partly of Egyptian origin. Lines and relationships taken from Greek works were ones that could be depicted simply by untrained people. These untrained Abyssinians worked in accord with recollections of that sort.

95. See Wilford, 'An Essay', 251 ff., which says the Brāhman deceived by word changes, erasures, and forgery of extensive passages, and that he brought in ten others to back him up.

96. Ellorā (or Elūrā), located in Maharashtra, has many cave and rock temples dating from AD 400 to 900. There is no mention of them in the works of the historian Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776–1831).

India in the Framework of World History

The two world-historical questions are: What advance has the Indian world generally made as an advance of the idea in itself? Does the Indian world stand connected to the rest of the world and, if so, in what way?

We already considered the first question at the outset. China is the patriarchal whole, and wholeness or oneness is its basic characteristic. The Indian principle is the second element of the idea, namely, that of distinction, of specific, firm distinction. As a human distinction that is said to be subordinate to the spirit of unity, it remains something merely natural and becomes a setting of the social classes in stone, in relation to one another. Because the distinction was so ossified, there was only inequality, distinction, multiplicity; rationality, freedom, and a political condition could find no place here. Therefore this distinction was fixed, and this is the Hindu principle.

It is the other principle in the world-historical context, although it has no connection either backward with China or forward with the next principles. The world-historical | advance is therefore only implicitly present—as in 218
the case of animals and flowers that form a system, albeit a system in which, as individuals, they emerge from the soil by themselves, without one species appearing in connection with the others. The connection is not explicit, but instead exists only for the reflective mind. This is the most irrational mode, that of nature, and in this naturalness the Indian principle exists in this connection only for the concept, not in the phenomena.

The second question—whether the Indian world stands in a historical connection with the others—must be answered in the affirmative. That is because the concept of the principle of distinction already involves difference, going-outward (*Nachaußengehen*). The Chinese principle is explicitly isolated. But distinction must go outward, and so the Indian principle also has an external, world-historical connection with the others. This, however, can only be a passive relationship, a mute, inactive expansion; for, inasmuch as the distinction is the abstract principle, the Indian world is without individuality. What there is of individuality is only the caprice of despotism. So it is a connection devoid of individuality. We will discuss this aspect briefly.

One aspect of this connection has of course been stated previously, namely, that India was always an object of desire for all peoples, above all the West. Hence early on India was a factor in commercial trade. Foreign peoples acquired for themselves Indian treasures—pearls, jewels, perfumes. The details of these elements are not our concern. This connection was

219 partly by land, partly by sea. The Indians themselves were early | seafarers and traders, and they had been visited by a people from the ocean to the south. This already took place before the Greeks came. Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans had contacts with India. Sailing around the Cape of Good Hope is a principal feature of more recent history. This trade that the Indians themselves also carried on is in general something inconsequential and ancient; it had no influence on the situation as a whole and the Indians discontinued it very early on, just as advances took place in the elaboration of the caste principles and the subservience to ceremonial observances, and stricter lines were drawn between the castes themselves, and between pure and impure acts.

So India had early visits from, and connections with, the ocean to the south. It is notable that the commercial connection with Asia and India had long been carried on by land, via Syria and Egypt, until at last the epochal discovery of the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. People often have the image of this route around the Cape as just an expedient to avoid the barbaric conditions of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia—that the natural and closer route passes through Egypt, and so people in any event propose to cut through the isthmus of Suez.[97] The ancient route does indeed go this way. But it is not the infinitely easier route, thus making the other one just an expedient. Seafaring from India to Suez can take place only three months of the year, because one has to contend with the monsoons, which blow in the opposite direction the greater part of the year. If one does not take advantage of the season and has gotten to the Gulf of Arabia, then here come the north winds as a hindrance. At the present time Egypt is peaceful, and yet people
220 favor the sea route. Last year Lord Hastings[98] dispatched two | captains to England via the two routes. The one sailing via the Cape reached London three weeks earlier than the other, who at that very time had been at the latitude of Bab-el-Mandeb[99] and had set out on the route via Suez. The one who sailed via Egypt had the most auspicious season but had to make part of his way over land and arrived three weeks later. Also, on the Arabian Gulf one sails only with small ships, ones that utilize the off-shore winds. Thus this apparently shorter route has disadvantages compared to the newer

97. The Suez Canal was opened in 1869.

98. Frances Rawdon, the first Marquis of Hastings, was governor-general of India from 1812 to 1823. He expanded the British domain and carried out internal reforms.

99. The Bab-el-Mandeb is the narrow strait at the south-western tip of the Arabian peninsula, separating it from the coast of Africa, and the Gulf of Aden from the Red Sea. It is a long way still to Suez!

ocean route. So India has in this connection a passive relationship with regard to commercial trade.

The second aspect of it is the dispersal of Indians. A characteristic phenomenon has been observed in more recent times, one that places India in contact with the West. It is evident that Sanskrit, the ancient Indian language, is not only the mother of all contemporary Indian languages, of which there are many, with all of them acknowledging Sanskrit as their mother. The Vedas are written in Sanskrit. The *Shakuntalā* ('The Decisive Ring'), a drama by Kalidasa, is even partly in Sanskrit.[100] As for the Hindustani language,[101] it is not typically Indian, but something composite. Sanskrit is not only the mother tongue of Indian languages but is also the original language underlying ancient Persian; it is also related, on one hand, to the Greek, Latin, and Germanic languages, on the other, to Egyptian. The root words of these languages are also found in Sanskrit. Even more amazing than the evident identity of the roots is the comparability of the grammatical system and especially the conjugation system, with those of the Greek, Latin, and Germanic languages. Professor Bopp in particular has carried out celebrated studies of these languages.[102] This has necessarily been very surprising to the European world. In India, Sanskrit is in fact the language | of the sacred books, as Latin is for us. In India we see Sanskrit, 221
and in other places we see the Persian, Egyptian, Greek, Latin, and Germanic languages. The [geographic] link is interrupted by Syriac and Hebrew.[103] So the linkage is not continuous, but is interrupted.

This points to a quite ancient dispersal of tribes of people from India. Yet this is not to be represented as though India is to be viewed as the land of origin, because the ancient Persian or Zend language likewise proves to be connected with Sanskrit; Zend is not its daughter but parallels it, so that

100. Kalidasa is held to be the greatest Indian poet. He lived in the 5th cent. AD, residing at the court of the kings of the Gupta dynasty. He composed both epics and dramas. The *Shakuntalā* is his most famous work. Hegel most likely knew the tr. by Georg Forster, *Sakontala oder der entscheidende Ring. Ein indisches Schauspiel von Kalidasa. Aus der Ursprachen Sanskrit und Prakrit ins Englische und aus diesen ins Deutsche übersetzt mit Erläuterungen* (Vienna, 1800). See above, n. 51.

101. Hindustani, the lingua franca of much of India today, is Western Hindi with Arabic and Persian components too.

102. Franz Bopp (1791–1867), professor at the University of Berlin, published his major work subsequent to these lectures by Hegel, in 6 vols., 1833–52. The title of the English tr., by Edward B. Eastwick, is *A Comparative Grammar of Sanskrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Gothic, German, and Sclavonic Languages* (Hildesheim and New York, 1985). See also above, n. 18.

103. In place of 'Syriac and Hebrew', Griesheim has 'the so-called Armenian languages, Syriac, Arabic'.

both seem to have an ancient, common source. Zend has its locus to the north of India, in the region of Bactria, of Kashmir, in the Afghan kingdom, in the Parapanisus Mountains. All these lands are ones where the predominant language is related to Sanskrit. There are regions where Sanskrit still today is the living vernacular and is spoken in purer form than in India proper. So we have this northern region that likewise belongs to the domain of the Sanskrit language; if we represent the dispersal as a displacement of peoples, we have to think of it as proceeding outward from this northern point, or that this point is rather the higher point than that from which the antecedent diffusion took place.

This migration of peoples that we see only in the language is itself a silent, mute feature prior to all the specificity of recorded history. It is a silent dispersal into circumstances where there was no inherent or extant culture
222 at all. The available historical | traces have been compiled very intelligently and cleverly, with great diligence, by Professor Ritter in his *Vorhalle zur europäischen Welt*.[104] This is, however, a very unstable field, very treacherous, with little credibility because connections often arise that reside merely in phonemes. Since these people were spread out in Central Asia, this dispersal route is represented as going northward from India and around the Caspian Sea, partly to the south and partly to the north, through Armenia and Asia Minor toward Greece, to the Black Sea, and so forth. As Ritter constructs them, the main connecting elements relate principally to points at the Black Sea: Colchis, Phasis, and the Sea of Azov. He delineates a commercial trade connection with these points, an inland trade that stretched from here to India and to China. The similarity of names of people in Phasis with those in India is remarkable. In this connection Herodotus transmits the legend that Egyptians dwelt in Phasis, since Herodotus assumed Egyptians to be the foreigners there.[105] These are the historical traces. These peoples were not imbued with the 'Indian spirit', for the dispersal took place in prehistoric times. As fortune or necessity would have it, what they were imbued with they cast off. So this is the historical connection of Indians with the outside world. Indians have not conquered but instead only have been conquered: they were no outwardly directed individuality.

104. 'Entryway to the European World'. Carl Ritter, *Die Vorhalle europäischer Völkergeschichten vor Herodotus, um den Kaukasus und an den Gestaden des Pontus* (Berlin, 1820).

105. Phasis is the name of the chief river in the ancient territory of Colchis on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, and also the name of a settlement there established by the Milesians. It was a major trading center, with many resident foreigners and many languages in use. Herodotus says 'the Colchians are clearly Egyptians' (ii. 104). See *The History*, tr. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 173.

In comparing Sanskrit with the Greek, German, and Latin languages, we find many roots that are shared with the Persian language. This is the material aspect; the more ideal aspect is the grammatical affinity. The grammatical system proves to be not only very developed internally; | there 223
are also a number of scholarly works about grammar. In Indian literature too one finds a sublime cultivation of grammar. From this feature people customarily infer an early, sublime cultivation of the Indians as such. However, this inference from the elaboration of languages to cultivation in general is wholly unwarranted. If the matter is viewed empirically, we indeed find the opposite. In Europe very cultured peoples have a simple grammar. Fulsomeness of expression for sensible objects is more a sign of barbarism than of culture. The German language too has many distinct sounds. But this abundance is not one on which to place a high value. Previously people took grammatical cultivation as indicator of a people's culture. But this elaboration is quite often a multiplicity of wholly insignificant distinctions. For instance, the English language has a very simple grammar; whereas with barbaric peoples we see that when they commence cultivation they engage in drawing minute distinctions. For example, in the Arab and Turkish grammarians we find the greatest acumen and the most extreme minutiae as signs of retrogression, or of a not yet highly flourishing culture. In the times of their decline the Greeks and Romans began to elaborate grammar.

Buddhism and Lamaism

We now have remaining for our brief consideration something yet related to the Indian world, namely, the range of peoples that belong to the Buddhist religion, those linked to Lamaism.[106] | 224

We saw the Indian spirit as one of a dreaming that, in representation, splits into two extremes. The shapes are nevertheless related. We saw that in representation this spirit goes wandering at random. Its foundation is the One of all things that casts itself about in a great many natural and spiritual

106. The portrayal of Buddhism confronted Hegel with various problems. One is that the overall presentation of Asia had become so wide-ranging that there was little time left for it. The other was that, as a religion spanning many lands and peoples, Buddhism was not, in Hegel's sense, a bearer of history, which in his conception could only be a state. So, owing to time limitations and systematic reasons, Hegel did not succeed in treating successfully and in depth this religion that is so widespread in Asia—although the available sources were not so skimpy as his portrayal would lead one to believe. Hegel limits himself more or less to repetition of a few travelers' reports and omits almost entirely a presentation of Buddhist doctrine. There is, however, some discussion of Buddhist doctrine in the philosophy of religion lectures, notably those of 1827 (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford, 2007), ii. 562–79).

shapes, comprising, within itself, the presentation of thoughts that are on the one hand still sensible, on the other most profound. Over against this dreaming, on the other side, there is the actuality of a helpless servitude having a fixed mode of distinguishing human beings [into castes], one on which the whole culture depends. In contrast to this dream-life, this whirl that is in actuality devoid of truth, stands first of all a naïve dream-life that does not develop into that distinction of modes but also for that reason has not emerged into servitude; instead, in actuality, it grasps itself more crudely but also more simply; it is also simpler in its configuration of representation. The spirit of this shape is on the whole the same, but it is more concentrated internally and hence brings its representation more to oneness and comports itself more freely in actuality; it is not amenable to caste distinctions. So caste distinction is a secondary feature. This is the character of the world that is related to India.

A number of diverse peoples and lands fall under this heading. Their history is only partly confined to India; partly it is a vast spilling over of torrential proportions that cannot be considered here. Belonging to this world are regions to the east, south, south-east, and north-east of India, [including] Ceylon and Ava—the eastern peninsula of India, which is in part the kingdom of Ava, in part Siam.[107] To this group belong all the nations of
225 the eastern peninsula of India, as well as | those to the north-east of India itself, the sequence from the Himalayas northward through all the Tatar region up to the eastern border of Asia. [These include] Tibet, the Tatar region, especially the highlands, inhabited by Mongols and Kalmucks, all the way to the Arctic Ocean. These peoples all go under this heading. Indeed we already remarked in the case of India that Hindus proper are called Brahmanic people, and Buddhist peoples can be contrasted with them.

Buddha constitutes the 'other' over against Brahmā; people believe that he is the same one as the Chinese Fo; in Ceylon he is called Gautama.[108] He was in India too, and his religion is still partly indigenous there. There is great controversy as to which of the two religions is the more ancient and elementary. There are reasons supporting both sides, but no definitive

107. Presumably 'the eastern peninsula of India' refers here to the western part of south-east Asia and the Malay Peninsula. Ava was the name, in medieval times, of a capital city and a region in what is today Burma (Myanmar).

108. For the various names of Buddha in different regions, see Samuel Turner, *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama, in Tibet* (London, 1800). Hegel would have seen it in the German tr., in *Neuere Geschichte der See- und Landreisen* (Hamburg, 1801), xiv. 307. Turner says the name is 'Fohi' in China. 'Gautama' is Buddha's Sanskrit personal name; in Ceylon the equivalent, in the Pali dialect, is 'Gotama'.

statement is possible. Obviously the Buddhist religion is the more elementary one and as such can be the oldest religion, although it could also have resulted from the reformation of an earlier one.[109] In any event we find among the Greeks this distinction with regard to Indian religion. The Greeks know of two kinds of priests of the Indians. They know of Samanas. Lamanas, and Garmanas (*Garmanen*)—a term that passed over into 'Germanic' (*Germanen*)—who were in the army of Xerxes; and on the other side, of Brāhmans and Magi. That Samanas were understood to be Buddhists is also clear from the fact that 'Samana' was a name used even as often as Gautama.[110] So the Buddhist religion is the simpler one.

According to the Brāhmans, Buddha himself emerged as the ninth incarnation of God and is also the founder of the first Maurya | dynasty; for 226
there is also a tradition drawing the distinction between solar and lunar kings.[111] Buddha is represented as king, as teacher, as God, and his last disciples are revered by the Buddhists. So he appears even in Brahmanic settings, just as, contrariwise, the Buddhists among themselves also in turn give currency to the Hindu representation of deities. They even have several sacred sites that are sacred to the other, Brahmanic Indians. In Tibet the Ganges is in any event [held to be] sacred. In Ceylon it is extremely meritorious to have visited such sacred sites. They acknowledge gaining wisdom and scientific knowledge from Benares, a city on the Ganges. So even the

109. In Hegel's day there were very distinct opinions about the age of the two religions. But it was quite possible to find a scientifically reliable answer. Proponents of the greater age of Hinduism included Turner (*Account*, 306) and Jones ('On the Gods', 235–6). Apparently straddling the fence were Mill (p. 310) and Abbé Dubois (p. 45). Today scholars regard Buddhism as having broken away from the antecedents of Hinduism, sometimes referred to as 'Brahmanism,' but as perhaps older than the specific shape later taken by what came to be known as Hinduism in its developed, theistic form.

110. The sources Hegel had at his disposal are very confusing, with the result that he cannot gain any clarity on this issue. See Francis Buchanan, 'On the Religion and Literature of the Burmas', *Asiatic Researches*, 6 (London, 1801), 163–308, esp. 274; H. T. Colebrooke, 'Observations on the Sects of Jains', *Asiatic Researches*, 9 (Calcutta, 1807), 287–322, esp. 300; Ritter, *Die Vorhalle*, 27. Buchanan regards 'Samanians' as Buddhists and as distinct from the Magi. Colebrooke says the 'Sarmanes' ('Garmanes'?) are distinct from Buddhists, and suggests they may be Jains. He also says Strabo calls them 'Germanes'. Ritter says they are to be contrasted with Brāhmans, as 'Budier' are with the Magi. Actually, a Samana is a wandering Hindu ascetic of ancient times who focused on the Upanishads rather than the Vedas. Ascetics of Jainism and Buddhism came from similar origins, which adds to the confusion, not only of Hegel but of his sources.

111. See Mill, p. 109. Ritter speaks (*Die Vorhalle*, 29–30) of a Brāhman tradition according to which the founder of the ancient Hindu dynasty referred to as 'children of the moon' was the son of a Buddha.

Buddhists and the Tibetans point to India.[112] This simple religion can be produced by a reformation of Brahmanic religion. More likely, however, is the greater age of Buddhism.

There are, to be sure, also Hindu reformers. A few tribal groups in India have freed themselves from this bondage, in particular from the caste divisions—chiefly the Sikhs, who inhabit a northern region of India. Two hundred years ago Muslim pressure likewise increased and there arose a reformer who, together with his people, sought to gain independence from the superstitions of both sides through viewpoints alone, not through force. Only when a follower of this man had been put to death by the Muslims did his friends rise up against Muslims and Hindus. Now this people lives as a kind of republic. So here we have a people that, by reformation, established its own religion.[113] According to all the historical evidence, however, the
227 Buddhists seem to be a much more ancient people. |

The second thing is to indicate the character of this religion, and the third, its historical path. It is a more humane religion in every respect. This is so much the case with regard to the representation of God that in one aspect their supreme God was a human being, in another their God is to them still living as a human being; so they revere a living human being as God.

The first feature is the case with the Buddha. They have extravagant stories about his earthly life equivalent to those we see with the rest of the Indians. He is an incarnation, indeed the ninth, and is to be revered as God.[114] He attained nirvana, that is, a condition of supreme abstraction in which spirit was immersed within itself, in which he no longer held fast to anything, was freed from everything, a condition we can to that extent call bliss. Buddhists attain this condition after death. Whoever attains nirvana has become Buddha. So this one, Gautama, is the true God. He was not some

112. On Tibetan views of Benares and the Ganges, see Turner, *Account*, 321 and 348 (cited in the German edn.).

113. Hegel may be drawing upon the account of Malcolm, 'Sketch of the Sikhs', *Asiatic Researches*, 11 (Calcutta, 1810), 197-292 (see esp. 200, 212–13, and 218–19). Griesheim's version says that Hindu pressure also played a role in the origins of this movement. Sikhism, centered in the Punjab region, traces its origins to the teachings of its first Guru, Nanak (1469–1539), who was born a Hindu. It is a type of monotheism that stresses meditation and rejects the caste system, as well as many external religious elements that can lead to superstitious beliefs and practices. The fifth in the line of Sikh Gurus, or leaders, that began with Nanak, was Arjan (1563–1606), the first compiler of Sikh scriptures, the Adi Granth. He was put to death by Jahangir, successor to Akbar, who was the greatest, and more tolerant, Mogul emperor.

114. Hindus regard Buddha as the ninth incarnation (avatar) of their deity Vishnu. Some Buddhists regard Gautama as the reappearance in the world of a pre-existing, transcendent Buddha-nature; but the conception of him as 'ninth' in a series is a specifically Hindu idea.

sort of natural being, not heaven or the sun, but instead was essentially a human being. They say that he was at the same time eternal, immortal. They ascribe to him all the attributes that we assign to the supreme being. They revere him in images in temples, images of him sometimes as seated, sometimes standing erect, and also together with his disciples. One feature consists of the temples that the Buddhists have, in which his image is erected. In addition to these temples dedicated to him there are pyramid-shaped buildings, as in Java, that are thoroughly massive, in which are preserved relics of him, some being of his body, although it is told that after his death his body was cremated on a funeral pyre of sandalwood. So we have here the feature that, in their representing God as having become a human being, his death is an element of their devotion. Gautama is God of Ceylon, but his religion extends through Tibet up to the Arctic Ocean. | 228

Here, however, the veneration of a living human being is linked to the fact that the supreme lama (priest) is the one in whom God is present for them. Such a living incarnation is also found in India itself, in the vicinity of Bombay, where this incarnation of a deity is hereditary in one family and the incarnation is Ganesha, represented and depicted in images with the head of an elephant. An English officer sought out the currently living individual. He was a man 30 years of age and was revered as God.[115] A similar belief finds its home on a larger scale in Tibet proper, in the land that extends northward beyond the Himalayas. Three such lamas are revered. The first is the Dalai Lama in Lhasa; the second is the Taschi-Lama in Taschi-Lumpo; the third, beyond the Himalayas and to the south of Lake Baikal, at the end of the highland, where Ghengis Khan had his origin, is the Taranant Lama, also a Buddhist lama, in Urga in Karak.[116] These are human beings who are revered as God present today; their service is linked to the Buddhist

115. Ganesha is a Hindu deity; so this part of the paragraph, which Hegel thinks parallels Lamaism in this respect, pertains to Hinduism, not Buddhism. See E. Moor, 'Account of an Hereditary Living Deity, to Whom Devotion Is Paid by Bramins of Poona and its Neighborhood', *Asiatic Researches*, 7 (London, 1803), 381–95. Moor says (pp. 394–5) that the individual looked to be 55, and was said to be 60.

116. Hegel's account here is erroneous. See Turner, *Account*, 314–15, where the second is called the Teshoo Lama. Turner says all three are located in Tibet and belong to the 'Gyllookpa' sect, and that three more lamas belonging to the 'Shammar' sect reside in Bhutan, but their superior resides in Tibet. The traditional seat of the Dalai Lama (now in exile), who is head of the Gelukpa (Yellow Hat) sect, is in Lhasa. The second, the Panchen Lama, has his seat at the Taschi-Lumpo Monastery. The location of the third (Gelukpa) lama is unclear from Hegel's statement. Turner says he is in 'Kharka'. 'Urga' is a name for Ulaanbaatar (Ulan Bator), the capital of Mongolia, a possible alternative, although there are various places in Central Asia with 'Urga' or 'Karka' in their names. Other possibilities for Hegel's 'Karak' might include the Karakoram Mountains to the north of Kashmir, or Karakorum, now the ruins of a Mongol city

religion, to the representation that this is Buddha present here and now, in living form. The more specific point here is the great confusion, albeit one preferable to the Hindu view, that the dominion of a One over all the many gods, demigods (*Genien*), and spirits is the foundation. More recently we have been better informed about the lamas, since Captain Turner has been an emissary to the Taschi Lama. When he stayed there, the previous lama had just died or, as they say, had gone away. The current lama was 2 years old.[117]

229 These lamas are spiritual as well as worldly leaders, but | 'worldly' only directly in Tibet.[118] They are revered as spiritual leaders by the Mongol tribes, and are consulted in political matters; they are revered spiritually as God. Besides the lama, however, there are then still many gods, Buddha or Gautama, and so forth. One could envisage such chief lamas as being most arrogant and, in their madness, becoming supremely haughty; yet that is by no means the case. In his embassy to the Taschi Lama, Turner found the current lama to be a 2-year-old child; in his stead there was a regent to whom the English embassy paid its visit. Nothing much was of course to be said by this child. It sat there, erect and well-trained, listening and watching. Father and mother stood alongside, and the child behaved quite alertly and calmly. A pot of tea was presented, from which the regent himself drank. When the teapot had been emptied and the child remarked that it was empty, the child looked about several times in order to have more brought to them, for the child proved in general to be alert and intelligent.[119] The priests selected individuals of the most superior disposition to be lamas. The previous lama was extolled as the noblest, most modest, man. He was educated and, far from being haughty and proud, was gentle to subordinates, intending their best interests in all things, and the government of the lama is one of the most patriarchal sort that can be found. So the lama is then the one through whom the God of the people is present, such that God cares for them. The relationship is of a kind that in general comes quite close to pantheism. Nevertheless it is not the Hindu pantheism where every mountain, stream, and Brāhman is divine, such that Brahmā is immediately

on the Orkun River in Mongolia. The other Tibetan Buddhist sect is the Karma-pa, or Red Hat Sect.

117. Samuel Turner visited the Tashi (Panchen) Lama on 4 December 1783, and published a report of his journey in *Asiatic Researches*, 5 (London, 1799), 199–205, in abridged form, and in a book (on which see above, n. 108). He says the current lama was eighteen months old.

118. See Turner, *Account*, 310.

119. Ibid. 334–5; also, his account in *Asiatic Researches*, 1 (London, 1799), 200.

present therein; instead, in the worship of the lamas the infinitely extravagant pantheism has | coalesced into a unity. These people distinguish themselves from the Hindus generally in virtue of their higher stance with respect to freedom. They know themselves in God inasmuch as they situate God as a human being and have a genial intuition of their God, and have thus arrived at a freer God. 230

As for castes, they are present in Ceylon but not so strictly and also only for the tradespeople. They are, however, somewhat different than in India. There individual castes can have no dealings with alien castes, not even for their own sake. Here in Ceylon, however, this is allowed, since one can undertake for oneself what properly is the province of a different caste. Also, there are no higher castes, no warrior castes. Since 1813, people have also come to know the interior of Ceylon in this way. In the Burmese kingdom, in Siam, there are no castes, nor are there castes in Tibet and among the Mongols. This, therefore, surely constitutes a great distinction of a free, courageous, more genial existence.

These peoples have priests, and in Tibet above all; in the Burmese kingdom, they live together in large monasteries. In Tibet the priests in a monastery number over two thousand.[120] These priests do not make up a particular caste, but instead come from the entire people. In Tibet the rule is that one of four sons must be a priest and be brought up for that role. In Tibet these priests have their own land rents and live from charity. In the Burmese kingdom they live principally from gifts freely given, since the priests pass through the streets early in the morning, anticipating gifts from the inhabitants. Here they are called 'Rahans'.[121] So these priests differ from the Brāhmans with regard to their entire behavior. The Tibetans call them 'Gylongs' and, as opposed to | the Brāhmans, they are on the whole quite without pride, are modest, educated, and affable, whereas the Brāhman is hardhearted and proud, unfriendly. Tibetan priests distribute surplus goods to the poor and give shelter to any wayfarer.[122] 231

There are two kinds of sects, one of which marries and the other does not. The latter is the most widespread today. They are distinguished by their robes, by red and yellow robes, and are hostile to the point of the bloodiest

120. See Turner, *Account*, 310, where he says there are at least 3,700 monks in the monastery of Taschi-Lumpo.

121. See Buchanan, 'On the Religion', 285, for a detailed account of these daily rounds.

122. Buchanan attributes to the Burmese monks the attributes Hegel ascribes to the Tibetans. Ibid. 276–8. Hegel does not always observe such distinctions in his accounts of various lands. On the contrast of these monks with the Brāhmans, see Turner, *Account*, 309.

conflicts.[123] They are pious, educated, and religiously observant in the temples as well as in the monasteries. The main thing in their services is chanting, which they raise to the highest volume. The emissaries dwelt in a monastery and could not have been more amazed at the enormously powerful voices.

Now as for the Mongols and Tibetans, they are described as extremely good-natured, open, trusting, observant, obliging, and far from the deception, cowardice, and baseness of the Hindus. Trusting and friendly, these peoples carry on a peaceful life. The priests are pious on behalf of the entire land. Everyone of the laity performs his job peacefully and untroubled. They are not, on the whole, warlike. Even in Tibet most remain exempt from warfare. It can also be noted that the eating of meat is to an extent forbidden among these peoples, in particular the Burmese. Nevertheless this rule is modified to a greater or lesser degree, and it depends in particular on the prince as to whether he wishes to uphold it. The Mongols and Kalmucks refrain from eating meat and regard it as wrong to kill an animal. Very benevolent in particular are the Kalmucks, who will not even kill their game
232 animals | but instead till the soil. On the whole these Mongols and Tibetans live peacefully; the Mongols are chiefly nomadic, but not actually in a patriarchal condition such that by birth one person would have unlimited power. Their chieftains are of course partly determined by birth; but the heads of families in the main arrange these things among themselves, and political matters are more or less the affair of the entire people. Today most of these peoples are under Russian dominion, with some under Chinese rule. In 1769–70 a Russian clan of Kalmucks, some 70,000–80,000 families, departed from the Russian territory along the Volga and Don rivers and fled into Chinese territory, because the Russians had broken off relations with the Dalai Lama.

These genial peoples, who are a freer sort than the charming, delicate weakness of the Indians, can, to be sure, expand outward and then, like rivers, wildly inundate everything; not sweeping through the world in warrior tribes but, as an entire people, they come into a state of inner, unsettled fermentation and then, restlessly expanding spatially, by laying waste they

123. As is evident from Turner's *Account*, 314–16, this sentence applies strictly to the Tibetan Buddhists, the two sects of which are the Gelukpas (Yellow Hats) and the Karma-pas (Red Hats). (See also n. 116 above.) Turner (while using his antiquated spelling for the names) says that the Karma-pas were the most powerful, and the Gelukpas assembled an army to drive them from their lands and gain the upper hand. Gelukpa power then stabilized when it gained the favor of the Chinese emperor. One should not mistake this sentence of Hegel's for a general feature of Buddhism; it is based on Turner's account of a single episode in Tibetan history.

subject all to themselves. But such deluges abate just as they have started. They have never been long-lasting nor in particular have they established a kingdom. Such surges took place especially under Genghis Khan, pressing all the way to the borders of Silesia.[124] After him in like fashion Timur, the Mongol prince or actually a Turk, was one who stormed through the world too.[125] His actual point of departure, the original tribe with which he surged forth, consisted not of Mongols but of Turkish peoples, or Turks. | 233

So, this world belongs on the whole to India. But whereas the Hindus are one whole with rigid internal divisions, these latter peoples have not arrived at this internal cultural shape, and instead are more disparate, although thereby freer. We proceed now from India to the third Asian realm, to Persia.

124. Between 1215 and 1223, Genghis Khan undertook several campaigns of conquest in all directions, and founded the Mongol Empire.

125. Timur (Tamerlane) was the leader of a confederation of Turks and Mongols that came to power in Central Asia. In 1398 he invaded India, not with the intention of annexing Indian territory, but for plunder.

Here we can be briefer because, on the one hand, we have fewer materials and, on the other hand, they are better known. The materials pertinent to the Persian Empire are, however, largely incomplete. With this empire we enter for the first time into world history proper. Although China is an important, essential element, it lies outside the connections of world history, as also does India, the other element, which has only a mute, silent, inner connection that passes by inconsequentially (*tatlos*). With Persia, however, there is in fact a conscious and clear connection. In China and India there is less to say about a history that is directed outwards but enough to say about internal matters, whereas in Persia we know much more about external matters but less about the inner world. The Chinese and Indian world is still contemporaneous for us and therefore we can be more precise about it; the Persian world is one that has long vanished. What we know of the Persian world and what appears to us to be its most ancient aspect is an element that has survived all history and is still extant in venerable remains,
234 and has come to light only in recent times. |

The Principle of the Persian Empire

When we examine the Persian Empire more closely, we find here for the first time an *empire*, that is, a total domain comprising entirely heterogeneous elements (to be sure, only relatively so). The peoples who were combined into one here were extremely diverse in language, customs, and religion. This splendid empire lasted a very long time, and the way it was composed more closely resembles the idea of the state than do the preceding elements [in history]. That is because here there is neither the patriarchal-moral tradition as in China, nor rigidly distinct groups as with the Indians; not the rapidly dissolving world-inundation of the Mongols, nor the negativity of oppression as in the Turkish Empire. Instead we see here a unity of ethnic groups persisting in their autonomy and yet dependent on a point of unity that held them in equilibrium and could keep them content. The Indian and Mongol world belongs to the Far East, and the sense of self (*Selbstgefühl*) in the Far East is quite different from that of Europeans. It is otherwise with the sense of self that in Persia still holds sway. In Persia today there is a different

1. 'Persia' refers to the ancient empire, centered in what is present-day Iran, that at its height in the 6th cent. BC, starting with Cyrus the Great, spread from the Indus River in Asia to the shores of the Mediterranean and Black Seas and comprised many cultures and peoples. It was controlled by the Achaemenid dynasty until it was defeated by Alexander the Great in 331 BC.

stock, a finer race of people more related to Europeans. Elphinstone, an Englishman who has those lands under his oversight, has visited and made known to us the empire of Kabul and Kashmir. He conveys the impression of how greatly Persians and Indians differ, and says that, all the way [east] to the Indus River, Europeans could believe that they are still in Europe. Immediately upon crossing the Indus, everything is different.[2] When we come to the Persians we find an empire outwardly directed, and so for the first time an empire impinging upon world history.

We have, then, to indicate the principle of this empire: it is the unification of the preceding principles. In Persia, the Chinese and | Indian principles 235
are united. In China there was the unification of the whole under the dominion of an external, moral will that determined a person's innermost will. The principle of the Indians, on the contrary, was that of absolute distinction set in stone by nature. In the Persian Empire we see the distinction of individualizations as nations too, and indeed in such a way that the distinctions are given free rein and yet overcome, held together by a point of unity. So here free individualization reverts into a point of cohesion; this is the third necessary element. What we have to consider more closely are the distinctions whose unity is the whole.

The Geography of Ancient Persia

In considering the distinctions externally, geographically, we can say that here the highland comes into conflict with the lowland, with the broad river valleys. In India we see the unfolding of life in sweltering valley regions separate from the highlands. In Persia the two principles are united in reciprocal conflict. One part of the whole is the highland that bears the general name of Persia. To it belong the mountain ranges more specifically and the valleys that attach to them. The other part is the river valley regions of the Tigris, Euphrates, Oxus (Amu Darya), and Jaxartes.

The highland is not to be characterized as a sort of elevated land like that of Chinese Tatary; instead it is somewhat lower relative to the valley plains, and for that reason it has singular features of fertility. The Indus marks the boundary between India and Persia. Westward from this river, Persia rises up

2. See Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India* (London, 1815), 148 ff. He says an English traveler in Afghan country would be disturbed by the institutional instability and evident disorder there. However, someone crossing over to there from India would look favorably upon the Afghans' independent and energetic character, their similarity to Europeans, in contrast to the stultifying effect of government on the Indian character.

above the valleys of the Indus and the Ganges. Farther on beyond the sources
236 of the Indus | is a higher mountain range, generally called the Hindu Kush, and eastward from it is a yet loftier region in which the Chinese and the Mongols dwell. Crossing over to the west from the Hindu Kush to the Caspian Sea is a mountain chain from which the Oxus River, now called the Amu Darya, flows in a northerly direction; it formerly emptied into the Caspian Sea but now it empties into the Aral Sea. Toward the sources of the Oxus [Amu Darya] the valley narrows, and another mountain range takes up, extending to the north. The Amu Darya originates in the junction (*Winkel*) of these two mountain ranges, where there is a valley alongside the river. This junction is an important point where lies the city of Balkh (formerly Bactria), the seat of an earlier culture. From here it is not far to Hindustan, in fact to Kabul. To the south-east lies the Hindu Kush; crossing over these mountains, one comes to Kabul. Along this mountain chain where Bactria lies to the east, Khorasan is to the west, then farther westward Aria,[3] Media, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, where the Armenian mountains then take shape. To the south-west begins the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, proceeding from the north-west in a south-easterly direction. Another chain of mountains extends to the Persian Gulf and alongside the gulf. Along this chain the ancient Farsi land of Persia principally lies.[4] This land extends farther, to the Indian Ocean and along the Indus, and terminates at the Suleiman Mountains. This elevated plain is Iran as such in its nonspecific designation and constitutes the focal point for our examination. To the north is Bactria, to the south is India, and Babylon or Assyria lies to the west, with Syria and Armenia farther west, and farthest is Asia Minor. Persia plays its role on this stage.

The components of this empire are then the Zend people in Bactria and, on the other side, the Assyrian and Babylonian peoples, with the third component being Media, or Persia proper, and the fourth Syria, extending
237 to the Mediterranean Sea.[5] |

3. Aria was an eastern province of the Persian Empire, a region now located in eastern Iran and the Herat area of Afghanistan.

4. These mountains, and the province of Fars, extend along the north-east side of the Persian Gulf. Fars, one of the ten provinces of Iran, is the heartland of the Persian Empire in its ancient and more recent forms. Today these are called the Zagros Mountains; they separate the basin of the Iranian highland from the coastal region with its harbor at Bandar-e Büshehr.

5. Hegel's four geographic divisions of the Persian Empire, which he takes up in order, correspond well with the sections into which we have divided the text from this point on, with their headings as follows. 'The Zend People . . . ' and 'The Religion of Light' correspond to the first division; 'Assyria and Babylonia' corresponds to the second; the next four, 'Sources for Persia and the Persian Empire', 'The Medes and the Chaldeans', 'The Founding of the Persian

The Zend People, Language, and Books

The Zend people has its name from the Zend language in which are written the books that a Frenchman, Anquetil du Perron, discovered in the 1750s and translated into Latin.[6] These books contain the teachings of the religion of light, which doubtless had been the religion of the ancient Persians, although not in the specific form of the Zend-Avesta. The name of the teacher is Zoroaster, as the ancients called him. This Zend people is doubtless connected with the ancient Persians, although it is certainly uncontestable that the ancient Persians who came to the fore under Cyrus were not made up exclusively of these Zend people. Anquetil discovered these books among the Parsis of his day, who still dwell in the East Indies as fire worshipers. One particular community is located south of the Caspian Sea.[7] They are a self-contained community. These Zend books are not without gaps, although the most important part of them is known. They were a new discovery [to Westerners]. The scriptures are something self-contained,

Empire by Cyrus', and 'Features of the Persian Empire' correspond to the third; the last three, 'Phoenicia', 'The Religion of Astarte and Adonis', and 'The Jewish Religion' correspond to the fourth.

6. Anquetil du Perron's tr., *Zend-Avesta*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1771) has been republ. in facsimile, with an Introduction by Robert D. Richardson, Jr., 3 vols. (New York and London, 1984); it was rendered into German, tr. and ed. by J. F. Kleuker, 5 vols. (Riga, 1776–83), an edn. referred to hereafter simply as 'Kleuker'. In 1754 Anquetil du Perron went to Gujarat in India, to learn the language of the Parsis, who still practiced the ancient Persian religion there. Long before that they had left Iran to escape Muslim persecution. (Below in our text Hegel erroneously states that they had their center in 'the East Indies', and that Anquetil du Perron discovered their books there.) In Hegel's day the Parsis were a prosperous commercial community under British rule, in the region of Mumbai. The correct name for these ancient scriptures is simply 'Avesta', or 'injunction' (of Zoroaster). What survived the Islamic persecution was accompanied by commentary (*Zand*), hence the hyphenated name 'Zend-Avesta' by which this scripture came to be known in the West. Hegel refers to the people from whom Zoroaster's followers came, or perhaps their forerunners too, as the 'Zend people', although these people of ancient Persia did not go by that name. Where possible, in what follows, references to the text of the Zend-Avesta itself will be given in Kleuker, in Anquetil du Perron, and in the English version ed. James Darmesteter in the *Sacred Books of the East*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1883, 1887, and 1895—a 2nd edn.), hereafter abbreviated as *SBE*. Modern scholars refer to this set of scriptures as simply the 'Avesta'; to avoid confusion, however, we will continue to speak of the 'Zend-Avesta', as does our text.

7. The Kleuker edn. (p. iii) states that, owing to the vicissitudes of history, Zoroaster's followers had to separate into two groups, one at that time still living peacefully at Kerman along the Caspian Sea, the other driven to Sūrat in Gujarat. (Actually, Kerman is located on the Iranian Plateau, well south of the Caspian Sea.). It says these contemporary followers of Zoroaster carry on the worship of Ormazd and still possess the holy books, the Zend-Avesta.

connected to the religion of the ancient Persians but nevertheless a characteristic whole.

To begin with, people still disagree about the seat of the Zend people, which seems, according to all investigations, to be Bactria, with its main city Bactria on the Amu Darya River. Bactria itself lies adjacent to Balkh.[8] Bactria is not so far distant from Kabul. In Wilford's account the route there involves about an eight-day journey.[9] Notable among the way-stations is Zohaksburg (Firdawsi), which plays a great role in ancient legends;[10] a second is Balkh-Bāmiyān (Balkh is the name of a city as such), about which Wilford remarks that the Persians often confused this city with Balkh [the province].[11] Near to Balkh-Bāmiyān there still exist remarkable ruins of another city, Galgaleh.[12] Here are found innumerable hollowed-out places in the rock, some 12,000 of them.[13] Also evident are the ruins of walls
238 and two gargantuan statues severely damaged | by the Muslims, as well as when Akbar fired cannon at them, whereupon blood is said to have flowed from the leg of one of them.[14] This point suffices to show that many fortifications must have existed here and that the tale associates many

8. Balkh is both a province in northernmost Afghanistan and a town there, close to contemporary Mazār-e Sharif. The province of Balkh is bordered on the north by the Amu Darya River. In ancient times Balkh was known as Bactra; it is in the larger region then known as Bactria. Medieval trade routes between East Asia and the West passed through Balkh.

9. Frances Wilford, 'On Mount Caucasus', *Asiatic Researches*, 6 (London, 1801), 463, actually says it is an eight-day journey from Bāmiyān (or Bamian) to Kabul. Bāmiyān, a province and a city in central Afghanistan, is considerably south of Balkh and to the north-west of Kabul (much closer to it than is Balkh). Since this whole area lay within the large ancient region known as Bactria, it is hard to attach any precision to the statement in our text. This passage also refers to the 'fort of Zohauk', near Zohauk (the 'Zohaksburg' of the next sentence in our text) and Bāmiyān.

10. See Joseph Görres, *Das Heldenbuch von Iran aus dem Schah Nameh des Firdusi*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1820), esp. ch. 5. Abu-l-Qasim Mansur Firdawsi (940–1020) was a famous Iranian poet and author of the historical epic *Shahnameh*.

11. See Wilford, 'On Mount Caucasus', 467, 470. Wilford says that Bāmiyān was a center of Buddhism in ancient times, and was later disparaged by Muslims in their opposition to idolatry.

12. Wilford states (p. 463) that the ancient city of Ghulghuleh, two miles south of Bāmiyān, was destroyed early on by the Muslims. He also says (p. 472) that rulers resided at this place, called 'the fort or palace of Bamiyan', and that Genghis Khan destroyed it in 1221.

13. Wilford says (p. 464) that some of these recesses were temples, and some contained reliefs of human figures. He is also the source for the number 12,000. The Muslim Taliban, recent rulers of Afghanistan at the beginning of the third millennium, destroyed some of the remaining figures at this site.

14. Wilford tells of two huge statues, one male and one female. He says (p. 466) that shots were fired on the order of Mogul emperor Aurangzeb (1618–1707)—not emperor Akbar (1542–1606), as our text has it—on his expedition to Balkh, and that the appearance of blood on the leg of one of the statues caused him to cease the bombardment.

memories with ancient heroes. Alexander the Great did not make his way to India via Balkh, but instead went around the Parapanisus Mountains to the south. The Parapanisus Mountains lie to the east of Bactria, a higher point of the Hindu Kush.[15]

This region of Bactria is then doubtless the stage for the Zend people and the place where Zoroaster lived. Anquetil, and following him the Germans too, took Armenia to be his native land, but Bactria as the site of his activity. In Bactria, Zoroaster lived under a king Gustasp, who has been held to be Darius Hystaspes.[16] But the fact that Zoroaster's time was more ancient makes it prior to the entire state of affairs portrayed in the Zend-Avesta. The chronological combinations by which one transposes Darius into Gustasp rest upon dates the later Persian historians select. But these dates are extremely dubious. The Zend books call one people 'Turan', the Turanians, but the names 'Persian', 'Mede', 'Ninevah', 'Babylon', and 'Bactra' do not appear, nor is there reference to Cyrus, but instead Dschemschid is named as the first mythological king.[17] He is taken to be Achaemenes,[18] from whom Cyrus is said to have descended. Extremely important is the fact that | nothing is to be found in the 239
Zend books about such famous peoples and princes of the Persian Empire.

The other important point is the entire condition that the Zend books lay before our eyes, that of a people already possessing a great culture. There are four classes, as with the Hindus.[19] Also to be found are agriculture, village

15. Actually the Parapanisus Mountains lie mainly to the south-east of Bactria and the region of Balkh, and then extend northward toward the Hindu Kush; so there is perhaps only an apparent tension between these last two sentences.

16. The Kleuker edn. says (pt. 1, p. 57) that Gustasp was 'the fifth in the second Persian dynasty'. The 'Life of Zoroaster' in Anquetil du Perron's edn. says (ii. 33): 'Then Gustasp, carried away by this multitude of wonders, embraced the Law of Zoroaster. The new Prophet explained the Zend-Avesta to him the whole day long.' According to Friedrich Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker*, pt. 1 (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819), 675, some scholars take this Gustasp to be Cyaxares I, of Media (625–585 BC), whereas another view holds that he is Darius Hystaspes (550–486 BC), namely, Darius I of Persia.

17. According to the Kleuker edn. (pt. 1, p. 38 n.), 'Djemschid' stood fifth or sixth in a line of descent from Noah, and Zoroaster was in turn his descendant. He worshiped Ormazd (Ahura Mazda), lived 716 years, ruled for 616 years, and issued many ordinances that Zoroaster subsequently upheld. Cf. Anquetil du Perron, iii. 416 n. Ahura Mazda ('The Wise Lord', or 'The Lord Wisdom') is the preferred name for Zoroaster's deity. Our text calls this deity 'Ormuzd'; so we are using that name in the tr., although spelt with an 'a' ('Ormazd'), which is customary in English.

18. According to Herodotus (7. 11), Achaemenes is the grandfather of Cambyses, and hence the founder of the Persian Achaemenid Dynasty of great kings, which bears his name. See *The History*, tr. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 473.

19. The Kleuker edn. (pt. 1, p. 58) says four social groups were established long before Zoroaster's day, and that he accepted them. It is not surprising that these should correlate

chiefs, roads, administrative districts, cities, provinces, and other similar features that indicate an internal organization and an advance in the amenities of life.[20] But there are none of the characteristics of an empire that could possibly have been like the Persian Empire we know via the Greeks. It is the same with the religious laws and civic conditions, which all point to the circumstances of a much simpler people than that of the Persians.

The name in the Zend books for this Zend people is 'Arier', and the land is likewise called 'Aria' or 'Ariene', with the soubriquet 'Vedjo' (the proper, pure Ariene).[21] The principal seat of this land is Bactria. Ariene is called more specifically 'the great Arien'; this 'Iran' is then Persia. Iran extends farther over the highland, and Medes and Armenians are included within it. The Zend language, in which the ancient books are in part composed, is similar to Indian Sanskrit, so that both seem to have one root. The land is not linked down to the Indus on its southern part, but instead to the north from Kabul onward into the center of Iran where, farther on, lies Khorasan. From the Zend books we learn that the people had simple customs, although we find chieftains and class distinctions. The main thing that we must consider
240 first | is the doctrine of the Zend, the doctrine of the Magi, which is extant even today, although in a more elaborate form.

The Religion of Light

This religion of the Magi involves the higher, spiritual element of the Persians as such. In the Persian religion we see worship of nature (*Naturdienst*) but not idolatry, something entirely different from Indian baseness; instead, a superior atmosphere (*Atem*) wafts our way. Individual natural things such as sun and moon do not constitute the foundation of the configurations that are revered. Although the Indians comprise the universal operations [of nature] in a figure grasped by means of thought, the sense of such configurations is itself in turn something sensible, a merely natural operation. We saw Brahman as indeterminate unity, not actual concreteness of spirit. Of course there is nature worship with the Persians too, but only the worship of light, this universal, simple, physical essence that is pure like thought. Thought longs for, or discovers, so to speak, its own self inasmuch as it has

approximately with the four main Hindu castes, for scholars believe that the ancient Iranian people and the Aryans of early Indian history came from the same, or similar, Central Asian stock and culture.

20. The Kleuker edn. (pt. 1, pp. 62, 67) mentions various of these features.

21. Ormazd tells Zoroaster that he has created this beautiful place of Ariene, and he calls it Eeriene Veedjo (Kleuker edn., pt. 2, p. 299); cf. Anquetil du Perron, ii. 264, and *SBE* iv. 3.

the light before it. Of course the Persians have not represented light to themselves in the way that Newton envisaged it. They prayed reverently to the light and not in sensible intuition alone; instead, in this intuition the soul goes within itself and thus also makes the object seen within itself; this being-within-itself of the pure object, of the light, is then immediately thought, or the spiritual as such. Free thought is not yet the free foundation; instead, something sensible is intuited. It is, however, something sensible as wholly universal, thus in the form of thought; insofar as this sensible element is known as something inward, the meaning is a thought, a cognition, a knowing, something good. This is the higher standpoint of the Persians as such. So their soul has raised itself up to this higher purity, to something sensible in the universal form of thought. | 241

With any religion one must look first at its configuration, then at its meaning. With every religion intuition is something anthropomorphic, but what matters is the meaning. With the Indians the meaning is that their shapes themselves have in turn sensuous meaning, whereas with the Persians the sensuous element is in the form of thought. Directly tied to this, then, is the antithesis in the Persian religion, this great dualism.

Considered philosophically, dualism is a determination that is not to be regarded as what is ultimate or fixed if its content is said to contain truth; the principle of truth is instead the unity of the antithesis. In the Persian religion we find the absolute antithesis of good and evil, of light and darkness, of Ormazd and Ahriman [Angra Mainyu], such that the two subsist independently of one another, contrary to the principle of all truth of philosophy, which is absolute unity; for only the natural sphere involves this equipollent mutual opposition. With the Indians there is absolute pantheism. With the Persians the endless variety of sensuous things was reduced to this dualism, and we have to say that it is precisely the greatness of the Persian intuition since, in its metaphorical significance, it is the dualism of good and evil, and so forth. This shows that the requirement of thought appears as emergent here now with the Persians, since the multifaceted confusion of the Indians is diminished and resolved in the simpler determination of the antithesis. So, this Oriental dualism itself demonstrates the grandeur of the self-simplifying thought of the Zend religion.

We have to distinguish two kinds of antitheses, the abstract antithesis of light and darkness, and an antithesis that is concrete. | 242

[1] When we consider the Persians with respect to the first antithesis, we can exonerate them from standing pat with it as the ultimate position; instead we also find with them the unity from which the two sides originate. This unity, the first element, is called Zeruane Akerene or uncreated time, as

feminine creator of those two.[22] Ormazd, the prince of light and creator of the world, is depicted as created by this time. So where there is the need to exonerate the Zend books from the reproach of dualism, one would reach for this unity. But the unity is less important here; instead, the interesting point is the more concrete, later religion. That is because uncreated time is itself only an abstract unity, something of moderate but not absolute importance, and it is not the object of reverence like the light that is said to be the One, the light by which Ahriman, who is darkness and evil, is said to be eternally overcome.

So Ormazd is the light. The name derives from 'Or', meaning 'Lord', the Supreme Lord, and from 'mazda', as 'maz', 'magnus' or 'great', as well as 'dao', 'Deus'. So Ormazd is called the great Supreme Lord. He is the lord of the light, the creator of all things, namely, of his creation—the creator of the good. Ormazd is not, however, the sun and fire but instead is the fluidity of fire, just as the sun is a container (*Hülle*) of it. Fire and the sun are a corporeal aspect of Ormazd. Wherever there is light, Ormazd is present. As such, he is the excellence in all the creation. And wherever evil or darkness is found, Ahriman's presence is evident.[23]

In the simple Zend books themselves we also find more profound metaphysical characteristics of Ormazd. Zoroaster's teaching is presented mostly in questions put to Ormazd. For instance, Zoroaster asks him, 'What are you called?', and he replies, 'Love, the basic seed of all good, the gift of knowledge, mastery and mastery bestowing, ground of actuality and possibility,
243 fullness and blessedness, | the pure will of the good'.[24] So everything that comes from Ormazd is living, and in this connection a host of objects were revered as manifestation of Ormazd. The word, the living word, the word of the teaching, is revered in this way, as also are the Vendidad and prayer.[25] All of these are more or less personified, although in all of these personifications the unity of Ormazd remains of paramount importance.

22. On Zeruane Akerene, the root of all things, see Creuzer, *Symbolik*, 697. See also the Kleuker edn., pt. 1, p. 3. Anquetil du Perron, in his index, calls it original time, the 'Tem[p]s sans bornes, l'Eternel' ('time without limits, the eternal'). Our German text has *Schöpferin*, which makes this creator feminine.

23. See the extensive summary discussion in the Kleuker edn. (pt. 1, pp. 4 ff.) of these features of Ormazd and Ahriman (who is called Angra Mainyu by the Zoroastrians). Scattered throughout Anquetil du Perron's edn., and *SBE*, there are many statements about these two.

24. See the Kleuker edn. (pt. 2, p. 184) for these and other descriptive titles of Ormazd. For a very full list, see Anquetil du Perron, iii. 145–8; *SBE* ii. 24–8.

25. See the summary statement of these points in Creuzer, *Symbolik*, 710. The Vendidad is a very long text consisting of mythological material, laws of purification, and various other topics.

The moon, the sun, and five other heavenly bodies [*Sterne*] were revered too.[26] Among these five—and it cannot be ascertained whether they are planets and, if so, which ones—we come upon Mithra, but only as one of these beings of light and not as Mithra is customarily designated in later times.[27] He appears part masculine, part feminine.[28] This figure was exalted later on and came to be revered during the era of the Roman emperors in the West, since the attribute of mediator was assigned to it.[29] The worship of Mithra even came to Germany with the Roman legions.[30] In the Zend books, however, he stands only as one being among the others.[31] The same is true of the antithesis of good and evil, which later on was made more prominent than is the case in the Zend books. In circumstances such as these one must observe more closely how a figure has one shape at one time, a different shape at another time. More recently there have been many disputes about Mithra; however, one must not suppose that what a later era made of such a figure was its original character in ancient times.

The other beings revered apart from, or subordinate to, Ormazd are the Amschaspands [Amesa Spentas]. These are not the five planets (*Sterne*) in addition to the sun and moon; instead they are in general the guardian spirits | of the world. Ormazd is the first, the sun the second. This mani- 244
foldness does not detract from the unity of the substance, which remains Ormazd, the light. Yet there are other personifications, just as there are, for instance, seven Amschaspands that always appear, however, only as aides to Ormazd, and from which too the seven days of the week have their names. So this is the chief representation.[32] Opposed to the light stands darkness, the realm of Ahriman, to which belongs all that is evil, lifeless, impure. This is the one great antithesis.

[2.] There is yet a different antithesis to note, a more concrete one. The Zend books in fact speak of the two pure worlds of Ormazd, one of which is

26. Five of the planets orbiting the sun, in addition to earth, are visible to the naked eye and so were those known to the ancients. These five, as well as the sun and the moon, undergo changes in their apparent positions relative to the fixed stars, and so played a major role in ancient observational astronomy and astrology.

27. See Kleuker's account (pt. 1, p. 16), which says Mithra is most splendid and is invoked together with the sun, but is not the sun.

28. Creuzer, *Symbolik*, p. 734, says the Persian Mithra has a masculine aspect, just as Osiris correlates with Isis.

29. Ibid. 729 and 760.

30. Ibid. 765.

31. There Mithra is one of the Izeds, which are good spirits of the second order. This term and identification also appears in the text cited in n. 27 above.

32. Kleuker's edn. sets forth these realms of subordinates to Ormazd (pt. 1, pp. 15–16).

the earthly world as such, the immediately sensible world, the sensibly living existence of the human being. Established as distinct from this living actuality is a kind of spirit world. To what is individual, to trees, streams, mountains, and human beings, there is given a kind of spirit world, a world of fravasis (*Feruers*), which are omnipresent and are at home in the realm of the blessed. Everywhere that there is activity and life the fravasis are present. They are said to be primordial, and everywhere.[33] This representation is similar to how we in fact represent the Ideas of Plato to ourselves as souls set apart from the actual world. So it is a realm of representation, a realm of spirit also on its own account and juxtaposed to the actual world of the good. These are the main representations of the Zend religion.

Now we have to speak about the cultus of the Zend people, about how they are supposed to conduct themselves in a legal, ethical, religious manner.
245 One serves Ormazd and reveres the light by planting trees and by | agriculture. The rules as a whole make the point that every citizen of the Zend people is a citizen of the realm of Ormazd, with the result that one is enjoined to propagate goodness and vitality and is supposed to shield oneself from impurity, a commonplace practice in Oriental religion.[34] A dead dog causes impurity. There are many rules for removing it.

[1.] The first precepts for the servants of Ormazd are to keep themselves pure by holiness of thought, by holiness in word and deed, by offering prayers to Ormazd, and also by worshipful actions and obeying the laws.[35] These are in part civil regulations, which also include moral precepts. They were understood to contain the living spirit, the revelation of God.

The Zend people have three kinds of laws.[36] The first pertains to personal security and penal codes, for instance, laws against doing harm. Whoever draws the blood of another or moves to strike him undergoes punishment, primarily lashes.[37] There is no capital punishment. Punishment for many things occurs in the hereafter. It is remarkable that there is no mention at all of the crimes of murder and homicide, although the series of books

33. Ibid., pt. 1, pp. 12–13, where it says the fravasis are the first copies of being, made by the thought of the Creator, and expressed in his creative word in the struggle against Ahriman. Even Ormazd has a fravasi of himself. Anquetil du Perron renders the plural term in French as *Ferouer*, evidently the source for the non-German term *Feruer* in our text.

34. The Griesheim transcript says 'bodily' impurity is to be avoided, one instance of which would be 'touching' a dead dog.

35. See Kleuker (pt. 1, p. 27).

36. Ibid. 39, where the three kinds are said to be: moral, ritual, and political-religious.

37. Kleuker (pt. 2, pp. 316 ff.) spells out the number of lashes for various offenses. See *SBE* iv. 34–45 for a longer list; cf. Anquetil du Perron, ii. 287 ff.

containing the laws seems to be complete. Later on, to be sure, in more developed conditions, punishments were enacted, although there is no punishment for murder of one's parents, because these crimes are too horrible to have possibly been committed. | 246

The second kind of law is more concerned with religious precepts, as well as those dealing with purification. The first of these is that punishments befall anyone who speaks contemptuously of a holy man and deliberately lives contrary to the laws of Ormazd.[38]

The third kind contains the Mithra offenses, above all the moral laws. Mithra appears as the one who presides over the inner or higher aspect in the human being. This aspect is far more highly esteemed, and the punishment for a moral transgression is much harsher. The precepts of rectitude are found here. Thus in particular, for breaking one's word the punishment is three hundred lashes. Whoever steals money furthermore receives in the other world three hundred years of punishment in hell. These then are the Mithra laws. The civil laws thus indicate extreme simplicity of the culture, and many of them are for the most part moral commandments, for instance, to not neglect one's own sphere of work.[39]

[2.] The second kind of precept concerns the sacrificial offerings. These do not have the meaning they have for other peoples, where each one relinquishes something of his own property, declaring himself or his property to be nonessential as opposed to the deity, and so gives either a portion of that property or his own self, unconditionally (*ganz nutzlos, ungebraucht*) to the deity. For the Hindus this sacrifice extends to the surrendering of one's life to the deity, so that in this absolute negativity a Hindu is just seeking to gain some worth. The Zend people themselves make offerings; animal offerings are enjoined and occur. The beast is not burnt nor is some of it discarded as useless; instead | the offering consists solely in the priest reciting certain 247
prayers while slaughtering the animal. So what takes place is only a dedication of the beast, and indeed only when it is supposed to be slaughtered on a festival occasion.[40] Explicit prayers are enjoined for daily consecrations; but

38. See Kleuker (pt. 1, p. 49; pt. 2, p. 364). The second of these passages states that impurity involves both internal and external factors. External impurity involves proximity to unclean persons or animals, or contact with a dead thing, without following prescribed practices for such circumstances. See *SBE* iv. 67–122, for many forms of purification after contact with dead animals or people; cf. Anquetil du Perron, ii. 297–353.

39. See Kleuker (pt. 2, pp. 315–16), where Ormazd cites these and other punishments for Mithra offenses (but in this world, without mention of years in hell). See also n. 37 above.

40. Kleuker (pt. 3, 206) says that the main offerings are meat that is consecrated and then eaten, as well as a variety of fruits, grains, dairy products, and the like.

these are not regarded as offerings. There are no negative acts directed against oneself to prove one's respect for Ormazd.

[3.] The religious action proper is that of the consecrated bread and chalice in remembrance and honor of Hom [Haoma], the actual founder of their religion, as Zoroaster is the reviver of it. There is a particular festival to honor Hom that consists of the consecration and partaking of unleavened bread, as well as the presentation and partaking of a chalice containing a beverage from Hom juice. So Hom is the revealer and is also a plant the juice of which is then consumed.[41] So this is something mirroring our Christian sacrament of the Lord's Supper. The Church Fathers even found this observance in the Mithra worship of Roman times, even into the Christian era too, and they say that through it the evil demons sought to ride on the coattails of what is good, as a mockery of the Christian religion. Zoroaster has Hom say: 'Whoever consumes me in thankful prayer is sacrificing to me, and receives from me the good things of the world.'[42] This ceremony in remembrance of Hom was also celebrated in the slaughter of a beast as a sacrificial offering.

This is the ancient religion of the Zend people, a foundation that made its way over to the Persians and the Medes. It is the purest nature religion in that light is the object of reverence, and the entire relationship of the cultus is upheld just as purely as the object itself. It is nature religion as pure as there
248 can be. | So this is the spiritual element of the Persian Empire, one that has its seat wholly in the empire's eastern part.

Assyria and Babylonia

The other, more sumptuous element, rich and sensuous, one of outward abundance, we have to seek on the western side, in Babylon and Assyria in the river region of the Euphrates and the Tigris. Here we have not much more than historically factual accounts. Little is provided for us about the spiritual character of this side of the region. Tales of these peoples in their

41. Kleuker (pt. 3, pp. 206–7) says that Hom is a sacred tree to which the Persians attribute the power of bestowing immortality; that it never decomposes, bears no fruit, and is similar to a grapevine; that the juice extracted from it is called the 'water of life'. 'Haoma' is the more usual rendering. This concept is paralleled by the Indian 'soma', also a plant the juice of which, when extracted and consumed, bestows immortality. Both plants are said to be yellow or golden. This Iranian tree of life was first planted on earth by Ahura Mazda, or Ormazd; it has a heavenly prototype. There are numerous references to it in the Avesta; see, for instance, *SBE* xxxi. 235–46. The theme of a tree that bestows immortality was widespread in the ancient Near East; see Gen. 2: 9, 22–4, on the tree of life placed by God in the Garden of Eden.

42. For this quote, see Kleuker (pt. 1, p. 92).

splendor have their setting in the most ancient history, which in any event is highly obscure and contradictory and multifaceted; the result is that the names of the kings and the lists of kingdoms pose many difficulties, and here in particular a critical stance is necessary. We are not, however, granted a glimpse into the inner character of these peoples; we have to be satisfied with the main elements.

First is Assyria, a term of highly uncertain application. Assyria is probably a main district along the middle part of the Tigris River, principally to the east of it. Media lies farther east, Armenia is to the north, and to the south is Mesopotamia, which was at one time part of Assyria, at another time part of Babylonia. Assyria is one section of what today is Kurdistan. By the Greeks, Assyria is called Babylonia and Mesopotamia. In Assyria the ancient cities were called Assur and Ninevah, the great city of Ninus.[43] The setting is in fertile soil, and yet the culture here does not seem to have reached the high level of that in Babylonia. It cannot be determined precisely where Ninevah was located, although its site is in the area of present-day Mosul. | 249

The southern part is Babylonia. Babylon, or Babel, is a name just as famous as Ninevah. Babylon lies on the Euphrates River, as Ninevah does on the Tigris. It is the city of Bel, of the sun, Kor.[44] In Babylonia as in Ninevah we see a twofold need: first, to abandon nomadic life and the raising of livestock, and to transition to agriculture, trades, and commerce, to adopt a law-based, civic life; second, to become secure against peoples who remained nomadic. The ancient tales speak of this valley land as having been traversed in early times by nomads who were subsequently displaced by city life. Abraham came from the region of the Euphrates to Canaan in mountainous Palestine.[45] The soil of the Euphrates region was shown to be extremely fertile, as valley soil, and Babylon furthermore was conveniently situated for commerce along the Euphrates and Tigris, which were linked by

43. Ninus was a king of Assyria and the husband of Semiramis, a woman of Greek legend who, after his death, supposedly built the city of Babylon. These are Greek and Latin names for the historical Assyrian king Shamshi-Adad IV and his wife Sammuramat. Ninus is also the Latin name for Ninevah.

44. 'Bel' derives from a Greek name for Marduk, the god of the city of Babylon. Bel was also associated with the sun. Another sun god, Shamash, was a principal deity in Babylon in the time of Hammurabi (*c.*1700 BC). Perhaps 'Kor' refers here to the Babylonian goddess Ishtar, who was associated with fertility-cycle mythology, as was the Greek figure 'Kore', a 'double' of the goddess Demeter.

45. See Gen. 11: 31–12: 9. Abraham's father Terah took his family west to Haran, from which point Abraham, then called Abram, later (at God's command) departed and took his family to Canaan.

canals for purposes of navigation as well as of agriculture. Navigation here extended over the Persian Gulf.

What must strike us in particular as characteristic of these cities is their vast size; just as famous are the huge edifices of temples and walls, which were phenomenal achievements and parts of which endured from ancient times or at least were still to be seen in ruins. Famous in particular are the magnificent buildings of Semiramis. There is no strictly historical indication as to the time of this splendor. The name of Semiramis was universally celebrated, and many great things have been associated with it. Babylon had a further period of resplendence seven hundred years before Christ, and for that reason it is uncertain whether the buildings were not erected until this later era.

We know little about the spirit, customs, and character of the people. It has been suggested that the finest construction was the temple of Bel. People
250 revere the sun. Besides, the worship of Mylitta | or nature is universal.[46] In the Near East generally there is reverence for universal nature. 'Physis' even serves as the principal title for Greek or Ionic philosophy.

Only Herodotus reports for us a few features of the customs of Babylon. One of them is that each woman of Babylon had to sit in the temple and offer herself to a stranger, who in return gave a monetary gift to the temple. We must not look upon this custom as something benefiting the strangers in the way it does the temple, but instead we have here a nature worship, the worship of Astarte, a religious feature.[47] A second feature concerns the same matter, in that maidens were married annually via an auction in which the fairest drew the highest bids and the unattractive and oldest ones were outfitted with that money.[48] We see no great respect for the woman in this practice, because her feelings play no part in the matter. It is not, however, the general Oriental practice that the maiden have a voice in the choice of a husband; it is the practice only in Europe. For what we see in it is a shared life, ethical equality, concern for everyone. Herodotus goes on to mention, as a third point, that a sick family member was set in the marketplace so that

46. Mylitta was a goddess at Babylon, linked to Ishtar and associated with childbirth. Herodotus, *History* (1.31; Grene, p. 95) associates her with Aphrodite. Her worship is linked to the practice of temple prostitution described just below in our text.

47. See Herodotus, 1.199 (Grene, p. 124). Herodotus is critical of this custom and says it is unfortunate for homely women, since a person has to offer herself only once, and a homely woman might have to wait a long time before a stranger chooses her.

48. That is, the money went to those men who would take the unattractive women as their wives. See Herodotus, 1.196 (Grene, pp. 122–3).

the passersby were able to impart good advice to him.[49] So this too bespeaks a shared life, a general sociability.

We next have to mention the historical elements of the terrain on which we now find ourselves. The most famous name is Ninus, the builder of the city of Ninevah and the savior of the Assyrian Empire, who is said to have lived 2,050 years before Christ.[50] Here too | the legends are thus as ex- 251
aggerated as they are elsewhere, for instance in China. The biblical tales of Nimrod as savior of the Babylonian Empire fall approximately in this same time period.[51] The story is that Nimrod subjugated Babylon, and then Bactria and Media to the north-east. Ctesias, a physician who was at the Persian court during the time of Cyrus the Younger, furnishes these reports.[52] He speaks especially about a war of Ninus with Bactria that was a hard struggle for both sides. He gives special attention above all to the siege of Bactria, which was conquered by means of the counsel of Semiramis, the wife of a general. The locale indicated as 'Bactria' is not a good fit with the Balkh of today on the Amu Darya River, but instead fits with Balkh-Bamian; Semiramis is said to have assigned to its conquest an infantry of one million, 700,000 men, a cavalry of 100,000 men, and 10,000 armed chariots.[53] Later on this Semiramis [allegedly] became the consort of Ninus, and subsequently was herself the sovereign;[54] her story oscillates between mythological and historical features. Derceto, a fish-woman, a mythological figure, is reputedly her mother.[55] Ascribed to this Semiramis is in part the construction of Babylon, in part its enlargement and selection as the main city, and construction of the temple of Bel. She caused to be installed three golden statues—of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva.[56] Ctesias himself claims to

49. See Herodotus, 1.197 (Grene, p. 123).

50. See n. 43 above. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* puts the historical figures lying behind the legends of Ninus and his queen Semiramis in the 9th cent. BC.

51. See Gen. 10: 8–12.

52. Ctesias, a Greek from Cnidos, lived in the late 5th and early 4th cents. BC, and was personal physician to Artaxerxes II. He authored *Persia*, a history of the Assyrian Empire and the Persian Empire in 23 books, a historically unreliable source, as well as works on geography and on India.

53. See Diodorus Siculus, 2.4–5; *Diodorus Siculus*, ii, tr. C. H. Oldfather (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1933), 356–65. The numbers Diodorus gives (taken from Ctesias) are actually 210,000 cavalry and 'slightly less than ten thousand six hundred scythe-bearing chariots' (Oldfather, p. 363).

54. Diodorus Siculus, 2.6 (Oldfather, pp. 365–71).

55. Diodorus Siculus, 2.4 (Oldfather, pp. 358–9). Diodorus says the Syrians have a goddess, Derceto, with the head of a woman and the body of a fish.

56. Diodorus Siculus gives an extensive account of the new city of Babylon constructed under the direction of Semiramis (2.7–9; Oldfather, pp. 370–83). It includes the great ziggurat

have seen a Jupiter still there. But they probably have these names only from the Greek accounts. That is because the Greeks import their gods into all mythologies and, in doing so, deprive their depictions of part of their value. Also recounted are further expeditions by Semiramis to Ethiopia, Egypt, and India. On the latter she suffered losses, although the king who defeated her was prevented from pursuing her beyond the Indus.[57] Her expeditions that
252 we hear about are like similar expeditions we read of by Dionysos | to India, as well as ones of Sesostris.[58] But it is to be assumed throughout that, if they do have some historical basis, these expeditions were quite unimportant. Should there be some historical basis to these narratives, it pertains to an age that still has nothing definitive about it, with the result that no [historical] progress is made by such expeditions. It is equally probable, however, that these expeditions are only imaginary, are the unalloyed fictions of Oriental nations. For it is typical of the Orientals, when they become acquainted with foreign lands, that they enlarge upon the tales of their heroes and of events, commensurate with their wider acquaintance with new regions. We find these phenomena everywhere.

So Ninus and Semiramis are the principal figures at this time. Ctesias and others provide lengthy and partly discrepant series of successive kings, whereby the empire is said to have endured for 1,000 years, or even 1,300 years. The main figure who emerges is Sardanapalus, whose downfall took place in 820 BC. The previously subjugated provinces rebelled. Later on Sardanapalus as such became a symbol, that of a wholly sensual prince. It was written about him that, after being besieged in Ninevah for three years, he burned himself to death on a pyre of wood, together with his whole family and his treasures.[59] One feature that signifies the eastern nobility is in fact the Oriental inability to acknowledge oneself as being subordinate.

(a temple dedicated to Bel = Zeus) with statues, he says, of Zeus, Hera, and Rhea (2.9.4–5; Oldfather, pp. 380–3).

57. Diodorus Siculus tells of her expeditions to Media, Egypt, and Ethiopia, and finally her 'war against the Indians' (2.13–19; Oldfather, pp. 390–417). He says she built a pontoon bridge to cross the river but lost the battle, having to flee back to the other side. The Indian king, Strobrobates, interpreted an omen to mean that he should not pursue her forces across the river.

58. The reference is to Dionysius I (c.430–367 BC), tyrant of Syracuse who, according to Diodorus Siculus (2.5.6; Oldfather, pp. 362–5), set out on his campaigns with a comparably large army—though surely not to India. Sesostris, a mythical king of Egypt, was said to have campaigned widely in Africa and Asia (Diodorus Siculus, 1.53–8; Oldfather, pp. 184–207; see also Herodotus, *History* 2.102–11; Grene, pp. 172–6).

59. Diodorus Siculus says that Sardanapalus 'was not seen by any man residing outside the palace, he lived the life of a woman' and that when finally besieged by rebel armies he set fire to

It is reported that, after the downfall of the Assyrian Empire, many independent states cropped up, ones now sustaining a more historical character. Media and Babylonia now come to the fore. Receiving special mention from this later Babylonian Empire is a | queen Nitocris, to whom in particular are ascribed many works, including some said to have been completed by Semiramis.[60] In fact, in accord with Jewish accounts, people often feel inclined to assume that there was a newly independent Assyrian Empire. Combining the diverse accounts of this and more ancient periods has been a perpetually attempted but fruitless endeavor; for the sources are in such a state that there can be no fundamental reconciliation of them. 253

Sources for Persia and the Persian Empire

The main sources we have are those of the Greeks. The foremost sources are Diodorus Siculus, Herodotus, and later, Ctesias, the latter of which would have been created from the Greeks' own archives. There are discrepancies between Herodotus and Ctesias. A second kind of source consists of the sacred writings of the Jews; for the two [Hebrew] kingdoms stand in relation to the Assyrian Empire and the Babylonian Empire.[61] A third source consists of Persian legends and accounts, and of course later writers, and these are the most important ones. Especially famous is the epic poem of Firdawsi, the *Shahnameh*. The stories that he recites are compiled also by others in almost the same form. Firdawsi lived in the eleventh century, at the court of Mahmud, the Ghaznavid sultan; his poems have as their topic the ancient heroic sagas of Iran. Görres provided an excerpt and endeavored to harmonize it with the accounts by the Greeks.[62] It is nevertheless just a bit of flashy pyrotechnics that, upon closer examination, dissolves into smoke.

With these heroic sagas we must take into account a circumstance like that of the other sources. The Greek accounts pertain to their closer neighbor Media; the Jewish accounts pertain to Babylon. Firdawsi's sagas are said

an enormous pyre in the palace, burning up his concubines, eunuchs, and treasures, as well as himself and his entire palace (2.23–7; Oldfather, pp. 424–41).

60. Herodotus says that Nitocris realigned the Euphrates River, dug canals, and created a lake, thus establishing for the city defenses against the Medes (1.185–7; Grene, pp. 116–18).

61. According to the Bible, in 922 BC, after King Solomon's reign, the Hebrews split into two kingdoms. The northern kingdom, Israel, lasted until 721–2, when it was conquered and incorporated into the Assyrian Empire. The southern kingdom, Judah, endured until 587, when it was conquered by the Babylonians.

62. On the Görres edn., see n. 10 above. Ghazna was a Muslim kingdom centered in Afghanistan that at its height extended from the Tigris to the Ganges. Sultan Mahmud ruled 997–1030.

254 to concern the history of Persia as such, | but his field of action seems to involve a different sphere than those of the other accounts. One must take into consideration that he was after all a Muslim and by no means simply a Persian. He speaks only in faint echoes about the ancient religion of the heroes. The soul of the people no longer lives in him. The main contrast for him is that of Iran, the high plateau, with Turan, the land to the north of the Amu Darya and extending to the Caspian Sea. This area is his chief concern. It may be that either the events and deeds that he narrates actually took place there, or else that the region was the only one familiar to him, in which case this area alone was in his purview. He came east from Media, from the mountain range that descends to the valley of the Amu Darya, from Khorasan. The Ghaznavids were rulers of Khorasan, of the land of Kor, a people who waged war with the Turanians. Their sultan conducted campaigns to that region. For Firdawsi's imagination, and for the dynasty under which he lived, this area is of the greatest importance, and that is why he could have given it as the locale of his narratives. Johannes von Müller too labored with these sagas and sought to impose a rigorous chronology on them, although fruitlessly and unsuccessfully, which also is explicable from the foregoing circumstances.[63]

The manner in which Firdawsi and the Orientals treat history, however, can be seen in the histories that we know from elsewhere. In India no trace of Alexander the Great is to be found. And yet, for instance, Alexander is renowned far and wide in the Near East as 'Skander'. We see, then, how
255 capriciously history | itself is dealt with. Thus Firdawsi tells how one of the princes of Iran waged war with Philip of Rum, overcoming him and forcing him to pay tribute. This Iranian prince then married a daughter of Philip, but sent her away because she had bad breath. She subsequently bore Skander by him as father. So Alexander was said to be the ancestor of a Persian prince.[64] The depiction of the deeds of Skander is similarly quixotic.

The Medes and the Chaldeans

The people who come to our attention now are the Medes. Their land is partly to the south of the Caspian Sea, partly southwesterly from it, on the

63. See Müller's 'Versuch über die Zeitrechnung der Vorwelt', in his *Sämtliche Werke*, viii (Tübingen, 1810), 195–230.

64. This episode is found on p. 255 of the Görres edn. of the *Shahnameh*, on which see n. 10 above. Rum, or Rumelia, was a region of the early Ottoman Empire that extended over Macedonia and Thrace. So this is apparently a garbled version (by Firdawsi) of Philip II of Macedon being the father of Alexander. The story seems to make Alexander the descendant of a Persian prince, and yet our text says 'ancestor' (*Ahn*).

mountain heights that descend toward the Caspian Sea and toward the Tigris. In ancient times we see them in strife and at war with the Armenians, Syrians, and Bactrians, the people of Sardis, and the inhabitants of the plains to the north of the Amu Darya who are otherwise known as Turanians.[65] The Medes include the Magi. Their chief city is indicated as being Ecbatana, in the region of what is today Hamadan. They are mentioned in part with respect to Arbaces, who led the revolt against Sardanapalus, in part by Herodotus in relation to Deioces, who was the first to get the Medes to build cities, to create laws, and to choose kings just as he too had been chosen.[66] The main thing that we see in the case of the Medes is that, for them as a mountain people, the era of their cultivation comes later than in the case of the Bactrians and the Babylonians. These Medes, a mountain people, are an important people.

What emerges on the other side [of the region] is the Chaldean-Babylonian Empire, the empire of the Chaldeans in union with the Babylonians. | 256
The Chaldeans appear to be a mountain people insofar as they remain to some extent in their mountains, and appear partly as the dominant people in Babylonia. In the *Cyropaedia*, Tigranes describes them to Cyrus as a mountain people, whereupon he enters into relations with them and makes them allies.[67] In this Chaldean Babylonia we become acquainted, principally via the Jews, with a highly developed situation. Daniel himself was a governor in Babylon, and the regulations that he instituted are evidence of an extensive commercial organization.[68] We even find multiple classes of the Magi, some as interpreters of scriptures or hieroglyphs, others as astrologers and prophesiers, just as the Chaldeans in turn form a particular class of prophesiers. This empire had gained renown at this time because of its commerce, its law enforcement, and its observations of the stars. Without a doubt they have no greater astronomical information with all this than one can obtain from long and careful observation. The calendar of Nabonassar, the first

65. Sardes, or Sardis, was the capitol of Lydia, in western Asian Minor. Turan was the name for a vast region in north central Asia.

66. Herodotus has a fuller version of the accomplishments of Deioces, the first king of the Medes (1.96–101; Grene, pp. 79–81). See Diodorus Siculus, 2.23–7 (Oldfather, pp. 424–41) for the full account of Arbaces' revolt.

67. Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is a fictional but historically based work in 8 books, about the life and accomplishments of the Persian king, Cyrus the Great, who ruled *c.*559–529 BC. It is tr. by Walter Miller (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914), as vols. 5 and 6 of the 7 Loeb Classical Library vols. of Xenophon's works.

68. See the biblical book of Daniel 2: 48–9.

king, is renowned.[69] But the supposition is that it was certainly not in use by the people, and only later was it placed at the disposal of the historiographer. In any event this is a principal empire of the Near Eastern culture.

The Founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus

Now, having examined the elements of the Persian Empire, we must consider how Cyrus consolidated it. The founding of the Persian Empire took place through Cyrus, a Persian from the house of the Achaemenids of Persia and one related to the Median royal line.[70] We do not know the eastern boundaries of this empire. There is even a king of Susa who regards himself as allied with the Babylonians.[71]

The first thing Cyrus did was to become ruler of the Median Empire. According to Herodotus, the king of Media whom he subdued was his own
257 grandfather.[72] | Like the Persians, the Medes were a mountain people and at that time were still unrefined, little advanced in culture. We find very harsh features in the story of Astyages. For instance, he had in his service Scythians who, upon locating no wild game, slaughtered the hunter's sons and gave their flesh to Astyages the king.[73] In a different story, the king had the son of Harpagus slaughtered and served to his father, because Harpagus had spared Cyrus. Enraged at this, Harpagus handed the army over to conquest by Cyrus.[74] So we encounter harsh features of this sort.

69. Nabupolassar (his name in Greek) was king of Babylon 626–605 BC, the first ruler of Chaldean lineage, and founder of the Neo-Babylonian Empire. His Babylonian name is Nabu-apla-usur.

70. Xenophon mentions (1.2.1; Miller, i. 8–11) that the father of Cyrus was Cambyses, a Persian, and his mother was Mandane, a Mede.

71. According to Xenophon (5.1.2; Miller, ii. 2–5) Abradatas of Susa was allied with the king of Assyria, and was his emissary in relations with Bactria. Susa lay east of Babylonia and southeast of Assyria.

72. Herodotus (1.75, 127–30; Grene, pp. 67, 93–4) says that the forces of Astyages, the grandfather of Cyrus, were under the command of Harpagus, who allowed some of them to desert because of a dreadful thing Astyages had done to him in the past, and so the army of Cyrus was victorious. The full story is in Herodotus (1.107–30; Grene, pp. 83–95). Hegel recounts elements of it just below in our text.

73. This story is in Herodotus (1.73; Grene, pp. 66–7) where, contrary to Hegel's account, these Scythians were in the service of Cyaxares, king of Media. They were angry at him, and so slaughtered a boy he had apprenticed to them (not the hunter's own sons), whom they served unbeknownst to the court of Alyattes, king of Lydia, where Cyaxares was dining.

74. According to Herodotus, Mandane, the daughter of Astyages, gave birth to Cyrus. In response to a dream, Astyages sought to have the infant killed, and gave the task to Harpagus, who instructed a herdsman to expose baby Cyrus to die in the forest. Instead the herdsman and his wife secretly raised him. Years later, when Astyages discovered this, he deceived Harpagus into unwittingly eating his own son as punishment for his failure to carry out the order.

The second conquest by Cyrus was the victory over Croesus. Herodotus says Croesus was defeated because Astyages, whose kingdom extended to the Halys River, had married a sister of Croesus and for that reason Croesus hastened to him for assistance. Previously Croesus had waged war against the Medes and, after a five-year struggle, had concluded a truce the condition of which was this marriage, mediated by a king of Babylon. And so we see a diplomatic connection between these kingdoms. We can pass over the story of the war. Cyrus conquered Sardis, and from that point on the Persians became wealthy, in light of the abundant goods there.[75] The Persians are said in this way to have become acquainted for the first time with the finer things of life. Cyrus then straightway subjugated the coasts of Asia Minor to himself and conquered the multitude of Greek colonial city-states. Bias is said to have advised these Ionic Greeks to take to their ships in order to seek a new | homeland. But they did not prove sufficiently courageous to 258
leave the land of their birth.[76] Through this conquest the Persians came into contact with the Greeks.

The third war of Cyrus was the conquest of the Babylonians and Syrians, right up to the Mediterranean. The last one was Cyrus' battle against the Massagetae, a Scythian people beyond the Amu Darya, in a region that the Persian tales call Turan. Herodotus states that Cyrus was killed here. He says, in addition, that the Massagetae have gold and copper but do not possess silver and iron.[77] In the prehistoric graves beside the Baltic Sea only copper is found but no iron, just like with the Massagetae. Cyrus died in battle with the Massagetae. So he died pursuing his calling, which had no broader aim than the uniting of the Near East under one rule. His accomplishment was the uniting of Near Eastern peoples throughout the West [of this region]. This unification had no further political or religious significance.

Again years later is when Harpagus got his revenge. See Herodotus, *History* 1.119 and 1.127–8 (Grene, pp. 89–90, 93–4) for these acts of retaliation.

75. See Herodotus, *History* 1.73–91 (Grene, pp. 66–77), for the full account of Croesus' defeat and submission to Cyrus. The last sentence refers to the fabulous wealth Croesus had accumulated at Sardis (see 1.30; Grene, p. 45).

76. Herodotus (1.70; Grene, p. 110) says that Bias of Priene (an Ionian city), who was regarded as one of the 'Seven Sages of Greece', advised that they all migrate to Sardinia and set up a single colony there.

77. He says (1.214; Grene, pp. 129–30) that most of the Persian army, including Cyrus himself, were killed in the decisive battle ending this ill-fated campaign. Herodotus distinguishes the Massagetae from the Scythians, although the two are similar peoples, and states that the Massagetae lack silver and bronze (1.215; Grene, p. 130).

Features of the Persian Empire

So we have to highlight the features of this Persian Empire. It is not so much a single shape as it is a tying of so many national groups together into one bundle; it is a unique entity, a kind of free union of peoples, thus reflecting in a single focal point the glory of all of them. There is no political whole of comparable customs and laws; instead the many peoples stick to their characteristic individuality. All of them retained their own characteristic features and they were not fused into one whole. The greatness of this empire is the very fact that each part is allowed its own characteristic shape—as, for instance, the Jews were too—and that these peoples simply array themselves (*sich konzentrieren*) around a single point. Cyrus allowed the Jews to reconstitute their own folkways, and this allowance for individuality is one of the great features of Cyrus. Princes remain in part rulers of
259 their own | tribes; surely the magnanimity of Cyrus broadened the empire's domain. We can take a brief look at the characteristics of these many peoples.

We see, however, that the Jews and the other peoples are caught up in inflexible individuality, incapable of uniting under universal thoughts and laws, for each people has its own wholly determinate nature, yet in such a way that they do not stand in isolation but instead enter into the most manifold relationships that lead to hostility, that are mutually irreconcilable, such that only the iron rule of the Persians can hold them together and forcibly prevent them from carrying on in an outwardly hostile way. In the prophets of the Jews we read the lamentations about the quarrels between the two kingdoms of Judah and Israel, and those with the Egyptians and others; so we can easily conceive how the prophets could have arrived at such hatred of foreign peoples. From this we learn how beneficial for the Near East was the consolidation that came about through Cyrus. Later on, in place of this iron rule, we see entering on the scene the fanaticism of the religion of Islam that brought about the complete opposite, the utter demolition of all reciprocal individuality. The Romans and the Greeks, as foreign powers, ruled directly over these peoples. But Islamic fanaticism emerged from the Near East itself, destroying every individuality of these peoples, wiping out all differences, as a principle in which all are equal but at the same time one evidently incapable of forming a political relationship. The
260 only rational relationship of the Near East therefore was one in which | an iron rule coerced these peoples into not bringing themselves to ruin.

As for the more specific features of Persian rule, we thus see the Persians as being an uncultured mountain people. The Persians are only the core that

exercises rule over the other peoples who differ from it, a core that does not blend in with them but instead reserves for itself the ruling power. While making their way down into the valleys, the Persians still stand with only one foot in the valley and the other foot on their mountains, just as today the Manchus do of course still rule in China but also stand back and perpetually remain a particular warrior people, and the [Manchu] emperor annually lives for a time outside the wall in tents with his horsemen, devoted to the hunt for wild animals. It is like this too in India, where the English govern but have their roots elsewhere, in order to reinvigorate themselves and not lower themselves to the Indian principle, so that they do not descend to the principle of the subject people. Thus the Persians endeavored for a long time to maintain themselves in this characteristic status, although they have not sustained it. With the Persians we see independence, gallantry, freedom, a certain boldness and greatness—a customary disposition, which can only exist together with a savagery that gives way when particular factors in life intervene, so that in the face of greater diversity it dissolves into harmless mildness. The Persians therefore sought to maintain themselves in this characteristic way. Their 'political constitution' was a simple way of connecting so many distinctly different peoples.

The Persian prince was surrounded by his nobles and was educated by the Magi; the Greeks called him 'the Great King'; he stood at the apex of the empire, was cultured, and was educated in the sciences. In his early years | 261
raised by eunuchs, he was introduced to military activities and from the ages of 7 to 17 was trained in all physical skills. Then he received four teachers, one of which, the σωφός, instructed him in the teachings of Zoroaster.[78] We did state beforehand that the civic and religious laws of the Zend books could not endure with a cultivated world-people. Gathered around the prince we see the nobles of the empire, mostly Persians. We see traces of 'the empire of light' reflected in their administration. For, just as the Zend people revered seven Amschaspands [Amesa Spentas], so we read

78. The Greek *sophos* ('wise'), which is surely intended here, does not occur with an omega in place of the omicron (as it does in our text) in the standard references: the *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* of Stephanus, and the Greek dictionary of Liddell and Scott. There is no Greek in this passage in the second edition of Hegel's *Werke*. So the omega is most likely an error in typesetting or in transcription. Xenophon is heavily influenced by Socratic philosophy, as seen in various of his works; so his *Cyropaedia* presents the tutelage of Cyrus as involving Socratic elements (1.2.6–7, 31–4; Miller, pp. 14–15, 116–19). But there is no explicit mention of 'four' teachers of Cyrus there, no designation of any one as *sophos*, and no indication that the young Cyrus was instructed in the teachings of Zoroaster. All references to the Magi come subsequently in this work and apply to later in the life of Cyrus.

often of the number seven when the Persians speak of the nobles and magistrates of the empire in such a way that the prince is compared to Ormazd. But there is no historical proof for a specific elaboration of this representation.

Historically the Persian nobles exhibit a patriotic attitude in which maintenance of the empire was a higher interest than selfishness and one's own interest. The intrigues occur more often among princes of the royal line. After the death of Cambyses, the Magi seized the power of the throne and ruled for some time. The nobles of the empire united, however, in order to install the Achaemenids on the throne and maintain the dynasty of the Persians.[79] Their concern was the thought of the empire and its maintenance. Following the expulsion of the Magi we see, as Herodotus depicts it, an impassioned deliberation among the nobles as to which constitution would be best for the empire, one in which no one is out for himself.
262 Subsequently | they settled on a monarchical constitution, and the decision as to who ought to be king was determined by whose horse would be the first to neigh at the rising sun.[80] We see in these nobles, some 1,500 strong, the leaders of the army. For their maintenance and that of the king, the provinces paid a tribute, with each satrapy providing for four months.[81] Xenophon recounts that at a festival the king, at the head of all the cavalry, was escorted from the royal city.[82] Xenophon imparts many things, such as that Cyrus gave to his army a constitution, calling for complete discipline and strict obedience.[83] Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is of course a work of fiction, although its general features are certainly accurate. The subject populations were ruled via satrapies, and this rule seems to have been

79. Cambyses II, the Persian king who ruled 529–522 BC, was the son of Cyrus the Great. Herodotus tells of Cambyses' descent into insanity, and of how the Magi conspired to install and control his successor (3.27–38, 61–79; Grene, pp. 222–8, 238–47), although the plot was foiled and Darius was chosen as king by the Persian leaders.

80. Herodotus tells of this deliberation and the ensuing events (3.80–8; Grene, pp. 247–52). The account places various theories of government (monarchy, democracy, oligarchy) in the mouths of the participants. Backers of Darius allegedly insured his victory by using a favorite mare to induce his stallion to neigh at dawn.

81. It is not clear why Hegel says this. According to Herodotus (3.89–94; Grene, pp. 252–4), the various peoples were grouped into twenty satrapies or provinces, and each of the twenty was subject to an annual taxation or tribute.

82. Xenophon describes in detail the grand procession in which Cyrus appeared in state in order to command respect for his government, and the ensuing festival events (8.3.1–34; Miller, ii. 348–65).

83. According to Xenophon (8.5.1–16; Miller, ii. 394–403), Cyrus was a firm believer in orderliness, and so gave strict instructions both for the layout of his encampment and for the tactics of his soldiers in battle.

more of a general oversight, since all the peoples continued on in their own customary ways of life.

The Persian prince was, in effect, lord over all property. Wherever he came, gifts were brought to him as signs that everything belongs to him and that these people have everything only by his favor. Within Persia proper, however, the king distributed gifts. It is evident that under this rule many individuals had great riches. Each [people] had to bestow a specific thing on the king and on the satraps. Thus Xerxes demanded earth and water from the Greeks.[84] The provinces sent only the most valuable things as tribute—the Arabians sent incense, Tyre sent purple dye, through intermediaries. Each province sent its most excellent products to the king.

Thus we see the Persian Empire as a consolidation of many peoples, with Persia as their master. So we observe this multiplicity of peoples engaging in wars against the Greeks, | in its characteristic fashion not divided 283
into regiments but instead made up of nations, distinct in their ranks, attire, weapons, military discipline, and mode of behavior. Their march was a kind of movement of peoples, and Herodotus even says about it that the warriors with whom they dwelt at home were those they also wished to be with in battle.[85] We see the Far East completely self-enclosed, whereas in Western Asia there is, on the contrary, the opening up or fragmentation into particular individualities. We see these individualities united for the first time under the Persian Empire, in such a way that individuality does not come on the scene in hostile fashion. The Persian, the worshiper of the light, of purity, hovers tolerantly over the whole, free of animosity and hostile particularity.

According to Herodotus' historical account of Darius Hystaspes in contrast to Cambyses, what emerges is that the Persians were conscious of this tolerance. Herodotus indicates that Darius Hystaspes had brought the Indians and the Greeks together. Darius asked the Greeks whether they wished to consume their deceased parents, upon which they distinctly recoiled in horror. He then turned to the Indians, asking whether they wished to cremate the dead, and when these people then recoiled from what was in

84. The emissaries of Darius made this demand of King Amyntas of Macedonia (Herodotus, 5.17–18; Grene, pp. 362–3). Prior to a later invasion, Xerxes made a similar demand of the Greeks for a symbolic offering of 'earth and water' as a sign of submission by foreigners (which differs from the tributes paid by the satrapies for support of the monarchy) but it partially backfired, and so he did not make this demand of Athens and Sparta (Herodotus, 7.131–3; Grene, pp. 511–12).

85. Herodotus describes in considerable detail these features of the various army and navy units, arranged in nationalities, as they passed in review before Xerxes prior to his invasion of Greece (7.59–100; Grene, pp. 491–501).

fact the usual practice among the others, he expressed the view that each people must stick to its own customs.[86] We cannot now enumerate the whole series of particular features. A few of them are to be highlighted, with their elements showing that they bring to fruition a condition we can say is more humane.

First of all we have in mind especially these elements on the coast of Syria,
264 and after that, as our fourth major topic, we pass over then to Egypt. | The Syrian elements are Phoenician commerce, the religion of Astarte and of Adonis, and the religion of the Jews.

Phoenicia

Phoenician[87] commerce had its locus on the Phoenician coast, a narrow strip in some places only two hours travel time in width, bordered behind it to the east by Mount Lebanon, which protected it from the interior, from the continent. Along this coastal strip arose a series of cities—Tyre and others—in which there emerged commerce in its distinctive and particular form; this commerce was indeed an isolated feature and not just an element of the whole, of the state; instead it existed abstractly for its own sake. We see this commerce in part reaching into the interior of the land, extending itself toward the interior even as far as the Red Sea, although it was carried out especially on the Mediterranean Sea. The Phoenicians proved to be very productive and resourceful, as is shown by their purple dye, their glass, and so forth. What is most outstanding and particularly noteworthy about them, however, is their wide-ranging and bold seafaring on the Mediterranean Sea and on the Atlantic Ocean to the north and south; they went to all areas of the Mediterranean, everywhere founding colonies such as Rhodes, Cyprus, Thasos, and others. There were gold mines there. Furthermore, there were at the same time colonies in Sardinia and in Spain—at Malaga and Cadiz—that have their origins in Tyre. Along the southern side, in Africa, they founded Utica, Carthage, and so forth. From Cadiz they navigated the Atlantic Ocean and far south down the African coast; indeed they circumnavigated Africa via the Arabian Sea. Farther to the north they sailed to the British

86. This anecdote is in Herodotus, 3.38 (Grene, p. 228). The Indians in question are an atypical group, the 'Callatians', who (according to Herodotus) consume the dead. Most Indians of course do in fact practice cremation.

87. Ancient Phoenicia lay on a strip of coastline in the eastern Mediterranean from Mt. Carmel northward, approximating to the modern country of Lebanon and the coastal portion of Syria. A Semitic people, the Phoenicians are credited with the invention of the alphabet, as well as with the seafaring, colonizing, and commercial ventures mentioned by Hegel.

Isles, where in Cornwall they traded in tin, | and in magnificent amber from 265
the Baltic seacoast and from Holland.

So we see a people that, by simply pursuing trade in its own fashion, is at these times a world-discovering people. Thus we see here a progression not previously apparent in Asia, one in which human beings, self-reliant in face of nature, become masters over nature, mastering its most savage power, the sea, whereas in Central Asia people worshiped nature as power over them. Here, however, they deliver themselves from nature, seek to guard against it, overcoming it. So here emerges an element incompatible with the nature worship of Asia—an emancipation from this power. Human beings who undertake such a risk extricate themselves from the many petty, scrupulous, formal, and obscure forms of worship. The spiritual existence and awakening self-confidence of human beings turn them away from this dependence, from petty ceremonies. So this is one difference from what existed heretofore.

The Religion of Astarte and Adonis

A second element is a religious difference. Along this coast nature was worshiped as a universal factor under the names of Astarte, Cybele, and others. This divine service is in one sense still very much sensual and licentious, albeit not lifeless and cold like the worship of the Hindus, but instead enthusiastic and spirited in its celebration. Human beings have value for the Hindus only when they achieve a higher state beyond consciousness through the death of spirit, being devoid of consciousness or devoid of the natural state (*Naturlosigkeit*). Here in this religion, however, we see emerging the element of spiritual infusion (*Begeisterung*); doubtless it even goes so far as the licentiousness that can be called orgiastic. In contrast to the Hindus, however, | there was in it an elevation to a higher state, one beyond 266
enmity, beyond finitude, coupled with a sustaining of the sense of self, one that still maintained self-consciousness.

In this context we have to touch upon the worship of Adonis at Byblos, which accords with that of Cybele or that of Apis. The worship of Adonis consists of two parts. The first element is the observance of the death of Adonis and the second is his rediscovery. The first is a sorrowful festival in which the women mourn for the dead lord, for the dead god, and fall into the most extravagant laments. This is a feature also found in Phrygia and even more so in Egypt, and it is alien to the Oriental spirit. In India, Hindus torture themselves without lamenting, women plunge into the Ganges in similar fashion, and wives immolate themselves without painful suffering

(*schmerzlos*);[88] the Hindus are ingenious in tortures, and all this takes place without suffering, without lamenting and with indifference to doing so. The elevation consists in the heroism of impassivity.

What lamentation entails is that the negative ought not to be. For the Hindus lamentation would have the opposite sense, because there the negative is supposed to be. But on the Syrian coast, in Phrygia, for the Phoenicians, and in Egypt, suffering is respected, is allowed. Here human suffering is expressly honored. Here the profoundest suffering is what is most palpable. In experiencing suffering, human beings discover themselves; they discover their bliss, their particularity, their 'thisness', their actuality, and this discovery here allows them to know themselves as being 'this one', here and now. This is what is human. Suffering is the discovery of the negative. But at the same time suffering contains the infinite affirmation; it is not the sheerly abstract negative but is instead at the same time the sense of self, the positive
267 factor | that is related to this negative factor. So here we see human feeling come on the scene.[89]

The Jewish Religion

The third topic to touch on is the phenomenon of the Jewish religion, the principle of which is still singularized here, is still one-sided. It is the principle that God is not a being of nature, not what is visible or sensible; the principle here is the grasping of actual being as thought.

The God of the Jews exists only for thought; here the light of the Persians has blossomed into thought, is completely spiritualized, but still abstractly

88. The German *Schmerz* can cover the range of the English words 'pain', 'suffering', 'anguish', 'sorrow', and 'grief'. The Syrian worship of Astarte *et al.* involved both physical pain (sometimes self-inflicted), and anguish or grief at the (temporary but real) demise of the deity. All these senses can play a role in 'suffering'. Hegel's point about the Hindus is not that they feel no physical pain (for they surely do), but rather that in their worldview pain and suffering have no intrinsic significance; they are something to be endured, ignored, and transcended. In contrast, for the Syrian and the ensuing Western religion, suffering in these various senses is not to be devalued or ignored, but instead affirmed as an essential (albeit ultimately to be overcome) element of human experience, and indeed of the deity's experience too. As Hegel states, *Schmerz* is essential to the blossoming of a person's self-affirmation as spirit.

89. In the philosophy of religion lectures Hegel gives fuller attention to this 'type' of religion that he discovers in (or perhaps constructs from) the ancient myths concerning Adonis, the phoenix, and other Near Eastern beliefs and practices. There this 'religion of anguish' (the label he gives it by 1831) is seen as a transition away from Persian and Jewish religion and toward a perspective in which self-conscious individual spirit clearly emerges as central, in the spectacle of, and responses to, the God who overcomes the negative by dying and rising again. There his principal source is Creuzer, *Symbolik*. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford, 2007), ii. 452–5, 457, and 743 n. 71.

so. One can wish to 'recollect' (*wiedererkennen*)[90] the principle of thought in this world soul of the Hindus or in that Brahman into which the Hindus transpose themselves. But we have noted that, as what is first, Brahman is only the existent material foundation. The content is not thought itself, but is instead the universally existent substantiality, the universal being of nature. The Brahman toward which the Hindus elevate themselves is not worshiped by them, but instead is the Hindu's own self, drawn together into an empty intuiting. So if Hindus were to revere Brahman they would be worshiping themselves, for to them this elevation to abstraction *is* Brahman. In the Jewish religion, however, pure thought, the way in which God is grasped—although essentially objectively—is in its purity the object of human worship, is their God, and thus human beings have a relationship to this object; they relate themselves positively to it and maintain themselves within it, whereas in contrast the Hindus, in relating themselves to thought, surrender themselves in their submersion and render themselves empty.

So the moment of the overturning of the Oriental principle commences at this point, the moment of the changeover from nature to spirit. Oriental people say that nature is the foundation, is what is first and eternal, and they proceed from nature to anything further. But here and now, conversely with the Jews, we see the spiritual as the foundation for the first time. | However, 288
this religion has not yet given universality to its principle, that of spirituality. It is not yet free thought, but is instead bound up with locality. It is pure, abstract thought, and not yet concrete thought; for apart from its abstraction it is, moreover, just the God of the Jewish people alone.

What we see in these three elements is the elevation of the human being above nature, above the employment of the elements of nature for their own sake; it is the fact that pure thought as what is abstract is acknowledged, and suffering retains its element of validity. These are the elements of a new self-consciousness, which poses for human beings a new and different problem for them to solve. We have to examine Egypt, as the [first] land to which is relegated the carrying out of this task.[91]

90. Hegel sometimes uses *wiedererkennen* in speaking of Plato's theory of Ideas as a theory of 'recollection'. Perhaps he is suggesting here that people seek to 'rediscover' in Hindu religious imagery 'thought as completely spiritualized'—although he does not think it is to be found there.

91. Alternatively, 'the solution to this problem' (*diese Aufgabe zu lösen*), since the next section begins by stating that Egypt poses the 'enigma' (*Rätsel*) but does not solve it.

The answer (*Lösung*) to this task or problem, however, seems rather to be that, in the individuality of the Egyptian people, the enigma (*das Rätsel*) is apparently posed and not solved.[1] Egypt confronts our soul at the outset with the image of the sphinx, similar to how dragons, centaurs, and giants generally call to mind the East; distorted shapes are as such the rule in the Orient. The symbol of Egypt, however, is the sphinx, this twofold figure, half animal and half human, and indeed female. It symbolizes the human spirit that tears itself away from the animal domain, that frees itself from the animal and casts its gaze about but has not yet completely grasped itself, is not yet free, does not yet stand on its own two feet.

The Land of Enigmatic Marvels

Thus grand edifices of Egypt like the labyrinth, half above the earth and
269 half beneath it, divided the whole realm into the land of the living | and that of the dead, dedicated to Amenti.[2] Standing upright there is the Pillar of Memnon; the light of dawn falls upon this structure and causes it to resound. Memnon resounds in the bright dawn.[3] But what sounds from it is not yet

1. In concluding the preceding discussion of Persia, Hegel said that the Oriental principle is to be overturned by a shift in focus from nature to spirit. Egypt has this shift as the task or problem (*Aufgabe*) set for it. Egypt tackles the task but fails to accomplish it; it poses the problem but fails to solve it. Egypt strives mightily to liberate spirit from its natural or animal forms in Egyptian religion and daily life, but fails to enable a new self-consciousness to appear. As Hegel states below in our text, the animal images are 'as it were, helmets from which the human visage peers outward', although spirit never fully emerges self-consciously from them. The Egyptians remain in a condition of *Befangenheit*, a term Hegel uses frequently to characterize them. It conveys the senses of both 'being self-enclosed' and 'lacking self-consciousness'. In what follows we sometimes render it as 'self-enclosed' and sometimes as 'unselfconscious'. The hieroglyphs and the architecture that the Egyptians produced are truly impressive but remain an enigma (*Rätsel*) because they just strive for, but never attain, the status of self-interpreting spiritual productions, of spiritual consciousness as self-awareness. (At the time of these lectures Hegel was apparently unaware, as his comment below reveals, that in 1821 a beginning had been made at deciphering the Rosetta Stone.) The Egyptians did not rise above the sphere of private or particular purposes, and had no genuine sense of the infinity or immortality of the self or soul. For those advances we must wait for the Greeks.

2. On the kingdom of Amenti, the underworld, see *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford, 2007), ii. 371, 627, 633 n., and 745. The Greek 'Amenthes' is a Hellenization of an Egyptian term referring to 'the lord of the dead'. 'Menthe' or 'Minthe', a Naiad, was mistress to Hades; she was trampled by Persephone, and became the sweet-smelling mint plant. The 'labyrinth' to which Hegel refers is probably the funeral temple of Amenemhet III.

3. Memnon was a mythical king of Ethiopia. There are legends of his journeys and deeds, and sites were dedicated to him at various places in the Near East and Egypt. The colossi at Thebes were huge statues of pharaoh Amenhotep III; Memnon was linked to them because their stones

the free light of spirit, resonating from itself, for the language of Egypt is still hieroglyphic; it is not yet the word itself, not yet script. We understand it only when we grasp it as hieroglyphic, and the definitive character of Egypt is as such the sphinx, the hieroglyphics, the enigma. Egypt appears as, and remains, a land of marvels.

Herodotus saw everything in Egypt, was acquainted with its priests, and yet said nothing about its profound religious nature; to him the history of the enigma remained enigmatic.[4] Diodorus too visited Egypt, during the time of Augustus. He offers us a great deal of information about its religion;[5] despite this knowledge, this opportunity to become informed, views about the Egyptian religion indeed opposed or contrary to his were to be found among the ancients. Recently, over the past twenty-five years, the French have brought the land to light and opened it up anew for us, and new descriptions are continually forthcoming.[6] But ever lacking for us still is the key for going more deeply into the discoveries; this key is an Egyptian literary work, although we have no such thing.

It seems to be a matter of chance, and yet it is in keeping with the Egyptian standpoint, that they have no book in the language; instead they only knew how to express themselves in part by hieroglyphics or in sculptures, and also by works of architecture, [inasmuch as they] had no signs of the kind that written languages do. The signs of spirit here are still in immediacy. The writers of history mention | no Egyptian Homer, no dra- 270
matists. Although Herodotus and Diodorus were in Egypt, they impart nothing about books. Even later, when the Hebrew Bible was translated in Alexandria at the behest of an Egyptian king, the Egyptians still stuck to Greek works; there was no mention of any written works in Egyptian.

were said to 'sing', or to emit sounds like those of a harp, when struck by the light of the rising sun, sounds believed to be his response to Eos, goddess of the dawn and his mother.

4. See Herodotus, *The History* 2.3 (tr. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 132), where he says that he will mention the names of the Egyptian gods (which he in some cases regards as counterparts to Greek deities), but will not go into other aspects of Egyptian beliefs and practices regarding the divine. All of the second book of his *History*, and the first part of the third book, are devoted to Egypt.

5. In the first book of his *Library of History*, Diodorus Siculus discusses a number of Egyptian religious topics. See *Diodorus of Sicily*, i, tr. C. H. Oldfather (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1933). These topics include the origins of the universe (1.6–7; Oldfather, pp. 22–9), sacred animals (1.83–90; Oldfather, pp. 282–305), and customs involving the dead (1.91–3; Oldfather, pp. 305–19).

6. The French research to which Hegel refers is presented in: Jean-François Champollion, *L'Egypte sous les Pharaons* (Paris, 1814). Champollion was a major figure in the study of hieroglyphics. Later than these lectures, in 1825, he demonstrated from the Rosetta Stone that some hieroglyphics have a phonetic character.

Ptolemy did commission Manetho, a priest, to write an Egyptian history, and it did come to fruition as Egyptian writing; but it is no more than lists, and seems not to have been something capable of serving as a national work.[7] So there are no works in their own language, ones in which their spirit expresses itself, but only books in foreign languages. Therefore we must draw conclusions about their life from the reports of foreigners and from the mute works of architecture.

Egyptian History

As for the principal historical elements, we have to mention Egypt's relation to the Persian Empire. Cambyses, not Cyrus, made the Egyptians into his subjects. We can describe what occasioned the conquest by following the account given by Herodotus.[8] As Herodotus tells it, Cambyses demanded to have the daughter of Amasis as his wife; he did so on the urging of an Egyptian eye doctor. (Eye diseases are commonplace in Egypt.) This doctor had prompted him to make the demand because the doctor sought revenge for the fact that Amasis had dispatched him to Cyrus [king of Persia and
271 father of Cambyses] in a foreign land. Being fearful, Amasis did | not want to refuse this demand and dared not fail to give his daughter to Cambyses. Yet he was concerned that Cambyses would make his daughter into a mere concubine. For that reason he sent the daughter of the former king that he himself had dethroned. We see this cunning to be a feature of the Egyptian king. When this maiden came to Cambyses she revealed the trick, and the enraged monarch declared war. In the meantime Amasis had died, and Cambyses engaged Psammenitus, the son of Amasis, in several battles. In this context Herodotus tells of a few touching events. Cambyses commanded the very highly refined daughter of Psammenitus to perform acts of servitude, to fetch water, and at the same time he ordered several persons to observe the king. Psammenitus remained coolly unmoved in the course of all this degradation, as well as about his own son being condemned to death

7. Manetho, who lived in the 3rd cent. BC and was the high priest of Heliopolis, chronicled in Greek the thirty Egyptian dynasties up to 323 BC. His work has survived only in excerpts quoted by other ancient authors. He dedicated his history to Ptolemy II, Philadelphus (308–246 BC). It is doubtful that Ptolemy himself commissioned the Septuagint, as Hegel states just above in our text.

8. Herodotus narrates the failed deception that Amasis, king of Egypt, attempted against Cambyses, the Persian king, and the ensuing battles that accomplished the Persian conquest of Egypt (see 3.1–16; Grene, pp. 211–18). He states (3.2) that this is how the Persians tell it; he mentions two alternative explanations for the Persian invasion (one of them the Egyptian version), but he does not find them credible.

by Cambyses. Ultimately, however, he burst into tears when he saw an elderly man, his father's friend, on the threshold of death. All this caught Cambyses' attention, and when he asked the king why it was so, his reply was that the misfortunes of his daughter and his son were too great or too hard to bear, and rendered him immobile, but that the latter and lesser misfortune moved him to human sympathy, to tears. So Cambyses directly sought to rescind or halt the execution of the son of Amasis, but it had already been carried out. Then Cambyses returned the daughter to the king, treated him and the daughter with respect, and would even have reinstated him | in the government had he not been a rebel. Cyrus treated Croesus in 272
similar fashion.[9] So Cambyses would even have kept the Egyptian king by his side, had he deserved it. These traits are interesting as illustrative of the Persian character.

We take up only the principal elements from the ancient history of Egypt. It is noteworthy that the ancient history of Egypt reaches very far back. We know that the priests assured Herodotus that the Egyptians are the most ancient people, the first human beings.[10] An extremely communal life is historically probable. In any event, the first state found historical expression in the upper Nile valley; it is the first formation of a state. Thebes, on the upper river, is the most ancient site where a community life emerged. With the passage of time commerce shifted more to central Egypt, so that Memphis, where the Nile divides into separate branches, became the principal site. Later the principal site shifted into the delta, at Sais. This transfer from the Upper Nile to the Lower Nile is therefore the first historical feature. In Roman times the principal site shifted again, to Hermopolis, where Hadrian founded Antinoöpolis, as a memorial to Antinous.[11]

A second feature of its history is that at times Egypt disintegrated into a number of sovereign domains (*νόμοι*) and at times it was unified under one rule. Sesostris is said to have united all the provinces (*Staaten*) for the first

9. See Herodotus, *History* 1.86–93 (Grene, pp. 73–7). Cyrus not only spared Croesus, but also relied on him as his adviser.

10. See Herodotus, *History* 2.2 ff. (Grene, pp. 131 ff.). Actually Herodotus begins his book 2, on Egypt, considering whether Egypt is to be regarded as just the delta area and the Mediterranean coast, or includes the land extending far up the Nile (he accepts the latter view). In the course of this discussion he cites the priests of Hephaestus in Memphis as holding that the Phrygians are an older people, but that the Egyptians were the first to invent or devise various cultural elements (2.2 and 4; Grene, p. 132). Later on (2.15; Grene, p. 137) he says: 'I believe that the Egyptians ... have been ever since the race of man was'.

11. Antinous, a handsome young man and favorite of emperor Hadrian, drowned in the Nile in AD 130. Hadrian insisted that he be deified, and in his honor founded the new city named for him.

time, in 1400 BC; a second unification is ascribed to Psammetichus.[12] Herodotus remarks about the earlier disintegration that the Egyptians had
273 nevertheless wished to maintain a common link, | which is why the labyrinth was built in central Egypt, in a westward valley of Egypt, on Lake Meroë.[13]

A third principal feature is that we find princes or pharaohs early on, and a priesthood associated with them, with the two sometimes united or linked and at other times separate or distinct.

Today a popular representation of priestly states or priestly colonies is one in which the cardinals are at the same time generals, and so forth. This is an inane representation. Historically, there is most certainly a priesthood in Egypt, but one in addition to the ruler. That is because an actual state essentially is always at the same time a worldly state; spiritual and princely occupations are different and must be kept distinct. An individual can be both, but the roles are conceptually separate.

So we see, historically, that the priesthoods and princes in Egypt are often united or linked within the state, but sometimes too they are in opposition and are wholly separate. Cheops [Khufu] and Chephren [Khafre], the rulers who erected the largest pyramids, harassed the priests; they were hostile to the priesthoods. Then the priests called upon the Ethiopians for assistance against the kings by whom they believed themselves oppressed, and in this way the priests regained their dominance. These priests were kings themselves, and it is priest-kings of that sort who compel the warrior caste to withdraw to Meroë.[14] These two aspects, the priests and kings, are noteworthy.

A fourth feature is that on the whole the Egyptians kept themselves shut off from foreigners.

12. Sesostris is a mythical Egyptian king, so there is little of historical value in the stories about him in Herodotus (2.102–11; Grene, pp. 172–6). Psammetichus I (ruled 663–609 BC) founded the XXVI Dynasty, and by 653 he had freed Egypt from Assyrian domination. Herodotus says (2.153; Grene, p. 199) that he 'became master of all Egypt'.

13. See Herodotus, *History* 2.147–9 (Grene, pp. 195–7). He says the twelve kings of the twelve provinces desired to have this common link.

14. Khufu reigned during the 26th cent. BC. He was succeeded by his brother, Khafre. Herodotus tells of the forced labor in pyramid building under Khufu and Khafre, saying that Khufu 'shut up all the temples', and that the ruler Myceris (Mycerinus), successor to Khafre and son of Khufu, 'opened up the temples and let the people . . . go freely to their own work and their sacrifices' (2.124–9; Grene, pp. 185–8). Herodotus states that after several more rulers 'the Ethiopians and their king, Sabacos, invaded Egypt with a great army . . . and the Ethiopian ruled over Egypt for fifty years' (2.137; Grene, p. 191). This last sentence of our text is perhaps confusing. Herodotus says, in the same passage, that the Ethiopians drove Anysis, the second ruler after Mycerinus, 'away to the marshes'. Meroë is a city and an 'island' situated between branches of the Nile, hence a marshy area.

Ancient tales speak of the great expeditions of Sesostris to Asia, and it is indeed said of Sesostris that he went far and wide in Asia. | If this is in fact 274
historically true, and if the bas-reliefs[15] at Thebes pertain to it, such things nevertheless fall in ancient times, and this earlier era has had no lasting effect, has left behind no traces.

In later times Egypt had no naval power, and along its coastlines it barred foreigners from its territory. For a long time this policy of exclusion was a basic feature of Egyptian life, and only in the later period of its history did the Egyptian state once again interact with foreigners, with other peoples; from this time on, then, the history of Egypt also becomes more defined.

This period fell [i.e. began] approximately 120 years prior to the conquest by Cambyses, and resulted in Egypt's decline. Psammetichus, most notably, transferred the chief city to Sais, united the many provinces (*Staaten*), and established external connections with other peoples. These peoples included Greeks as well as Carians from Asia Minor, often with the influx of as many as thirty thousand who constituted the essential component of the Egyptian army. The wars with Syria, with the Jews, and with the Babylonians occur in this period. In light of their historical dates, however, little import is to be attached to these wars. These later kings also waged war principally with Cyrene. Other relationships with Africa to the south and with the Hyksos are more transitory, occur in more ancient times, and are to some extent of no consequence. | 275

Features of the Land and Life of Egypt

The features of Egyptian life must be of more specific interest to us. Egypt is a complex topic (*schwere Aufgabe*). Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, and the [other] ancients who spoke about the Egyptians, provide the very best evidence about them. Herodotus says they are the most rational (the λογιώτατοι) of all the peoples that he has visited and observed.[16] These authors leave us amazed, on the one hand, by the African stupidity and, on the other hand, by this people's reflective understanding and spirit, by the

15. As for the 'bas-reliefs' (*Basschass*), ancient authors indicate that these were lewd. Herodotus (2.106; Grene, p. 174) speaks in this way of inscriptions he has seen in Palestinian Syria, and of statues in Ionia. Diodorus Siculus (1.55.7–10; Oldfather, pp. 192–5) writes in more detail of stelae that depicted warlike enemies with male genitals and cowardly enemies with female genitals.

16. Herodotus devotes book 2 and the first part of book 3 of his *History* to Egypt. Concerning their calendar, he states: 'Their reckoning, in my opinion, is much cleverer than that of the Greeks' (2.4; Grene, p. 132). Diodorus Siculus devotes book 1 of his *Library of History* to the myths, customs, and kings of Egypt, recounting in great detail the highly organized and regulated daily life of the king (1.70; Oldfather, pp. 240–5).

intelligent order, optimal regulations, and admirable works of fine art, especially the architecture.

The first thing it is essential to notice is Egypt's geographical circumstances. It is common knowledge that Egypt consists of the Nile valley, about one thousand miles long overall, and that where it is [actually] a valley it is quite narrow. The Nile valley stretches or extends from south to north for about 7½ degrees of latitude.[17] The delta, the flat land where hilly areas disappear, amounts to only about 1½ degrees of latitude. Where Egypt is valley it is only about five to six hours travel time (*Stunden*) in width. This valley is the Nile valley. The Nile and its flooding, in conjunction with the sun, constitute the overwhelming feature; the entire life of the Egyptians depends on it. Their soil is saturated by the Nile; it provides them with water. Rain almost never falls, or does so just as an omen, as happened once in the time of Cambyses.[18] Nile water serves as drinking water too. The population is dense and lacking in diversity; the vast Nile delta too is nearly lacking in diversity. The prevalent feature in the delta, in the Nile sedimentation, is agriculture. A few areas are marshlands, but for the most part the land is extremely uniform. The flooding and the sun are so related that the flooding emerges concurrent with certain
276 positions of the sun, and | so the Nile in conjunction with the sun totally accounts for these geographical circumstances.

The land is externally bounded, in part by the sea, in part by scorching deserts, and connection to the south via the river is impossible owing to the cataracts. There are no weather cycles, but instead just the quantitative difference between greater and lesser inundation. So the isolated land is flooded by the Nile in a set and specific sequence, since throughout the entire year there is no rain. Infertility is a consequence when the Nile rises too high or not high enough. Herodotus compares the land as inundated to the Aegean Sea, with the villages elevated like islands.[19] The villages are protected by dikes. After the runoff the land is saturated, then soon harvested, thus twice a year. Directly after the inundation the wildlife emerges: frogs and creeping things (*Gewürme*) in endless numbers. An Arab general who had conquered Egypt wrote to his caliph that Egypt is an ocean of dust that transforms itself into a sea of fresh water and then into a sea of plants.[20] These are, on the whole, the physical conditions. The agricultural principle

17. That is the approximate extent of Egypt to the south. The Nile and its tributaries of course extend much farther south in Africa than this.

18. See Herodotus, *History* 3.10 (Greene, pp. 214–15).

19. Herodotus, *History* 2.97 (Greene, p. 170).

20. Presumably this refers to 'Amr ibn al-'Âṣi, the Muslim conqueror of Egypt who governed there (641–63), reporting to Caliph 'Umar, the leader of Islam (634–44).

constitutes the main theme of Egyptian life. Agriculture was very far advanced, as the Egyptians are a very skillful agricultural people.

The second thing to take into consideration is the castes that we encounter here (as in India), which are described by various authors. The main castes are the priests and the warriors. (Diodorus also has a caste of kings, but this can only be a social class.[21]) Herodotus then also names other castes, the third and fourth being the cattle herders and swineherds, the fifth that of merchants, the sixth the interpreters and the sailors.[22] He makes no mention of farmers. Diodorus says the third caste consists of farmers and artists.[23] The supposition is | thus that agriculture did indeed occupy several castes, 277
in particular even the warrior caste, which received a certain domain or landed estates for cultivation, especially in Lower Egypt. So overall we see here diverse castes that do not, however, seem to have been so strictly isolated as are those of the Hindus. For instance, [the pharaoh] Amasis was from a lower class, from a lower caste. And when the warriors refused to line up for battle against Sennacherib, King Sethos, from the priestly lineage, struck against the enemy with an army from the castes of farmers, assembled craftsmen, and so forth.[24]

Proof of how the Egyptians held back from engaging with other peoples is the fact that the soldiers or warriors often refused to venture into foreign fields, to do battle outside the borders of the land, as happened under Apries. When Apries, the predecessor of Amasis, dispatched the warriors against the Cyrenaeans, they revolted and installed Amasis [as king], which goes to show that they preferred to remain in their own territory.[25] So this people seems to be peaceable and agricultural, with the result that Greek mercenaries carried on the wars for them. In other instances too we observe that Egypt brings little force to bear against attacks from outside. The Ethiopians often conquered the land, and Cambyses easily did so.

A third topic concerns the more specific mode of daily life, the police regulations, and so forth. According to Herodotus and Diodorus, the

21. See n. 16 above. Diodorus says that 'the life which the kings of the Egyptians lived was not like that of other men who enjoy autocratic power' (1.70; Oldfather, pp. 240–1).

22. The passage in Herodotus (2.164; Grene, p. 204) actually reads as follows: 'There are in Egypt seven classes, which are called, respectively, priests, warriors, cowherds, swineherds, shopkeepers, interpreters, and pilots.'

23. He states (1.74; Oldfather, pp. 254–5): 'There are three other classes of free citizens, namely, the herdsmen, the husbandmen, and the artisans.'

24. This story of the Assyrian invasion under Sennacherib is told by Herodotus (1.41; Grene, pp. 192–3).

25. See Herodotus, *History* 2.161–2 and 4.159 (Grene, pp. 202–3, 340).

Egyptians' daily life is most amazing to the Greeks. Herodotus and Diodorus tell us about its simple features; for they were amazed to find characteristic features in the very smallest details.[26] Herodotus says that the Egyptians do all things the opposite of how other peoples do them, and he adduces several practices for those who seek to know the inner meaning from the externals. Such practices are, for instance, that the women urinate while standing, the men while seated, and that men have two garments but women only one. The order of the day here is cleanliness, frequent washing, in general contrast to the Hindus, since the Egyptians do not, like Hindus, simply wash the body out of superstition but otherwise keep nothing clean; instead they also
278 wash their clothes. The Egyptians maintain bodily health | intelligently. Egyptian doctors are known to be very skillful, especially in treating individual diseases. There are different doctors for different diseases.

More important are the police ordinances, which are the basis of order. These are excellent. Annually each Egyptian had to give his name in writing to the governor, together with the information as to where he resided. It had to be correct, on pain of death. The land was divided in an orderly way, and geometry was developed in doing so. The land had courts consisting of thirty judges, headed by a chief justice (*Präsident*). Trials were handled with precision and were conducted in writing, to the point of duplication, so that the lawyers and the way the parties appeared would not be disconcerting or beguiling [to the court].[27] Diodorus found this very beneficial in counteracting the eloquence of lawyers and the compassion of judges. The chief justice wore about his neck a chain of precious stones, as the emblem of truth. The verdict (*Wahrheitsspruch*) was given silently by means of the precious stones about the judge's neck, by their being turned toward the side of the party that was said to be acknowledged as victorious. In addition to these features, it is reported that the life of the king was highly regulated. His arising, the conducting of prayers, sitting in public judgment, the royal upkeep—this all took place in the company of the priests. His bodily functions likewise were precisely regulated.[28]

In addition, we know that the Egyptians made a number of discoveries and had manifold skills. Their way of dividing the year was like ours. They

26. See Herodotus, *History* 2.35 ff. (Grene, pp. 145 ff.) and Diodorus, 1.69 (Oldfather, pp. 238–41). Herodotus goes into detail about the Egyptian practices Hegel specifically mentions below, as well as numerous others.

27. See Diodorus, 1.75 (Oldfather, pp. 258–61). Diodorus states that each side presented its case twice, the second time in a rebuttal to the other side's presentation. He also speaks of precious stones worn about the judge's neck (as in our text below) and their function in the trial.

28. See n. 16 above.

divided the year into 365 days, five of which were intercalary. As for marriage, there was monogamy in one part of Egypt, in Lower Egypt alone, and in the rest there was polygamy. Herodotus says that the men stick to household matters, whereas the women take care of external affairs and so are not in seclusion as they are in the East.[29] | When we see how the 279
Egyptians transformed their entire land (*Boden*) into a work of art, they are exonerated from the charge of indolence that Winkelmann levels at them.[30] Diodorus says the Egyptians are indeed the only people in which the citizens did not trouble themselves with the affairs of the state, but instead concerned themselves solely with their own affairs and lived tranquilly for themselves. Diodorus lived under Augustus and therefore of course was not thinking about a republic.[31] Herodotus states that each one carries on by himself his own specific and particular occupation, and we thus find this to be the case through all the social classes right up to the king, who also has his occupation defined by the law.[32]

So we see that in Egypt everything was in definite order, such that even the kings did not rule capriciously. This is a totally ordered condition, enforced by the authorities, in which all caprice is eliminated. So we see a defined, rule-governed condition all the way down to private matters.

Religion and the Cycle of Nature

It seems then that, complementary to these conditions, there must have been a comparably tranquil religion, that the impulse toward something higher had been satisfied in a comparably tranquil way. When we pass over to this topic, however, we are surprised when we behold and examine the most opposite and marvelous phenomena. The political condition is only one aspect, and in this other aspect we are dealing with an impulse set in motion internally, and an ardent, active, laboring spirit. We are dealing with an African people that, in its secluded condition, is inwardly aroused, is a people aglow and afire, exceedingly compact, a people staying self-enclosed

29. Herodotus, *History* 2.35 (Grene, p. 145) says men do the weaving, whereas 'women run the market and shops'.

30. Johann Joachim Winkelmann (1717–68), a German archaeologist and art historian, stated as much in his *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (Dresden, 1764), pt. 1, ch. 2. In contrast to this, Diodorus describes in detail, and praises, the diligence and excellence of Egyptian farmers and artisans (1.74; Oldfather, pp. 254–9).

31. What Diodorus actually says (see the previous note) is that Egyptian artisans are not allowed to pursue other occupations, and so do not dabble in trade or take part in public affairs (namely, the business of government).

32. This view actually fits Diodorus better than it does Herodotus.

and not dealing with anything external; instead the tremendous labor actively operates within its own horizons by means of the most extraordinary
280 productions. |

We notice this characteristic in the religious aspect: a pressing and laboring within its own horizons, an unending pressure toward objectification within itself that, however, does not attain the free self-consciousness of spirit. There is still an iron band around the eyes of spirit, where the free apprehending of spirit is not yet set forth; instead spirit is still encircled by an iron band, so that the only thing to which spirit gives birth is what we called the enigma. And thus the enigma, namely Egypt, is a concrete individuality that holds multiplicity fast within itself and unifies it, although in such a way that the unity does not advance to the free self-consciousness of spirit within itself.

We cannot draw any retrospective conclusions when we hear that Pythagoras emulated the Egyptian setting for his teaching. For it is obvious from the [Egyptian] religion that Pythagoras just adopted a one-sided picture of the priestly caste, one without any basis, and according to it he took no account of human impulses, passion, and reflection. So of course his community disintegrated. It did of course carry on, but not for long in that form. A circle of people rooted in itself soon proved to be a vacuous representation, one making it clear that human beings ought not to remain placidly isolated and self-contained.[33]

For a closer look at the character of Egyptian religion, we must hold fast to the fact that in this case we are still within the bounds of a nature religion. In Egypt we find ourselves still within the bounds of the intuition of nature. When *we* say 'God', we are directly on the soil of thought, and so we represent to ourselves a being of thought; we then pass over from this abstract thought to further determinations, passing over to just the attributes. Here in Egypt, however, we have to set this standpoint entirely to one side; we have to hold fast to the natural intuition, to forgo our customary thought of a being | beyond the earth and the heavens, and simply keep our sensible eyes open and let the sensible power of imagination be active.

With this nature intuition we do not even have before us the universal heaven of China, or the universal natural foundation of India, the Indian soul of nature, or the pure light of the Persians; we do not have to think of, or call to mind, any incarnation. The Egyptian deities are not even heroes having human nature as their foundation. We are dealing not with

33. See the comparable discussion of the Pythagorean community in *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Oxford, 2006, 2009), ii. 36–7.

something universal, but instead with a particular, specific intuition of nature. The Egyptians live in a closed world as such, and this world is also the basic intuition in the religion of the Egyptians, is what they know as their substantial being, as their essence.

Inasmuch as this closed, private world becomes religious, it does not remain sensible but instead becomes distilled into a representation. However, in keeping with the enclosed condition, and with the Egyptians' inner alertness, the inward state of this intuition gets transformed into further intuitions in that a further meaning in it is called to mind as well, and in fact gets determined as a symbol. And so in the Egyptian religion we find ourselves utterly in the domain of the symbolic. Immediate intuition therefore has a meaning, although this meaning does not elevate itself to thought, for instead the meaning is in turn only the image or the symbol of what beforehand was itself a symbol. These are the images and aspects linked through a bond that emerges here, but not as thought; instead this individual or inner point remains, binding or linking together these representations without revealing itself in thought. | 282

So we have here the individuality that ties together distinct phenomena, ones that have a foundation, but not the universal foundation of thought. The whole is therefore an artifact of the fanciful imagination (*ein Phantastisches*) because it connects such manifold or multifaceted elements. Its basis is an inward content, something that was pointed to in this way by an imaginative (*phantastisch*) connection, but this content was not actually set forth and did not lend itself to deciphering (*erraten*). So the imaginative element involves the task of grasping this inner element; however this inner element, then, is not grasped but is instead just pointed to symbolically; and what the symbol *is* remains unspecified (*ist freigestellt*)—something other that is itself only a symbol of something else.

To see more precisely what is involved, we have, at least in a general way, to allow for a representation of it. What first confronts us is the closed physical cycle of nature that, for the Egyptians, is everything as a whole. For the Egyptians the Nile, the land, the sun, make up such a closed system that Herodotus learned nothing from the Egyptian priests about the sources of the Nile; he learned that only from the people of Cyrene.[34] The information the priests had was therefore limited to their own locale. So then, the

34. See Herodotus, *History* 2.19–32 (Grene, pp. 138–44). In an extended speculation on why the Nile floods, para. 19 mentions the ignorance of the Egyptians about this, and para. 32 presents what Herodotus learnt from the people of Cyrene, in Libya, about the interior of Africa, but not specifically about the sources of the Nile.

Egyptians' representation was also limited to that locale and emphasized a particular contemporary era.

This self-contained whole was the essential being or the main God of the Egyptians. Isis and Osiris, this duality, are the main deities here. Osiris is the sun in connection with the Nile; Isis is the earth and, in [her] connection with the sun, she is, correspondingly, the moon. This [duality] is the basic deity of the Egyptians; it is their distinctive feature and the foremost element of their religion. These two, Isis and Osiris, are themselves procreated, are themselves in turn counterparts; for, wherever religion begins from nature, God is something emergent and not what is absolutely first as is the case in a religion of thought. So this Osiris and this Isis are the essentially Egyptian
283 gods. |

Yet this nature intuition is, furthermore, a history, a process: the sun, which becomes distant and returns; the Nile, which inundates and fructifies the land or Isis, which recedes from it and goes into opposition to the sun and is devoured by the sun, has in the sun its enemy, Typhon.[35] So heat, the scorching wind, appears in a hostile way as Typhon, just as then too the Nile empties into the sea and dies. This cycle was transposed into the characterization of the gods, and this divine twosome has its history too. Osiris, the sun, is born. After the sun has become distant it draws near once again, just like for us too [it recedes] during the shortest days. Osiris is born in the springtime, just as there is a temporal connection for all peoples and for us too, insofar as God, that is, Christ, is born after the shortest day. After his birth Osiris becomes the bringer of good fortune, of fertility, of blessing; he is said to have completed his course through the world, just as, according to the Greeks, Dionysius traversed the world. So this is then the felicitous period of Osiris, when the Nile overflows.

However, the opposite also comes into play; the sun retraces its steps and goes away once more; the land is desolate, the water used up; the Nile dies out in the sea, and Isis alone rules in the absence of Osiris. Typhon hatches a plot and slays Osiris. Then ensues the lamentation of Isis, seeking her

35. Typhon is a figure depicted in Greek mythology as a monster who engages in conflicts with Zeus, and is generally a cause or instigator of evil. Typhon is also the Greek name for the Egyptian god Set. Diodorus describes him as the brother, and murderer, of Osiris (1.21; Oldfather, pp. 64–7). He also says Isis, the wife and sister of Osiris, avenged the murder by killing Typhon with the aid of her son, Horus. A similar account occurs in Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 13 ff. Hegel uses the name 'Typhon' here to stand for the 'evil' of the scorching desert heat that counteracts the beneficial flooding of the Nile associated with Osiris. The sun 'becomes distant' (stays lower in the sky in winter) and 'returns' or 'draws near again' (rises higher overhead in summer).

consort who has been dismembered, and she collects the parts of his body. All of Egypt strikes up a dirge, the 'Maneros', over the dead God; according to Herodotus it was always sung by them and is the only song that they have. People do of course have a lot to say about Egyptian music; we find many instruments portrayed and | hear talk of Egyptian songs, contrary to the 284
assertion of Herodotus. In any event, he says that the Greeks call this dirge or this song 'Linos', and that it was the only song of the Egyptians; thus that they had no poetry and no songs.[36]

A principal element, then, is this lamentation over the god, which corresponds to the lamentation over [the Greek and Asian fertility deity] Adonis. Human grief upheld his honor. Isis then buried Osiris, and there are many holy gravesites of Osiris throughout Egypt. A further point to note in this context is that nothing of this sort is to be found among the Brāhmans or Hindus. In the case of the priests of Buddha, however, there is at each Buddhist temple a pyramid with relics of the Buddha. So this circumstance is a point of agreement with the Buddhist religion.

Isis then has the body parts of Osiris embalmed, a task performed by Hermes.[37] The Egyptian manner of embalming as such, even embalming animals, essentially distinguishes them from the Hindus, who show no respect for the bodies of the dead, casting them into the Ganges. The Egyptians, however, are the first ones to have called the human soul immortal, and showing respect for the dead is linked to this practice, in that here the individuality of the human character has attained an entirely different meaning and value than it has with the Hindus. So Osiris was buried in the earth and is lord in the realm of the dead; he is judge in the invisible realm, that of Hades. We can also remark here that in later times, in the era of Alexander and subsequently in Rome, the god Serapis took over this function in place of Osiris, just as the invisible realm, that of thought, ἀίδιον, gained a greater ascendancy over the visible one.[38] | In this cycle from the history of religion 285

36. See Herodotus, *History* 2.79 (Grene, p. 164). Herodotus calls it the 'Linus Song' and says that, in Egyptian, Linus is called Maneros. Herodotus says that, according to the Egyptians, it was the funeral chant upon the untimely death of the only son of Egypt's first king, and it 'was their first and only song'. In Greek mythology Linus, or Linos, was a son of Apollo, and a famous singer and poet. In Homer this song is sung by a boy during the grape harvest and wine-making.

37. In the Egyptian accounts this honor to the dead is performed by Horus (the son of Isis) and other Egyptian deities. The Greek figure Hermes is not typically identified with Horus, so perhaps the auditors misheard what Hegel said.

38. The Greek word refers to what is unseen.

there lies the history of the human individual—a person's birth, activity, enjoyment of the world, and death.

Linked with this concrete, Egyptian imagination, with Isis and Osiris, is the benefit of the introduction of agriculture. Thus Nile, sun, and earth were essentially something useful, were means essential to meeting [human] needs. So Isis and Osiris acquired the characteristic feature of being benefactors of the human race; they provided the means for living effectively (*Benutzung*). Isis discovered grain, not wheat or corn but barley. Attributed to Osiris were the plow, the broad hoe, draft animals, and the yoking of oxen, as well as the introduction of marriage, of laws, religion, and civic order. Osiris is then at the same time also the likeness of the seed that is buried in the ground, dies, and shoots up again. Thus all specific features come together in Isis and Osiris. Hence the Egyptian God is not some sort of general benefactor, not an abstraction. Thought does not project itself out beyond these specific features; instead, multiple intuitions of nature are linked in one complex—Nile, sun, seed, human activity, and so forth. So, what is fancifully imagined is conjoined here in a unity. This Isis and Osiris thus link or bind together within themselves all the representations, all the specific features; one symbol becomes symbol of the other. Osiris is the symbol of the Nile and the sun, the very same symbol is the symbol of human life and, vice versa, life is thus in turn symbol for the sun, the Nile, and so forth. Therefore each is the counterpart (*Gegensatz*) and symbol of the other.

Nevertheless, the universal element in them has not yet emerged explic-
286 itly. | When *we* speak of 'symbol', the representation we have is expressed by means of a general representation, by an image: for instance, as an image, Mars is the general, abstract representation of war. In the case of Isis and Osiris, however, we do not have these two in one image, in a general, abstract representation. Instead we have a bundle of symbols, which themselves are another symbol of a sensible representation, not of an abstract representation. These basic Egyptian representations are typical of that people.

Besides these, however, the Egyptians also have more abstract gods, in general three kinds of gods: as Herodotus says, eight ancient ones, twelve intermediate ones, and several more recent ones.[39] These abstract gods are the ones especially that the Greeks adopted for themselves, for instance *Ποσειδῶν*, the sea. We have only a few vague reports as to what these

39. Herodotus thinks that most of the Greek gods came from Egypt (2.50; Grene, p. 153), and so for the most part he uses Greek names for the Egyptian gods he thinks are their Greek counterparts and predecessors. Thus he states, in a discussion of Heracles (2.43–5; Grene, pp. 149–51), that the Egyptians 'say it was seventeen thousand years before the reign of King Amasis when the Eight gods became Twelve'; but he does not follow up with an explicit statement about there being 'several more recent ones'.

particular Egyptian gods and their cultus involved, and their particular significance. The most ancient god, Knef or Kronos, is time, and Ptah is fire.[40] The representation of the planets and the starry heaven is connected with these gods, as it is with Isis and Osiris. Connected with Osiris is the representation of the passing of the year and its determinations, how the year is divided; in keeping with this aspect, the festivals of the Egyptians are, up to today, something wholly governed by the calendar. Osiris, the sun, is called the prince of heavenly herds, which he leads, and the shepherd especially of the zodiac. All of this has its impact in these symbolic representations.

Animal Worship

We still have to speak about animal worship. We have covered universal inorganic nature, this universal foundation, as the Egyptians see it. The other most noteworthy point is that the Egyptians do not stop with reverence for inorganic nature, but instead pass over to reverence for animal life as something divine. According to the general image of nature in Egypt, after the Nile recedes, | animal activity ensues in tandem with human endeavor. 287
Just as the animal realm reawakens along with the revival of the soil, so the existence of the Egyptians orients itself to that occurrence. Spirit, however, remains inaccessible (*verschlossen*) to them. And we see, then, that the thought or the being-for-self of spirit remains something in itself inaccessible to the Egyptians; they sympathize not with the free, spiritual soul but instead with the soul remaining confined within living things, for the reason that their fanciful imagination merely works symbolically from the soul that is confined within sheer life itself. So we have to consider this mode of reverence for animal life.

In seeking to grasp this point we must, in doing so, set aside as such, in thinking of what is higher or considering what is higher, our customary practice of seeking it on the soil of thought and representation, and of closing our eyes to what is sensible, present at hand, actual. By sticking to sensible intuiting, the Egyptian grasps and holds fast to the living thing, the instinct of the animal, this marvelous feature that operates from within it.

40. It is unclear to which deity the name 'Knef' applies. The 2nd edn. of the *Werke* reads (p. 278): 'In the first class comes fire and its use, as Ptah, as well as Knef, who is also represented as the good daimon.' The god Ptah is associated with Memphis; Herodotus calls him Hephaestus (the Greek god of fire) in 2.3 (Grene, p. 132). It is unclear why 'Knef' is linked here to time, unless there is a possible confusion with the goddess Neith, whose temple inscription in Sais refers to her being 'what was, what is, and what will be'. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 639. See also Hegel's mention of Neith below in our text.

This intelligence that an animal has for the purpose of its vitality we can call something incomprehensible to us. For although human beings might study animals and imagine themselves in their place, we cannot represent to ourselves how things appear within the soul of the animal. Human beings cannot succeed at imagining themselves inside the nature of a dog or a cat; it remains something alien, something incomprehensible to us.

When we seek, then, to grasp the divine for ourselves as something higher and incomprehensible, there are two ways in which the incomprehensibility confronts us. The first is as the vitality in the animal; but although we are living ourselves, our vitality is determined by spirituality. The second way is the soil of representation, of reflection, of thought. In recent times it has been
288 the particular fashion | to call God something incomprehensible that we encounter in the course of seeking, by the use of thought, for the foundation of existing being, of all that there is. In the one way there is the vitality of the natural being, and in the other the aspect of reflection in which the incomprehensible thwarts us. We define this latter incomprehensible element thus as something higher that is beyond us. The question is where the incomprehensible confronts us with greater legitimacy. Is it in the first way, or the second? Obviously we encounter what is incomprehensible more legitimately in the first way, in the natural aspect, in the realm of nature. For spirit is self-understanding, presence to self, being free. The Greek standpoint is the liberation of spirit, the understanding of the essence of spirit, knowing how God's essential being is defined; even more so, the Christians *know* what God is. For them, and for the perspicacity of the Greeks, the incomprehensibility has vanished on the side of spirit, and it has retreated to the side of the spiritless, of the external, while still being a factor on that side of things. If then, we define the incomprehensibility as what is higher, we must grant that the Egyptians are justified if the abstract was for them something beyond them, something enigmatic in animal life. And if this was the case, then they are even more justified in having found it in animal life than are we today who suppose we have kept the aspect of the incomprehensible safely within [the realm of] spirit.

For the Egyptians truth was still the problem, still this enigma, and they of course possessed or determined it for themselves in their intuition of the animal. Those who reckon truth to be incomprehensible in every respect are directed to the natural domain; for spirit is transparent to itself, is free, and
289 reveals itself to spirit; it has nothing alien within itself. Nature, | however, is what is hidden. With their thought in bondage, the Egyptians have to wrestle with something incomprehensible, and they possess it in the naturalness of animal life. They have defined this incomprehensibility, in the unselfconscious

nature (*Befangenheit*) of the animal, as something remote from them, as something higher, and this remoteness from spirit is sheer life, what is devoid of spirit, the animal domain. This, then, is therefore the most distinctive aspect that we find in the case of the Egyptians.

We find this aspect—the fact that what is intuited in animal life is not a lower life but a higher one—not with the Egyptians alone, for it is also present in the case of the Indians, indeed even in that of the Greeks and Romans who saw knowledge and vision in [the flight of] birds, which discloses the future to human beings and so could serve as an oracle. The main feature here is that, when human beings have not in fact arrived at freedom of spirit, they hold the incomprehensible to be something higher and consequently seek it in animal life rather than on the side of spirit. The Egyptians intuited animal life as something higher and, in doing so, proceeded to the most obtuse and inhuman superstitions, as we see in the worship of Apis. They also worshiped two other oxen in addition to Apis. When Cambyses came to Egypt he, as a noble Persian, called them dunderheads for doing so. He himself wounded Apis and had [the animal] killed.[41] Among the Egyptians this superstition passed over into barbaric obtuseness. Apis was worshiped in one city in particular; other cities or districts worshiped other individual kinds of animals: cats, the ibis, the crocodile. These animals were fed in enclosures (*Häusern*) and large endowments existed for their maintenance. After they died they were laid to rest, embalmed as carefully as human beings. For those not embalmed, their bones were | 290
collected and preserved, as was done with the bones of all cats, which were brought by ship to Bubastis and laid to rest there. Their skeletons were deposited in large tombs. Splendid tombs were dedicated to Apis. In the second pyramid to be opened up after a few thousand years Belzoni discovered, in a major chamber, an alabaster coffin containing bones of oxen, thus showing that Apis had been laid to rest here.[42]

41. Herodotus says that a calf born under special circumstances and with special markings was regarded by the priests as the manifestation of the god Apis, and that Cambyses mocked them, stabbed the animal in the thigh, and it died from the wound (3.27–9; Grene, pp. 222–3).

42. See Giovanni Battista Belzoni, *Narrative of the Operations and Recent Discoveries within the Pyramids, Temples, Tombs and Excavations in Egypt and Nubia* (London, 1820). Somewhat at variance with Hegel's statement, Belzoni mentions finding mummies of various animals, including bulls (p. 168); he says only the heads of these livestock were mummified, 'the rest of the body being represented by two pieces of wood'. He also found alabaster vases containing embalmed entrails of human mummies and having covers depicting the heads of various animals (p. 172). See also n. 52 below.

It is also noteworthy that the death penalty applied for the killing of a revered animal of this sort, in some cases indeed only when it was killed intentionally, although in other cases even if the act was unintentional. Diodorus tells of a popular uprising when someone had unintentionally killed a cat, in the course of which the slayer lost his life.[43] When there is famine the supply of animals remains untouched and people are left to starve rather than slaying revered animals. So this further enhanced [respect for] the great vitality of the animal. The magnificent life of animals therefore counts as something infinitely higher. Sheer vitality for its own sake is thus highly honored in this way by the Egyptians. This includes reverence for vitality in the abstract and not merely for the particular vitality of individual animals. Thus the worship of the lingam constituted a principal focus for the Egyptians too; according to the testimony of Herodotus this practice of theirs was even brought to Greece and copied by the Greeks.[44] Other offenses too, such as sodomy, were commonplace for the Egyptians. So this worship of vitality is one aspect.

As then vitality for its own sake counted as the supreme thing, it also transpired that the animal figure did not remain the absolute object of worship, but instead was transformed in turn into the symbol for something that is not said to represent itself; the animal figure is instead the means for pointing to something other than it. This is likewise a familiar and essential aspect [of Egypt], and we can call to mind in this regard the falcon, sparrow
291 hawk, | dung beetle, and scarab, which were revered for their own sake but were demoted to being only the presentation of a significance they have within them. Yet we do not know what they are supposed to signify; the more precise symbolic characteristics are not given. The dung beetle was said to represent the power of procreation, then the path of the sun, and so on. This is something wholly impenetrable to us. We must not think of these symbolic representations, however, in such a way that the universal representation was at hand and that then a symbol was sought for it; instead, what came first was the intuition of a kind of animal in which something universal, a universal representation of that sort, was then imaginatively envisaged, and not vice versa. The general idea (*Gattung*), the universal

43. See Diodorus, 1.83 (Oldfather, pp. 282–5), who says 'the common people gather in crowds and deal with the perpetrator most cruelly, sometimes doing this without waiting for a trial'. In this instance the cat-killer was a Roman, who was punished even though the Egyptians were zealously seeking good relations with the Roman visitors.

44. Herodotus states (2.49; Grene, pp. 152–3) that a certain Melampus learnt the ritual of Dionysius from Egypt and instituted it for the Greeks, including a phallic procession to Dionysius.

feature of the representation, sought to work itself out on the basis of an animal figure of this kind. We find traces of the respect for living things among all ancient peoples, which is why in the Old Testament it is forbidden to eat blood, because blood contains the soul or the life of the animal.[45]

This is the mark of the reverence for life. To the spirit that is not free, the divine is something over yonder. The unfree spirit knows truth only as something 'over there'. The spirit that is free is spirit for itself, is not in the presence of something other. However the Orientals, not being free, relate to spirit as to an other, to a localized, specific vitality in particular form (*partikularisiert*), in which they situate spirit's essential nature. This particular living thing, the 'other' to spirit, is therefore what is incomprehensible, and the unfreedom of spirit is its having its essential being in what is incomprehensible. Life as such, life in general, human life, universal vitality, is of course to be conceptualized. But what is in particular form, the life of the animal, is just as incomprehensible as | is the nonconceptual caprice 292
(*Willkür*) of human beings. Unfree caprice is to be apprehended in the same way as animal vitality. Unfree spirit or superficial will wants nothing more than to place itself on a par with particularity, to satisfy itself with particularities; and so we see people who get on well with animals, like old maids who are at home with cats or with dogs, who live with them as with like-minded souls. For the more profound spirit, however, such a particular form is something other to it, and when spirit feels itself bound to such a particular form, then it proves to be still wholly unfree.

We now have to say, furthermore, that the Egyptians were resistant to this severely unselfconscious state (*Befangenheit*), to this determinacy in intuiting the animal; so they downgraded this unselfconscious state to something said to represent something other than it. What they did was convert the animal element into a symbol, and 'symbol' is what does not bear its own explicit interpretation by itself, as it immediately exists, but instead has that interpretation in what is yet something other. Thus in Egypt we see animal figures as symbols, transformed and thus downgraded into the sheerly external reality of a representation or meaning that is supposed to be distinct from this immediate animal form. The dung beetle and the sparrow hawk are symbols in this way. A symbol, however, is always something opaque. In language there is free clarity; in the symbol, the representation is expressed only opaquely by human beings or by the sensible element. The representation does not become entirely clear; it merely makes use of the symbol. The

45. See Gen. 9: 4.

power of procreation and the sun's path were expressed in this way via the symbol of the dung beetle. Here, then, there was the intuition of nature that imaginatively envisaged a general significance within the living thing. So, representation progresses from the exclusively immediate representation to something further. We have every reason to take such forms as symbols. Posited explicitly as such, as symbols, they are, moreover, positioned differently here where the animal figure is transformed and thus not left to be as it exhibited itself in immediacy. Here belongs the juxtaposing of animal fig-
293 ures, for instance | a snake with the head of a bull or ram, or a lion body with a crocodile tail and a ram's head, and so forth.

Even more explicit, however, are the animal figures reduced to symbols in the actual sphinxes or animal bodies from which a human figure makes its way outward; lion bodies with female-male heads. Thus they also have sparrow hawks from which human beings come forth. So animal images are, as it were, helmets from which the human visage peers outward, with the result that the animal aspect serves more as adornment or attribute. What this represents is the fact that something spiritual raises itself up out of the animal nature. The human being that immerses itself in the animal always, in doing so, still has human sensibilities. In such twofold beings the universal begins to project itself outward. The spiritual element is not yet free; thus the spiritual element is indeed expressed in the task of making itself free, in its detaching itself from the animal aspect. Vice versa, however, there are also other formations in which the spiritual element is represented in the human figure. The human element or the human figure is no longer symbol but is instead the immediate, sensible expression, the distinctive figure, of the spiritual. The human figure appears, with the face having the characteristic of a spiritual soul. So the sensible figure of the spiritual is the human figure. In their proceeding to the point of bringing out the spiritual element in this figure, the Egyptians in turn perverted and distorted this figure by the use of the animal form or animal face; for it requires the higher kind of art to enliven the human figure into being a free and distinct expression of an [individual] character. The Egyptians were not yet capable of this, and in
294 order to render the figure in particular form, they | employed once again the animal aspect or animal figure, and thus represented human beings with the heads of rams, sparrow hawks, bulls, lions, and apes. Greek art understood how to achieve the particular, spiritual expression in beauty itself, so that the human countenance as such is intelligible of itself, whereas in Egypt the intelligibility is supposed to be brought about by means of animal figures. The Egyptians even put animal masks on human bodies; then even

the priests had to attire themselves in such animal masks in order to indicate or identify which deities they served.

How the Egyptians Envisaged Spirit

These are then the Egyptians' ways of envisaging essential being; spirit's task of becoming self-conscious was, by the natural domain, bound up with the intuition of nature and breaking through this bondage, the transition to contradiction, the inversion of the spiritual element into the natural element and vice versa. But for human beings the spiritual element is also present in an existence proper to them, in the spiritual power of their own discoveries and aptitude. The arousal and power of the Egyptian consciousness and spirit has not overlooked this, but instead this consciousness has set itself up as something to be revered, something essential and substantial, just like the powers of nature, and this then constitutes the other aspect of the Egyptian religion. Human aptitudes are objectified (*hypostasiert*) in this way and looked upon as important and worthy. But the spiritual element has not then also become the object (*Gegenstand*) as free spirit, as universal; instead it appears only as a particular power alongside the power of nature, something particular too in keeping with its particular | content. The Egyptians therefore also had gods whose 295
being was spiritual efficacy or activity, but it too was confined within a restricted, narrow scope (*Partikularität*), and it was downgraded or demoted to symbolic status and was linked to natural things. This aspect of this spirituality is preserved for us above all in Hermes, also Teith or Thoth (Herodotus). As Egyptian, this deity [Hermes] is the god Anubis, friend and companion of Osiris, and his deeds include discovery of hieroglyphic writing, of surveying, astronomy, music, and medicine, of religion and teachings of sacred matters, and so forth.[46] The Egyptians say that Iamblichus has set forth all their customs, the inventions of the priests, and the name Hermes.[47]

46. Herodotus mentions Hermes in various passages (2.51, 138, 145; Grene, pp. 153, 191–2, 195), but does not state explicitly that Hermes equals Thoth. The writings of Hermes Trismegistus are associated with Thoth, the reputed author of those philosophical-religious writings known as the *Hermetica*. According to *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 'Hermes Trismegistus' clumsily renders the Egyptian phrase 'Thoth the very great'. In Greek 'Trismegistus' means 'thrice greatest'. Thoth is the Egyptian god of wisdom who presides over the judgment of the souls of the dead. He is not the same one as Anubis, who assists him by weighing on a balance scale the heart of the deceased, set over against an ostrich feather on the other pan of the scale.

47. Iamblichus, a Neoplatonist of the 3rd and 4th cents. AD, wrote various works on Pythagoras, mathematics, magic, the mysteries, and theurgy.

This spirit is the inventor of particular, individual (*besonderen partikulären*) inventions, not of free thought. As noted, the content of this divine element is then the particular natures of human arts and inventions, all lumped together here and grasped not as pure spirituality but instead in their individual essential being. This content was also in turn degraded into nature symbols and linked with natural figures. It is God in fact with the head of a dog. In addition to this natural, sensible mask, it also becomes linked on the other side to a natural object, to Sirius (the Dog Star). Just as the content of this spiritual activity as such is constricted in this way, the mode of its appearance, its concrete being, is constricted too. Therefore this confusion [of spirit] with animal symbols that took place, a confusion evident with the sphinx, is also in part present in the most glaring fashion in other and broader circumstances. Thus, for instance, the sphere of human purposes and interests—how people have to conduct themselves when dealing with natural things and by which they have to define themselves—is in turn such a confused state that even one's own act is then constrained by the powers of nature.

For example, in medicine the diagnosis of bodily illness is bound up with
296 the most diverse superstitions and is linked with | astrological or lunar influences, with mysterious, magical wisdom. Likewise, in cases where people wish to decide upon other matters such as building a house or going on a journey, decisions of that kind are controlled by the influence of the stars; in all these contingent matters the Egyptians resorted to oracles, especially consulting the oracle of Ammon,[48] and doing all this in the most extraordinary way, for there is a confusion of one's own understanding with the supposition of, and belief in, other influences. The fact that external contingency is at work carried over here to minor matters. The oracle of Ammon was extremely famous. In one city a shield with precious stones on it was the oracle, in virtue of the fact that, when moved, these precious stones either were, or were not, made to vibrate.

The spiritual element, free science, constrained in this way from coming to consciousness, is not to be sought among the Egyptians and hence did not come to solve the enigma, did not arrive at free consciousness. It is a ridiculous supposition to believe that Greek sages or philosophers obtained their thoughts and their wisdom from Egypt. Pythagoras had been there in Egypt, but we do not know what he brought back with him. When we see, however, that he taught the Egyptians to calculate the size of the pyramids from their

48. The famous oracle of Ammon was located at his temple at the oasis of Siwa.

shadow, it is certain that they were not far advanced in geometry. What he brought back from them was of little consequence. Also, if we wish to assume that Pythagoras brought back philosophy, we see that Pythagoras himself did not yet arrive at free thought but only at number, inasmuch as he comprehended what is spiritual in the abstraction of number. And if we also assume that the Egyptians had such philosophical themes, they still had not yet arrived at pure thought. So the Egyptian priests could well have engaged in speculation; but what others obtained from them was not pure thought, and in any event it was different from the standpoint of the [Egyptian] people. | 297

So these are the principal features of the Egyptian religion, which has as its principal element the urge or impulse (*Drang*) of spirit to work its way free from the intuition of nature. This superstition is a harsh fate for the Egyptians themselves; here spirit is still in strict, harsh slavery, and spirit strives or longs to be free of (*heraus*) it, yet has nothing but struggle. The Indians too long to be free of it, but they remain stuck in negation, in self-centeredness (*Selbstzweck*). The principle of this African spirit, however, is precisely to endure such harshness and to overcome it, whereas the Indians take their own lives. The Egyptian sustains the impulse and lives within it. So the content of Egyptian religion is then of a sort that cannot be only a subjective content of representation; instead the content is the tremendous urge itself, and since the content is this harsh driving force, it must, in going out beyond subjectivity, become objective to itself, must portray itself, must annul the onesidedness, must overcome the self-enclosed state (*Befangenheit*). Hence the Egyptian religion is in one aspect this content of representation, and is the urge to supersede the merely subjective status of the representation and to produce the object.

So we see the Egyptian spirit as the laborer, the great master builder, whose wondrous works, after three thousand years, still deserve our complete admiration.

Art and Architecture

Art is a principal feature of Egypt, and it presented itself mainly in the Egyptian religion. Art can have no place in the religion of the abstract One [i.e. Judaism and Islam] for the very reason that this religion's object is only something indeterminate and invisible. In that setting art is even something sinful because representation of the abstract One, of the indeterminate, ought to be ruled out. In the higher religion of spirit, in the Christian religion, art is something | subordinate and not the absolute way in which 298 the need for understanding represents its content to itself, nor how spirit can

make a representation of itself. In the form before us, to the contrary, the form we have before us in Egypt, in the spirit enclosed within the natural domain where spirit is an impulse but cannot come to itself, art from this standpoint is the necessary means of self-knowledge, of bringing about self-consciousness and making it into a representation. So what spirit makes representational is the very content that we have seen.

The material in which spirit makes itself into the representation cannot be that of thought; it can only be the sensible, natural material, the material of the natural realm. Here spirit is the master builder that works or inscribes itself into stone and has only this [natural] material. So what it then makes into the object of its consciousness, what it produces, what knowledge this spirit brings itself to, can only be this impulse, this task, this enigma itself, namely, the hieroglyph. Therefore what this impulse produces are the hieroglyphics. We marvel at the power of this tremendous impulse in these works of art, in their mechanics—how far advanced the Egyptians were in the mastery and movement of massive natural objects, in impressing upon them the form that spirit seeks to know in them. They developed the understanding of mechanics to the greatest extent. In more recent times people made much ado about the transporting of the obelisk to Rome and the head of the sphinx to England;[49] they made a great ado about Egyptian mechanics; for all our works of this kind are trifles in comparison to what was accomplished in Egypt as to the workmanship on, and overcoming of, massive objects. They worked on what is hardest.

The engraved forms that they carved into the hardest stone are, on the one hand, hieroglyphics proper that were inscribed upon, and covered, vast
299 walls, with the result that these walls had the appearance | of pressed cotton. These hieroglyphics have more to do with subjective representation. On the other hand there are the works in stone, the sculptures, or else in painting, although these too are more or less hieroglyphs. Up to now these hieroglyphs have not been deciphered. Most of the representations are religious, are enigmatic, and more or less just express the task of resolving the enigma, the urge to do so. Even with the aid of the great discoveries of more recent times we are still not much further along in understanding the Egyptian hieroglyphs. We have not yet given up the desire for actual works

49. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 546, where Hegel says 'Belzoni . . . also transported a colossal head of Memnon to England, a stupendous work.' Belzoni describes in considerable detail the laborious and protracted endeavor of transporting the huge bust of Memnon overland to the Nile, via which it was sent by boat to England for display in the British Museum. See Belzoni, *Narrative*, 39–50, 110–12, and 125–35.

in the language; yet even actual works in the language themselves, their content, would always be only what the works of art represent for us. The enigma that the Egyptian spirit made of itself would ever remain just an enigma for us and would not become wholly clear. These artistic productions in architecture and sculpture are the principal work of the Egyptians. With other peoples the work of their effort is subjugation or domination of other peoples. The vast and abundant realm of the Egyptians' deeds is, in contrast, their works of art.

Works of annihilation endure in memory, but we still possess the [actual] works of the Egyptians, though only in ruins. One hundred thousand men were engaged for ten years in the Trojan War, and what they accomplished, the endeavor of the Trojan War, was the devastation of Troy. The chief result is the futility of both sides, of the besieged and the besiegers. What the Egyptians presented, and left behind them, is a far loftier achievement, a positive one that, albeit in ruins, is still something more or less indestructible and enduring. These are works of the greatest kind; to Herodotus the works of the Greeks appear paltry indeed compared to those of the Egyptians, and especially compared, for instance, to the labyrinth with its three thousand chambers above ground and three thousand below ground.[50] It is likewise with the walls. These works are as impressively grand as they are elegant. | The architectural design is as impressively grand as it is beautiful like that of the Greeks. So the Egyptian spirit is this laborer, and this is the principal feature of Egypt as such. 300

The Dead and Immortality

Especially important among these works is their novel aspect, one dedicated to the dead. A great many of these subterranean works that they dedicate to the dead still remain, and not just by chance, for this subterranean realm plays an essential and major part in the project of Egyptian labor. There are countless ruins of temples to the gods, especially in the delta region, the arena (*Tummelplatz*) of the Greeks and the Arabs. All around Thebes, on the hillocks of the valley, are the sorts of tombs in which the majority preserved themselves, especially the works or cemetery vaults dedicated to the dead on the hillocks of the valley.[51] Belzoni established that the pyramids

50. See his account of the labyrinth, and of Lake Moeris, in 2.148–50 (Grene, pp. 196–8).

51. Belzoni describes his explorations of mummy caves in the mountains of Gournou, 'a tract of rocks, about two miles in length, at the foot of the Libyan mountains, on the west of Thebes'

too were dedicated to the dead.[52] More recently they have been opened up. Belzoni made the second one accessible, investigated the walls, and discovered well-proportioned crystalline structures (*Kristalle*). These enormous, well-proportioned crystalline structures are not organic but rational (*verständige*), straight-sided structures that enclose nothing but a cadaver.[53] The tombs of kings are awe-inspiring. Belzoni opened up and investigated a king's tomb that was built into a hill. However, he did not reach its other end, which is probably on the other side of the mountain. Evident here is the importance that the Egyptians placed on this realm of Amenti, of death, of the invisible, and the kind of representation they accordingly attached to it. It fits together with their representation of the essence of the human being as such; for this aspect of the realm of the dead relates to the individuality of human beings. What comes to light here is the representation of the human being by human beings, divested of all contingency and temporality; from this we see what the Egyptians themselves thought about the immortality of their souls.

Dealing with this aspect of the realm of the dead involves going over the
301 features | pertinent to what the Egyptians themselves thought about the immortality of their souls.

The first noteworthy point is that Herodotus says the Egyptians were the first to have believed and taught that the human soul is immortal.[54] Chinese reverence for their ancestors and the Indians' transmigration of the soul—for the Indians dreamed of extensive wanderings of souls through many natural things—can lead us to believe that Herodotus, being uninformed or ignorant, spoke in error. But to grasp his words solely with respect to the meaning of his account, we must be clear as to what belief in the immortality of the soul means. Every people has a representation of the immortality of the soul, although this representation lends itself to quite diverse characterizations; so we must of course examine whether there is agreement regarding

(*Narrative*, 154), one so extensive that he calls it 'a complete labyrinth' (p. 52); see pp. 51–4, 120, 123–4, 155–8, 229–30.

52. Ibid. 277, where he states about the pyramids: 'The circumstance of having chambers and a sarcophagus . . . I think leaves very little question, but that they were erected as sepulchres'. See his account of the opening up of the pyramid of Chephren (Khafre) on pp. 255–81.

53. Belzoni notes (ibid. 275) that 'it might be supposed these large sarcophagi were made to contain the bones of bulls, as the sarcophagus which we found in the tombs of the kings of Thebes was of enormous size, and more fit for a bull than a human body. I cannot agree in this opinion'.

54. He says (2.123; Grene, p. 185) that they are the first to tell that the human soul is immortal and that, upon bodily death, it cycles through some other living thing.

what we call immortality. It is not a matter of mere representations, such as of respect shown to the deceased.

In the Oriental viewpoint no freedom is granted to the individual. So we saw that the subject is recognized not as being something infinitely free or inherently self-subsistent (*Für-Sich-Bestehendes*), but instead only as something that passes away. Indian 'Spinozism' does not allow that subjectivity could have an infinite, free self-subsistence; instead, the fact that substance modifies itself at one point is only a superficial modification. With the Chinese we see great respect shown to the deceased, the son ascribing all that he does to his forefathers. It exalts them, not him. So we see in this instance the view that the deceased are a perennial factor, although that does not suffice for the belief in the immortality of the soul—quite the contrary. People suppose that, when the emperor elevates to a higher level the father of the person being honored, this is a proof | of belief in immortality. But 302
immortality of the soul means that the soul, this inwardness, is infinite of itself. This inward, individual, private sphere, to which no temporal honor can any longer befall or be shown, is supposed to be immortality, something that is over and done with temporality. The emperor cannot honor it by exalting it, and so this is the indication that for the Chinese there is no such thing as this absolutely free, inner being-for-self of soul. Hence exaltation in time no longer has any meaning; for the soul resides where worldly honor can no longer reach it; and if worldly honor does extend to it, then this is a sign that what we have here is not what is called an immortal soul.

So this absolutely free, inner being-for-self of the soul is something alien to the Oriental character. Even in the Old Testament, in the Jewish religion, there are only faint traces of immortality, and we do not even find immortality of the soul to be a dominant topic, so that here too no light is shed upon it. If, then, we do not find it among the Orientals, the question is whether it is to be sought in the case of the Egyptians, namely, whether there the soul is considered to be something subsistent for itself that is granted release from the temporal sphere. Our view of immortality is essentially the characteristic of the person as destined for eternity, the view that the spirit or the soul has an eternal purpose wholly distinct from its finite purpose, distinct from temporality. Where this depth of the soul goes unmentioned, what can appear to be a [mere] continuation is meager and lacking in interest. This higher destiny that is conferred upon human life in faith constitutes faith's genuine interest in the soul's continuation. For the Egyptians, the consciousness of the existence (*Bestehen*) of such a higher purpose has not yet arisen.

We have to discover exactly what they expressed by saying the soul is
303 immortal, exactly what perspective this was. Herodotus attributes to | them a beginning of this consciousness of a higher destiny.[55] For them the intuition of immortality was only at an initial stage. [Their concept of] spirit was not yet fulfilled by two aspects: that spirit has a higher, eternal purpose, and that, reflected within itself, spirit is inherently infinite. They apprehend immortality only in the sense of abstract oneness, of the atom, but this oneness does not suffice for the character or concept of spirit. They thought of this oneness or this atom as ongoing and indestructible, yet not ongoing in an eternal, universal existence but instead as existence in a particular form (*partikularisiert*) in which the soul passes over into the body of an animal. They did not think of themselves as infinite in and for themselves. This I or this 'one', and the way in which the reality of the soul is represented, are what makes the difference.

The objectivity of spirit is its eternal destiny. If the soul is not viewed as this spirit, then its destiny is only being something in a particular form (*Partikulär*), and so the soul indeed continues on as an atom, though one tossing about within particular forms of existence.

A further representation or feature that belongs here is the fact that Osiris dies, is buried, remains buried, and is not in turn resurrected. So he has many graves. Another point is that, by embalming, by the mummies, the Egyptians give the dead a continuation; the body would be preserved in this way for the time being. People suppose that in this endeavor they have a proof for the belief in genuine immortality, since it is said to have been a folk belief that the soul continues on together with a body preserved in this way and, when together with it, does not decompose. Yet there is no historical evidence for this belief. In any event, this more recent or modern way of explaining things is unhistorical and it is a silly view. The very fact that they sought to enable the body to endure reveals instead that they had
304 no genuine sense of immortality; for the latter, the body itself | or the bodily being is precisely the more insignificant feature, and only an outward respect ought to be shown it. This embalming instead testifies far more to their infinitely high esteem for the mortal, particular, finite, bodily being that the soul has as its body. For with true immortality the preservation of the body is completely nonessential. So this mummification does not point to the authentic sense of immortality.

55. Herodotus describes in detail the embalming process that is designed to make the body of the deceased as perfect a model as possible of the god Osiris (2.86; Grene, pp. 165–6).

A further circumstance is that we find the judging of the dead also in inscriptions and in their surviving paintings too, as well as in the [writings of] historians. It is historical fact that, prior to the burial of a private person and that of a king, there was a public tribunal and a funeral oration, with narration of the person's life and the extolling of his virtues, at which time anyone in the assembly was able to present a contrary view. If the bystanders did not concur, they could make accusations against the deceased. Hence the tribunal for the dead is not represented as held in the underworld, in the way it is with the Greeks (in Minos and elsewhere), and still less so does it resemble our Last Judgment. In general, we have no justification for adverting from this image to our Last Judgment, because the judging of the dead here is done by the living, not by a judge in the beyond. These tribunals are to be understood as the sort that the living hold concerning the dead.

Another circumstance, one recounted by Herodotus, is that images of deceased relatives were set up at banquets, together with the admonition: 'Eat and drink, for you will become such a one as this.'[56] So the reminder of death was no occasion for reminding the living that death involved knowledge of a higher destiny; instead, the images of the dead were | used to 305
encourage taking advantage of the present by seizing upon life's sensual pleasures. So this spectacle served not as an admonition regarding a higher destiny, but instead as an inducement to the sensual pleasures of this life. This is what we observe in the case of the Egyptians concerning their view of the human being and of the soul.

Private or Particular Purpose

The [Egyptian] orientation is to vitality in the present. On the one hand, here we see the Egyptians engaging themselves over against nature with a powerful understanding of their own strength that is self-confident and is awesome in the operations of the state just as it is in the mechanical and technical features of their edifices. On the other hand, we see in this vitality too the power of transforming the particular and the finite. We have observed this characteristic of transforming natural particularity into something symbolic, of representing one representation in another, wherein the Egyptians represent one sensible representation in a different one in such a way that the one becomes symbol for the other. Here we see the power of the particular

56. Herodotus states (2.78; Grene, p. 174) that the wealthy do this at their banquets by having someone carry around a miniature coffin containing a human likeness.

(*Partikulär*) and the spiritual power of changing or transforming it—the presence of mind and steadfastness or good sense that is, on the one hand, immersed in the sensible, in particularity, and is strictly bound to it, and on the other hand, however, also has the power to venture out beyond this particularity, to transform it, yet going forth not into something spiritual or universal or freely emergent as such, not to thought, but instead into another particularity that only transforms the one intelligible representation into a different one, such that what is universal always remains something 'other' or inward. Herein lies the characteristic of subjection to what is private and particular (*die Partikularität und die Besonderheit*), and the strength of
306 seeking to break through it. |

When, in this light, we turn to the consideration of personality and to the Egyptians' customary conduct, we find behavior that is correspondingly circumspect and appropriate. But we also find audacity and boldness on the part of king Amasis, who sent the daughter of his predecessor to Cambyses. On the one hand he holds fast to the purpose of his own daughter's honor, and on the other hand he has the audacity to substitute for her the daughter of the one he murdered.[57]

Striking and just as noteworthy is another story told by Herodotus. He speaks of a king Rhampsinitus. This king Rampsinitus had a large amount of gold in a stone chamber of his palace. The builder of this chamber, on his deathbed, revealed to his sons that he provided for a life of riches for them by having inserted one stone of the chamber in such a way that it might easily be removed without that being noticed. (This extreme representation of the private purpose of providing for his sons in this way is authentically Egyptian.) The sons put this information to use and laid their hands on the gold. The king spotted the loss and was amazed; he set traps, and one of the thieves, upon returning to the site, was ensnared in them. Then this thief called out to his brother and, despairing of escaping and out of concern for his brother, bade the brother to cut off his head and take it away with him. (This is one feature of a frightfully consistent representation of a heedless understanding, which sees what is necessary and heedlessly carries out what serves finite ends.) Upon finding only the torso, the king became ever more curious. Then he had the headless corpse displayed with guards posted by it who were charged to pay attention to the demeanor of the passersby. The mother of these sons became extremely angry about the suspended body and
307 commanded the remaining | and surviving son to fetch the corpse of his

57. For the story, see above, pp. 336–7 with n. 8.

brother, to free the body of his brother from this humiliation; otherwise, she threatened to reveal all to the king. So her son, the brother, carried out the command by loading donkeys with wineskins and cutting into one of the skins when they were near the guards, so that the guards came and ladled the wine, and drank it, growing merry until they were drunk. Then the brother removed the corpse and shaved the right cheeks of the guards. The king, having become even more exasperated, then in despair offered his daughter to someone who must tell her what has been the most intelligent or wisest thing he has ever done, and the most outrageous or ungodly thing. Then the robber came too and told her the story of the theft, whereupon the king's daughter sought to grab hold of him. But he had cut off the hand from his brother's body, and he extended it to her and made his escape. Then the king promised the bold robber a pardon and the daughter for his wife.[58]

So we see brought out here the typical [Egyptian] character; the private nature of the purpose is established throughout. In reading this story, I imagined it was from 'The Thousand and One Nights': in one aspect it is fantastic, in another totally confined to a private passion devoid of any wider reflection and scope and possible transformation of what is inward. Linked to this is the general lack of any integrity or any general ethical life. The private character of the passion is a thoroughly private purpose and is the ultimate thing; and this purpose is pursued and carried out with an understanding heedless of consequences and ever focused on the present, and with a momentary | dissimulation. This similarity to Arabian fairy tales is worthy of 308
admiration, and Herr von Hammer says that 'The Thousand and One Nights' is by no means Arabian but is instead of thoroughly and strictly Egyptian origin.[59] For in the concerns of the Egyptians there is nothing of the Arabian character, which involves far simpler passions: courage, horse, sword, love, woman. Thus we see the Egyptian character clearly realized in these stories, and so their Egyptian [origin] is to be inferred.

58. Herodotus tells this long story much as Hegel does, except that he offers more detail (2.121; Grene, pp. 181–4). In Herodotus the treasure consists of silver, not gold. Shaving the cheeks of the drunken guards is an act of derision. Also, we need to be told that the encounter of the brother with the king's daughter takes place in the dark, which is why she could be fooled by grasping the severed hand (and arm) of a corpse, which was in fact not that of the deceased brother but taken from a different corpse. The reason for the pardon, and so forth, is that the king was very impressed with the man's wit and daring; he had come forward in response to a proclamation of immunity from the king. Herodotus himself does not accept as true the part of the story regarding the attempt to discover the thief by the use of the king's daughter.

59. See Joseph von Hammer, *Geschichte der schönen Redekünste Persiens* (Vienna, 1818), 6.

When we compare this private (*individuell*) character of the Egyptians with their religion and their civic life and their endless urge toward labor, we find in all this a uniform determinacy: this abstract immortality and fixity of individuality, this atom, but not yet something concrete, not yet concrete individuality. Since this [atom] is what it becomes, it immerses itself in particular elements (*Partikulären*) and for that very reason it is firmly animal, the firm understanding that operates within a private domain of purposes and intuitions but is, just so, an endless impelling, a steadfast presence of mind and striving that, for private purposes, risks everything, inverts everything, and knows no bounds. So we see that this compulsiveness or energy of the Egyptian soul is not yet directed to what is universal and does not yet know the universal as such, and thus it does not yet know itself; for the soul is this onefold and universal element on its own account. Grasping something universal is immediately identical with the fact that this unyielding 'one', the I, grasps itself and relates itself to itself, to this universal, abstract element. The very fact that the soul knows itself is its making itself into the
309 content. The Egyptian understanding | or spirit stands at once in particularity and does not yet go back into its own inner being, does not raise itself up to the point of grasping itself as universal and coming to be *for* itself. In this unselfconscious state (*Befangenheit*) this spirit at the same time shows or proves itself to be free, bold and brave. It renders its natural intuition symbolically and positions itself as the means to something universal that, however, does not make its appearance as universal. It involves a self-enclosed state (*Befangenheit*) and a struggle against it, an implicit struggle, or a mastery over particularity, but one that is not yet ideal particularity, is not yet *for itself*. The particularity already is this means implicitly, because the Egyptian spirit supersedes the self-enclosed state, utilizing it for the sake of another self-enclosed state. Spirit does not yet have as its explicit purpose the positive result or the universal itself. That this particularity is also explicitly ideal is what must now come forward as the joyous, free, cheerful spirit, and this is the spirit of Greece.

Transition to Greece

An Egyptian priest said to Herodotus that the Greeks are perpetual children. But we could with more justification say that the Egyptians are impulsive boys who lack the ideality of youths and who will become youths only by means of the ideal form.[60]

60. This is not correct. See the passages cited above in n. 10. While Hegel is mistaken about what Herodotus said, he has in mind his own division of world history, starting with the age of

The Oriental spirit is spirit remaining immersed in nature, is this unalloyed unity immersed in nature. In Egypt we see spirit as self-enclosed, but it is impossible for spirit to keep itself within this self-enclosed condition because the impulse is to disrupt it. The Indians are only disposed toward negativity and flee to it, whereas the Egyptians absorb themselves in their labor. Egypt is the land of conflict, of dialectic, the land of the task or the problem (*Aufgabe*). The task stands higher than that [Indian] identity devoid of interest—if no problem, then no solution; and if the problem is devised and defined, then the solution itself is accordingly given at the same time. The Egyptian spirit is one of liberation, of universal inwardness. The struggle is against particularity, and what must emerge or has to spring forth is just the form of universality. It could have been interesting to investigate the historical intimations, and to consider, | how the consciousness of the 310
Egyptians represented their own spirit in the form of a problem.

In this regard we have to recall the Greek inscription of the goddess at Sais (the goddess called Neith in Egyptian, *Παλλάς* in Greek): 'I am what is and what was, and no mortal has lifted my covering or my veil.' Expressed here is this unknown—the longing for, and supposition of, something higher, and the added point that it is not disclosed. This is how Plutarch puts it, and in his *Commentary on the Timaeus*, Proclus introduces this inscription with the addition: 'The fruit that I bore is the sun, Helios'.[61] Helios is the sun of spirit. The renowned prince of light was celebrated at Sais with a festival of lamps [of Neith] (Pallas)[62] corresponding to our Candlemas and the lantern festival of the Chinese. The fruit of Neith is the light, but her attributes, the predicates that are given her, one can equally well refer or relate to night, and that not in the specific sense (the Greek sense as such) of Pallas, or Athena, because Neith is called 'night' in England too. So night gives birth to the sun.

This sun or Helios, to which this veiled goddess has given birth, is the Greek spirit or the Greek light, is Phoebus Apollo, who has the sun as his radiance (*Nachhall*). As for the Greek Apollo, this god of light, we know the

infancy or childhood (Asia), then proceeding to boyhood (Egypt), youth (Greece), adulthood (Rome), and old age (Europe). See above, pp. 206–8.

61. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 639 with n. 345, where Hegel also presents these quotations. The sources are: Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 9, and Proclus, *In Plutonis Timaeon* 1.30. The additional phrase 'and what will be' is omitted from our text, although Hegel includes it in his lectures on other topics.

62. See Herodotus, *History* 2.62 (Grene, p. 158). 'Pallas' is a title of Athena.

inscription of his chief temple: 'Human being, know thyself!'[63] Apollo is the knowing God. In this instance self-knowledge is not the commonplace, psychological being of our human knowledge; instead it expresses a supreme command, the absolute command, that spirit should know and grasp itself in its own essential nature. This knowledge is what is primary, and the labor of the world, the striving of every religion, ascends to it; there is no inscription more sublime than this. There is no utterance of the Greek spirit more distinctive than this, and so the contrast of the Greeks to the Egyptian spirit
311 was expressed in this way. |

The definitive transition is expressed in these telling features, although we can call to mind even more clearly a familiar story. In Thebes [in Greece] a sphinx, the very image of Egypt, posed a riddle, asking: Who or what goes on four legs in the morning, on two legs at mid-day, and on three legs in the evening? Since no one could solve the riddle, destruction and misfortune befell the people and the land. Oedipus, from the line of Cadmus, solved the riddle by stating that the answer is a human being, and the sphinx collapsed into a heap of stones.[64] The task for the Egyptian spirit is that what ought to emerge is the thought in which human beings grasp themselves. If this thought is grasped, then the human being is grasped. In considering the story more closely, we find this spiritual clarity linked in Oedipus with the greatest ignorance. Clarity of spirit dawns in this royal residence, but as still linked with appalling ignorance. Here we have the first rulership, the ancient patriarchal rule, to which knowing is a foreign (*heterogenes*) principle, and which therefore disintegrates because of that. The Oriental [principle] must give way. This ancient knowledge attains clarity only via political freedom. This knowledge is only purified by political laws; as immediate, it is not salutary. The initial knowledge is something calamitous[65] and must first develop itself into what we see in the Greeks. So this is the characteristic, and the mythological intimation, of the transition to the Greek spirit.

63. See the discussion of this motto, with reference to Apollo and Socrates, in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ii. 150.

64. A sphinx is a creature of Egyptian mythology that in Greek literature is regarded as female; it is represented in numerous examples of Egyptian statuary and art (including the famous huge statue near the Great Pyramid at Giza). In Greek legend the sphinx terrorized Thebes (in Greece) by destroying persons who could not solve the riddle it posed (the one stated in our text). Oedipus correctly guessed the answer—an infant crawls on all fours (the 'morning' of life), a grownup (the 'mid-day') walks on two legs, and an elderly person (the 'evening') adds a cane to make three 'legs'—the sphinx committed suicide (or else was killed by him), and so the city was rescued by his feat.

65. Oedipus unknowingly kills his father and marries his mother.

At the same time we must recall that Egypt was a province of the vast Persian Empire, and for that reason we have juxtaposed to Greece not just Egypt alone but the Persian Empire too. In the Persian Empire there was a political point of unity in the power of the Persian race, this mountain people. In the religious mode this point of unity took the specific form of the pure light, as the knowing of the absolute, | in the existence of pure 312
knowledge. The Persians had this physical 'one' as their object and content, as also did the multiplicity of languages, customs, and other particular features of the various peoples. So one aspect is an abstract, fixed point of unity, though implicitly so; what it holds together is only a multiplicity of various particular elements that are not interconnected organically. We have already mentioned these particular elements. On the one hand there was the Persian intuition of light, on the other, a life of pleasure and physical valor, as well as the Egyptian impulse. This is the vast totality of Persia that stands over against Greece. Greece is the land in which these elements that in Persia are not interconnected organically, but just juxtaposed, receive their authentic integration through the deepening of spirit within itself; so Greece is where the particular elements mutually link up and rise to the highest unity, by spirit idealizing these particular elements. All the materials, all the elements, are present in the Persians, and what is lacking is just the spiritual unity and the rebirth of this material within spirit. The rebirth of spirit from out of this material is the characteristic feature of Greece.

We still have to mention, with respect to Persia, the fresh energy of the mountain people. Allowing the distinctiveness of their subjects proved to be a beautiful, noble relationship that in its purity, however, was only of brief duration; for simple gallantry sank back suddenly into Asian primitiveness, in that it could not withstand Asian excess and knew not how to put a stop to it. The simple Persian sense entered suddenly into Asian opulence and had no internal restraint. Persian religion was not fanatical; the absolutely basic intuition was the intuition of light as a still simple, natural essence, and only fanaticism would have | been able to maintain itself over against opulence, 313
against this principle of multiplicity. But then fanaticism would also have proven to be neither noble-minded nor tolerant. The simplicity of the Persians, situated within the Asian multiplicity, was at a loss; for the Persians brought with them no political understanding, no organized system for holding together these peoples, one in which the various particular elements would have had their proper place. They discovered no organized political condition, and since they encountered an endless diversity—not, indeed, an already structured condition that they could have adopted, as the Manchus [did in China]—they thus remained simply in the relationship of ruler over

these peoples. As 'barbarians', this sufficed for them.[66] In their far-flung Asian expanse the Persians remain a people by itself, cut off and isolated over against this diversity.

Thus, for instance, Herodotus narrates how, after the overthrow of the Magi by the eight great princes, Otanes wanted to have a democracy, Megabyzus an aristocracy, and Darius a monarchy.[67] Here there is no evidence whatsoever of considering the governance of so many peoples and the broad expanse of so many nations; here we see nothing but regard for the Persian people. Each of the speakers is concerned exclusively with the Persians as such, who held themselves apart. There is no commonality of laws or rights shared with the other peoples, just as the Persians themselves evidently are not the particular government officials for these peoples; the chief connecting elements were instead just tribute and military service. So, Persian rule gained no inner legitimacy among these peoples; that is, there was no law and right in common with the ruled. Defining themselves in this way as separate, the
314 Persians remain the abstract | masters, and such a relationship necessarily brings with it violence, lack of rights, and oppression.

This circumstance, then, brought about the internal debilitation of the Persian power that came up against the Greeks. The encounter of these two peoples, the Greeks and the Persians, is the great topic, and the epoch, of what Herodotus thus called the 'Median Wars'.[68] From here we pass over directly to Greece, and consider the culture of the land of Greece up to this point in time.

66. The Greeks called the Persians 'barbarians' because of the way their speech sounded ('bar bar') to the Greek ear. This term came to mean not just foreign, but uncivilized.

67. See Herodotus, *History* 3.80–3 (Grene, pp. 247–50), a passage in which speeches attributed to the debaters can only have reflected Greek theories of forms of government, for Greek thinkers liked to classify various types of 'constitutions'. The outcome favored the view of Darius, who subsequently became king. Herodotus speaks of seven successful conspirators ('princes') who overthrew the Magi, not eight.

68. For Herodotus, the encounter of the Greeks with the Persian Empire as such has its beginnings with the attacks of Croesus, king of Lydia, upon the Greeks of Asia Minor in Ephesus, Ionia, and Aeolia (1.26; Grene, p. 43). Croesus then fought a war with the Medes (1.74; Grene, p. 67), who by this time had been bested in a revolt by their Persian subjects and been incorporated into the newly formed Persian Empire under Cyrus. Harpagus, a Mede and a general in the service of the Persian king Cyrus, conquered Sardis, the capital of Lydia (1.84; Grene, p. 72), which is how Lydia, together with its Greek subjects in the westernmost part of Asia minor (who were originally colonists placed there by city-states on the Greek mainland), came to be absorbed into the Persian Empire.

Earlier we compared the Greek spirit with the age of youth.[1] The noblest figure that hovered before the Greek spirit was that of the Homeric youth Achilles. The Trojan War is, speaking generally, the beginning of the actual unity of the Greek totality, and Homer articulated this actuality in representational form. Thus Homer is the basic literary source (*Grundbuch*) for the onset of intellectual representation, the source for the intuition of the nation, the source drawn upon for a period of a thousand years. His work is the mother's milk on which the Greek people have been reared. The Homeric youth, Achilles, son of the poet, of representation, is the beginning of the Greek spirit; but he is still subject to, subordinated to, the king of kings, Agamemnon. In this initial condition, he cannot be the leader without becoming a figure of fantasy, cannot yet step forward as leader.[2] | 315

The second youth of the Greek world, Alexander the Great, the actual youth, who stands at the pinnacle of the age of youth in its full maturity and concludes the whole, is the culmination of what is authentically Greek. This comparison of Greek life with the age of youth does not capture the specific figure of a human youth, but instead the concept [of youthfulness]. Young people are immature and incomplete, for their aims are outside themselves; and if they believe that they already possess within themselves the proper aim, if they regard their way as the ultimate aim, they would be mistaken, and the wrong thing would result.

In regard to Greek life, we can say that it does not yet involve an activity or effort on behalf of abstract understanding, an effort that sets itself a universal goal and toils to achieve it. What is found here is a concrete yet sensuous vitality, which, though born of the spiritual, still has sensuous presence. This unity, this fusion of the spiritual and the sensuous, which

1. See above, p. 207. The term used here is *Jugendalter*; earlier it is *Jünglingsalter*.

2. Hegel's principal ancient sources for the presentation of the Greek world are, in addition to Homer, Herodotus, *The History*; Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*; Diodorus of Sicily, *Library of History*; and Pausanias, *Guide to Greece*. Since these are well-known and accessible sources, the German editors give citations only when required by specific references. The English edn. provides additional notes. Hegel's library contained copies of Homer, *Ilias*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1819–21), and *Odyssea*, 2 vols. (Leipzig and Leiden, 1820); Herodotus, *Historiarum libri IX* (Paris, 1592); Thucydides, *De bello Peloponnesiaco libri VIII* (Frankfurt, 1594); Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliothecae historicae libri XVII* (Lyons, 1552); and Pausanias, *Graeciae descripto*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1818). Hegel was thoroughly familiar with the Greek philosophers, dramatists, and poets, and with modern works on Greek history.

we see also among the Asians, is now, however, no longer something subsisting and immediate; rather it portrays itself as born from the spirit—a spiritualized sensuousness that exists for spirit. So we have here the sensuous-spiritual intuition of the Orientals, but produced from individuality, from the individual spirit. Thus the Greek world has as its foundation the Oriental world; it starts out from the divinity of nature but reconstructs it,
316 giving it spirituality as its inner soul. This is the Greek principle. |

THE PERIODS OF GREEK HISTORY

Three periods are found in the Greek world, and this is the case with every people thereafter. The distinction among the periods can be indicated more precisely for the Greeks because here peoples are entering for the first time into the concrete nexus of world history. The first period is that of the beginning. The second is that of the retrospective contact with an earlier world-historical people, the contact of the Greeks with the Persians. The third period is the contact with a later world-historical empire, in the case of the Greeks the contact with the Romans.

The first period, the period of beginning, starts in the first epoch; and it continues to the point of inner completion, to the sort of completion within itself that makes it possible for a people to engage with an earlier world-historical people. This period comprises the first formation of a people up to a condition of real maturity in which it can come into contact with the people that precedes it. With the Asians this formation could only begin with nature, with what is immediate. With a people that has a precondition,[3] however, an alien culture appears at its beginning. It has from the beginning a double factor within itself: on the one hand, it proceeds from itself, on the other hand, from something alien, a foreign stimulus; and its maturation consists in bringing this doubling into a unity, into unification. For a people has to digest the foreign element and expel what remains alien. This first period ends, therefore, with the marshaling of a people's inner, real, distinctive vigor, which is applied precisely against its predecessor.

The second period is that of a people's triumph, its good fortune. Because
317 it | has turned so much to external relations and accomplishments, it lets internal matters go, and so feuds develop within it; it falls into disunity,

3. Hegel presumably means that, whereas the cultures of Asia arose directly out of nature, all later peoples encountered cultures that preceded them and conditioned them; they do not start *de novo*.

struggle, and conflict. Now the outwardly directed tension disappears. Having attained a pinnacle within itself, and having been victorious outwardly, the tension turns inward and brings about a disintegration within, a disintegration into a real existence and an ideal existence, so that it becomes objective to itself in this mode of thought as it portrays itself in art and science. This is the point at which a people founders.

Now the third period begins, that of decline and destruction and of contact with the next world-historical people—a people called upon to construct a higher stage of the world spirit, a stage in which the higher spirit appears. These periods are to be distinguished in the case of the Greek people too. Thus we now move on to Europe.

The sun takes its course from morning to evening (*Abend*), and so we move from Asia to Europe, the West (*Abendland*). First we will consider the land of the Greeks. The fourth location,[4] which we encounter here, across the sea, is the group of islands of the Aegean Sea and a mainland that is just as insular in nature, partly a peninsula [the Peloponnesus], partly numerous narrow spits of land, and frequently bisected by bays. A diversity of landscape dominates the interior, alternating hilly areas or mountains with narrow plains and valleys intersected by small streams. Greece has no large rivers with the sort of alluvial plains whose | fertile soil nourishes only a race of people to whom the heavens 318
offer merely a type of dependence. Here in Greece this much-divided land is superficially connected. This is the elementary character of the geography and of the Greek spirit—the spirit of self-subsistent individuality, which was not unified from the start by a patriarchal realm but which stands on its own and by itself, and must find unity in a higher medium, that of law and spiritual custom.

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK FOLK SPIRIT

Who Are the Greeks?

A closer consideration of the Greek spirit reveals the difficulty of knowing what the Greek people actually were originally; for the Hellenic first had to become the Greek.[5] An inwardly heterogeneous character is what we first

4. The preceding locations are the Far East (China, India), the Middle East (Persia), and the Near East and North Africa (Egypt).

5. Since 'Hellenic' (*hellenisch*) and 'Greek' (*griechisch*) have the same meaning, Hegel may simply be engaged in a wordplay meaning that the Greeks had to become Greek. The word 'Hellenic' goes back to Hellen, the legendary ancestor of the Hellenic peoples—the Dorians, Ionians, Achaeans, and Aeolians. Among the first Hellenic tribes to colonize Italy were the 'Graecians' (so named after Graecus, according to legend a nephew of Hellen), and thus the

encounter, and the free, beautiful spirit of Greece could only emerge out of such heterogeneity by surmounting it. The heterogeneity from which it emerges is not something that is basic and more profound, else the Greek spirit would have become something higher than it is. Thus the heterogeneity is a necessary principle. Only a superficial and foolish representation makes the claim that a beautiful ethical whole could come about through a simple, singular development of something of the same kind as it—a race that remains tied by blood and clan relationships. For even the plant needs and makes use of heterogeneous elements such as light and air. The representation of a natural goodness and of the absence of need as the peaceful development
319 of such a goodness—this sort of notion must be abandoned | when spiritual development is to be considered. Such representations are contrary to the concept; the experiences of history demonstrate the opposite.

The beginning of Greek life reveals to us a mixture, intersection, and migration of tribes and peoples of whom we do not know the extent of their Greek nature, and of tribes whose entirely non-Greek nature is familiar to us. The Athenian people—Athens, the summit of the Greek spirit—came about as a place of refuge for individuals of various tribes, of the most diverse clans and peoples. Likewise Persia, the genuinely Asiatic empire, is a collection of varied and heterogeneous tribes; and even the Romans were a national collection of castoffs (*colluvies*) from diverse peoples who, without family ties, were bound together solely through an interest in pillage. All the nations of Europe have arisen through a melding of peoples. Thus the aspect of heterogeneity is essential to a world-historical people. Greeks, Romans, Germanic peoples first became one out of heterogeneity. This is the necessary prerequisite for a people to claim world-historical significance.

In looking more closely at the Greek people, we cannot say which of the peoples were originally Greek in origin. Later, a broad swath of countries that were inhabited by Greeks belonged to the Greek people, such as the lower part of Italy, the Black Sea, the coasts of Asia Minor, and Sicily. There were also Greek colonies in France, such as Massilia, and Cyrene on the coast of Africa.[6] Based on the earlier situation, we do not know about the relationship between

Latins (and later the West) used the word 'Greek' to designate the Hellenes (whereas the Greeks referred to their country as 'Hellas'). But since Hegel quotes Thucydides' claim, based on Homer, that originally the term 'Hellenes' designated only one of the tribes, that of Achilles from Phthiotis (see below, n. 12), his meaning may be that the various peoples who settled in the area had to acquire a common identity. In any event, the point of the next few paragraphs is that the Greek spirit emerged only gradually out of heterogeneous elements.

6. Massilia is present-day Marseille, and Cyrene is an ancient city located in what is now eastern Libya. The Greek Empire reached its greatest extent in the 7th cent. BC.

Greece and the interior lands of Asia Minor. Nor do we know the extent to which we should pay attention to peoples other than Greeks, such as Phrygians and Carians. (In modern times a tomb of a King Midas | with an ancient 320
Greek inscription has been discovered in Phrygia.) Herodotus said that he did not know whether the Phrygians or the Egyptians were older; likewise Homer regarded the Carians as barbarians because, so he said, they did not understand Greek; and yet Thucydides reported that the oldest inhabitants of the Greek islands were Carians.[7]

The natural relationships thus cannot be determined with precision; we have no clear scientific knowledge nor does the nature of the case make it clear. It is essential to remark that here we find ourselves in murky waters because the natural relationships themselves are by nature obscure. The names of these tribes and clans are very changeable because the clans are constantly on the move. One of the important peoples here are the Pelasgians, who were constantly on the move and were drawn also to Italy, the Peloponnesus, and Asia Minor. Their name vanished; it is not known where they came from physically; and they melded with other peoples. Thus there are a host of names that later disappeared when one tribe mixed with another and, when united, formed a common body. The Pelasgians were absorbed into Hellenism and thus disappeared; as Herodotus says, the Pelasgians were present in Athens and became Hellenes.[8]

Not only are tribes seen to wander back and forth; so, too, various loci of culture arise only to disappear again. Thrace, for example, where Orpheus and others once lived, is mentioned as an early locus of culture—a country that later, however, vanished so completely from the Greek world that it no longer counted | as part of Greece.[9] Thessaly too was mentioned: Deuca- 321
lion was an extremely famous man in antiquity, and we can observe in him

7. See Herodotus, *The History* 2.2 (tr. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), 131); Homer, *Iliad* 2.867 (tr. E. V. Rieu, rev. edn. Peter Jones and D. C. H. Rieu (London, 2003), 44); and Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 1.4, 8 (tr. Steven Lattimore (Indianapolis, 1998), 5, 6). Phrygia and Caria were ancient regions located in what is now central and south-western Turkey. The Phrygians came from the Balkans about 1200 BC, and the Carians were probably native to the region. Midas was a king of Phrygia in the 8th cent. BC but also figured in Greek mythology.

8. Herodotus, *History* 2.51 (Grene, pp. 153–4). Little is known of the Pelasgians other than that they were an aboriginal people who inhabited parts of Greece prior to the Hellenes and spoke a language other than Greek. Their origins and ethno-linguistic identity are matters of dispute.

9. The region of Thrace presently comprises north-eastern Greece, southern Bulgaria, and European Turkey. The ancient Thracians were independent; subsequently they were subjugated by the Greeks, later by the Romans, and eventually disappeared into the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. In Greek mythology Orpheus was a celebrated Thracian musician.

the same restlessness as portended by his ancient origins.[10] According to a saga, he came from the Peloponnesus, then traveled to Locris to which he led the Telchines,[11] whom he allied with the indigenous people, and he erected a permanent base at Mt. Parnassus. There, the second deluge caught him unaware, and he moved on into the sacred land of Thessaly where, upon conquering the Pelasgians, he founded a kingdom in Phthiotis. One of his sons was named Hellen; one grandson was named Aeolus and another Dorus.

Thucydides indeed mentioned that Homer uses the term 'Hellenes' to designate a tribe rather than as a generic name.[12] Since we have to do here with matters of spirit, the natural connection is secondary. The uniqueness of the Greek spirit, however, is seen in how it assimilates what is foreign. In this material that exemplifies this restlessness and adaptability, we see an even more alien and more heterogeneous element enter into play than what had thus far emerged: namely, the many colonies of aliens who settled in Greece (ancient Inachus is known in the ambiguous sense as a son of Oceanus, hence as one who came from the sea); additionally, colonies from Asia Minor (such as Deucalion's lineage from the Caucasus) and also from Phoenicia. Settlers from Egypt, such as Cecrops, came to Athens. The Pelasgian oracle of Dodona, likewise, is traceable back to Egypt, supposedly founded by an Egyptian woman.[13] Even things of antiquity (*das Alte*) are thought to be of foreign origin. Cadmus, the founder of Thebes in Boeotia, a son of Argenos, King of Tyre, came from Phoenicia, bringing with him the
322 alphabet. Danaus in Argos likewise came | from Thebes. Pelops, the progenitor of the Atrides,[14] came to the Peloponnesus from Lydia. These, then, are the main elements that the Greeks kept chiefly in mind. Cecrops led the Egyptians to Athens. We have spoken of Neith,[15] and on the citadel of Athens, the Acropolis, Athena was still depicted as riding upon a crocodile.

10. Thessaly was the largest ancient region of Greece, located in what is now north central Greece. Deucalion in Greek mythology was the son of Prometheus and the father of Hellen. He was associated with a flood sent by Zeus to punish the hubris of the Pelasgians.

11. The Telchines were semi-divine beings with their traditional home in Rhodes.

12. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 1.3 (Lattimore, p. 5). 'When Hellen and his sons became powerful in Phthiotis and were called in to help other cities, each tended now to be called Hellenes through the association, although it was a long process for this to prevail for all. And Homer is the best evidence; born long after even the Trojan War, he never uses this term collectively nor for any except Achilles' followers from Phthiotis (precisely the first Hellenes) but refers in his poems to Danaans, Argives, and Achaians.'

13. Herodotus, *History* 2.56 (Grene, p. 156).

14. A reference to Agamemnon and Menelaus, sons of Atreus and grandsons of Pelops.

15. See above, p. 367. Neith was an Egyptian goddess, the patron deity of Sais, where her cult was centered. Among other attributes, she was regarded as a water goddess and the mother of crocodiles. She was also a goddess of war, a protector, and later she was associated with Athena.

The First Social and Political Organization

Taken as a whole, what we refer to as the 'Greek people' is a conglomeration of tribes that came from elsewhere. It is from this foreign lineage that the many famous royal dynasties were established, descended, and so provided more enduring centers of authority and identity, taking on more definite contours. These dynasties formed the bond of small inner circles and behaved as lords and heroes in relation to a previously disunited group. So there were established more permanent centers, which emerged as cities or developed into them. The building of citadels was a major element through which the restless wanderers established themselves. Thucydides says in the introduction to his history[16] that, over a long period of time, farming activity remained threatened by constant plundering; hence farming was not introduced until later. Good soil alone was no guarantee of permanent settlement because, being coveted by all, it was more likely to be subject to change of hands and conquest. The poor soil of Athens was the reason that so many foreigners had found refuge there. However we do now see citadels established from time to time, fortifications on high ground. These are the first works of architecture.

These first works of architecture are of a peculiar construction and are called Cyclopean. In more recent times they have been searched out and found to have been constructed of large, irregular building blocks of rock. The lateral sides are hewn into smooth | surfaces so as to firmly join, 323
forming a stable matrix. Hence very large buildings were erected in this fashion, in particular, a royal treasury in Boeotia, the walls of Tiryns and Mycenae, and the treasury of Atreus, structures that Pausanias had described;[17] today ruins of these walls still stand and are only slightly more deteriorated than in Pausanias' time. What is unusual and constitutes a further connection is that when other examples of this type of wall were sought, they were found elsewhere, namely, on Crete, Cerigo,[18] Milos, and in Smyrna; also in Asia Minor, in some Italian cities, and on Sardinia and in

Hegel refers to Neith in the philosophy of religion lectures, where he says that 'Athena [comes] out of Neith', meaning that the spiritual goddess Athena evolved out of the nature goddess Neith. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford, 2007), ii. 152, incl. n. 132.

16. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 1.2 (Lattimore, p. 4).

17. Pausanias, *Graeciae descripto*, 2.4, 5, 16 (*Description of Greece, Books I and II*, tr. W. H. S. Jones, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1918), 265–75, 327–33).

18. Cerigo is the Venetian name for the island of Kithira, south of the Peloponnese. We have corrected the German edn., which reads 'Enrigo'.

Spain. Thus citadels of this type were established centers of the oldest kind. They have been attributed to the Cyclops. More precise details and the relationship of the peoples to each other are of no interest for us.

Thus, these centers are the earliest to be found. Of the ancient cities and citadels, Thucydides remarks[19] that they were not situated on the sea due to insecurity along the coast from fear of pirates who stole livestock and abducted people, enslaving the latter. According to Thucydides, it was not until later that cities were relocated to the coast and especially to landing places; and it was even later that coastal regions became densely settled. The centers of culture in Greece are situated either along the coast or nearby but somewhat inland, differing markedly from other centers, such as those in
324 Egypt and India, which are centrally located in those countries | and without any connection to the sea. The second kind of [cultural] center, however, lay on the coast of Syria at water's edge, as in Phoenicia, for example. Just as with Carthage, the geography of these countries determined their orientation to the seacoast and offered them no possibility to extend inland. Even the Greek [states] of Asia Minor, such as Miletus, which sent out sixty to seventy colonies, still lay on the coast without expanding inland. The presence of well-established populations inland prevented them from doing so. In Greece itself, however, the populace was firmly established on the land. Farming is integral to Greek identity, which nonetheless retains a tie to the sea.

These centers thus are characterized by this particular geography. Another aspect of these centers is political, the rule of royal dynasties over the people. Here we find heroes who exercise control over the people, [ruling] families who are not separated from their subjects by caste differences. Nor is the relationship patriarchal; rather these heroes and sovereigns are of a particular, mostly foreign lineage. Nor are their subjects oppressed, as is seen with tyrants of a later time. Their relationship did not entail the need for a legal-juridical nexus; rather it was a quite loose, open, and personal relationship. It was the respected families who ruled. In one respect their class, birth, and also their bravery naturally set them apart. As leaders needing to provide order, they were accustomed to ruling; they were in
325 charge. The need for order | per se thus elevated them above others. However, another consideration played a part. These circumstances were not at all equivalent to those of the later monarchies.

Royal power was the prerogative of a family, but it also resulted from their personal qualities, for example, bravery, and an understanding of

19. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 1.7 (Lattimore, p. 6).

matters divine and human. Nestor showed such knowledge when, after the death of Achilles, he described the agitated sea as Achilles' mother, and he explained to the Greeks why the sea was restless, namely, because Thetis, Achilles' mother, was mourning her son's death.[20] Such an understanding belonged to the qualities possessed by royal families. This distinguishing feature, that kings are on the one hand honored because of their lineage, but on the other hand exercise and preserve royal power through their personal qualities, based mostly on personal strength, was befitting such circumstances.

The clearest depictions of those circumstances are found in the Homeric poems, concerning, for instance, the relationship of Agamemnon to the other kings, and the relationship of the latter to their people.[21] Agamemnon had primacy over all other kings. Without them, he undertakes nothing of importance. In camp, Agamemnon takes the counsel of his chieftains, each of whom brings his personality to bear. It is not a matter of simply voting; they express their opinions and the sovereign takes them into account, while it is he who decides which of their wishes is feasible. The people followed their chieftains into this war out of obedience, but also more or less out of trust and respect for them, just as the chieftains did with Agamemnon. They obeyed in complete confidence. If a leader is | dissatisfied with the sover- 326
eign over the kings, then he withdraws, as did Achilles, and with him his retinue and people. The people, the soldiers, do very little in this war; rather it is the chieftains who do the most. They themselves must fight the battles. The people are not simply driven along like an apathetic herd, such as a caste in India. Nor are they fighting for a cause of their own but only as companions of a mighty representative, as witnesses to the deeds and glory of their chieftains, magnifying both by their own strength. There is something quite unusual about conducting a war in this way. The leaders, the chieftains, are seen advancing on their chariots, the infantry following behind; no cavalry is in evidence. The infantry does very little, [leaving] the chieftains [to join battle]—just the opposite of our way of waging war. It is only if a leader falls that the people fight to retrieve his weapons and his corpse, so as to avoid the shame of losing their commander's body or armor.

20. Homer, *Odyssey* 24.51–5 (tr. E. V. Rieu, rev. edn. D. C. H. Rieu (London, 2003), 312). Nestor, ruler of Pylos, was the oldest of the Greek chieftains fighting at Troy. Thetis, Achilles' mother, was a divine sea nymph.

21. Homer, *Iliad*. On Agamemnon's primacy, see 1.281, 2.577; on Achilles' withdrawal, 1.149–72 (Rieu, pp. 11, 36, 8). Descriptions of the Greek army and battlefields are found throughout the *Iliad*.

Hence, the relationship is still rather loose; the people do not really consider the affairs of their chieftain to be their own, just as the entire war was not their affair. The Trojan War as a whole was solely an affair of the chieftains. The people simply followed trustingly, scarcely championing it with their own lives. There is no discord between leaders and followers, no mistrust or rebellion. The figures in Homer are timeless because they exist in and for themselves. In the Greek camp there is of course Thersites[22]—a timeless, perpetually recurring figure [of literature]—a vituperative person, who blames and reviles the kings; however, he is the only one in the camp who does so. He is slight, hunched, and, to the delight of the people, is
327 flogged by Odysseus | with the rod. He is a demagogic troublemaker, insistent, noisy, and beaten, but quickly calms down—a person whose defiance and buffoonery are soon over, who sheds tears and withdraws. This literary type appears as a single individual. Portraits of the other characters are comparably done.

In his homeland, Odysseus is surrounded by many people of stature. During his absence, as a young man Telemachus has little say in things; consequently, the suitors and chieftains manage the affairs in his royal house as they see fit.[23] Also Achilles, in the underworld, asks Odysseus how his elderly father Peleus is faring, who because of his age is probably no longer honored.[24] It is clearly not royal power that is honored. Hence, royal prerogative is not valued for its own sake.

What is more, Zeus has the same relation to the other gods as Agamemnon has to the chieftains. On Olympus the other gods wrangle with Zeus (Jupiter), but they have to resist extreme measures. Things must not come to a break in the bond that unifies them; and, in the face of Jupiter's threats and bluster, they again accede to his aims because he is, after all, the most powerful; all are subject to his sovereign power, and his will prevails. These circumstances are such that birth and lineage are one aspect, but nonetheless a figure must establish his own authority. The people benefited little from this royal dignity, and when popular consensus became the practice, then the king was of little import, somewhat superfluous. For court could be held by an experienced
328 member of the community; | the bravest and best general could command in battle; the cleverest and wisest could attend to human and divine matters during a sacrifice and during legislation. The development of [structured]

22. Homer, *Iliad* 2.212–77 (Rieu, pp. 27–8).

23. Descriptions of Odysseus' royal house, of his son Telemachus, of the suitors of his wife Penelope, etc., are found in the *Odyssey*, starting in book 1.

24. Homer, *Odyssey* 11.494–503 (Rieu, pp. 152–3).

social bonds had not yet taken place. Royal title and its perpetuation through hereditary succession was not yet necessary.

It is crucially important to recognize and to grasp this distinction and the conditions under which monarchy is absolutely necessary. Social conditions in early Greece were such that the royal title became superfluous of its own once it had fulfilled its purpose. It is remarkable that the kings were not driven out, but instead that the royal families stepped down without hatred and strife, without battle, simply dying out naturally or through mutual elimination. In part, they simply declined or sank back into the [common] people. The line of Cecrops existed for a long while in Athens. King Cleisthenes in Corinth died without male heirs, and his daughter moved to Athens with her treasure where she married a commoner. Thus, in contrast to Rome, the kings in Greece were not exiled but simply died out, and they were always esteemed and loved in memory.

History reports that numerous atrocities and crimes occurred within these royal dynasties, and that the main cause of their demise was internal unrest and atrocities, and dreadful palace revolutions. This upheaval is similar to the Old Franconian (*altfränkisch*) dynasties. Willful passion and caprice erupt, unrestrained and destructive. There is as yet no internalized | conscience, no 329
law, nor any church to fear; laws hold no sway over their minds. The people have no stake in such atrocities; they do not participate in these acts, they are not affected by them. The people represent the tragic chorus, and their reflections about fate are based on sentiment, although they allow the royal parties to settle things among themselves. We see that sentiment is involved, but not action. The people only watch passively; they appeal to the gods, but no power or authority exists to judge such [royal] individuals, neither externally in statutes nor internally in their conscience, in their minds. Hence, their passions play out destructively, but only for themselves, without bringing harm to the people. So the royal dynasties are superfluous to the social order, and they declined as a result of their own actions.

Once they had formed, the diversity of such centers is remarkable. This multitude of states had its [common] ground in expeditions that drew the peoples together on more than one occasion. In these circumstances no despotic power was present to unite them, as was the case in Asia. The individual as such is no longer without legal standing, without rights, and should no longer disappear into the collective whole. Nor is that other principle of purpose yet present: there is no abstract aim, no principle of universality, to which individuals could be subordinated. As the Greeks evolve, we see them united just once, under Agamemnon, and here the youth Achilles is the foremost figure. However, by his reputation and

power in particular, as Thucydides reports, by his predominance, Agamemnon prevailed upon the chieftains and peoples to go to sea, to war.[25] But this is a chance alliance based on personality. The Acarnanians did not partici-
330 pate in the war against Troy, | and later, even against the Persians, the Greeks were by no means unified. Only during their decline, as the states disintegrated, did the second youth, Alexander the Macedonian, who was at once Greek and non-Greek, reunite them, unifying all of Greece. Greek unification during the Trojan War, however, was of no political consequence; it had no consequences for the whole, for the political existence of Greece. It remained ephemeral with regard to the actuality. The poet [Homer], however, for the sake of popular representation, presented this unity as the image of the Greek spirit and greater virtue; and it has always remained so in the eyes of the people.

The association of the Amphictyony[26] can serve as an example. Its union, however, remained rather weak and endured neither in actuality nor in imagination. Stronger bonds resulted from the oracles and national games and festivals. What was politically unifying was the notion that the formation of a Greek state was something sacred and revered. The individual state was not protected by federative arrangements. An actual unification by means of treaty never occurred, but unity did remain an honored and sacred notion that was of help to such a people. Even so the Lacedaemonians perpetrated the unholy deed of subjugating and enslaving a free people, the Messenians. It was not until centuries later that Epaminondas righted this heinous wrong. Just as disastrous was the execution of the citizens of Plataea after its conquest in the first Peloponnesian War, when all the
331 inhabitants without exception were killed.[27] |

Greek Culture and Art[28]

One aspect in which the Greeks must be considered as one, as a single world-historical people, is that of their culture. By means of this culture the

25. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 1.9 (Lattimore, p. 7).

26. The Great Amphictyony was a league of twelve Greek tribes, which met in the spring at the temple of Demeter at Anthela and in the autumn at Delphi. Concerned at first with religious matters, it gradually assumed a political role.

27. Lacedaemon or Laconia was a region in the south-eastern Peloponnesus with its capital at Sparta. The Messenians were their neighbors to the west. The attack on and siege of Plataea is described in Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 2.2–7, 71–8 (Lattimore, pp. 74–8, 110–14).

28. See Hegel's extensive discussion of Greek art in his *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, tr. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1975), i. 427–501.

Hellenes became a world-historical people and distinguished themselves from other peoples, whom they called 'barbarians'. Of interest are solely those Greeks who exhibit Greek culture. Each of us feels at home, and takes pleasure, in the realm of Greek culture, art, and science. Enjoyment of the beautiful is something ever-present that can educate us and that we must each acquire for ourselves. It is here, with Greek culture, that there begins the conscious connection of the chain of cultural tradition.

We come from the Romans, who were educated by the Greeks. At the same time, what we have received remains foreign to us, and, in the course of adopting it, we create something new. This is essentially the case with the culture of all peoples. Greek culture also has a cultural precursor. On the basis of such precursors a people educates itself and its educators, reworking in equal measure what has been received.

In regard to Greek culture two positions can be taken, namely whether the art and science of the Greeks originated from external sources or from within themselves. Historically, it wholly appears that the Greeks produced their culture and all its subsequent stages completely from within. We observe a consistent sequence without a break, a continuous succession of cultural stages with no necessity of drawing from external sources. Moreover, what is authentically and specifically Greek is not found anywhere else, only in | Greece. But it is likewise a matter of history that the Greeks started 332
with foreign material, and they did so necessarily. Mechanical and intellectual progress could remain in the form that it was received, and technical knowledge as well, such as stone cutting, geometry, and mathematics. Matters lacking in spirit are received just as they are passed down. Roman law, were it still valid today, would also be something lacking in spirit. What is spiritual, however, develops further within itself; it passes through independent stages. So Greek culture too has its precursors. Having a precursor, one of foreign origin, is just as necessary as is a reworking that passes through its own independent stages.

A closer look at Greek culture would reveal the concept of the exceptional or of excellence (*das Ausgezeichnete*) as its focus, primarily in the fine arts. The Greeks did not acquire their art through conquest, either actively like the Romans or passively like the Gauls. We Germans have also acquired [art] in the latter manner, partly through being conquered, but we have also expressly learned it. The Greeks were neither conquered nor conquerors. We see them preserving the memory of the first stages of their civilization, of their earliest culture, and all stages remain sacred to them. They honored the beginnings as gifts of the gods, and possessing them [the gifts] from all these myths, they celebrated this point and acknowledged it with respect to laws,

marriage, agriculture. Thus, they celebrated the introduction of agriculture and of marriage, both historically and as myth. They also reverently attribute fire to Prometheus; the horse was given to them by Neptune, the olive tree by Pallas [Athena]. Evil too is preserved in a myth, the myth of Pandora. Such beginnings are in part ascribed to a foreign origin, but always one that
333 is honored. |

The historical context as a whole points to the fact that the Greeks acquired many of their arts and many cultic elements—technical and other matters—from beyond the sea. Eastern Greece also is the most developed part; the western part—Acarnania, Aetolia, and Epirus—played only a minor role in the culture. The western peoples had been and remained uncultured and savage. Even in the Roman era the Aetolian League was more an association of thieves or the lawless than one of the law-abiding. And the uncultured Albanians are to be found there even to the present day. The Peloponnesus lies in between [the western peoples and eastern Greece]; Arcadia likewise kept to itself, and the western part, Elis, became sacred territory. The abstract element of Greek culture is to be found with the Eleans, where the [Olympic] games and sacrifices were established, and they remained focused on them. Thus culture took root predominantly in the east.

A further aspect of Greek culture is the peaceful condition that was established on land (partly by the kings, partly by the heroes, e.g. Hercules) through arrangement in communities. Aggressive and hostile actions, especially robbery at sea and on land, remained a challenge. According to Thucydides,[29] peace at sea was established by Minos, while peace on land was not achieved until later; the Locrians, for example, continued to raid for a long time. On land, however, [population] centers and individual heroes countered this plundering.

A major element of enmity between uncivilized peoples, that of hostility between tribes, is not found in Greece. Vengeful tribal warfare did not exist with the Greeks because their associative ties were not based on family status. We see wars of conquest only later after stable states had been established. Wars of revenge had no place there because the Greeks did not
334 originate from tribes but from the mixture [of tribes and peoples]. |

Most of these associations had absorbed very diverse elements, and the second condition [of Greek culture] is the internal diversity of the associations. Thus there was no patriarchal family structure that might have spared individuals from needing to prove themselves; for in the patriarchal

29. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 1.4 (Lattimore, p. 5).

condition a person carries weight based on family, and each individual is of a particular standing, has recognition, because of his family, and precisely for that reason carries weight not on his own account, but only in and through the family. Such a [patriarchal] structure was not found in Greece, and in this respect Greece has similarities with North America. Just as, near [to Greece], the great land mass of Asia underwent the dispersal, contact, and intermixing [of peoples], something comparable took place in North America, where intermingling and settlement coincided, over and over again. The more complete segregation of tribes only occurred in the west of Greece, where peoples became more permanently settled. However, in these circumstances and spheres individuals worked their way to the fore, and the association thereby became something essential, valued, and highly esteemed, something into which individuals had to enter and to which they had to conform because it did not come from the family. In this association the singular appeared as something individual and self-sufficient.

In addition to these elements, numerous intellectual stimuli came from foreign sources. Imagination (*Vorstellung*) was aroused from the East, from Egypt and Asia Minor, and from Crete. Similarly, the fortunes of the nomadic tribes, their own early wanderings, provided an abundance of natural and intellectual ferment, which, under the conditions of a tranquil common life and inner peace, could be revived and fashioned into cultural forms. So, in distinction from the barbarians, the Athenians for the first time refrained from the bearing of arms in peace, | thereby manifesting the 335
earliest culture. They were among the earliest, and later the most cultured, of peoples. They were [as a people] the most composed and established. Federations from early times formed the basis for peace with others and remained of such importance that wars were fought only in a limited fashion.

Under these peaceful conditions we now see the emergence of the boundless drive of individuals—the drive to display and give evidence of oneself, to let it be seen what one has made of oneself and can make of oneself, and in this way to achieve status with others and to take pleasure in this status. Sensual pleasure did not form the basis of Greek life or peace, nor did superstition, dependence, apathy. The barbarians also wanted to display themselves, but go no further than preening and self-adornment. With other barbarians we see this as the drive to be seen and adorned. Adornment is meant to make the body pleasing, thereby enhancing its beauty; the trappings are not intended to represent something for its own sake but are only meant for others, to serve a different purpose. The Greek people are too individualistic, and we see them to be too strongly spirited, to be captive to

outer adornment, to be able to be content with that. From an early time they were marked by their self-awareness, by their self-respect. Individuals had first to prove themselves, to show others what they are on their own account, and to see to it that this was acknowledged. This appears quite early with the Greeks in the form of peaceful competition; hence we do not see them enslaved to superstition or to vanity (the latter can become a factor later
336 on). For in the beginning what is substantial must first be brought forth. |

The drive to manifest this joyful self-awareness, to show themselves in contrast to savage self-awareness, to the merely sensuous, constitutes the major characteristic of the Greeks, and with them this drive progressed into fine art (*schöne Kunst*).[30] Fine art begins with a satisfaction that is not a remedy for a need but an articulation of what resides in unspoiled human nature. The origins of Greek art are subjective. Art arises from the element of a labor that is free of need and consists in the fact that individuals make themselves into something, that they comply with something other and thus exhibit it, that the character of universality, of universal validity, is imprinted upon it. The first and subjective beginning of art consists in the Greeks making something of their own bodies, giving them free versatility. It consisted in the development of the body, in the shaping of the body into a work of art. We recognize this to be the oldest form.

In Homer we see no art works; for him the Palladium in Troy is not a piece of sculpture.[31] We find no minstrels in the Greek camps yet (these first appear among the Phaeacians) but rather costly garments and attire. Likewise the weapons of the heroes are ornaments. The shield of Achilles is noteworthy and significant in this regard as a decorated weapon; but it is evident that it is not yet a free-standing work of art, not an art work that is said to count explicitly as such.[32] This shield is of significance as portraying the cycle of life in ancient Greece. Mars and Minerva are, to be sure, executed on it in gold; but the main point is that the Greeks, before they created such shapes and beautiful images, first developed their own bodies

30. The German term for 'fine art' means literally 'beautiful art', which fits Hegel's interpretation of Greek culture perfectly: its art highlights the beauty of human and natural shapes, and its religion is one of beauty (the harmony of the sensible and the spiritual) rather than of truth (spiritual truth). See the following discussion.

31. The Palladium was a legendary statue (an image of Pallas) on the preservation of which the safety of Troy (Ilium) was supposed to depend. It was stolen by Diomedes and Odysseus, thus enabling the Greeks finally to capture the city. So for Homer, claims Hegel, it was an object of political, not artistic significance. However, the reference to the Palladium is found in Virgil, *The Aeneid* 2.166 (tr. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1916), i. 327).

32. Achilles' shield is described in detail in Homer, *Iliad* 18.468–617 (Rieu, pp. 332–6).

and themselves into beautiful shapes, into works of art. So we see games at an early date, for example, at the tomb of Patroclus.[33] Hence the games are ancient: wrestling, throwing the javelin and discus. Song and dance are tied to these activities, dance being the dominant form and song the subordinate; they are the outward expression of an unrefined gaiety. | Such dances are 337
mentioned as being depicted on the shield of Achilles; they are art works in their own right. Just as with the dance shown on the shield of Daedalus, the sole purpose of this dance is zest for life; it has no connection whatsoever to a sacred festival. Both exist for the sake of display, to allow admiration of form and skill. Song later became an independent form; it was given instrumental accompaniment and thus called for a content drawn from representation. And just as the image of representation becomes free on its own account in song, so the representation itself becomes something that likewise ought to be shown. In this way the representation as such becomes outwardly a pleasing, autonomous shape, just as humans in the first instance displayed themselves in their beautiful [bodily] dexterity.

Song as such is an immediate self-expression of the cheerful, individual subject. This organ, the voice, is not merely a sensible articulation, not merely an immediate manifesting of an existence; it is also a manifesting of representation. The content that properly belongs to representation and proceeds from it can be characterized in such a way that it is said to contain the essential. What exists has passed through spirit and is formed by it. This content, formed by spirit, can be highly diverse in nature; but, to the extent that it is formed by spirit, it is sensible content that is elevated to universality, and it captures sensible, immediate existence as something universal. This universal feature becomes religious content and is to be understood in its highest sense.

Greek Religion[34]

Religious content is the principal content of spirit, something brought forth from spirit within itself; and the question is what the nature of this religious content is for the Greeks, how what is essential must appear to them. | 338
With the Greeks we see that this essentiality became something that is not exterior and natural but interior and human, formed first of all as a [human] shape and as its beauty, so that in it human beings comprehend themselves as

33. See Homer, *Iliad* 23.257 ff. (Rieu, pp. 402 ff.).

34. See Hegel's treatment of Greek religion in the 1821 philosophy of religion lectures (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 122–34, 141–52, 160–89).

free. Human beings esteemed themselves, and what is esteemed is the primary content, their gesture, shape, expression, deeds and actions: the elaborated human being. If we proceed in this fashion from the subjective side, we see how highly human self-consciousness situates itself. We discover that this was necessary. Human self-consciousness had to grasp this [exaltation] as being essential. God is for human beings their own essence. Humans conceive God to be in a positive relationship to them, as their 'other' to immediate contingency and finitude, as their essence and substantiality. Thus the true (*das Wahrhafte*) is in one aspect 'other' to human beings and yet, as what is true for them, it is their own truth and thus their own inner being. However, this true itself, this essentiality, is for the Greeks the beautiful (*das Schöne*)—spirit in its sensible manifestation. So sensibility is sheerly the appearance of the spiritual when sensibility is divested of its finitude, contingency, exteriority. The beautiful for the Greeks consists in this unity of sensibility with spirituality in and for itself; free beauty [is what constitutes] the divine. The Greeks occupy the standpoint of knowing themselves to be free. Knowing themselves to be free is their determinate characteristic. The characteristic of free individuality constitutes their fundamental principle. This principle of being free, the principle of thinking, has not yet itself been
339 explicitly conceptualized; | it has not yet been thought, emphasized, and acknowledged; rather this knowing-oneself-to-be-free is still united with the natural sphere.

Actuality, broadly construed, comprises both *concept* and *reality*. With the Greeks, however, the freedom of spirit is not yet itself the subject matter but is still associated with the human-natural form. The latter is the externalizing of self (*das Sich-äußerlich-Machen*). It is possible to determine what forms the basis of the Greek intuition of the universal when we consider two aspects: first, the question why the Greeks do not yet worship the absolute in spirit and in truth, or why spirit does not yet appear to spirit in the spirit; second, the fact that the God of the Greeks does not at the same time appear to them in the flesh, although they had what-subsists-in-and-for-itself, the divine, in unity with the human—they had it in human shape.

[1. The Aspect of the *Reality* of the Idea or of the Divine.] The first aspect, then, is that spirit, God, has not yet appeared for the Greeks in pure thought, not yet as the invisible, the spiritual, the nonsensuous; for the Greeks are the closest principle to the Orientals, whose basic intuition is that of the substantial unity of spirit and nature. The Greeks are sublime in their intuition of this unity. They themselves reduced this substantial unity, the unity of substance and nature, to the aspect of the *reality of the idea*, to the status of ideality, and the other to it is the subjective or the individual aspect.

The principle of subjectivity, of individual spirituality, emerges; but this subjectivity is as yet only emergent, and it has two aspects: one is the soul-function (*das Seelenhafte*),[35] the other the natural aspect. First of all, the soul-function is imagined as belonging to the natural aspect; but it is also [something] on its own account, and emerges over against that natural image, which appears | as life. In this appearance, the soul-function and 340
the natural aspect are in immediate unity; this aspect is of itself the Oriental [intuition]. Now, [in the Greek intuition], the subjective element [still] has this aspect but only as a mode of existence. Thus the spiritual is encountered twice: as subjective being-for-self and in unity with the natural. The animal likewise has a soul, paralleling the human being; the soul constitutes the life-force (*Lebendigkeit*) of the human being too. However, in the case of the human being this soul-function is opposed on its own account to the merely naturally imagined soul-function. The human being is a living being with a soul; however, this soul exists for itself in yet a second way and is distinct from the soul that is submerged in naturalness. It is in this fashion that the Greek [intuition] contrasts with the Oriental. For the Greeks, the Oriental intuition is merely that of reality. The immanence of the spiritual and natural is for the Greeks found only in the aspect of reality, and the spiritual opposes itself to what is merely submerged in materiality, to what is merely immanent to the natural. This is the first stage of elevation above a mere soul-function.

But in this way spirit is not yet one with itself in thought. 'Spirit thinks itself'; 'God is revered in spirit as what is nonsensuous': this simply means that God is posited in the element of thought, and simply for thought. God has a mode of appearance in thought too; God appears for an other; but this aspect of appearance is the thought itself.

The aspect [we have been discussing] is that of reality. The free was indeed one aspect for the Greeks, but the place where this freedom appears is a spirituality that is still immanent, submerged in materiality. Here, therefore, | God cannot yet be revered in spirit. Spirit is not yet the knowing of 341
spirit. Its reality in this aspect is natural appearance. In terms of this aspect we must say that the Greek principle has not yet developed and risen into a world of thought; the object of its reflective, individual principle is rather the substantial unity of the spiritual and the physical. The higher, nonsensuous world does not yet stand above the sensuous world.

35. With its suffix *-hafte*, this term seems to refer to the soul as still attached to or in contact with nature, but at the same time as emerging from it. We have translated it loosely as 'soul-function'.

[2. The Aspect of the *Concept* of the Idea or of Spirit or of the Divine.] The other aspect is that the Greeks possessed the spiritual in individual form and elevated spirit to subjectivity, so that the subject was the essential aspect, and the natural as such was reduced to the aspect of appearance. This natural form serves as the expression of the appearance of subjective spirit, and so this natural can only be the humanly natural, can only have human shape; for only the latter can be a spiritual expression; only in the latter can spirit appear as such. But inasmuch as the Greeks portrayed essential being [*Wesen*] as human, we can ask why God does not appear to them as human, why God does not appear in the flesh, in actual existence, and why they fashion God for themselves only in marble or in fanciful images. This characteristic is connected with the fact that human beings only counted and only would have their worth insofar as they made themselves to be the appearance of the beautiful, only to the extent that they have displayed and elaborated themselves in a beautiful form.

Thus the divine itself has been brought forth by the subject, and the
342 contingency of the singular has been made subordinate to it. | It was only the Greeks who developed themselves in this way; all the others were barbarians, and even among the Greeks there were true Greeks and there were slaves. Being born a Greek did not suffice to make one a Greek, and it is an essential quality of spirit to make oneself into what spirit is.

That spirit is what it makes of itself is only one aspect; the other is that spirit is essentially and intrinsically what is originally free. This is the *concept* of spirit that the Greeks did not yet grasp because they were not yet engaged in thinking. They did not yet grasp spirit as the in-itself (*An-sich*)—in accord with its universality, its concept—but only in terms of how it is engendered in individuality. They did not yet have the view that the human being is created in the image of God and is intrinsically free. For this reason they could not yet have the conception, the Christian idea, of the unity of divine and human nature. For they did not yet regard human nature as such, humanity in its concept, to be capable of receiving the divine, but only those human beings who have elaborated, produced, spiritualized, and idealized themselves. The spirit that has produced and built within itself its own inner world is the only spirit that can recognize existing liberation and the divine nature in what is singular; only it can convey the fact that the natural has envisaged the spiritual directly within itself. Only the spirit that has matured inwardly as a totality no longer needs to image the natural in spiritual form. When thought is free on its own account, it *thinks* the external; and, by thinking it, it can leave this externality in its immediacy,
343 in its immediate existence, just as it is. | If it [externality] is not yet thought

but rather intuited in the connection [with the spiritual, as with the Greeks], it cannot be grasped in its immediacy. If the divine is supposed to be represented and thought, it must be assimilated and adapted in order to express the spiritual. If, however, thought is free for itself and reflective (as in the Christian religion), then there is no need for it to give form to the natural; rather, thought allows the sensible to remain what it is, namely, a *this* (*Dieses*), and it grasps the divine in this *this*. The totality of the idea requires that the idea should have consummated both aspects, thought on the one side and the sensible on the other, so that it should ramify itself into singularization. Only this infinite antithesis attains the profundity of the idea, which has the strength to hold the antithesis together in its profundity. Here for the first time is the profound idea, which contains within itself the infinite antithesis.[36]

One can indeed reproach the Greek religion for being anthropomorphic; but its defect, its liability, is that it is not anthropomorphic enough; it did not know God in immediate existence. The Greeks have heroes, to be sure, but with Homer they are not yet revered as divine. This came later and with a different significance (e.g., the emperor for the Romans). Thus the anthropomorphism of the Greeks did not yet go far enough. Schiller has written an important poem, 'The Gods of Greece', which shows that the author was profoundly moved by the sublime (*Höchsten*), but that his idea is in part quite wrong. For the opposition | that he draws between the Christian and 344
Greek religions is false when he avers: 'As the gods were more human, . . .'.[37] The Christian God is much more thoroughly human. But this can be addressed only speculatively.

The next thing to note is that polytheism is directly implicated in the Greek mode of religious intuition. However, the being-one (*Eines-Sein*) of God is directly bound up with the incarnation of God. We can indeed say, 'God appears in nature and in the human race', although in saying that we stop short with God's externalization or divestment (*Entäußerung*), with the outward appearance, since in nature God does not appear as God. For,

36. The idea (*Idee*) on Hegel's view is the unity of the concept and objectivity, or thought and sensibility. The unity appears in the singular or the individual (*Vereinzelne*), which has the quality of spirit. Only the profound idea (*tiefe Idee*) has the strength to hold together the antithesis between thought and reality, the mental and the physical. See *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, §§ 213–44 (*The Encyclopaedia Logic*, tr. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis, 1991), 286–307). On the *this*, see below, pp. 396–7.

37. Friedrich Schiller, 'Die Götter Griechenlandes', ll. 191–2: 'Since the gods were more human, humans were more divine' (*Da die Götter menschlicher noch waren, waren Menschen göttlicher*) (*Werke: Nationalausgabe*, ed. Julius Petersen and Gerhard Fricke (Weimar, 1943), i. 195).

appearing as spirit, God has sublated the externalization or divestment, and the latter is expressed as the Son and as *one* Son.[38] In the Greek religion, which is still in the state of externalization, there must be many gods; that is how the divine appears for the Greeks.

With this portrayal we have started out from the subjective side, from the human in its subjective aspect. The other side is that of nature. The divinity of the Greeks is humanity idealized into beauty. Just as the sensuous human being is idealized and exalted in its outer aspect, so also must it be in its inner, spiritual aspect, to which belong knowledge, justice, truth, goodness. When these attributes are exalted to their essential form, we refer to them as the highest good, etc.; but this is only a quantitative exaltation and distinction. The true exaltation would be the sublation of humanity's finitude.
345 The exalted spirit is the spirit | that at the same time has power over nature, as what initially appears as other to it. The spirit that is essential and nonfinite is precisely the spirit that has sublated the antithesis to nature and that therefore is itself a natural power.

In modern times it is customary to say that Helios is the god of the sun, Rhea the goddess of earth, etc. The Greeks did not have such a notion, namely that the sun and a god are the same thing; rather they understood the sun in its essential nature to be divine. Poseidon is not the god of the sea; rather the god is the sea itself, the sea as god. If we speak of 'a God transcending nature', this already establishes a wholly different relationship than that found in the Greek gods. The Greek gods are not merely natural powers but essentially are spiritual individuality, which for the Greeks is what is essential and supreme, but is not yet established as free individuality. Spirit is not yet comprehended in spirit. The Greeks are free individualities, but free individuality in its substantiality. The spiritual is not yet its object. This free individuality is the free spirit. The Greeks, therefore, *are* free, but just for this reason they still exist within the condition of naturalness. With the Greek gods, naturalness, the power of nature, is no longer the foundation, and this constitutes the difference from the Orientals. We shall now consider the difference between the two.

Spiritual subjectivity is the principal matter with the Greeks. To be sure, natural power is maintained as a natural divinity, but it functions in this way only as the beginning, the starting point that is sublated in spiritual progress, in the broad destiny of spirit. Thus the Greeks have Cronus and Selene, etc. But
346 they are of a wholly different race than that of Zeus; they are | the Titans.[39]

38. Cf. Philippians 2: 6–7. God, in Christ, 'did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness'.

39. The Titans were nature deities that were overthrown by the Olympian gods.

This distinction between the old and the new gods is an essential element in the conception of Greek intuition—it is essential that the Greeks distinguished these gods from the new gods who ruled with Zeus. The Titans dwelled outside the limpid earth; they were in part overthrown and in part excluded from spirit that is becoming conscious of itself. They still hold sway but have above them a mighty ruling race [of gods]. So in part they are preserved as nature gods, but in part the resonance of the natural powers is preserved in the more recent gods—preserved only as a resonance, as an element. Thus Apollo is the knowing God, and this has the resonance of being the god of light. Poseidon is partly this but also partly the resonance of the nature god Oceanus, and still echoes elemental natural powers. There is much controversy over whether Apollo is the sun god, etc. But the succession in the races of gods is to be understood in this way.

Such a distinction is also found among the Egyptians. The Egyptians have three races of gods. Isis and Osiris belong to the third creation, the third race, the third class, which approached closer to spirit; thus they have also the most abundant qualities, since the earlier gods were only aspects of nature. We note in this regard that the Greeks are oriented to the Oriental mode in having nature as the foundation. [Their view of] nature as foundation comes to them from the Orient in such a way that springs, trees, waves, rivers are also represented in the form of divinities. They have maintained this in Helios, in the mountain nymphs, the river gods, etc. The Greeks, it is said, have animated and ensouled the whole of nature in a genial way. But such animation has an Oriental character. In the river god the merely natural acquires the | significance of divinity. Here, however, it is simply the merely 347
natural, this spring, the divinity. This fantasy of the Greeks is surely more beautiful and pleasing than that of the Orientals; and this comes precisely from their clinging to and revering the human as the form in which divinity reveals itself, because it alone is capable of being the sensible manifestation of the spiritual. Revering the finite in human form, they have humanized the configurations of knowledge, etc.; they have not, like the Orientals, distorted them. They have remained free of the Oriental absurdities. The shape of the absurd is precisely what diverges from the human. The Greeks, having on the one hand the Oriental outlook, merely added to it and, by transforming it, founded a higher order of the gods.

Historically speaking, there are two schools of thought, two dominant views: that the Greeks took their gods from Asia and Egypt, and that the Greeks let them emerge from within themselves in Greece. Herodotus himself expresses this double view: he avers that Homer and Hesiod gave Greece its gods, but then he says that they, after consulting the oracle at Dodona

(Janinna), got the names and the gods themselves from Egypt.[40] At Dodona they asked whether these newly acquired gods should be accepted. The modern controversies draw upon these viewpoints. We have already indicated how they are to be reconciled. The Greeks adopted culture as well as heterogeneous elements from what remained standing in the sphere of nature; however, their labor, their cultural work, is the transformation of this alien
348 element. Thus they adopted the Asian principle. | The Asian principle lived in them, but they did not leave it as they received it; they exalted it as well.

To the alien and ancient elements that the Greeks adopted belong in particular the Greek mysteries, the distinctive mode of worship that has engaged curiosity over the centuries and elicited much controversy even to the present day. Their standpoint follows directly from these circumstances. They were an ancient form of worship (something that is expressly stated), deriving in part from foreign sources. Regarding their content, the historical material itself points to the fact that these mysteries contained traits of an ancient nature religion; and it is necessarily the case that they contained this and nothing more.

The image people associated with the mysteries is that what in them is ancient, and in which the spirit of the people no longer lives, delves into something obscure and venerable that is the beginning or source of what follows from it, so that later versions can be interpreted and understood from such ancient elements. When what develops and is novel has become valid and sacrosanct, and is something sprung from the earlier condition (as, for instance, in political constitutions), then the ancient elements, although revered as the source, are nevertheless at variance with the new arrangement. It is, as it were, dangerous and forbidden to know the ancient source as something that readies the downfall of the new—because one would know what the truth of things is; because one would accept that, in knowing the old,
349 one knows what justifies the new; | and because this new element then appears to be something without justification. This is the natural connection between what comes earlier and what follows, and it seems that if one is to know the new one must turn to the old. The mysteries had this relationship to folk religion; a customary part of it is the representation, the belief, that this mysterious and earlier source is much wiser because it facilitates knowledge of what is new. So it was partially right to regard old and musty parchments to

40. Herodotus, *History* 2.52–7 (Grene, pp. 154–6). In 2.53, he suggests that the second view is what the priestesses at Dodona say, but he inclines to the first view (that Homer and Hesiod created for the Greeks their gods). Janinna, also Yanina, are later names for the ancient site of Dodona.

be the genuine basis for justifications, the proper source of information about the present. These are kept secret because the old source differs from what follows, and subsequent validity could therefore be endangered if it were revealed to people what is present in the new. The relationship of the mysteries to the folk religion is represented in the same way.

The mysteries contained essential traits and cultic depictions from the old nature religion; but the newer religion was genuinely spiritual, and so [for the Greeks] the folk religion had an advantage over the old and more abstract religion. But it is the same for our understanding. For example, we call for an explanation of the Greek gods, and we take as an explanation the abstract natural element from which it [such a god] emerged; we say, for example, that Poseidon is the sea. But in fact the sea is something inferior to Poseidon. Such a natural element was only the beginning and in the mysteries there was no greater wisdom; the mysteries were not simply a secret. *Mysterium* does not at all mean a 'secret' (*Geheimnis*); for the meaning of *mysterium* is the speculative, | which to the understanding is in any event a 350
secret.[41] In Athens everyone but Socrates was initiated into the mysteries of Eleusis. He did not take part in them because he wanted to reserve a free hand; when he established something by means of thought, he did not want to be responsible for divulging Eleusinian secrets. In his history of Egypt Herodotus often said that he could not reveal what the priests told him.[42] He heard there about the foundations, the abstract beginnings, of the Greek gods. This is, then, the relationship of the old gods to the new ones. Greek mythology itself contains this transition; the battle of the gods is famous. Zeus and his siblings are a new and later race. From this it is clear that the Greek gods too are an emergent phenomenon. The resonance of the natural beginning is there; but it is only the gods that come from thought that are eternal, and with these gods there can no longer be a theogony. These are the basic features.

When we have beheld the nature of the Greek gods in this fashion, we see in them spirit in its freedom. Spirit is no longer immersed in nature (even though people now regard this unity [with nature] as the most excellent feature). Spirit is no longer subject to superstition. If spirit is still within this natural unity, it is bound and subjected within its other, in superstition. (But

41. Hegel attributes the linkage between mystery and speculation to the Neoplatonic philosophers, and to Proclus in particular. See *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, i. 382, iii. 28; and *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Oxford, 2006, 2009), ii. 345. A mystery is a disclosure of a more profound truth or a higher rationality, inaccessible to the understanding.

42. Herodotus, *History* 2.3 (Grene, p. 132).

Greek religion is [essentially] devoid of superstition.) While detaching itself from nature, Greek religion still has an aspect where superstition rules; this is because the infinite breach on the part of the subjectivity of human beings
351 within themselves has not yet happened; the infinite antithesis | is not yet present; the antithesis of good and evil does not yet exist, the [antithesis] disrupting that beautiful cheerfulness of the Greeks—the infinite break of human subjectivity within itself and consequently the infinite antithesis of the 'this' to the universal. And in this respect Greek religion is therefore still superstitious, as is shown by the oracles. It is said that the antithesis of the individual as a *this* (*Dieser*) to the universal is not yet present to thought and thus is not yet resolved. But the characteristic of infinite subjectivity is in fact already present in actuality because every individual is a *this*. But the character of the *this* is not yet religiously comprehended, has not yet been taken up into religion, and so the antithesis is not yet reconciled and subjectivity is still bound. Thus superstition still is a factor here.

The Christian is confident that his particular destiny and welfare, temporal and eternal, is an object of God's care. His life journey turns out for the best. In his particular circumstances and with his particular aims, in these matters, in prayer to God, the Christian is God's object and aim, and is absolutely justified. *This* person, each and every person, should be redeemed and eternally blessed. The Greeks did not and could not arrive at this view; for it is only in the Christian religion that God has become a *this* and has taken the character of the *this* into the character of the divine concept.[43]

We see that the Greeks consulted the oracles about particular concerns. Earlier oracles were found in a number of locations in Greece; there were
352 other places besides Delphi and Dodona. | Natural phenomena were included under the general category of oracles. They were not consulted about ethical or legal issues but only about particular matters. Because we are comparing the attitude of the Christian religion [with that of the Greeks], we indicated that we found the God of Christians to be defined as a *this*, as an actual human being, as being *this* God. In determining the nature of the Christian God to be *this* God, who has a Son who is an actual human being, the category of 'this' is established. The familiar trust of Christians in God resides in the fact that God has experienced the feelings of human suffering

43. In the 1821 philosophy of religion lectures Hegel especially emphasizes that God is definitively present in a *this*, that is, in a single and unique individual who is distinguished from all others. In Christianity there is only *one* incarnation as contrasted with many in the Hindu and Greek religions. In this way, on Hegel's view, the individual human being is sanctified (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 110–15). See also above, n. 36, and below, Hegel's discussion of medieval Christianity, pp. 489–94.

and therefore particular concerns stand under the care of God. With this conception, this confidence, individual human beings can decide and resolve things themselves. It might be assumed that decision on the part of human beings, deciding for oneself, is superfluous here, since God will make things right. But this can be said only by empty and idle talk that does not assume that action must be taken. But since action is assumed, the only question concerns whence comes the determination of the action. But the indolent do not make this assumption of action. Thus the question is: Does the subject derive the determination from itself or from something external? Since infinite subjectivity (the 'I will'), since the determination of *this* willing, is not yet developed in God, is not yet taken up into this idea of God, then abstract willing and abstract deciding, this 'I will' of the subject, still has no proper standing. The subject has not yet been able to derive from itself the characteristic of willing as a 'this'. Humans have not yet grasped this power of decision as their own; and if their own being was the decisive thing, that would have no justification. Insofar as they have it, it is more in the form of an arbitrary will (*Willkür*), a sacrilegious presumption. For human beings are absolutely justified only insofar as nature knows the *this* in the divine nature. Thus the Greeks have | not yet taken their own counsel about 353
decisions affecting their particular concerns, but must rather obtain the decision from an external source. This explains why it appears that this infinitely free and gifted people has nonetheless found a place for superstition.

In the *this* Christians recognize the divine nature, and they trust in God that God might shape the circumstances of the *this* to the purpose of God's providence (*Vorsorge*). This is a very important consideration because the Greeks place their superstitious trust in the oracle. When someone, for example the nobleman Pausanias prior to the Battle of Plataea, frets over [the entrails of] sacrificial animals,[44] it is essential to ask how this is congruent with the free Greek spirit. This apparently bizarre circumstance is connected with the Greek conception of spirit, and talk about priestly legerdemain, etc., is superficial chatter. Circumstances such as this reveal the difference between the Greek and the Christian religions.

Closely connected with the oracles is another Greek view, that of fate. It is said that the Greeks did not yet inwardly grasp the absolute principle of deciding for oneself about particular affairs or events. They had [not] yet

44. See Herodotus, *History* 9.61–3 (Grene, pp. 639–40). Pausanias, king of Sparta, led the Greek forces against those of the Persian general Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea (479 BC). Prior to the battle, both sides resorted to omens to foresee the outcome.

established this ultimate determination in itself. This is connected with the fact that the principle that determines the particular they grasped in objective form: the Greeks were still perplexed about the particularity of events. The category of providence, or faith, for Christians stands opposed to what we call fate for the Greeks. In other respects, however, for Christians as well as for Greeks the connection of particularities to the universal is something incomprehensible and misunderstood. Destiny unfolds on a soil that must be
354 called contingent in respect to particular purposes; | for it is a question of particularities that are not justified *vis-à-vis* what exists in and for itself and on its own. The particularities of circumstances, the life-journey of the individual, are incomprehensible for Greeks and Christians; but Christians have the view that all these particularities serve for the best, that God guides all these contingencies and leads them to the best outcome. Thus they assume that God's object is what is best for them. The Greeks lacked this view just because what is particular, the end of individuals, was not taken up into God. They accepted individual events as they happened and where they found them, but they did not have the conception that what is best for them would be a final end, that as a 'this' they would be an end. So they were just left with the thought that 'that's how it is'. They remained with the mere fact of being. 'I am such that I am an end' could not have entered their thinking. It only remained for them to think, 'That's how it is, and humans must submit to it'. This was their ultimate [recourse].

At the same time we must say that no superstition is present in this fate, in the reiteration of 'That's how it is', in this representation of things, as there is in the view of the oracles, where the human being is unfree. But, in the representation of fate, freedom is still only formal freedom, for if humans accept what is and let things fall as they may, then no discord occurs between them and things as they are, between what they want and what is. Human beings are only dissatisfied when external reality does not correspond to their aims and differs from their desires. But when persons do not regard themselves to be justified in a particular way, then they have no aims of their own and submerge everything in the simple notion, 'That's the way it is'. Thus a unity exists between them, their representations, and the way things are. They are at one, at peace. Since they have no particular purposes,
355 the | 'other' is annulled in them, and there is peace and freedom. However, this offers no solace, for solace presupposes that I have a purpose and that it was satisfied. Solace is not found. This disposition, this subjection, does not require solace precisely because it does not yet have the deeper need of subjectivity, and this is because individuals in their particularity do not view themselves as ends or purposes. The deeper demands of subjectivity

are not met here; but the situation is by no means unreasonable. If one were to view destiny as a blind power over right and ethical life, as is the case in modern tragedies, that would be a most spiritless and unreasonable outlook. But this was not the way that the Greeks viewed fate. The sphere of divine justice is something other than that of destiny.

The Constitution of Greece

Here we make a transition to the constitution of Greece. The latter is directly connected with Greek religion. We have already spoken of the beginnings of Greek political organization and said that the sovereign power imported from foreign lineages finally fell away as superfluous. Let us now examine its positive aspects more closely. What distinguishes the Greek constitution is democracy, which could attain this development only here and only here be so admired, while the Oriental world offered a brilliant display of despotism. The Roman world is that of aristocracy, and the Germanic world that of monarchy.

Oriental despotism is absent, then, from Greece because the [Greek political] condition did not begin from patriarchy (fundamentally, the two systems [democracy and patriarchy] remain alien to each other [even] when they are intertwined); rather the Greeks united as rational individuals, not as individuals linked and bound together by nature. On the other hand, however, the subject, or subjectivity, | was not yet infinite reflection within 356
itself, not yet the wholly free ideality of thought, nor the infinite subjectivity to which conscience belongs. An absolute determination regarding the particularity of conscience did not yet have a place here; it was not [yet] expected here that everything should be justified before human inwardness. Missing is what human beings justify with reference to themselves. There had not yet occurred this breach in which autonomous, independent inwardness is formed, seeking to determine for itself in thought what is right and ethical, recognizing only the latter to be justified, and not recognizing what is not justified according to its own insight.

Since this breach has not yet occurred, this world [of subjectivity] is not yet erected; the particular will is not yet free; the particularity of conviction and intention does not yet carry weight. Passions are therefore not yet involved in the operations of the state.[45] In regard to such inwardness, to

45. Since the early Greek leaders surely did act out of passion, perhaps what Hegel has in mind are passions based on a subjective sense of self. In place of this sentence, found in Griesheim, Hotho continues the preceding sentence: '[the particularity of conviction and intention] does not yet come into association with the state'.

such particular powers of the spirit and will that inwardly strive to be free, the state is then [in the Germanic-Christian world] precisely what is of universal interest, appearing as something external. Since it is determined [as] something external to which the subjective free will is not subjectively bound, the state must have its own distinctive mode of stabilization, its own distinctive bond, because [otherwise] only spirit, only conscience, is something secure and stable. The only thing in my mind that is secure is my conviction; and the state, because it is external, must provide another mainstay over against this inwardness, this [personal] opinion.

The time for monarchy has arrived when such a bond is required; thus monarchy emerges when external order requires a focus for the sake of stability. This bond can only be secure if it has occurred naturally and
357 been formed naturally. | Hence, the moment of naturalness is taken up into the ethical order. This stable order can take up the element of naturalness and can support the state apart from and even contrary to the conviction and conscience of the individual, since the latter are uncertain and are left to one's own opinion.

We do not yet find this situation or any of these characteristics with the Greeks. However, in order to be able to do justice to the Greek constitution, we must have mastered these propositions and become sure of these conceptions both abstractly and in external phenomena; it is only when we have its concept that we are permitted to discuss conceptions of the constitution. Inwardness is very important to the Greek spirit and will soon surface in it, where both the subjective spirit and, together with it, [personal] opinions appear. Their appearing, however, can only be destructive, because the constitution has not yet developed to this point. Hence, the principle of subjective freedom appears only as something disruptive in it because it is still a heterogeneous principle for this constitution.

The Greek constitution, therefore, proceeds from the unity of subjective and objective will, whereas the Oriental world starts out from the patriarchal principle, and the modern world starts out from subjective freedom. Since these [other] two principles are not present in the Greek world, the central thing here is beauty, which in terms of the political aspect leads to the Greek constitution and sets the Greek world apart. This world is beautiful, but the true [is] always higher. Beauty is not yet truth. This beautiful center of the ethical and the just [is what] is grasped and sought by the free individual, by free individuality—not yet in the specific quality of morality but instead as custom, as the objective aspect of willing. The will has not yet been intensified into the ideality of being-for-self, has not yet arrived at the interi-
358 ority of the latter. The ethical and the just are based on the freedom | of the

will; they actualize this freedom. Thus the content is defined by the law of freedom, and it is rational. The will is indeed no longer bound from the outset and is no longer fixated in unity with the natural, as in the Orient. Thus the content is the free, the rational. As to the form, it is that of immediacy. The law of the ethical is valid here because in the condition of immediacy it is the law of one's own country. It is not valid because *I* regard it to be right and have convinced *myself* of it; rather it is the simple custom by which we live. What is natural, what befalls us, just *is*, and thus it must take place. Here this is simple reflection, simple ethicality, the custom of life. Here there is no higher ground for obedience. In beauty as such the idea is still the natural element in sensible representation and is expressed for sensible representation. It expresses the divine in the sensible; and thus ethical practice, which does not yet comprise morality, has here as such the character of custom and habit in the mode of nature and of necessity.

Thus the law has here the form of immediacy; the particularity of will is not yet present. Hence the interest of the entire community, its common being, can reside in the decision of individuals, the citizens; and this will of the citizens must be the basis of the constitution, for there is no principle that could hinder the existing ethical life in its actualization. Thus here the democratic constitution is the absolutely necessary form. The will here is still the objective will; and Athena, the goddess, is still Athens, still the spirit of the people, still the actual spirit of the citizens; this ceases to be only when object and subject separate. And this form is the justification and necessity of the democratic constitution; none other is possible here. The democratic constitution rests on this immanent ethicality. When the will | has retreated 369
into an interior conscience and the separation has occurred—only then has the moment for the democratic constitution passed by.

Of greater interest are the tenets that lead to the call for a democratic constitution. If we speak of such a constitution, in our time in particular it is frequently represented to be the best. It is said that interests, decisions, and ordinances of the state should be the concern of all citizens; this is true and it is quite important. A further tenet adduced is that individuals, citizens as individuals, must have the right to deliberate and decide about public matters, because their own and their most essential concerns in this world are at stake. It can be said that citizens will be motivated to choose what is best for themselves, and that they will best understand what that is, and thus should have the right to make this choice.

However, an essential consideration is the question as to who these individuals are who are to determine what is best, and where these

individuals are who should understand these concerns. They are single individuals, citizens; and of them it must be said that they have this absolute justification only to the extent that their will is still the absolute and objective will and is not split between the interiority of subjectivity and what is universal and objective—only to the extent, therefore, that their will is still the simple unity of substantial volition. This is indeed the standpoint of the Greeks, but no longer that of the modern world, where Christ says,
360 'My kingdom is not of this world'[46]—where, then, this split | exists and the inwardness and eternity of spirit within itself are found. The objective and substantial will should not be called the good will, for the good will is precisely what is distinguished from the objective. The good will is the moral will; and the moral will judges what the individual and the state should do, acting in accord with an inner rational determination, in accord with the good as an idea within itself, as a knowledge of duty. This good will is no longer the substantial, objective will. It appears to be a remarkable destiny of the human race that, as soon as it arrives at subjective inwardness, at this religion of freedom and spirituality, its higher standpoint of subjective freedom inhibits the possibility of achieving what one often calls, preeminently, the freedom *of a people*, namely democracy. These are fundamental determinations at the core of the concept. One must be acquainted with these determinations [in order] to avoid idle talk about what a constitution is.

Three conditions relating to the democracy of the Greeks can be added here. The first [is] the *oracle*.[47] While the oracle was inseparably connected with democracy in its older and purer period, democracy itself results in the oracle no longer being consulted about the most important circumstances and matters. There was a rapid transition to citizens deciding for themselves rather than consulting the oracle. Along with the rapid transition to assemblies to take counsel, the feeling soon arose that citizens themselves should decide, play an active role. We find this in Athens where democracy fully developed; there the people themselves decided. The decision of the people reached its height in this
361 period, | when Socrates experienced his *daimon*, which did not yet appear to him as his interiority but as something alien, something that determined him, his oracle.[48] He did not yet call this subjectivity.

46. John 18: 36.

47. The connection of the oracle with democracy appears to be as follows. When political decisions were no longer made by patriarchs or despots, they fell to individual citizens. Individuals first consulted oracles to determine how they should act. Subsequently they gathered in assemblies and took votes based on their own decisions, deriving from their inner oracle.

48. On the *daimon* (or 'genius') of Socrates, see Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ii. 145–50. 'What it implies is that human beings will now reach decisions in accordance

In the conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon, Homer ascribes to Pallas [Athena] Achilles' inner decision to refrain from fighting.[49] When such decisions are now made by citizens entirely in the state, the majority decides. In earlier times, at the beginning, votes were not counted individually but estimated as a whole with great imprecision. As evidence Thucydides reports that in Sparta an ephor proposed that, in order to decide whether to go to war, [the Lacedaemonians] should not raise their hands but rather stand on different sides in different groups.[50] Later on, decisions were made by precise count. The greatest accuracy could be achieved only by counting, but there was also the awareness that such a decision appears to be a matter of chance, and all the more so the greater the number of voters. This can cause an uproar because the large number of votes is quickly tallied and the individual vote is devalued, is now regarded as insignificant. It is even said that, by increasing the number of votes so that individual votes become insignificant, the individual has less regard for his vote and casts it irresponsibly. Here is where contingency enters on every side: one [citizen] stays away for this or that reason while [another] speaks eloquently. The decision then appears to be a matter of chance. Indeed the majority | can 362
become indignant if, for [example], there are six hundred on both sides and only one insignificant vote decides the matter. If things come to this final exactitude, the decision also appears to be contingent and will be resented, especially if at the same time inner conviction, the reflection of will, comes into play and is aware that whatever law alone, or whatever else, has been decided, contributes to the corruption of the state. And this strength of conviction enters the picture as a result of education. Thus all the attention to, all the respect for, such decisions collapses, and this whole way of deciding collapses. With the *daimon* of Socrates, this interiority, we see in Athens itself the onset of the age of this δαίμων,[51] and also of the age of decline. If the oracles are the first form for outwardly expressing what is

with their inner being, insight, reasons, and consciousness in general, although genius is not yet "conscience", for that is a later expression' (p. 145). References to Socrates' *daimon* (as a divinity or voice that comes upon him and determines him) are found in various passages in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and Plato's *Apology*.

49. Homer, *Iliad* 1.190–220 (Rieu, pp. 9–10). As Achilles debated with himself whether to disembowel Agamemnon or to control his angry impulses, Athena appeared and persuaded him to fight with words rather than weapons.

50. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 1.86–87 (Lattimore, p. 42). Thucydides does not refer to raising hands but to shouting as the alternative to standing in groups. The ephors in Sparta were overseers or magistrates, selected annually.

51. The German text adds a final omicron to this word.

determined—which still has the advantage that what is outward comes in the form of a divine apparition—this changes into a second form, into a majority of votes, into a number; but the oracle has the advantage of being a divine authorization.

History shows that a second condition is bound up, and necessarily so, with Greek ethical life and its democracy, namely, *slavery*. For ethical life exists as custom and habit, and has in this respect a particular mode of concrete existence. It is only when human beings know that they are not things but persons, infinitely free on their own account, that slavery does not occur. It does not occur when the concept of the human is that human beings are free as such. But this is where the infinite inwardness of subjectivity comes into play. For the Greeks, freedom holds good only because they are Greeks, because they are these particular citizens. Thus we see that [only] these Athenians, these Spartans, etc., are free; freedom is not yet grasped as
363 what is | universal but rather as something that is particular. Only when the free is *thought* are human beings free—free because they *are* free. This freedom presupposes that thought comes to itself. Thus slavery is necessary in Greece.

A third observation is that democratic constitutions can be found only in states of *small size*. Again, this is no mere contingency of history; a democratic state cannot spread out very far. One can also think differently about this, in abstract terms; but that is of course a quite stagnant and lifeless picture. The character of democracy is an essentially plastic, compact unity. Just this plastic character requires that it is not one person who decides; rather it is the whole body that renders the decision, taking into account all circumstances and interests, all sides and reasons. The citizens must therefore be present [together]; the picture of interests must be alive for them. This can only happen in small states.

THE MATURITY OF THE GREEK SPIRIT

According to our previously indicated division of the history of a people,[52] the unfolding of a spiritual principle belongs in the first period. In the second period the principle itself is evident; and thus the Greek spirit in its maturity comes forth in all its brilliance.

52. See above, pp. 372–3.

First we shall indicate in more detail what the major elements of this second period are. What we have had up to this point is intrinsic to the first period of the Greek people—the period that constitutes its strength and formation. In the second period what has reached maturity manifests itself: inwardness comes into concrete existence (*Dasein*), presents itself in its brilliance, comes into prominence; it does not simply remain within itself but appears in | works, ones that are for the world. Thus these works 364
constitute the second period of the Greek world.

The Persian Wars

The epoch with which such a second period begins involves contact with the antecedent world-historical people. [In the case of the Greeks,] the epoch with which this second period begins involves contact with the Persians. The individuality that has matured inwardly must turn outward and then recede back into itself. The first point, therefore, is the contact of the Greeks with the Persians and the events involving what Herodotus calls 'the War with the Medes'.[53] The history of the latter, brilliant as it is, cannot be considered further here; it is well-known, and here only the following needs to be recalled.

We must recall that not all the Greeks participated in the war. A significant number were allied with the Persians and fought with them against the Greeks. Even here, where the highest stakes were involved, particularity maintained the upper hand; for inwardly mature individuality is a person outwardly before it returns again into itself.[54] We see the Greeks united only once. Their separation is a necessary element, and particularity inevitably gained the upper hand over a common Hellenism. Athens and Sparta above all distinguished themselves. The Athenians alone led and won the first war, against Darius, which was decided at the Battle of Marathon. In the next war, with Xerxes in command (he invaded with all of Asia), Boeotia, Thessaly, and even Argos were subjugated by the Persians. In the Peloponnesus, Argos took no part in the defense of the islands; Sicily and Crete came

53. The Medes became part of the Persian Empire in the 6th cent. BC and played a major role in the Persian attacks on Greece. Herodotus describes the Persian Wars (500–449 BC) in detail in bks. 5–9 of *The History* (Grene, pp. 357–664).

54. Hegel's argument throughout this section is as follows. In the first period of Greek history, inwardness or subjectivity matures as an inner possibility for human beings. In the second period, this inwardness takes on concrete existence, appearing in the form of 'particularity' (*Partikularität*) or 'individuality' (*Individualität*), that is, autonomous personalities who assert themselves over against communal identity. This is a necessary step in the maturation of spirit, but it has negative as well as positive consequences.

365 under | Persian aegis; and thus only a few peoples stood on the Greek side. Only a few states withstood this great conflict.[55]

Also noteworthy here is the favor of destiny. Marathon, Salamis, Thermopylae remain immortal names, which live eternally in human remembrance. The small number of Athenians who fought at Marathon, the three hundred Spartans under Leonidas at Thermopylae, the Athenians who took to their ships to battle against the Persians—these will always be examples of bravery. Since these battles and that age, many thousand times three hundred have died just as bravely. There is no people that has not engaged in heroic deeds and had many defenders; all native lands are bravely defended. But for us, none of these countless battles and the men who died in them, these heroes, compare with the immortal glory of Thermopylae and the three hundred. It may appear to be good fortune, but fame decides according to the nature of the case. We must consider how fame distributes its laurels. Fame rewards, deciding not according to moral, subjective values, nor on the basis of subjective merit; rather it decides in accord with objective values and the nature of the case. The defense of Greece is unique in its universal aspect. West and East stood so opposed here that the interests of world history lay in the balance. The defense of other interests, of one's native land and the like, have all been more limited. Pericles, in his funeral oration for the
366 fallen during the Peloponnesian War, | spoke in praise of Athens, for which the men had died, and he said: 'It is for such a city that these men struggled and died.'[56] He attributed the excellence of their sacrifice to the greatness of the cause. Thus it is because of the cause that their fame here is so great.

As to the powers that were opposed here, on the one side there was Oriental despotism, the entire Eastern world united under a single master, mighty in numbers, having the great advantage of being under a single dominion. And these Persians, these Orientals, Xerxes in particular, are by no means to be seen as soft and weak or to be derided. Herodotus gives quite a different picture of them; while some groups were soft, many, indeed most, were the opposite: they were strong and belligerent, and indeed displayed a raw and savage bravery. Over against these folk, who in part were very

55. The Battle of Marathon occurred in 490 BC. Ten years later, Xerxes prevailed at Thermopylae, overwhelming a valiant Spartan contingent, but was decisively defeated by a united Greek navy at the Battle of Salamis in 480. With the defeat of the Persian army at Plataea in 479, the threat of Greek destruction ended, but the Persians very nearly succeeded in their conquest. The parenthetical remark 'he invaded with all of Asia' refers to the fact that the Persian forces consisted of units drawn from the many distinct ethnic groups contained within the Persian Empire.

56. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, 2.41 (Lattimore, p. 94).

warlike and were united under one leader, stood a few peoples of limited means but possessing free individuality. Never in world history has the advantage and superiority of the noble power of spirituality over massed forces—who were indeed not to be disdained—been displayed so splendidly. In modern times it often happens that in a single battle a small force has prevailed over a large number: 400 French defeated 60,000 Indians in one battle. It is otherwise with a war of long duration, in which one battle is but a single and rather contingent matter. | This war, therefore, is the most 367
glorious [episode] of Greece, and it had as its author the father of historiography, Herodotus. This war is decisive for this great epoch. The epoch was marked by tension; and as soon as these [foreign peoples] had been repelled in the outward tension, the tension had then to be directly inward, for the Greeks were still not capable of conquering the Persians. Having been aroused and no longer having an outward object of their activity, the people had to seek it inwardly, in inner dissension and conflict. Thus we see here the emergence of conflicts between Greek states within Greece itself. The conflicts are partly among individual states and partly among individual parties within each of the states.

Athens versus Sparta

Athens and Sparta were in the greatest and most substantial opposition, and the interests of the other states especially revolved about this antagonism. It provides a great deal of material for specialized histories—accounts of all the separate states (*Inselstaaten*), of the factions and individuals within them. The particularity of the other regions, which have the greatest diversity of constitutions, comes into view; this is an anthill, in constant and continuous movement within itself and against itself. But the major interest focuses on Athens and Sparta; the whole struggle turns on their opposition; indeed, even the internal opposition within the other states defines itself by the struggle between these two. For already here, at the beginning of the conflict, the antithesis between democracy and aristocracy comes to the fore—an antithesis that Rome strove to end in a unity that was visibly accomplished in Rome. | The balance 368
quickly shifted back and forth between Athens and Sparta. We shall examine more closely the character of these two peoples.

Regarding Athens, we have already noted[57] that early on it established peaceful conditions as a place of refuge for inhabitants from other regions, for other peoples of Greece; and so it had a mixed populace, made up partly

57. See above, p. 374.

of Greeks and peoples from the islands, and partly of foreigners, of Asians and Africans.

A second thing to note is that its essential orientation was to the sea, trade, and shipping commerce; but at the same time farming, olive cultivation, and landed property were related to these activities. We know historically that from an early time opposition developed between different factions.

We shall pass over the earlier or older [history of Athens], for example the unification under Theseus. The only noteworthy point is that the unification is attributable to the fact that he enabled the various autonomous communities to unite in Athens, in the city itself. He enabled all aspects of the state to be under a common authority and a single tribunal, all being in one central point. We see the opposite in Boeotia and Lacedaemonia, where the authority was distributed across the whole region.

[58]Thus, in Athens, unification of the region and the city occurred earlier. But three groups began to emerge quite soon, which were related to different locales and the way of life associated with them: inhabitants of the sea coast and mariners, mountain dwellers, and plains dwellers. The three can be called classes (*Stände*) to the extent that they are based on
369 distinct ways of life. | The situation with these classes was unsettled; and insofar as Athens also constituted one whole, a union, in effect a state, there thus arose a see-saw between aristocracy and democracy. The legislation of Solon resolved this situation. (Solon was one of the Seven Wise Men; the other six bore this name for diverse reasons. Solon's legislation indicates a level of culture where the awareness of, and need for, a universal representation, e.g. of general well-being, emerges; this is the point at which the need for law arises. The Wise Men were principally legislators, some being referred to as rulers and tyrants, the ones who were the noblest and wisest.[59]) Thus Solon gave the laws to his fellow citizens. It is a rare stroke of good fortune that an individual gives laws to such a people—this lot befalls few mortals.

If we say that an essential aspect of democracy is that the people themselves must make the laws, then it is remarkable, and can appear striking,

58. Here and at the beginning of the next several paragraphs the German editors add topical headings that we omit.

59. On Solon, see Herodotus, *History* 1.29–33, 2.177 (Greene, pp. 44–8, 208). His reforms date from his archonship in Athens, 594–593 BC. The list of the Seven Wise Men of ancient Greece differed widely but always included Solon. It is not strictly true that all of them were 'lawgivers' in the sense of exercising political power. Some were simply persons who gave good advice for the best way to conduct one's affairs, political or otherwise.

that here one individual promulgated the constitutional law; what is more, Solon also established the civil law. However, it is quite superficial to say that a democratic constitution should give the legislative power to the people, that in a democracy legislation should be in the hands of the people. For democracy is already a constitution; it is already the development | of a 370
legal system in which its own great and important laws are already established, and further elaboration is unnecessary. Its own laws, on which things depend, are already established in every constitution, insofar as it is one. Solon gave the Athenians a democratic constitution, but in such a fashion that an aristocratic element was involved. Solon's laws do indeed specify equality among the citizens, but the wealthy still have an advantage over others, principally in regard to the administration of public offices; hence there is an aristocratic element.

This difference was ameliorated, as we notice, by a transformation in the age that followed. At the instigation of Cleistenes, the constitution became more democratic. Up to the age of Pericles the Areopagus had issued decrees about everything, decrees in which the people had no say. But following Pericles the actions of the Areopagus were suspended, so that for the first time in the age of Pericles a democratic constitution was firmly established.[60]

We should note that slavery was a major aspect of private life. In contrast to Sparta, however, slaves were an incidental private possession, acquired by purchase. In Athens no free Greek peoples were enslaved.[61] We must keep in mind these major distinctions.

Industriousness, and ethical and legal equality, are essential; they are the means by which the inequality of individuality and the diversity of character could develop most effectively and be made acceptable. In the conduct of private persons toward each other, we see in Athens a refinement[62] of customs and freedom that has taken a very fine and delicate form.

60. The Areopagus was the prime council of Athens, which met on a rocky hill (also called the Areopagus) north-west of the Acropolis. It combined judicial and legislative functions and through the 5th cent. BC was the stronghold of the aristocracy. By the 4th cent. its scope had been greatly reduced. In 463 Pericles stripped the Areopagus of its chief political power, thus weakening the oligarchy. Cleistenes (chief archon 525–524) is regarded as the founder of the democracy, because he changed the political power structure from one based on family or blood relationships to one based on locale of residence.

61. Athenian slaves were typically foreigners captured in war—hence not Greeks.

62. Hegel uses the term *Urbanität*. It derives from the Latin word for 'city' (*urbs*), and describes a quality of life found in cities, namely a way of being polite and courteous in a smooth, polished way. 'Urbanity' is a form of 'refinement', and we have preferred the latter term in translation.

371 Refinement is civility in matters of substance without | expressly assuming forms that we associate with it, for example certain expressions and courtesies. Everything that for us is a matter of form is, in the refinement of the Greeks, the substance itself. These courtesies consist in the ongoing recognition of the rights of other persons, and the conviction that, in expressing myself, I respect the right of others to their own opinions; I respect whether they want to listen to me or not. If I speak without knowing whether they want to listen, I violate their rights, and the same is true in regard to what is said. If I speak in this way, then I presume to speak on behalf of the listeners and, as it were, demand their agreement. This presumption upon the freedom of the other person is not found in refinement. This enduring respect for the other, this refinement, is developed into the highest form in the Platonic dialogues. If I am refined, I must do nothing that betrays an imposition of will on the other. Thus refinement consists of one person always acting and speaking in such a way as to acknowledge the rights of the other.

In the more precise sense culture (*Bildung*) is what distinguishes the Athenians formally—the form of their actions generally. As a consequence, the form of universality is expressed in works and activities in which there is respect for others, and they find themselves validated therein. The material content of this culture is constituted in part by the state and in part by the religious cultus, the major aspect of which were festivals. The great political figures were shaped by the distinctive democratic constitution; they are found especially in Athens, where all individuals are challenged and obliged to demonstrate their own talents; and this is possible only when it is known how to meet the expectations
372 and carefree nature of a highly cultured people. |

Talent was most deeply inspired to become art by religion, for the god is a beautiful individuality, elevated to ideality, the principle of the spiritual idea present in the element of sensibility so as to serve spirit. The cultus does not occur inwardly in prayer; so, then, the god is venerated outwardly in festivals, not inwardly in the mind. Because inwardness does not yet exist, humans portray the god to themselves outwardly, in a worthy fashion. Because the cultus still lacked inwardness, it suffused its outward character with beauty. So Athens offered the spectacle of a state that lived for the purpose of beauty, and that, in doing so, was aware of the flux of public life and of life generally, and proved to be energetic in the pursuit of practical affairs.

The funeral oration of Pericles, found in the second book of Thucydides' history,[63] gives the best indication of the Athenian spirit. Here he articulates

63. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 2.35–46 (Lattimore, pp. 91–7). Hegel's quotations are from 2.40, but his version differs widely from standard translations.

his consciousness of what Athens is, showing that he had a deeper comprehension of his state than a statesman normally would. He says in particular: 'We love beauty without pomp, without wallowing in it, without haughtiness, not for the purpose of display but rather for the sake of beauty [itself]. We philosophize without being indifferent and without becoming indolent. In other words, we are aware of what we do.' This is characteristic. The Athenians know what they are about, but this does not progress to the point of mere indulgence in thought that might lead to a disconnection from the practical. Thus they liked being aware of their action and their being, without that awareness adversely affecting practice. 'We are brave', Pericles says further, 'not from coarseness of spirit, not from ἀμαθία [ignorance], not from lack of culture—a lack in which the spirit that does not respect itself surrenders because it is nothing in itself and as yet has no content. Our soul is cultured. We know | what is pleasant and what is difficult, but despite this 373
knowledge we do not avoid danger.'

Sparta is the antitype to Athens. In terms of their origins, the Spartans are called Dorians. This distinction is not yet found in Homer, where generally the [Greek] racial stocks are not differentiated; so this distinction was first drawn later.

Sparta's origin is completely different from that of Athens. As Dorians they came into the Peloponnesus from Thessaly—they came as conquerors who made slaves, 'helots', of the native people whom they encountered, as they did later also of the Messenians. Thus the Spartans lived in a relationship to these peoples that is similar to that today of the Turks to the Greeks, who are deprived of equal rights by their conquerors.[64] But the condition of the Greeks still is not so harsh. The condition of the helots was much harsher; they were slaves and were not regarded as free, in the way contemporary Greeks are regarded as free; the Greeks are only subjected to taxation and random maltreatment. In this way the Spartans live in a continuous state of war; within their own society they are always perpetually involved in military exercises, in which the young Spartans, even in times of peace, were forever hunting down the increasing number of slaves that ran away. This pursuit was a state-sanctioned arrangement, whereas with the Turks today it happens only in momentary outbursts of fury. The helots were often armed in times of war; but afterward the brave ones were killed treacherously, massacred *en masse*. So even in times of peace the Spartans perpetually lived in war and freedom. | 374

64. In the early 19th cent. Greece was still part of the Ottoman Empire, but the Greek War of Independence began in 1821, an event that must lie in the background of Hegel's comment.

A second aspect is the legislation of Lycurgus.[65] It dealt with all aspects of landed property, dividing it into thirty thousand sections; one section was devoted to the Achaeans and another to the Lacedaemonians proper, who among themselves were said to be equal. In this way the equality of resources was maintained and grounded. But this and other arrangements were in no way adequate to this purpose; for, counter to the intention and desire of Lycurgus, landed property fell into the hands of a few, and in the end we see the most extreme inequality. Moreover, Lycurgus permitted no other metal than that of iron, thereby cutting off external trade and internal industry.[66] Citizens were expected to dine together in order to maintain common customs and familiarity; this is a much-praised practice and is particularly highly regarded.[67] But no great import is to be attributed to it. It is of no consequence that they ate the same fare; for whoever is satisfied does not think of those who have feasted on better fare. Eating and drinking are in general a private matter, and it is natural that this should take place in the family. There is no great virtue in dining in common. Everyone was supposed to contribute to the cost of the food, to this common meal; but whoever was too poor to do so, the poor citizens, were excluded from the meal. With the Cretans the food was paid for by the community; but it is well-known that they acquired a bad reputation. The New Testament calls the Cretans ἄγα θηρία and 'worthless bellies',[68] and thus nothing much can be said for equality. The Athenians of course did not dine in common, but they engaged in physical exercise (*lebten sie in den Gymnasien*) in a spiritual way.

Constitutionally, Sparta was a democracy with kings; the kings, however,
375 were at first only magistrates, public officials, | and military leaders. Later we find ephors who, as the most important persons, were in command, so that Sparta was a democracy in name only and was actually an aristocracy or an oligarchy.[69] The apathy of spirit of the Spartan people allowed control of the government to fall into the hands of the few. As a consequence science and art were banned. Individuality was uncompromisingly absorbed into the

65. See Herodotus, *History* 1.65–6 (Grene, pp. 61–2). Nothing is known of the life of Lycurgus, the traditional name of the founder of the Spartan constitution.

66. These are examples, presumably, of Spartan asceticism and ineptitude.

67. Plato treats this practice—not just dining together but sharing all goods in common—as one of the key features of his guardian groups (philosophers and soldiers) in *The Republic*, although Hegel does not discuss it specifically in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (ii. 223–4), beyond general remarks about private property.

68. Titus 1: 12. The Greek text reads: κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί ('vicious brutes, lazy gluttons'). Hegel quotes the first two words in Greek and translates the second two.

69. Ephors were elected officials who exercised general control over the actions of kings, as well as having other functions.

state; it was unrelated to free and spiritual consciousness, and multiple viewpoints went unacknowledged. Science on the whole was excluded. General conceptions, principles of right and ethical life could not come to the fore here. The stringent relationship to the one, uncultured state suppressed everything universal, and thus the Spartans could not determine their own actions. Even if they are said to have acted justly among themselves, we still know that in all things they were dishonest toward outsiders and were not guided by general principles.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that many noble Athenians had a preference for Sparta.

In modern times we find great and profound men such as Rousseau[70] who look backwards for what is better, for example, to the wilderness conditions of North America in preference to the cultured European states; the belief is that what is better precedes the | introduction of culture. 376
However, this is not the case; what is better lies ahead. So we always feel ourselves drawn to Greece. We regard Greek life in general, its ethical and political qualities, to be shaped in charming and beautiful and interesting ways. But spirit cannot find its highest satisfaction here. The objective absolute that is beautiful lacks a principal element, namely truth; and here right and ethical life still lack the sublime freedom that comes from the subjective unity of self-consciousness.

The higher principle always appears for the world in the shape of destruction *vis-à-vis* what is earlier and lower. What is earlier has developed its law and ethical life into a present world and actuality. Against this the higher principle seems to be something different that disrupts this world, something that this world does not recognize, but [by which it] is disavowed. This disavowal, which constitutes the next higher principle, will rob the state of its staying power and individuals of their virtue; and consequently this higher principle appears as something revolutionary and demoralizing.

DECLINE AND FALL

It remains for us to consider the aspect of destruction as the third period, and here again the distinction between Sparta and Athens is of interest. In terms

70. On Hobbes, Rousseau, and others, see above, p. 102, n. 61.

377 of the external history that is related to this period, | the great historical event is the Peloponnesian War.[71]

The Peloponnesian War

At the beginning of the war, Pericles stood at the apex of the Athenian state. It is generally the case that, where there are many, a leader must come forward, one individual who always stands at the forefront. In a republic this leader is a distinctive personality, a person who must legitimate himself but can only do so when also accepted as leader. And the wisest, the freest, the most virtuous individual is Pericles, who exemplifies the highest perfection. Athens at this time had a league of allies in the islands and engaged in friendly commerce with them; the allies contributed funds that were deposited in a central treasury, administered by Athens in equipping the fleet.[72] Thus Xenophon asked: 'Who does not need Athens, who does not need all the wealthy regions, all the wise and gifted individuals who grasp what is worth seeing and hearing in politics and religion?'[73] Athens was the center of the league since it administered the central treasury. If it was reproached for collecting money by force and using it for itself, for temples and statues, at least nothing was squandered. But the league also had a share in all of this, and Xenophon reported how honestly Pericles cared for the city.

In such confederations no single community has concrete power; rather an abstract center serves that purpose. But in Greece there was no universal order or organization, no abstract center; the latter developed for the first
378 time in Rome. | In Greece each community strove to be the whole on its own terms. The exigencies of war perpetually drove the Greeks into such a confederation, but its hegemony was temporary because each one no longer desired to be part of a whole. The struggle between Athens and Sparta hinged on the impossibility of producing such a center and the drive to do so.

In the Peloponnesian War Athens was defeated by their enemy, the Lacedaemonians, who allied themselves with the Persians; it was a base

71. Hegel's principal source for the next few paragraphs is Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*. The war lasted from 431 to 404 BC.

72. The Delian League, under Athenian leadership and based on the island of Delos, and comprising various member states in the Aegean region and its islands, originated in 478 BC as a buffer against Persian power. Sparta disbanded the original Delian League in 404, after defeating Athens in the Peloponnesian War.

73. Xenophon, *Symposium* 8.39. Hegel gives a very loose paraphrase of the text, which makes specific reference to Pericles, Solon, and other Athenian leaders. See Xenophon, *Symposium*, tr. A. J. Bowen (Warminster, 1998), 83.

act of Sparta to betray Greece by turning to the Persians for help. The Spartans' need for money required them to seek it from outside and to resort to the worst means. For a second time, Sparta acted in a vile and treacherous way. The Lacedaemonians turned against Greece; they promised to liberate the Greek cities and islands from Athens, but instead they made them dependent on themselves and in all the cities transformed democracies into oligarchies. In a third betrayal, at the Peace of Antalcidas,[74] the Lacedaemonians, the Spartans, treacherously handed over the Greek cities in Asia Minor to the Persians.

Now the cities, with Thebes at the head, revolted; they threw off the yoke of Sparta, and Sparta declined. We see the Messenians, and the Arcadians too, reestablished and forming a state. Thebes, lifted up by Pelopidas and Epaminondas,[75] again assumed its earlier role. Pelopidas and Epaminondas died, and the previous situation almost repeated itself, such that Greece found itself thus entangled now in mutual amity and hostility of every sort; | and without such [orderly] circumstances no state endured unless 379
some kind of authority had established peace and calm among them. This authority had to come from without.

This brought about the external political destruction of Greece. Not only were the states divided among themselves, but also each state was split inwardly into factions, so that always a portion of the citizenry was living in exile, and when some returned others were banished.

The Emergence of Thought

However, the main form in which change came to the Greek people has its basis in the beginning of a thinking (*Denken*) that is a self-comprehending. It came about through thought or conception (*Gedanken*), [and it resides] in the principle of interiority, of the freedom of subjective self-consciousness.

With the Greeks we see art and philosophy, and marvel at these works: they are our eternal model. Despite these achievements, Greece on the whole exhibits a narrowness in principle. The deficiency in the Greek world lay not in their lack of one single legislation, nor in one or another particular law, nor in the passions of single individuals; rather it is with how they viewed the essence of things. The religion of the Greeks, their consciousness of the absolute, is found in beauty—a spiritual quality burdened with sensuous

74. Antalcidas was a Spartan general who made an alliance with Persia and, in 386 BC, forced Athens and its allies to accept the treaty called the 'Peace of Antalcidas'.

75. Pelopidas accompanied the military commander Epaminondas in successful campaigns against the Spartans (in the 370s BC) that restored Theban power and influence in Greece.

elements. Therefore art was their religion and cultus. Their God is beautiful individuality—a beautiful God but not yet a true one. Likewise their
380 constitution, their laws, their justice and ethics were | a matter of custom. The manner by which they lived, and established what is valid, is still an immediate one of custom and practice. In their consciousness they still lacked a knowledge of the principle of subjectivity and conscience—the reflection of thought within itself in such a way that what ought to count as true confirms itself through *my* reason, through the witness of *my* spirit, through *my* feeling. Thus what is lacking here is the infinitude of spirit—spirit as an inner tribunal before which everything validated has to be justified.

We now see this inwardness emerge in Greece in a twofold fashion. The ideality of thought threatens that beautiful religion, for thought is something other than the ideality of beauty; and the same principle threatens the laws and the political constitution. At the same time, the passions of individuals and the free will (*Willkür*) of particular subjectivity are also threatened by the ideality of thought. This very inwardness is twofold: on the one hand there is the universal, the idea of the true, from which the true principles emerge; on the other hand, subjectivity is what is particular, is inclination, in which passions and free will are conjoined. The principle of Greek freedom already comprises the idea that even thought has become free on its own account; thus the development of thought begins along with the development of art, the Greek religion, and the political constitution. The development of thought runs parallel to the development of art and is hostile to the realism of art. From Thales on we see the philosophers making these advances, and this could only happen in Greece.

Initially, science (*Wissenschaft*) emerges as a contentious understanding (*räsonnierender Verstand*) that applies to all objects. This activity and stir in the realm of representation is widely praised. The practitioners of knowing,
381 the | champions of this application of thought, were called Sophists, a term that has taken on a bad connotation for us. Inasmuch as thought was strengthened so as to venture everything and to begin to feel its force, it addressed all sorts of topics, including ethical life, justice, belief, and confidence [in one's views], treating them exhaustively and in ideal form, and resolving (*auflösen*) them. This knowing showed itself to be master of these topics. However, in the midst of this vacillating array of all sorts of topic, the Sophists did not yet comprehend themselves, did not yet discover their own central point. Thus the essential thing, the science of the Sophists, remains the art of 'dialectic', which must seek and recognize something as a fixed end

(*festen Zweck*). They situated this fixed end in human beings; thus humans in their particularity have become the goal and end of all things, and utility the highest value.[76] So the final end (*letzten Zweck*) is a matter of one's personal preference. This 'dialectic' regarded itself to be universally valid, and has done so [again], even today. In this way objective truth is denied. Thought makes everything vacillate depending on the preference of subjectivity.

At the beginning of and during the Peloponnesian War, Socrates[77] was the one who finally grasped the independence of thought. Being-in-and-for-itself came to be recognized as the universal, and thinking as the final end, as what is valid, in that human beings are able to discover and recognize from themselves—not from their own preferences but from themselves as universal and thinking beings—what is right and good, and that everything that is to be valued has to justify itself before this inner tribunal of thought. In this way Socrates discovered what is essential (*das Eigentliche*), what is called morality. Socrates is frequently called a moral teacher. But he *felt* morality more than taught it, for the Greeks knew well what was ethical. Ethical life was present in the entire objective content [of their society] and was known in every relationship. | But the position at which Socrates arrived is that 382
human beings must essentially seek and find this within themselves, determining it from conviction and reasons for action. He is no mere agitator (*Aufregender*) and pedagogue (*Bildender*); rather conversation (*das Gesagte*) is his essential principle.

By this principle, the discontinuity in which an inner world has found firm footing is expressed, an inner world that sets itself apart from what previously had been the sole objective world. The prior actual world is now defined as exterior *vis-à-vis* this interior world. Because human beings find their tribunal in their inwardness, the process began whereby from now on individuals sustained themselves inwardly, could find satisfaction in an ideal modality, taking part in the life of the state without fettering themselves to the state. Thought began to want the validity of everything to be justified in its own eyes. Now ῥαθυμία [lack of passion] was introduced, and the question was raised as to whether there are gods and what they are. This is when Plato bans the poets Homer and Hesiod from his state:

76. An allusion to the view attributed to Protagoras—'the human being is the measure of all things' (see *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ii. 121).

77. Socrates (469–399 BC) began teaching in Athens at about the time of the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, 431. Plato was born during the War, about 427 BC, and Aristotle twenty years after its end, in 384. The irony is that the greatest philosophers of Greece emerged at the time of its political destruction.

thought of the absolute is required instead of sensible representation of it.[78] Thus this higher principle of thought, of subjectivity, comes on the scene at this point.

The fate of Socrates is that of highest tragedy. He was condemned by the court. His death can be seen as the highest injustice because he completely discharged his duties to his native land and opened up for his people an inner world. On his own behalf he had the justification of thought; but for their part the Athenian people were completely in the right too: they must have been deeply aware that respect for the law of the state would be weakened and the Athenian state destroyed by the principle that justification resides in
383 one's own inwardness. Thus | it is quite correct that the teaching of Socrates appeared to the people as high treason; accordingly they condemned him to death, and Socrates' death was the highest justice.

One of the peculiarities of Greek life is that the formative principle of the state is custom, something immediately valid, the unity of the subjective and the objective. *Our* political life is organized quite otherwise from that of the Athenian people and can regard the subjective disposition or inner life [of individuals]—even when it opposes religion—rather indifferently. What is inward and moral is not a matter for the state. But the Athenian political life is still somewhat similar to that of the Asian, in that objectivity and subjectivity are inseparably united. Aristophanes understood in the most fundamental way what the Socratic principle involved.[79] The Athenian people necessarily felt remorse over the condemnation of Socrates, inasmuch as they must have realized that what they had condemned was indeed part of themselves. Thus they had condemned themselves too. Thus Socrates did not die an innocent man; if he had, that would not be tragic but merely moving. The great tragic figures are those who do not die innocently. In Socrates the higher principle appears in its purest and freest form, that of thought. This is the break between actuality and thought.

Thought constitutes on the one side a break with actuality and on the other side a pure presence to self, identity with self, the ideality of peace. Thought has broken with actuality, and one can say: the heart of the world must first break and only then will reconciliation in the spirit come about. This is [what has happened through] Socrates. In Socrates the break with actuality is still abstract, and reconciliation is still an abstract thought.

78. Plato, *Republic* 377d, 388c, 398a (*The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, 1980), 624, 633, 642–3).

79. See Aristophanes, *The Clouds*.

Art itself is now what destroys the beautiful religion. | Art makes every- 384
thing that is sensible manifest. If the material itself does not transcend the nature and idea of art, and if art has sprung wholly from itself and has wholly perfected it [the material], then everything sensible is made manifest, and the object itself is no longer of interest. The only content that revelation can express and spirit can produce is the content that, for the understanding and sensible experience, is revealed and at the same time still remains hidden. And such an understanding is the higher content of speculative religion, a content that does not lose itself in exteriority. But this no longer happens in Greek religion. It is also the case with the Athenian people that art itself reaches the point at which its content loses interest, at which its principle itself ceases to have an interest in being the content of religion. It is ludicrous to say of Plato that he wanted to ban art and poetry. What Plato banned is not art and poetry in general, but what art [in his day] represented as the highest, which is said to be recognized as the absolute. Plato did not ban art, but he no longer let it have divine status.[80]

The political aspect is similar. Democracy overshoots itself and on its own falls into contradiction because [on the one hand] individuality must be impelled to the highest extreme in order to be actual, and [on the other hand] the people itself is said to rule. Democracy requires points of individuality in order to carry out its decrees, and thus it contradicts itself because individuality is necessary to carry out the decision of the many. Thus if democracy is the political system not of an unrefined people but of a highly refined one, it can only be of short duration. Individuality was sacrificed by Pericles. In the individuality of [the rule of] Pericles, universality (this highest pinnacle) was actual in this one beautiful, plastic whole, in which the people at the same time ruled. But this can happen only once, and after him the state was sacrificed to the individuality of particular [persons], | just as previ- 385
ously individuality was sacrificed to the state. We have said that interiority, subjectivity can exist as universality, as thought, for example as in Socrates; but it can also exist as private concerns, as passion, as the greed of individuals, and this latter aspect is principally the greed of corruption. This is the case with the Athenians too; but with them individuality also appears in a more ideal and suitable form. So these [Athenian] individualities still belong to the state. The dark aspects of the principle, such as private concerns, thus are more moderate among the Athenian people than, for example, among the Spartans. With the latter, the principle appears as the naked destruction

80. See Plato, *Republic* 2.377–83 (Hamilton and Cairns, pp. 623–30). Plato objected to the poets' depiction of gods and goddesses (who should be role models) as immoral and fickle.

of lands, as the naked principle of the self-serving private concerns of the subject and its inner volition, as their power-seeking and greed. But with the Athenians we see that they acknowledged their corruption, made light of their shortcomings and depravity, played them down and ridiculed themselves. In no other people do we find this ability to laugh at and ridicule themselves. It is not found among the Romans, except for the soldiers' mockery of the generals. The Roman people saw Julius Caesar in triumphal procession mocked as one of themselves.

The End of Greek life and the Age of Alexander the Great

We still have to touch upon the end of Greek life. After the humiliation of the Athenians, Sparta ruled, but only for a brief period inasmuch as it was defeated by Thebes. But the Thebans did not rule for long either; they were conquered by the Phocians, who plundered and destroyed the Temple of Apollo at Delphi in a godless fashion.[81]

This completed the whole process: the determining will that was destroyed in these temples, no longer ideally protected from [attack by] other peoples, now had to come from outside and provide *actual* protection. And since this will no longer existed in the form of an oracle, a foreign king had,
386 by actual willing, to | be the decisive factor, to become the master of Greece. Thus there had to be a transition from the oracle to an actual king. The nature of this transition announced itself in the simplest way. This foreign king, Philip [of Macedon], established his power and authority in Greece; the power he assumed was odious. His son received the power and had a free hand to use it.

This second youth of Greece gathered this land under his new banner—a land that had matured in every aptitude but was no longer effectual, that had lost the political life it developed within itself; [*he*] became its determining will. He consolidated the still-existing agitation, the inner impulse of Greek life, hence turning it against the motherland of Greece, the East, the Orient, and bringing to an end, for this era, the old antagonism between East and West, which had broken out again after a lengthy hiatus. In one respect, Alexander avenged the evil that had befallen Greece at the hands of the Orient; in another respect, however, he repaid a thousandfold all the good that Greece had received from the Orient in the form of early cultural impulses. In part, he elevated the East to the maturity and well-being that

81. Phocis was one of the cities in the Delphic Amphictyony that was involved in the three 'Sacred Wars' (of the 6th–4th cents. BC), in which the shrine was held, gained, or lost by various groups. The Phocian forces under Phalaecus pillaged the shrine in the third of these wars.

Greece had achieved based on these beginnings. The great work of Alexander, his great and immortal deed, is that he made the Near East into a Greece.

We must not repeat what is usually said, and what one historian has said: although there is nothing but bloodshed, still, Alexander is great. One must be prepared for blood and strife | when one turns to world history, for they 387
are the means by which the world spirit drives itself forward; they come from the concept. We must also not say that after Alexander's death this empire declined and broke up. To be sure, his dynasty did not remain, did not continue to rule; what remained, however, is the Greek dominion, although his son, his wife Roxana together with her posthumous son (*ihrem Postumo*), were killed.[82] Alexander's greatness and his fame represent the pinnacle of Greek individuality. He could indeed establish a Greek world empire, but not a family dynasty just because he was an individual decidedly set apart. The time had not yet arrived for such a family dynasty—that such a thing should be an essential element of state control. The possibility of building an abstract unity, of founding a unitary empire, no longer resided in the Greek principle; it would have to wait for the Romans.

Alexander's empire embraced present-day Turkey, transforming it into a Greek world. An even closer connection can be found with Turkey. Alexander took his wife Roxana, the most beautiful woman of Asia, from Sogdiana in Bactria,[83] where the Turkish tribes first lived. We could thus indeed say that the people of the husband ruled and possessed the land [i.e. Turkey] that is now ruled by the people of the wife. Alexander lived for two years in Bactria and advanced to the [land of the] Scythians, going to war with them, etc. If we had a historian of these events like Herodotus, | we 388
would have much information about the condition of the peoples living there and about the broad connection between these peoples and those whom we later see turning up in Europe, such as the later Huns.[84] The

82. Roxana was the daughter of Oxyartes, a Bactrian baron. Alexander married her in 327 BC to consolidate his power in Persia. After his sudden death in 323, she bore him a posthumous son, Alexander IV. Roxana and her son became involved in various political intrigues after the collapse of the Alexandrian empire until they were both assassinated about 309.

83. Bactria was an ancient kingdom in the vicinity of what was once eastern Persia, and is now Uzbekistan and northern Afghanistan. Sogdiana lay between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers to the north of Bactria and well east of the Turkey (i.e. the Ottoman Empire) of Hegel's day. The Turkish tribes originated from broad regions of central Asia.

84. Herodotus, writing a century before Alexander's conquests, discusses the Scythians as they were, in and before his day, in *History* 4.1–142 (Grene, pp. 279–331). The Huns, nomadic peoples who originated in north central Asia, appeared in Europe in the 4th cent. AD and built up an empire there. Attila, their greatest leader, had his palace in present-day Hungary. Several

Bactrian kingdom lasted two hundred years, until it fell to the Romans. Greek kingdoms in Asia Minor, in Armenia, and in Egypt flourished for centuries. They became kingdoms in keeping with the nature of those regions.

In Greece itself the earlier circumstances, including external political relationships, remained unchanged. Greek kings honored the republic in these small states, and considered themselves honored to have descended from them. They had their principal estates in the cities in which they believed themselves to be revered because of their [efforts on behalf of] preserving the city. Fame and glory came from liberating Greece; ['liberator of Greece'] now became a title of honor. It became a slogan, but it only meant that the Greek states and communities were maintained in a condition of weakness; each individual city was isolated, and the whole was dissolved and split up into a countless multitude of insignificant cities[85] and communities. Thus Rome too challenged Greece, and the Roman principle prevailed over the Greek.

If we compare the condition of these states earlier and later, the personality of Alexander is of central interest. Earlier the chief historical interest focused on Greece, and individuals were singled out only inasmuch as they labored for the state. Such distinction for such services necessarily aroused envy in a democracy, just as reward for meritorious service motivated individuals to serve. It was, however, subjective personality that was already rising to such importance. After Alexander, on the contrary, it is not the destiny of states that is of major interest; rather it is interest in
389 individuals | on whom this destiny now depends—the destiny that determines things for good or ill. With Alexander the greatness of the people and of individuals is in equilibrium. The enterprise (*das Werk*) is the personal greatness of individuals; the individual is precisely what belonged to such an enterprise. Likewise, the enterprise was only to be undertaken, and was necessarily carried out, by this particular individual. The individual, Alexander, is the pivotal point in this transition.

Through political and petty deal-making, his father, Philip, had to assemble the means and had judiciousness and attention to detail; his son no longer needed to concern himself with these means because his father had

centuries after their defeat, in the late 9th cent., the Magyars, a Finno-Ugric people from beyond the Urals, conquered and settled most of Hungary. The Magyars might be considered 'later Huns' (although they are not ethnically related), or Hegel may simply mean that the Huns entered Europe later than the events described in this paragraph.

85. Thus Griesheim, slightly altered; Hotho reads: 'into countless insignificant states'

perfected the instruments of power. These he handed ready-made over to his son. On the other hand, Alexander was educated by Aristotle, the most fruitful and most profound philosopher of antiquity, who, by means of his most profound philosophy, his profound metaphysics (which even today many professors of metaphysics do not understand), conducted Alexander into an understanding of the nature of history. He did not educate him as a prince but taught him worthwhile things in a serious manner. Alexander's disposition, his profound genius, was thus liberated in the element of thought in such a way that, by his being open-minded, he could devote himself wholly to the deed. His great genius for, and extensive grasp of, ruling led him boldly to make Asia into a credit to Greece, and to found Alexandria, for many centuries a great world city.

Equally commendable was his relationship with his troops, whom he led as a prince and field-commander. Furthermore, having a broad outlook and his goal in his sights, he knew how to speak to his troops as Pericles did to the Athenians. What he imposed on the soldiers enlarged the sphere of their lives. He had a more difficult relationship with the old subordinates of his father. These former subordinates were accomplished men, and such men regarded their preceding accomplishments as of supreme value. They were jealous | of the young man who engaged in great works. It was humiliating 390
for them to acknowledge that the deeds of the youth were greater, that he was accomplishing something greater than the basis for their fame, greater than what they had thought about, what they had developed. With Clitus[86] in Bactria, this jealously boiled over into the blind rage and fury of indignation, to which there was a full response, one perhaps entirely deserved but still unfortunate. Alexander's great personal bravery was renowned; he was always the first in battle and to confront every danger. Equally great, finally, is Alexander's death. Lying on his death bed, speaking to his army, he bade farewell to his friends; he died, like Achilles, at the right time. His work was finished, his image sealed, and he left his accomplishments behind for us. The grand and unsurpassable image of this personality was of a stature that could at most be tarnished by petty reproaches.

This individuality could arise and come to prominence only in Greece. But such individuality could not be borne and sustained by a Greek political constitution. Plato's deep insight grasped this very well and truly.[87] He

86. Clitus, a Macedonian officer, became agitated at a dinner party and made insulting remarks to Alexander, who in a drunken rage killed him on the spot. Later Alexander regretted his action and even considered suicide.

87. Plato discusses these matters generally in the *Republic*.

pictured a constitution as simply apprehending and portraying the actuality of Greek ethical life; the actual nature of Greek ethical life is not an ideal but rather what Greek life expresses. But since he observed that the corruption of subjectivity threatened this principle, he wanted to exclude subjectivity from the family and private property; he banished it and portrayed a situation in which only substantial ethicality should rule. In this subjectivity, in this personality, however, lay the kernel and principle of the spirit of higher freedom—the principle that should now enter into world history.

Just as the particular personalities of individuals have become free, and
391 cannot endure and abide Greek life, so | too particular qualities now defined the individual shapes into which the Greek states had differentiated themselves. It was [like] a distinctiveness between beautiful gods, in which the differences in shape were not detrimental to their divinity. If, however, their connecting links fall away, then only a distorted, barren, abstract particularity remains, focusing obstinately and inflexibly on itself, and it stands in conflict with other such particularities. Greek history presents us with this spectacle for a century and a half after Alexander's death, up to about the year 146. The situation in this interim period is regrettable. On the one hand, the relationship between the states is diplomatic in such a way that only a wholly artificial web and play of various combinations could preserve the states. On the other hand, in this period there are particular personalities on whom the destiny of states now depends; through the particular interests and passions of these individuals, the state is now inwardly torn asunder into parties and factions, each of which seeks to acquire outward prominence in order to appeal to the favor of the king and bring it to bear on the conduct of the state. Athens still retained a modest position; in the sciences Athens still enjoyed respect. The Aetolian Confederation was an association of robbers. From the outset, the Achaean or Peloponnesian League was properly and worthily maintained for a long time with fame and honor until it was reduced to, and collapsed under, the baseness of its chiefs, who then found support from the Romans.

What still interests us in this period are the great personalities, the great tragic characters. However, the best they could do was ward off harm;
392 through their administration | and skill, chiefly directed outwardly, they preserved their native land for a while but were unable to establish a secure and sound state of affairs. They failed in these efforts and struggles, without the vindication of having provided peace and security to their native land; and thus we cannot determine whether they always conducted themselves in a pure and appropriate manner. What interests us in this period are the

biographical writings of Plutarch and Polybius.[88] Polybius gives us the history of the states at that time, but this is of less interest because then individuals were of primary importance. Plutarch's *Lives* is renowned as great scholarship. The biographies of older writers such as Theseus are partly mythological, and partly their lives are intertwined with the state. (At least in former times both of these authors were popular reading.) The best accounts fall into the period that we are now considering. Two states, Sparta and the Achaean Confederation, furnish the best examples. Persons loyal to their native land also had to contend with inner factions that always found outside support and were enemies of the state. Two kings, Agis and Leonidas,[89] sought to resist evil, but without success since they could not avoid creating enemies within and without. The Achaean Confederation provides good examples from which, through *The Histories* of Polybius, we gain the impression how, in such circumstances and after futile efforts, good and practical persons must either despair or withdraw. And such circumstances, together with such personalities, call for a power to which they themselves finally succumb—a power that judges and discloses the impotence of the old ways. Over against these parochial concerns, and the fixation in these finite circumstances in which all that is particular in states and personalities rigidifies itself, a destiny appears | that can only negate 393
what has gone before; it is blind, harsh, and abstract. And the Roman Empire plays the role of this fate.

88. See Plutarch, *The Parallel Lives* (a series of biographies pairing Greek and Roman lives); and Polybius, *The Histories* (which covered the Mediterranean world from before 220 to 146 BC).

89. A probable reference to the Spartan King Agis IV (*c.*265–241 BC), who opposed concentration of power in large estates and burnt mortgages that bound the citizens. Leonidas II was also a Spartan king (254–235 BC), but in a different dynasty.

THE ROMAN SPIRIT

Introduction

Napoleon said to Goethe that what is of interest in tragedy is destiny (*Schicksal*), and since we no longer have this fate (*Fatum*) of the ancients, what takes its place for us is politics.[1] Merely private concerns and personalities must be subject to the irresistible authority of two factors—the purpose and the authority of the state, this irresistible entity—and politics as power cannot take individuals into account but instead must sacrifice them.

The achievement of the Roman Empire is *power* as purely abstract universality, through which destiny, which is abstractly universal, entered into the world. In the Roman Empire the life of private concerns was severely constrained (*in Banden geschlagen*). In the Pantheon of its world dominion Rome assembled and sequestered all the gods and spirits, amassing every misfortune and all suffering. Rome broke the heart of the world, and only out of the world's heartfelt misery, out of this wretchedness of spirit's natural state, could free spirit develop and arise.

In the Greek world we have individuality; in the Roman Empire we have abstract universality. What is concrete in this universality is just self-seeking, is prosaic, practical dominion. In the case of the Romans we are not dealing with any inherently spiritual, free life; joy is envisaged theoretically, yet there is only a lifeless existence, a vitality that has, as its exclusive purpose, practical understanding, the validating of what is inflexibly universal, a
394 universality that sticks to practical matters. | For that reason we can be brief, because the manifold materials are reducible to these characteristics.

The first thing we have to speak about is the Roman spirit as such.

1. See Goethe's *Tagebücher*, conversation with Napoleon, Sept. 1808. Goethe reports as follows: 'The emperor. . . returned to the topic of drama and made very significant observations, in particular about how someone who studies the tragic stage with the greatest attention, like a criminal court judge, in doing so would be very profoundly aware of how French theater departs from nature and truth. Thus he came with disapproval to the plays concerning destiny or fate. They would have belonged to a more obscure time. He said: "What does one intend today by 'destiny'? Politics is destiny."' See *Johann Wolfgang Goethe Sämtliche Werke*, div. 1, vol. xvii, ed. Irmtraut Schmid (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), 381.

The Origins of Rome

The locus of the world spirit is moving more to the West. It is still on the far side of the Alps [from Germany], in the Mediterranean theater, and only later does it make its way to the north. Rome was founded along a river, but this river is no longer the warm, incubating element as in the East; it forms no Asian river valley. Instead the river is of interest in virtue of its link to the sea. Rome has a firm basis directly in the land and is set back from the sea, whereas Tyre and Carthage had to take shape exclusively along the sea. We should state, however, that the particular land in which the Roman Empire had its origin is not a major factor, and we can say that Rome took shape abroad. That is because in this case the hub was the starting point, the reverse of the situation in Greece, and what ensued was the expansion outward from this center. Three territories came together at this point, those of the Latins, the Sabines, and the Etruscans, and so it is a matter of indifference as to which one of them Rome more belongs. Rome first becomes evident in this confluence [of peoples].

Here there is no starting out from a family or a patriarchal form, and not even a uniting or intermingling for the purpose of a peaceful life. Instead the vacant land is the goal of a robber band in circumstances also involving Romulus, Aeneas, Numitor, and so forth.[2] The historical point is that Romulus and Remus founded here a new historical hub, the kingdom. An ancient connection with Troy is something very widespread in the tradition, | and 395
later on it became a truly literal fancy of the Italians that their lineage stems from Troy.[3] Livy refers to four places that are called Troy. Thus according to Livy his native city is a colony of Antenor's, and we find a comparable fancy in ancient German legends.[4] So in chronicles even the ancient Germans

2. Numitor is the legendary grandfather of Romulus and Remus, and is king of Alba, a town on Mt. Alba, a place sacred to the Latins. Much of the information in this and subsequent footnotes is obtained from entries in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford, 1977).

3. The *Aeneid* of Virgil builds on earlier stories of how the Trojan hero Aeneas wandered about the Mediterranean after the war, eventually coming to the later site of Rome. Virgil (70–19 BC) turned this material into an epic of the founding of Rome.

4. See Livy, *Ab urbe condita libri*, book 1; tr. B. O. Foster, in *Livy*, i (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1919), 1.1.1–1.3.11 (Foster, pp. 9–17). Livy says that two Trojans, Aeneas and Antenor, founded colonies in Italy after the Trojan War, Antenor on the Adriatic (where the people are called Veneti) and Aeneas at Laurentum (on the Tyrrhenian coast), and that both places are called 'Troy'. He states that Aeneas founded a town called 'Lavinium', that Aeneas' son subsequently went from Lavinium to establish a colony at Alba Longa, and that the city of Rome ultimately derived from Alba Longa. Livy was born in Padua, a city under the control of Venice in his day, which makes Hegel's statement about his 'native city' correct. Antenor, a Trojan elder, was spared by the Greeks, and (in the historically dubious

are descended from Troy; however, we [Germans] are spiritual descendants of the Greeks, not of the Trojans. Rome's connection with Troy be as it may, Rome took shape as a brotherhood of shepherds and bandits, formed by Romulus and Remus. This initial community expanded to include castoffs (*colluvies*),[5] and in doing so made itself into a free city for all these convergent people, into a sanctuary city for all (*urbs omnis asyle*), for the emancipated, those with no homeland, and criminals.

Marriage and the Social Order

A tradition just as specific is that the first Romans had no wives. Being wifeless, they invited the neighboring peoples to a religious festival. The only ones to come were the Sabines, a mountain people; the Etruscans and Latins did not. Since these peoples, even in later times, had no bonds of marriage with their women and did not wish to, the Romans robbed these people of their women, revealing thereby how the Romans understood the use of religion as a subterfuge. This expresses the main character of Roman religion, that its purpose is political in nature. Here we have the genesis of the community, and it is typical for all the subsequent history of Rome. We see these two factors, the locale that is isolated by both choice and circumstance (*activ und passiv*), and then the method of abduction by which the community was enlarged.

The third thing to notice is the direct consequence of such a bond: the marriage relationship for the Romans. In the Greek case the forerunner of the genesis of the state was not a patriarchal relationship, but was nevertheless the family relationship. Also, the Greeks united for peaceful purposes
396 because, | in contrast to the marauding Romans, they required the formation of defenses of the land, for then too the eradication of pirates was the primary requisite for their prosperity. Quite the reverse, Romulus and Remus were expelled from the family,[6] and so too Romans acquired their wives not legitimately via courtship, but instead by force and abduction. So they are far removed from the instinct of natural ethical life, and this leads to

Roman version) led a Paphlagonian people to found Patavium (later Padua) in the Venetia region of Italy.

5. The unusual term *colluvies* is cognate with 'colluvium', for which *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* gives the meaning of 'rock detritus and soil accumulated at the foot of a slope', and it gives the derivation as from Latin *colluvies*, in turn from *com* + *luere*.

6. According to legend the twins Romulus and Remus, reputed founders of Rome, as infants were abandoned to die by exposure, and were suckled by a wolf.

harshness or severity toward the family, with the result that harshness toward familial instincts remains the rule from this point onward.

For the Romans there are two ways in particular that a woman entered into marriage. One way was marriage accomplished by a solemn ceremony (*confarreatio*) through which she came to be a legal possession (*in manum, mancipium*), that is, she became a slave and thus *mater familias*, that is, *filiae loco*: she took up the legal status of a daughter. The husband became the complete owner of what is hers, of the dowry (*dos*) and what she otherwise was heiress to; in ancient times he himself was even master over the life and death of the wife (and could take her life on account of her drunkenness or adultery). This is the most ancient kind of marriage.

The other kind was marriage by continued use (*usus*), by acquiring the woman, by taking possession or making use of her, by ownership based on continued possession (*usucapio*). If in fact a woman lived with a man for a year without being apart from him for three nights, she was then his wife without further ceremony, was under the control (*in manu*) of the husband. But then she was just called matron (*matrona*), and the husband was not the owner of the woman's goods, of her property. Her sons did not have the legal rights in holy matters (*in sacris*) that those of the *mater familias* did. If she remained apart from him for three nights, then she did not become a slave and she was held in honor and dignity. To be independent of the husband involved having legal rights over against the husband in virtue of liberation from his authority, the reverse from how it is in our day. For us the wife has honor in being one with the husband.

A third kind [of marriage], through purchase, later came to replace the first kind. | 397

Sons and daughters too stood in the same relationship as that of the wives who were slaves or were totally dependent, as legal possessions (*in mancipio*) of the father, having no possessions and authoritative status of their own, and they could not even free themselves from paternal authority in virtue of their holding offices. Only the *flamen dialis* or priest of Jupiter and the vestal virgins were exempt from paternal authority, because they were the property (*mancipia*) of the temple, of the priests. Likewise, later on people were also extremely capricious in the making of wills. So we see how ethical life became wholly unnatural, and an unshakable status was given to the husband over against the family.

This harshness on the husband's own part (*activ*) correlates with the passive harshness that is his lot, a lot in which the Romans find themselves in relation to the state, for an abstract commanding brings with it an abstract subjection. Those who on the one hand are despots are, on the other hand,

ruled over themselves. The fact that the Romans thus found themselves in a political bond that sacrifices all natural and concrete ethical life is the greatness of Rome. This abstract oneness with the state and this utter subordination to it—approximating to how in our case things are in the military, although we still keep distinct the civilian life of someone in the military—constitutes the greatness of Rome. For the Romans, however, civilian life too was pervaded by this harshness.

If we want to take a closer look at this relationship, we must consider the Romans in their role as warriors. In this instance it seems to be magnificent how, without flinching or yielding, the Romans keep their focus on the state and its dictates. This feature appears from one angle to be the virtue of Rome. From another angle we must likewise consider how this characteristic
398 appears not only in external affairs | but also within Rome itself, for Rome owes its strength to maintaining it. In the dissensions arising between the plebeians and the Senate and leading to rebellion, dissensions in which public order and respect for the laws was suspended and the legal cohesiveness shattered, there was almost always respect for the form [of law], with the result that reverence for order restored order among the plebeians, putting a halt to their lawful and unlawful demands. Often, even though there was no war, someone was made dictator, someone who then conscripted the citizens as soldiers and led them as soldiers from the city. The laws of Licinius are of the greatest importance for the relationships of the plebeians to the patricians. Ten years were indeed required for their implementation, and the people who were his followers were kept waiting for ten years and more, by the objection of a few tribunes, before these laws were adopted and put into operation.[7] We do not find the story of this dissension conceivable unless we also see this obedience to, or respect for, the dictates of the state. The circumstance of Roman origins has indeed its seed, and thus its inherent prerequisites, for a condition or an obedience of this sort to be able to come about, since only by strict measures can those with no native land be held together as one.

A further point would be to demonstrate the more specific, internal, natural progression to the harshness of such a bond, of such hostilities, and its natural possibility would then be sought and found in the life of
399 the ancient Italian peoples from whose convergence | the Roman community took its shape. But, owing to the spiritless character of the Roman

7. On the Licinian-Sextian Laws, see below, n. 20.

historians who, unlike the Greek historians, do not describe the lives of enemy peoples, we know little about these ancient [Italian] peoples.

We have remarked in general terms that we proceeded from East to West, setting out from that Eastern conversion of all finitude into infinitude, from the inability of individuals to know themselves as autonomous, and likewise from the conversion of the determinateness of natural objects into something without measure. So what comes first is this immeasurability, and what is second, in Greece, is animation (*Beseelung*) and limitation in beautiful individuality. The Greek revered what is bounded, and at the same time gave it life (*beseelt*). The third element exhibits for us the consciousness of finitude, the holding fast to finitude. Over against the poetry of the Greeks, which constantly oscillates between the indeterminate and the determinate, there now emerges the [Roman] prose of life, the element of the finite, the abstraction of the understanding as something ultimate, in that *this prose*, this abstract element, is what is ultimate.

The family in its inflexibility does not extend itself outward, for instead the harsh unity remains.

This same principle is evident in Etruscan art. What we know of it, insofar as the works themselves are recognized as genuine and are not from a more developed form of art, exhibits completeness, a developed state of mechanical technique and execution but without the idealized beauty of the Greeks; it lacks the ideal nature of Greek art. It consists of specific, prosaic, arid, imitative portraiture. So one consistent feature is the external prose and internal abstraction. | 400

Life's relationships too were entered into, and situated in, this aridity, in this specificity of the understanding. Here we have separation, but not into families, for there were none, because love was not a factor; instead under this specific heading we have also to mention the separate existence (*Abscheidung*) of the *gens*. A *gens* of this kind was something established on its own account also with reference to its political characteristics, and for centuries these *gentes* maintained their own distinctive characters in their outlook and means.[8] Each *gens* had its own *lares* and *penates* [household gods], its own *sacra* [rites], and had become something absolutely fixed; its fixity took the shape of something religious, something fixed absolutely. With the Greeks too families had their household gods and distinctive rites, although this was more a matter of the worship and priesthood of a

8. A *gens* is a clan or group of related families consisting of freeborn persons who claim a common ancestor and share a common name.

god in which the whole populace took part. In Rome, however, each family had its own set religious rites.

Related to this fixed character is the Roman restriction or exclusion of marriages between patricians and plebeians, inheritance between them, and the like. The *limites* [boundaries] of a farm field were something sacred and fixed too (see, for instance, Cicero's *Pro domo sua*[9]). Just as sacred were certain minor matters that are equally insignificant. We should not look upon this as a matter of piety, but instead quite the contrary: there is nothing necessarily sacred in this practice of making something profane into an absolute, and making such disparate things to be sacred, things that are themselves devoid of spirit.

The development of Roman law is related to this fixing of distinctions based on the understanding.

What becomes firmly fixed here are abstract persons on their own account. We owe the development of law in the juridical sense to the
401 constricted (*unfrei*), | unfeeling understanding of the Romans, to the constricted, unfeeling Roman world. Although this law is a great gift, a law of this kind is not to be viewed as the ultimate of wisdom or reason. Previously we saw, for instance, that in the Oriental world ethical life and morality and religion were made into law in the juridical sense, and this even took place with the Greeks. Because of that the political constitution therefore rested on ethics and then subsequently on fickle inwardness, the inner being of subjectivity. The Romans brought about the great separation [of these factors]. They are famous for inventing juridical law, the unfeeling sphere of abstract personality, and they developed it. But they themselves were sacrificed to it, thus preparing the way for their successor races to attain freedom of spirit and to be relieved of a thankless labor. At the same time, however, the Romans did not yet have spirit, heart, and religion. They have not set spirit, heart, and religion apart from law in a formal sense, although they have developed formal law independently, and in doing so they parted ways with these other aspects, cutting themselves off completely from them.

Art too has its technical aspect. Those who have the technique can allow free beauty to come within their purview and can freely develop fine art. But to be deplored are those hapless persons who suppose that the essence of art

9. The usual name of Cicero's treatise is *De domo sua* ('The Speech Concerning his House Delivered before the College of Pontiffs'). Cicero's speech, given after his return from exile, includes a lengthy protest against the seizure of his house and land by Clodius Pulcher, who had been responsible for Cicero's exile (§§ 100–47). In the course of the speech Cicero makes numerous references to ritual 'consecration' of the site. See *Cicero*, xi, tr. N. H. Watts (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1923), 132–311.

lies in this technique and who believe that the sublime is to be found in it. For craftsmanship in art is not the starting point but is instead only what encompasses the external aspect.

In recent times the Enlightenment [mode of] understanding has, in the same fashion, seized upon the content of religion, first making it explicit and believing that, in doing so, it possesses the whole of religion. To the contrary, however, | what necessarily happened was that the higher aspect of 402
religion and philosophy separated itself off from that understanding, inasmuch as religion and philosophy have the understanding to thank for the fact that, by its intertwining [its version of] religion with the understanding, the understanding itself has put an end to this intertwining of what is merely finite and narrow-minded with reason, and has left the finite to develop a particular domain on its own.

So the Romans by themselves had nothing but jurists; proceeding from the jurists, religion here was able to make its way into determinate existence.

Roman Religion, Utility, and the Aristocracy

So now we have to pass over to Roman religion. We have seen the Romans placing their confidence in the understanding of finitude; we saw them bound to the determinacy of the understanding. This character also applies to their religion. Cicero derives *religio* from *religare*, 'to bind', and in doing so he is content with the truth of the *majorum* (multitude).[10] For the Romans there is in fact a 'being bound', whereas for the Greeks religion is free fantasy, the freedom of beauty, and for the Christians it is the freedom of spirit. Greek religion and Roman religion are not the same, although there is a retention of names. Along with the Roman principle of discord within oneself, with this bifurcation, what developed and became decisive is the constraint (*Beschränktheit*) and the particularity within the Roman state as such.

This negative element, this constrained condition within spirit as such and more specifically in willing on the part of spirit, is a finite, constrained purpose. For the Roman spirit the ultimate vocation is a finite purpose. For the Romans there is no free enjoyment of ethical life. In their case we see no free, ethical life, but instead the greatest seriousness on behalf of the

10. In *De domo sua*, § 141 (Watts, pp. 302–3), Cicero ridicules the ritual blunder and religious inefficacy of his enemy's attempt at performing a consecration rite, and says: 'Great is the power that resides in the dispensation of the immortal gods, yes, and in the republic itself.' On Roman religion see the 1821 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford, 2007), ii. 190–231.

constrained interest in their purposes; whereas with the Greeks there is a more profound seriousness. For this reason the Romans are more thoroughly practical; they are people who have to accomplish goals, and they are not theoretical in the setting of those goals. Theory calls for disinterested activity and orientation toward what is objective; it requires a free objec-
403 tivity. |

Hence the divinity or piety of the Romans is not something free but is instead something internally constrained, so that they themselves are not free in relation to it, and it is not free in relation to them.

But what then begins [to exist] in them too, together with this constraint, is an inwardness, a restraint (*Festhalten*) with respect to oneself, within one's inner self, internally. This restraint is a separation, that is, a determinacy, of oneself within oneself, brought about by the constrained nature of the purpose, and it is for that reason that, together with this constraint, inwardness itself as such becomes a factor. So the Romans are this seriousness of constrained purpose and are practical, because this constraint of theirs is the ultimate thing. The Orientals exist in placid indolence, in substantial unity with self, immersed in self, untroubled by what is particular. The Greeks are ceaselessly in motion, are light-hearted without purpose, are moved only in a transitory way by constrained purposes. That is because, insofar as spirit posits a purpose for itself, spirit still immediately exists within itself in a set condition (*Festigkeit*) of its own, over and above this purpose. The Romans, however, are enchained in superstition, and earnestly so. What they look upon as absolute is itself something in bondage, not something liberated from the constraint of particular purposes.

We do of course see in Roman religion many Greek gods and others adopted by the Greeks, although even this practice of adoption has a hollow ring to it. We are disheartened when the Romans speak of something external; it leaves us cold. The Romans do also have a few unsophisticated nature festivals of rural simplicity that introduce a cheerful element, ones involving a more cheerful and deeper devotion. But the main characteristic is the set condition of a specific willing and purpose that they demand of their
404 gods, and for the sake of which they worship the gods. | So Roman religion is a religion of purposiveness, utility, and constraint.

We see a host of prosaic deities of [special] circumstances, of commonplace skills and sentiments, deities drawn from the useful arts and similar specific domains (*Bestimmungen*), deities that the mundane fantasies of the Romans make authoritative and worship as something ultimate. Altars are erected to plague and famine, even the goddess Fornax is worshiped,

and so forth.[11] Other deities include Peace, Tranquillitas, Sorrow, and other such mundane circumstances and arts. They held Juno to be the goddess Moneta, the goddess of coins,[12] whereas [her Greek counterpart] Hera was the goddess of universal life. So they came to envisage the essence of coinage as something divine. The further point, then, is that we see the gods entreated from a condition of need, that in their need the Romans made their promises and vows and thus allowed gods to be imported from abroad, with the result that all their festivals are memorials of events. Almost all their festivals are based on specific occasions and almost all their temples are erected out of necessity, as a result of vows. What is useful or of constrained purpose was the foundation of their festivals and temples. There is no disinterested, general thankfulness toward, or exaltation and invocation of, what is higher, for what we have instead is what is specifically expedient.

We saw that the Greeks based their temples and religious worship on love for the beautiful and the divine. In the Roman dramas we see the same [aforementioned] character. The Romans were simply the spectators, whereas the performers or actors were emancipated persons, subject peoples, and slaves, ones held in contempt, just as later on the performers were the gladiators who were condemned to die. Nero got most of the blame for this | because he frequented the theater himself. The performances 405
were an outwardly exotic spectacle targeting these people; they degenerated into the introduction of animals that tore human beings to pieces, and into people slaying one another. In one day 600 lions came into the Circus [Maximus], as well as crocodiles, elephants, bears, and animals from all parts of the world. Most of the gladiators had already been condemned to death, so the 5,000 who approached the royal seat cried out: 'We greet you, emperor, as those doomed to die'. All those doomed to die had to provide the Romans with the spectacle of murder. So, in order to hold their interest, the Romans needed for there to be actual suffering, actual cruelty.

To the Romans the suffering of these people, their pain, thus became theoretical, became a theoretical purpose. This suffering inherent in the Romans from their very origins onwards became objective to them in this way. The meaning of this direction taken by the Roman spectacles lies in the fact that the Romans [themselves] did not take an active part in these dramas and festivals. Roman earnestness militated against the exhibiting of one's own personality, and it presupposes that an inner purpose, an inner value, a *gravitas*, an explicit restraint, has taken shape within oneself, a restraint that

11. Fornax is the goddess of ovens.
12. In Rome, money was coined in the temple of Juno Moneta.

cannot develop itself in externality, one that cannot simply present itself in this sensibility; whereas beautiful individuality, entirely from out of itself, gives shape to what is within it. When people have formed an internal purposiveness within themselves, then this [individual expression] is no longer possible. The beautiful gods appear wholly as what they are; in the *gravitas* [of individuals], however, there is something different within them that becomes external.

The auspices and the Sibylline books, the auguries, display superstition in its utter intensity, and have as their exclusive purpose—with these ceremonies becoming only means to this purpose—dominance by the patricians, in the way that then, for instance, Cicero too regards them expressly as means
406 for deceiving the people.[13] |

So the religion is a religion of utility in which particularity is made absolute. This sanctification of different things, this constraint and [its ensuing] complications, is also pertinent to the governing principle of the political constitution. The entire principle, the inequality of lineages, entails the fact that there can be no democracy of equality, no concrete vitality of the kind there is in Greece. The basic feature is the overwhelming dominance of one sector of the *gentes*. In the same way too no monarchy is possible here, because monarchy presupposes the spirit of the free evolving of particularity. And here purpose is still something constrained within which, as the purpose of the state, individuals are bound. The Roman principle or the Roman political constitution lends itself only to aristocracy, which is, however, also by the same token something internally hostile and constrained, and even in the most complete existence aristocracy cannot be the explicitly accomplished shape; instead it accordingly has opposition and struggle within it, and is a shape that can be made good only for the time being, as a result of unhappiness and necessity. Aristocracy is in fact something that does not lend itself to internal unity and that can be unified only by harsh measures.

THE PERIODS OF ROMAN HISTORY

Now we have to examine things from a historical perspective. Here too there are three periods. We already saw the epochs as those of Rome's origins, its
407 reference to the East, and its relation to the principle that ensues.[14] |

13. See *De domo sua*, §§ 39–42 (Watts, pp. 180–7) for Cicero's attack on the misuses of augury and the auspices.

14. See above, p. 372, for a similar periodization of the Greek world: 'Three periods are found in the Greek World, and this is the case with every people thereafter'. See also p. 467,

THE FORMATION OF ROMAN POWER

Early Kings, Patricians, and Plebeians

We have already spoken about the first epoch, that of Rome's origins.[15] Between it and the epoch of Roman emergence as a world-historical people on a world-historical stage there comes the development of the inner principle to the apex of its greatest strength.

Rome made its beginning as a state by means of sovereign authority. Roman chronology puts the beginning in 754 BC. The Greek Olympiads originated in 776 BC. Most of the Roman kings were outsiders. Romulus, Numa Pompilius, Hostilius, the Tarquins, Servius, and those who followed, were for the most part foreigners.[16] So the kings were mostly outsiders.

In Roman history, then, there is no beautiful mythological antecedent as in Greece, no [mythological] powers either natural or ethical. For the Greek spirit these powers came to have physical and ethical definition in a mythical way. There are no echoes of this in Roman history. What is most ancient simply begins in a specific way that one cannot take to be poetry. This material is legendary, to be sure, but there is nothing of a poetic nature in these accounts. The accounts concerning the 'centuries'[17] and the like, ones we must accept as historical, are specific and so little poetic that instead the most specific understanding expresses itself directly in them. The Romans derived partly from the Etruscans and the Latins, and the [faculty of] understanding was directly apparent in their institutions. The kings were soon expelled as being superfluous. The cause of this expulsion was said to be the violation of a woman, and this violation of the maiden subsequently brought about the revolution | and occasioned the banishing of 408

below, on the periods of the Germanic World. Actually, Hegel's treatment of the arrival of Christianity, occurring in the second period of the Roman World, adds a fourth element to this arrangement; see p. 447, below, with n. 37. Hegel devotes more attention to Christianity here than he does to Roman dominion itself.

15. See above, pp. 427–8.

16. According to tradition, Romulus was the first king. He was followed by six others in the list, most of whom were probably Etruscans and historical figures: Numa Pompilius (715–673), Tullus Hostilius (673–642), Ancus Marcius (642–616), Tarquinius Priscus (616–579), Servius Tullius (578–535), Tarquinius Superbus (534–510). After the expulsion of the last of these kings, power passed from the Etruscans and the Romans established a republic based on an aristocratic society.

17. Servius Tullius, the sixth king, is said to have arranged the Roman people into 193 'centuries', or divisions. That is likely the point to which Hegel refers here. Later on a 'century' was a Roman army unit of 100 soldiers, one-sixtieth of a legion.

the *decemviri*.[18] In such times we see the most profoundly inward violation as being the violation of honor and family unity, for in these times honor is what is innermost, just as in later ages conscience is the innermost and most profound aspect. In this instance, however, the interesting point is the deference (*Pietät*) within the family.

The kings were driven out with vicious hostility, with vicious hatred, precipitated by a criminal violation. At first glance the change appears to be an important one, although this transition from monarchy to republicanism is not so very significant because in no sense had there been a [genuine] monarchy. 'Republic' is an indefinite term too, since here in the Roman case what existed was simply aristocracy and not a splendid democracy. Hence nothing in fact changed after the kings were expelled. Kingly power was given to the aristocrats, and in kind (*in specie*) to the consuls.

One aspect of the further development involved the administrative authority, the fact that particular occupations were set apart or detached from the highest authority, namely, the 'personal jurisdictions'. The chief factor in the further progression consisted of the distinction between, and relationship of, patricians and plebeians. The expulsion of the kings put the plebeians in an unfavorable position. They gained nothing by the expulsion of the kings. Beforehand the kings had even been averse to, and detested by, the patricians—especially so, Ancus Marcius. The kings had been favorable toward the populace and exalted it, giving it at least a certain place in the
409 legal, civil society. | The patricians were averse to the kings, even to the last ones, because the kings had impeded their subjugation of the plebeians. This impediment was now removed. And it is a constant, perpetual circumstance in every state that the populace has its friend in the higher royal power; it has protection provided by the kings, and yet it allows itself to be deceived and aligns itself with the middle class, cleaving to the middle ranks to its own disadvantage, since they become its oppressors.

In the nation, then, all the offices and positions, and almost all the landed property, were concentrated in few hands (*vereint*). The people had no lands of their own, and so their lot was poverty. Livy gratefully praised the final policy of Tarquinius [Superbus], which enabled the people to gain

18. The term *decemviri* means 'ten men', and was used for various panels of magistrates. Tradition holds that the constitution was suspended in 451 BC, and ten patricians were appointed to construct a new law code. Hegel jumps from the expulsion of the kings to a later episode in which the *decemvir* Appius Claudius lusted after a young woman named Verginia, and her own father killed her to prevent her from being victimized by the *decemvir*. This event precipitated the overthrow of the *decemviri* in a revolution in 449 BC. The whole story is legend rather than accurate history.

sustenance via public works.[19] A second deficiency was that the administration of justice was in the hands of the patricians, there being no specific written laws; they also held all other authority in the state. The decemvirs remedied this deficiency by committing the unwritten law to writing. But they abused their authority, and this abuse could only be checked by revolution. The impoverishment of the people was in part temporarily ended by the partial cancellation of their debts to the patricians. Another means was the assistance provided by the agrarian laws.

One sector of the plebeians themselves, or at least the sector that later came to consist mostly of plebeians, found itself in a client relationship with the patricians, one like the later feudal relationship existing among the Germanic peoples. Despite all efforts [to understand it], this relationship has still not become entirely clear. This client relationship involved the clients having to pay a tax to their patron when the patron's daughter marries, and having to ransom his captive sons when they are prisoners of war, | as well as underwriting, or acting on behalf of, the patron himself 410
when he is in debt, loses a court case, and so forth. These clients, then, may have been part of the plebeians, who were a definite social class, a class on the one hand in harsh subjection, and on the other hand so numerous as clients that the patricians were at a disadvantage if it came to armed conflict. Later on, then, the plebeians were allowed use of the government's land, or a portion of the landed estates, or were fully granted property. All this was gained, however, only by the most violent conflicts, and the fact that they gained this advantage constituted a major turning point. Only later, as a way to prevent indigence, came occupations and disbursements derived from the public treasury. With regard to rights, the popular assemblies gained civil and political weight by the introduction of tribunes of the people, so that the people now to an extent made decisions on their own—some made by themselves alone, some made in conjunction with the Senate, with some made by the Senate alone. However, the tribunes of the people could check the decisions of the populace by their own veto power, and the Senate and the consuls could in any event likewise override the assemblies, since the auguries and auspices were under their control. In addition to the tribunes of

19. Livy describes the temples and other structures that Tarquinius Superbus had the plebeians build (1.15.1–1.16.3; Foster, pp. 190–5). He states that 'the plebeians felt less abused at having to build with their own hands the temples of the gods, than they did when they came to be transferred to other tasks also, which, while less in show, were yet rather more laborious'. Yet Livy has Lucius Iunius Brutus, the denouncer of wicked deeds committed by Tarquinius, complain: 'The men of Rome, ... the conquerors of all the nations round about, had been transformed from warriors into artisans and stone-cutters' (1.16.9; Foster, pp. 206–7).

the people, and the importance of the people's decisions, a major point was that all positions and all state official posts ultimately were opened up to the plebeians, something the patricians sought to prevent almost as tenaciously as they did the agrarian laws.

(Still in Cicero's day only the patricians held the priestly offices.) This was the practice for a thousand years after the conquest of the city. The elevation in status of the plebeians was accomplished within the first four hundred years.

411 The Licinian Laws fall approximately | in the year 389 BC; according to them the plebeians gained agricultural land, as they also did later under the Curulian Laws.[20] This was the point of greatest strength for the Roman people, because henceforth the demands of the plebeians were satisfied. At this time the common interests of the state were the universal focus. Weary of the internal struggle, with their restlessness taking a different turn, the people turn outward, and this is the point at which they are strongest. Internally placated, their energies turn outward. Despite its being so inadequate in its content, the satisfied state of affairs nevertheless seems, for the moment at least, to suffice. Later on, however, this inadequacy made itself all the more appallingly evident.

Upon examining this Roman political constitution, we can say that, as aristocracy, it is the worst constitution, even though Aristotle wants the 'best people' (οἱ ἄριστοι) to be allowed to rule.[21] 'The best ought to rule' is a splendid tenet, although if the ἄριστοι are 'best' in a merely formal [i.e. not actual] sense and they become bad, then this is the worst of constitutions. However, the Roman aristocracy was not as lifeless as perhaps was that of Venice; instead it even generated its own internal opposition, and so produced practical results. So we see here an aristocracy but also what is opposed to it, two extremes that positioned themselves as counterweights, and for the time being that produced an equilibrium. This, however, is the worst sort of relationship, because this very equilibrium is a third factor, is what is essential. It is what must exist, must itself be present and actual, not the two extremes that produce it. Beauty is likewise an equilibrium of the spiritual and the sensual, but not in such a way that those aspects exist on their own; instead, they occur in such a way that the

20. Gaius Licinius Stolo and Lucius Sextius Lateranus, tribunes of the people (376–367 BC), in 367 enacted the Licinian-Sextian laws that made various reforms favorable to the plebeians, including allowing one of the two consuls to be a plebeian, although it is perhaps doubtful that, as Hegel says, these laws granted farmland to the plebeians. Hegel puts the date of these laws a bit too early. A *curulis* is a curule or a curule aedile, an official associated with the conduct of the games in the Circus. Among the other duties of these aediles was oversight of the corn laws. Various aediles authored agricultural reform laws in the 2nd and 1st cents. BC.

21. For Aristotle on rule by 'the best', see *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Oxford, 2006, 2009), ii. 258.

extremes are not distinctions existent for their own sake; what exists instead is just this third factor, the equilibrium. But that is not the case here, where this equilibrium in the Roman state was for that reason only palliative and temporary; and | the breach subsequently emerged all the more appallingly. The 412
equilibrium in which the antitheses positioned themselves brought forth its outward orientation, and in one respect this equilibrium brought good fortune, riches, and fame, the very things that contributed to holding together the weak (*schlecht*) bond; but at the same time it introduced appalling unhappiness and exigency, the very things that, to be sure, unite the abstract sides, although only for a period of time.

Expansion and Conquest

Another and second situation to be examined is the outward expansion of Rome, [achieved] in its wars.

The main element here is steadfast solidarity, obedience to the laws of the state, an obedience that is the seat of Roman virtue; the fact is that the Romans had their mainstay in this patriotism, in this submissiveness to, and absolute sacrifice for, one thing, that which the state commands. This solidarity often saved Rome and set it apart from the other Italian nations that did not have this abstract solidarity as their principle.

The military tactics and strategy of the Romans constitute a second and related feature, one equally characteristic of them. Every great general has introduced more or less his own mode of military strategy, has nearly always introduced a new kind of tactics. The usual battle arrangement of the Macedonians was the phalanx, one-eighth of which, equipped with iron pikes, stood to the fore. The Roman legions have a close array of this sort. The Roman battle order was indeed that sort of massed troops too, although they were arranged and subdivided internally. It did not have the two extremes, of compactness and the fragmentation of the light troops, but instead was something stable and whole that was internally | arranged and 413
mobile, similar to the principle of more recent military science too.[22]

We note that going over or analyzing the various forms of Roman warfare is a tedious business. Especially tedious is Livy's arid rhetoric and his remarks that they always positively have right on their side. There are,

22. The phalanx was a Macedonian massed formation that, in the form employed by Philip and Alexander, put a portion of its members to the fore in battle while holding back the rest. Hegel's comment is that the Roman formation, which proved superior to the Macedonians in battle, was similarly massed and was organized internally into distinct units, but these units were not physically separated from one another by gaps in the battlefield.

however, always two sides to the story. Tedious too is the rhetorical mode of the historians in their constantly stating that the Romans are just dealing with the abstraction of 'enemies', so that we learn only the name of a people but nothing about the individuality of its language, ethics, military science, constitution, and so on.

In this second period of conquest there are the Roman virtues and these grand, virtuous characters who seek to be what they are simply for the sake of the state.

THE WORLD-DOMINION OF ROME

Rome's Place on the World Stage

As it grows stronger Rome enters into a second period, since by piling up smaller amounts of wealth (*Kapitalien*) the Romans, through their might, had come to be very wealthy (*großen Kapitalisten*). Now they enter into their second period and into a world theater that is round about them like a panorama, putting them in contact with Gaul, Spain, Carthage, Italy, Macedonia, the vast expanses in Asia Minor, Greece, and then with Egypt and Epines[23]—in short, therefore, with the entire perimeter of the Mediterranean; here things develop in an interconnected way. Polybius, an Achaean, grasped this era and portrayed it. He became a sacrifice to the partisanship
414 and baseness of his countrymen and, on the other side, to the Romans.[24] |

Carthage was one of the major powers against which the Romans fought. The greatness of Carthage lay in its relation to the sea, since it had no proper land forces or national army. Hannibal[25] drew the large resources with which he beset Rome from the forceful combining of nations such as the

23. It is not evident to what 'Epines' refers. Perhaps it is Epirus, which was a separate province in the Roman Empire.

24. Polybius (*c*.200–118 BC) was a Greek historian who chronicled the rise of Roman power. The Achaean Confederacy, of which he was a leader, became part of the Roman sphere of influence in 198 BC, but got into frequent conflicts with the Romans thereafter. Polybius was among a large group of Achaeans deported to Rome and detained there. Subsequently he became associated with prominent Romans and traveled widely in the Mediterranean world.

25. Hannibal (247–183/2 BC), Carthaginian general whose father, Hamilcar Barca, made him swear an oath of eternal hatred of Rome, assumed command (in 221) of the Carthaginian forces in Spain. Hannibal deliberately provoked the Second Punic War (218–201) with Rome. The Carthaginians had made inroads into Sicily during the First Punic War (264–241). Their protracted campaign to conquer Spain began in 237 (and lasted until 219). Perhaps the year 237 is what Hegel has in mind when he states (just below in our text) that Hannibal 'had been in Italy for thirty-six years', up to Hannibal's decisive defeat in 202.

Numidians and others. But these sources had no enduring character; they were held together simply by his subjective genius. After he had been in Italy for thirty-six years and when they had become exhausted, Hannibal found no means for besieging the Romans, either with his countrymen in his native land, or with the Greeks and the armies of Macedonians and Syrians which were long since in internal disarray. The human stock from Greece and its provinces had dried up and faded away. So Rome became mistress of the Mediterranean Sea and all the lands around it, and then only had to work her way from this periphery farther into the breadth of the lands. In this period we find the ethical, successful, and eminent individuals of the Scipios, who lived during an ethical and healthy condition of their fatherland; although the great Scipio too died unhappy and in exile.[26]

After this victory over Carthage, corruption broke out on a large scale and individual personality became diverse, but no longer can it possess greatness. The greatness of individuals becomes intensified in striking events, but it is no longer capable of being consonant with the meaning of their fatherland. This period of magnificent splendor, which did not develop itself inwardly as something ideal, was not followed by spiritual consummation as happened with the Greeks; instead there was a burgeoning of private interests. The tension that exhibited itself as hostility toward the 'other' subsided, for the Romans no longer found it necessary to be warriors. Now they were allowed to be more concrete, since their abstract task was completed. This oneness of abstraction with | the state did indeed cease; but they did not 415
work out beautiful concrete shapes, for what broke out on all sides instead was suppressed particularity with its utter bitterness.

What transpire now (146 BC) are the plundering of Spain and the conquests in Asia Minor and Greece, while turmoil is brewing concurrently within and without.[27] The turmoil and restiveness of the Greeks, the Jugurthine War, the wars with the Cimbri and the Teutones, [and with] Sartorius, the federal state of Marius and Sulla, all lay bare the total

26. There were numerous influential members of the Scipio family in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. The 'great Scipio' is Scipio Africanus Major, who decisively defeated Hannibal at the battle of Zama (202) to end the Second Punic War. Although a hero, he was later involved with trials of members of his family by their political opponents, and he died an embittered man while in self-imposed exile from the city of Rome.

27. In 146 BC much of Greece was incorporated into the Roman province of Macedonia. About the same time Roman provinces along the coast of Spain were enlarged inland. Conquests in Asia Minor occurred over an extended period, and were not completed until some time after this.

depravity of the Roman aristocracy.[28] The slave uprising under Spartacus,[29] the wars with Mithradates[30]—all sorts of misfortune ensued for fifty to one hundred years. This turmoil of fifty to one hundred years duration displays the individuals who became the major figures, for now revolving around them are the concerns of the Roman state as to whether it should exist as such and how it ought to be. This is once again a time of extraordinary individuality like that in Greece after the death of Alexander. Interest now revolves around Marius, the Gracchi, and Cicero. Finally Caesar emerges. Caesar is the consummate image of Roman purposiveness, an artless, simple human being who wishes nothing else than to be the ruler and is undeterred by any constraints or passion.

The gallery of these colossal figures very much merits closer examination. Great individuals grapple with misfortune, and their own principal misfortune is that they do not keep clearly to what is ethical and are unable to resist immorality. Even the most noble ones, such as the Gracchi,[31] fell victim not only to the injustice of the outer world but also to their own inner injustice, since they were compelled to trample underfoot what they had lived for. The great elements of life come to the fore in these individuals. When Hannibal
416 returns to Carthage, | his first act is that he must cast the orator from the podium for finding fault with the peace that Hannibal achieved.[32] Marius,

28. Jugurtha, of the royal family in the Roman province of Numidia in Africa, precipitated various conflicts but finally surrendered to forces under Marius in 104 BC. The Cimbri and the Teutones were Germanic tribes who caused the Romans difficulty in Spain and Italy until they were defeated by Marius in 102–101 BC. 'Sartorius' is likely intended to be Sertorius. Quintus Sertorius, praetor in charge of Spain, in 80 BC led a rebellion against Rome lasting until 72 BC. Gaius Marius (157–86 BC) and Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix (138–78 BC) were Roman officers who served together but later fought one another in protracted and complex conflicts over rule of the state.

29. Spartacus, a gladiator from Thrace, led a prolonged revolt in 73–71 BC.

30. Mithradates VI (120–63 BC), ruler of territories in Asia Minor, fought three wars against the Romans, in particular as an antagonist of Sulla.

31. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (163–133 BC) and his younger brother, Gaius Sempronius Gracchus (153–121 BC), enacted agrarian laws that redistributed land to poor citizens and made other reforms. Tiberius was killed by some who thought he would gain tyrannical power, and Gaius inadvertently brought into being a new and oppressive social class of knights (*equites*) that, together with the Senate, dominated the plebeians.

32. After his long wars with Rome and his ultimate defeat by Scipio Africanus in 202 BC at the battle of Zama, Hannibal returned to Carthage and advocated peace with the Romans. The Carthaginians sought peace and sent envoys to the Romans with proposed terms. Polybius, *Histories* 15.18–19, reports the terms as well as the specific incident mentioned by Hegel. The later version in Livy, 30.37.7–10, states: 'Gisgo came forward to oppose the peace. . . . Hannibal, indignant that such things should be said and heard at so critical a moment, seized Gisgo and with his own hand dragged him down from the platform.' Tr. by Frank Gardner Moore, in *Livy*, viii (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1949), 506–7.

the victor over the Cimbri and the Teutones, has to hide out in the reeds and must take his seat on ruins, the remnants of Carthage.[33] Caesar, pacing up and down the bank of the Rubicon for long hours in the night, ponders the destiny of the world and suddenly becomes resolute, and in the end is wounded [and slain] by twenty-three wounds. History is replete with such moments. We find this in Plutarch,[34] and the representations envisage the sort of conflicting states (*Kontraste*) the human breast is known to endure.

The Emperors: One Will Dominates All

Caesar bore the weight of this colossal juxtaposition (*Auseinander zusammen*). Outside [the Roman sphere], beyond the Alps, he had made inroads into Gaul and Germania, had pressed into the Nordic world and, in doing so, discovered and opened up a new world. The other factor was that he then positioned himself at the apex of the Roman world, but not as Sulla did by a civil war in the Forum, not by struggle between factions; instead he conquered the Roman world in all its parts. His own struggle did not resemble a private struggle, for instead he went against the republic, which remained a republic in name only, the banner under whose aegis all the petty, humdrum factions operated. Caesar moved freely and openly against them; he won for himself the power and the banner of the republic, and set a free will of private interest in place of the many particular elements and over the many arbitrary wills. One must rule over many. All affairs had become rife with factions; all was passion and particularity. Caesar set himself up in place of these base, petty, private interests, and he then cleansed Rome of them. Nothing was more necessary than this dominance on the part of unalloyed free will. However, Caesar was murdered by | twenty-three wounds, in 417
virtue of a striking and unusual misunderstanding on the part of aristocratic individuals, as soon became evident. Clearly the reining in of one individual personality did not succeed. Cicero himself, this father of the fatherland, was able to envisage the salvation of the state only in particular persons and to let it rest there; and then a change is always necessary. Such a great change had to take place twice, the fact that one person came to be the ruler. We say that 'once does not count', in the sense that what takes place once can happen by

33. When his rival, Sulla, usurped power (88 BC), Marius fled to North Africa, to the protection of Africans who had served with him in earlier wars.

34. The famous account of Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul, deliberating before deciding to cross the Rubicon and advance on Rome with his army ('Let the die be cast'), is in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, vii, tr. Bernadotte Perrin (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1919), 520–3.

chance. Thus Augustus had to follow, just as Napoleon had to be dethroned twice. Augustus first of all, and then Tiberius, brought about the continuance of the form of the state.[35]

This is how the Roman political constitution came into being, as merely formal and something inherently lacking in substance. Issues of power and rule, of authority, were removed from it and passed into the hands of a free will that made itself authoritative. The mechanism of rulership was very simple. The 'Caesars' assumed the leadership of the Senate, but they had an encampment or legions close to Rome and arranged for uncooperative senators to be murdered. Soon they found even this mechanism to be unnecessary. Here in the emperor we see then particular subjectivity as self-impelled in the most utterly unlimited way. Death is the only constraint or bounds to personal particularity, and death was made into a sheer drama. Nero's demise can surely stand as an example of indifference in the face of death, where there is no fear, no future, nothing more than the desire of unbounded caprice in the present. There is no restraint against willing otherwise, against willing something universal; the circumstances of rulership are unconstrained. In the whole world there is no will equal to that of the emperor. The emperors, these Caesars, express spirit's complete coming-out-of-itself, the utter, intentional, deliberate finitude that is without con-
418 straint. Under this rulership | everything is in order just as it is; for what is needed is only the harmony or agreement of all with the rulership and the will of this one being. The concrete features of the emperor are of no interest. These concrete features do not matter in their case; even the noble features of the figures of the good emperors arouse no interest. These features are a fortunate happenstance that leaves conditions just as they are, passing by and vanishing without a trace. The emperors have only to will, for good or for ill. In this case there is no opposition, no thought, nothing that ought to be produced. Hence it did not occur even to the Antonines to establish any institutions, for they instead stuck to private interests, to particular will.[36] In virtue of this pinnacle of utter particularity the Roman world is secure and in order. This extreme particularity is so secure that virtue and vice seem a matter of indifference; there is no longer any antithesis, anything valid, for both virtue and vice are just matters of private concern. All is in order just as

35. Gaius Julius Caesar (100–44 BC), ruled 49–44 BC. Gaius Octavius (63 BC–AD 14), 'Octavian', was a triumvir with Antony and Lepidus until he became 'Augustus', and was emperor 27 BC–AD 14. Tiberius (42 BC–AD 37) was emperor AD 14–37.

36. Antoninus Pius (ruled AD 138–61) and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (ruled AD 161–80) are regarded as 'good emperors'. The Stoicism of the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius equips one to face the vicissitudes of life with courage and equanimity.

it is, for sheer finitude is the goal. In this secure being, however, there is an externality of spirit—a profound breach is present here.

In opposition to this order, this finitude, however, the subject made its appearance. Absolute subjectivity in itself, the infinity of being-within-self, has already broken in over against this abstract finitude, and it did so inconspicuously, revolutionizing everything. Spirit is utterly outside itself, and this spirit rules the world; it has become, and has provided, the absolute basis for this order. Since, therefore, one free will dominated the entire world, the great breach was accordingly introduced. Under Augustus himself, under this consummate, single ruler, to the first one who began rule by particular subjectivity, to the finitude that for its own sake counts as what is ultimate, there appears its opposite, namely infinity. However, the finitude that is determinate for its own sake unites internally with this [infinite] principle, yet in such a way that finitude is only the form of the appearance while the content is what is absolute, what is being-in-and-for-itself. With that, the Christian religion, this matter of world history, comes on the scene. | 419

THE ARRIVAL OF CHRISTIANITY[37]

The Truth of the Idea

What is to be examined here and can be demonstrated here is not what constitutes the true religion and idea of God, but is instead only its *appearing*, or the necessity of its appearing, at this time, when the time was fulfilled; for history deals with the appearing of what is true. The true idea is therefore to be presupposed.

The absolute idea is what is universal, subsistent-in-and-for itself, what exists only for thought and in thought, although not in such a way that what is universal would be what is abstract, what is empty, absolute essence; instead it is what is directly, endlessly, and internally determinate within itself, is absolute negativity or what is universal as having every form of determinacy within itself, albeit as infinite form. This idea of God is the One, the utterly universal, in which everything natural or particular has perished. This One, however, is in its way still abstract. But the concrete determinations must become established too, and these are not attributes, for

37. Christianity, with its principle antithetical to the Roman principle, comes on the scene during the second period, that of Rome's world-dominion, thus planting the seeds of Rome's ultimate downfall. Hence it gets its own major heading, though as a feature of the second period.

attributes are themselves always something particular (of course not sensible particulars like the Greek gods, for instead they are attributes of the One). These attributes themselves, however, have only particular content: omnipotent, all-good, and so on. But these characterizations still do not fulfill the subject. The Orientals designate their gods in diverse ways, and yet these characterizations are not exhaustive but are only attempts at being exhaustive, attempts that do not accomplish what they ought to and are only a 'bad infinite'. So attributes do not exhaust the essential being of the One. Whenever the true fullness is grasped, it is the One. It is exhaustive, and this exhaustiveness has its basis in the fact that this determinateness does not
420 constitute multiple particular elements, | that this determination is not something particular but instead only returns into itself, therefore does not project itself exclusively outside itself but instead draws itself to itself too and returns into itself; it is what is being-for-self.

This is the infinite fullness: the One, then, is said to be absolutely determined, to be determined within its own self. And this determinateness is absolute determinateness, not empty, absolutely infinite determinateness; it is so in virtue of both factors so that, in projecting outward, [it consists] in relating itself to an other but likewise draws itself back to itself: this returning [to itself], which is a limit that is no limit. This is the fullness of the idea. The idea is this One that determines itself, that particularizes itself; it brings itself forth as an other to itself but does not lose itself in doing so. [It is the One that] in this other is itself no other, for instead it likewise negates this negative element to it, posits it as 'not-other', and in doing so thus returns to itself. God is this infinite life of separating the other from itself and being present to itself in this separated element. This relationship is the speculative form.

We are familiar with this relationship in many forms, for instance in the sentiment in which we know it as love, when I have consciousness of myself in another. I look to another, am not present to myself; I am incomplete, having a willing and knowing in another, although in this knowing and willing of mine in another I am myself; it is given back to me for the first time in another, such that the other one is no other to me but instead is utterly
421 I myself. Each of the two is an other, | reciprocally excluding and returning from the other to oneself.

In higher form, this idea is spirit. The definition of spirit is the same, and this content is what is represented as the Christian church's doctrine of the Trinity—except that in this religion the concept of spirit is proclaimed, and so God's essential being is revealed; for it is revealed *what spirit is*. Christians know what God is in that they know God as triune.

There are two ways to grasp this truth. One is the way of faith via representation, and the other is the way of thought that thinks the truth, the way of knowledge via reason. Between the two lies the understanding, which holds fast to distinctions it does not know how to lead back to unity; instead it sticks to what is abstract. Upon approaching truth, the understanding destroys what is true in it. The understanding knows nothing of God as triune, knows nothing of Christ other than that he is a moral, virtuous human being, and not what is divine. Whoever does not know about God that God is triune knows nothing about Christianity. Even Muslims know about Christ's virtue, the fact that he was a moral and virtuous human being. A human being who has not the truth of the Christian religion has no truth at all; for this is the one and only truth.

The Christian religion can be grasped, then, with respect to its beginnings, and in this way it is a relic from the past. But Christianity is likewise living, contemporary spirit that has fathomed itself from that time onward, that has brought itself to a more profound consciousness. So the fact that God is triune is not a matter of whether it says so explicitly in the Bible. That is literalism. The spirit of the community, of the church, the spirit as existent there, is effective spirit, is actual spirit. Christ wills to be in his community and to teach it; 'the spirit will lead the way into all | truth',[38] but not by 422
referring to the letter of the text. And so what stands in the Bible is, as known previously, not yet what is true. The church, the community, is what recognizes truth, is what has received this consciousness, the spirit of truth that, from out of itself, has brought itself to determinate consciousness. This is the foundation of the Christian religion, of reason and of the speculative idea. The understanding is not knowledgeable about either of them, about faith or about reason. We need to remember that we are not to be thinking of a Christianity of the man in the street, as whatever anyone makes it out to be.

What we have to speak of, however, is the fact that the time had been fulfilled, that God sent his Son, namely, that doing so was in fact necessary. The self-consciousness of the spiritual world has raised itself up to the elements that belong to the concept of spirit. This element [of self-consciousness] had, on the one hand, become consciousness of worldly consciousness, albeit as torn asunder by the world's understanding, and on the other hand there was nevertheless need for these elements that were split apart to be grasped as united in their truth.

38. See John 16: 13: 'When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth'.

The Appearance of the Idea

We have to consider more closely the elements in the concept of spirit. These elements are now the governing categories of the world, and that they are such is the main point. So the first question, therefore, is: what are these categories? First of all, they are only categories, *disiecta membra* [disparate components], categories of the understanding; they are the content that possesses its truth only as comprised in a unity.

One category is the being-determined on its own account of finitude, the category of being-for-self, the category of the point relating itself to itself, of the belief that finitude is something absolute. The other category, the oppo-
423 site, is the belief | in infinity, in the universal that sets its own limits. The two together constitute being-in-and-for-itself.

When the two are separated we have in one instance finitude, the absolute separateness that we see in the Roman world. In the harsh servitude of the Romans there is an inwardness that is practical, that is a purpose, a finitude that is not the finitude of nature but is instead an internal finitude, the harsh servitude that becomes adapted to sensuality and posits a constricted purpose, one upholding legal force as something ultimate. Something universal is accordingly posited. This is the servitude that makes the finite into something inward, abstract, and ultimate; it is universal, but only finite. This harshness of servitude exists in the Roman world; there is, however, no freedom apart from this harsh servitude, just as there is no inwardness and no love without fear. Without the sense of this negativity of the natural there is no inwardness; only in virtue of the submissiveness of the natural can there be freedom.

In the Roman world purpose was, first of all, specific and constrained, and purpose in its other aspect was established as absolute, as ultimate. We see Roman religion as the religion of finite purposiveness. This finite purpose was therefore established as absolute and was represented as the human purpose in virtue of which it was binding. This inwardness is only the beginning of freedom, not freedom itself. That by which human beings are bound here is something absolute but nothing universal.

What is one's own is thus this purpose. However, what is one's own, which is the predicate, also appeared as subject: spiritual personality as the principle of abstract personality, of positive, formal, absolute law. Under this law I am *this one*, having this abstract feature as my property, and in this context I exist as infinitely this point. Posited here is the category of
424 the point, this infinite | rigidity (*Sprödigkeit*). We then also see this finitude as the suffering of the *this one*, as object of interest and, on the other side,

also in turn we see the *this one* as ultimate, as private interest in the caprice of the emperor. This positive and negative feature is what counts here as ultimate. This emperor, this one, is the god of the world. Therefore the god of the world has become *this one*. This is one of the categories. This category is the absolute limit, is finitude; it is likewise the boundless self-determining, although it is this self-determining still only in a sensible way; it is the consciousness that has arrived at this understanding or, however, only at this unhappy state of abstraction, at the unhappy state of looking upon the bounds of constraint as what is ultimate. It is still the onesided category of the idea, is the absolute restriction, the direct opposite of the infinite bounds.

The other category is infinite freedom, is universality, the opposite of the bounds [of constraint]. This is the other aspect, and it is to be shown how it was the ground (*Boden*) in the world. This ground of abstract universality is to be demonstrated. It was at one time the ground for philosophical thought. It is principally the form of Stoicism that, just like Epicureanism and Skepticism, was very widespread. As a group these philosophies departed from the teaching of Socrates, and they entail that human beings should only be inward and should be indifferent to all things, that they should not find their satisfaction in the world but instead should achieve it only in solitude with oneself, in ἀταραξία, *imperturbabilitas*, in the stolidity that is brought about only by complete indifference to all things, by holding nothing to be true, nothing to be | right, nothing to be valid.[39] This is the form closest to 425
universality.

The broader universal form is the one we have in the Orient, and thus the Roman world is the connection or linkage between this abstract rigidity or finitude of the West and the endless breadth, this free universality, of the Orient. This other element must, however, be present not only in the mode of thought but also essentially in the mode of appearance, in intuition. We find this other element of breadth, of vastness, in Eastern intuition. Here, however, it is primarily just a predicate and is no subject on its own account. Limited objects or intuitions become an immeasurable expanse, but this expanse is not yet established as what is ultimate, is not known as existent for itself; instead it is known only as a characteristic that holds good alongside the objects. So this breadth is Eastern [in nature], and thus in

39. In the specific phrases of this sentence Hegel lumps together what are in part distinctive features of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism respectively. See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ii. 263–316, where he discusses the three philosophies in detail. The one feature that they share is the quest for imperturbability by turning within, by indifference to the unsettling features of the external world.

representations it is not established explicitly as what is ultimate; it is nothing but the supersensible in the characteristic of being-for-self, the supersensible as what is ultimate and true. As the supersensible it emerges only in Israelite representation as the universal God of thought that exists for itself; it is not Brahmā or the light of the Persians, but instead is stripped of sensibility. The God of Judaism (*Judas*) is this One, the universal, such that only the universal is what is ultimate. This is graspable sheerly in inner representation, sheerly for thought. Also, with this characterization nothing is left except that God is the One. In philosophy we can of course speak of the absolute as the One, for doing so involves the express thought that this One is not the predicate but instead is the subject, that the content in this subjectivity is what is being-for-self. Doing so is requisite for the determination of God as the One. Here for the first time, at this point, this religion or this characterization of God as the One becomes a world-historical
426 principle. |

These, then, are the two principles of the idea: the One, and the envisagement of the rigidity of singularity, of subjectivity. These are the two categories of the self-consciousness of this age. The two principles of East and West coalesce here for the first time externally, in virtue of conquest, but they also coalesce in virtue of inner assimilation. In isolation they are one-sided, to be understood abstractly; in their truth they are posited as one. This uniting of East and West, and the assimilation of the two principles, took place in the Roman world. The West longed for a deeper inwardness, for universality, a profound vastness, and found it in the East; such a uniting of its principle with the universal is the sort of union that disseminated itself in multiple ways and gained validity in obscure ways. This unification is what the times needed. Spirit, dispersed and lost in a finite purposiveness, in the finitude of the Roman Empire, called for something infinite and found it in the East.

Thus the worship of Isis and the worship of Mithra arose about this time throughout the Roman world. The uniting of the concreteness of the West with the breadth of the East came about in this way. Alexandria in particular was the focal point for the two principles, the place where the two principles were assimilated scientifically. Inasmuch as the Egyptian enigma was now grasped in thought, it was accordingly resolved. The very content of fantasy, raised up into thought, received its resolution where what is contradictory finds its unification. Therefore Alexandria was the soil on which the unification emerged in manifold forms. In Alexandria we find learned Jews who link the Eastern representations with the thought of Plato, Jews who

cognized their intuitions of thought by means of Western categories, God grasped in God's infinity, in logical purity, united with the Logos.

Studying the history of this era is a most interesting aspect of religious and philosophical views, especially | after Christian formulations (*Vorstellungen*) were initiated in Asia, in Syria. In all these countries countless sects having one and the same impulse, one and the same longing, called for and produced one and the same thing—the same tendency, the same feeling that often with admirable ingenuity comes upon what is true, but also intermingles it in turn with strange representations, with strange additions. This impulse is particularly evident in the allegorical methods of interpretation, to which belong in this case the allegorical representations of Greek mythology that had their beginning here and had no other purpose than to delve into the thoughts in this sensible mode, in these sensible images, liberating what is determinate from the sensible mode and, by this inwardness and oneness, breathing life into what is concrete. These manifold phenomena are all presentations of this same impulse. But this idea was not only able to make its appearance in this incomplete, nonautonomous mode; instead it had to present itself in its pure and complete shape; it had to reveal itself in such a way that this idea itself thus appears and is envisaged in a mode in which this determination that it contains has been consummated and worked out to the ultimate point, to the sensible presence of *this one*. 427

Thus God had to reveal godself as human being in human shape. The world longed for God to reveal godself as human being to human being. To this end the world longed for human being that only in one aspect grasped itself as purpose, and knew its own infinity within itself, to be envisaged as absolute; it longed for human being as finite to be elevated and grasped as element of the divine essence; and, in another aspect, it longed for human being as God and, vice versa, it longed for God as human being to come forth from his abstract remoteness into appearance and into human intuition. This intuition is what constitutes the reconciliation of human beings with God and of God with human beings, the reconciliation with God that was thus represented as the unity | of the human and divine natures. 428

The essential determinations in this case are that the human being or the finite spirit—not as one is naturally or according to the flesh—finds itself in this unity with the divine essence; alternatively put, that the human being in its sheerly natural state is not good but is instead unspiritual, and only by renouncing natural being and working free from it—therefore only by the negation of this natural state that for it ought not to be, that is said to be a non-being, hence something evil and not something good—does the human being for the first time come in this way to the security and certainty of this

unity with God, does it come to faith. One's well-being is in this mystical, essential being, in this unity with God. Faith is this certainty that the divine spirit dwells within oneself, that one is in mystical unity with the divine. This faith can come about only through liberation from one's natural state, through working free from one's naturalness. However, human beings who remain within the natural state, thinking themselves good just as they are, find damnation in it. So human beings have to supersede this natural mode in order to come to faith.

This intuited unity also had to be present in a natural mode, in a natural phenomenon, in the mode of immediate being, of the bounded state that is a *this one*. Therefore the immediate being, the *this one*, belongs to the consummation of this reconciliation. The unity, however, could appear in this way only one time, in a single individual. God is inherently only *One*, and God's appearing must therefore be designated utterly with the predicate of *oneness* and so it excludes all multiplicity. The many human beings existing as they ought not to be are what is ungodly.

This appearing of the *One* emerges within the Jewish people; for this
429 people prayed to God as the One, and looked upon God as the One. | But at the same time characteristic of this people is this noninvolvement (*Unvermischtheit*) with sensibility. This religion remained lifeless and unnoticed until it became world-historical, until spirit had traversed the way stations to which this element gave rise and had encountered the other element, the absolutely bounded state, the element that required the boundless, the onefold, as its extreme limit, a requirement in virtue of which this other element emerged in world-historical fashion. The universal or the One can come into consciousness, or arise within consciousness, in a twofold way. One way is instinctively (*unbewusst*), as in the case of children, to whom we say 'God is One' because this is easy to grasp—and this way is abstract. The other way is when the One is something required, a result of the multiplicity that is unhappy within itself, that is the longing for the One. This determination of the One must be in this twofold mode. Thus it [this consciousness] arises as negation of all boundedness.

In the world-historical setting this determination arises as result, as demand for boundaries that become too narrow for it, and it retreats into boundlessness or into its own abstract inwardness. But there is also the way of immediate ascent, the way of its own immediate going-forth or ascent within the spirit, a way that was present in the Jewish people. And so there was this ancient religion that took its beginnings with Abraham, who arrived at Brahmā, the onefold, the One. He arrived at this representation of the One by parting ways with all that is earthly. We do not know as historical

fact just how he arrived at this religion by parting ways with all that is foreign. Because the elevation is immediate, however, it itself is thus constrained and bounded; for elevation to the One is only then truly unconstrained if every constraint and finitude is expressly negated. For the Indians the representation of God as the One is itself constrained.

We even see this constrained character of immediacy directly in the Jewish religion, where it has the feature that the One is not concrete internally and has no content, with the result that the content, what is concrete | or 430
determinate, falls outside this One, and what we have is the sort of relationship in which the One is related externally to the human being as something determinate, who constitutes spirit in its constrained state. Spirit will then be grasped only as this determinate being to which the One is related. Therefore the One has nothing to do with the universal concept of spirit. Instead God has to do with the singular, the constrained, the finite. Thus God is related just to these human beings, and so he is only the God of the Jewish people.

In this religion, however, there is also preserved in any event the representation of the universal nature of the human being, maintained in the story of the creation and fall of human beings. The fact that human beings have been created in the image of God, and in pursuit of knowledge have forfeited their natural well-being, the state of paradise, in virtue of sinning, carries this twofold message: that human beings arrived at the consciousness and the knowledge of good and of evil. One aspect of this message involves sin; the other, however, is their creation in the image of God, and their having become like God, in knowing good and evil. At the same time, however, not only the serpent but God himself says: 'Adam has become like one of us'.[40] This statement becomes true for the first time in Christ.

So, represented in this story is the higher concept of human nature, a perspective of a higher order, one considering human beings not as they are in their natural state but instead according to their concept, in their being in the image of God, such that human nature is inherently one with God. We do not find representations and thoughts of this sort in other Oriental representations or in Greek narratives | and myths. These [biblical] representa- 431
tions are still nothing extravagant or Oriental; they are reason in the form of representation. In the Jewish depiction (*Anschauung*), however, this narrative just stands alone at the beginning, as myth, and remains without consequences; and nowhere in the Old Testament do we find a backward glance to this concept of the human being or an allusion to this story, nowhere an

40. Gen. 3: 22 reads: 'Then the Lord God said, "Behold, the man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil..."'

investigation (*Insichgehen*) of the essence of the human being, therefore nowhere a recalling of this concept.

Only now, in this harsh servitude of fate, does it come to pass, only now is the meaning acquired, that human beings examine themselves; [this is] the meaning given by the Greeks: 'Human being, know thyself!' No longer is this just a knowing, and it does not advance merely to the stage of beauty. Instead what is consummated and comes to universal consciousness via representation, and is grasped as the universal nature of spirit, is that God has become human being and thus reconciliation or liberation has come to pass. That is the liberation that was given in the Christian religion.

We have seen, then, that what has entered into human consciousness via the Christian religion is [in the first place] the objective nature, or the objective idea, of God. God was revealed according to God's truth. Abstract echoes of Greek philosophy now revealed themselves to human beings in concrete representation. In the second place, human beings discover themselves in this idea, in this truth. Human nature is goodness, is spirit. They discover this nature to be their own, and they possess this nature, their authentic essential being, in the divine determination, more precisely envisaged in the Son. Therefore human being, as element of the divine essence, discovers itself as *this one* in God. Insofar as human beings know themselves as finite, they still do know themselves as ends in themselves. So, just as the divine idea has within itself this crossover to human being, the human being knows itself as infinity within itself, knows itself as, in this determination, being eternity within itself, and indeed eternity not only as a future state but
432 rather as a present state. One's true existence | one thus possesses in an infinite inwardness in opposition to one's natural existence and willing, and one acquires this characteristic of one's existence in eternity only by one's labor in breaking through the natural sphere. This breach is the pain or suffering of nature. Evil or wickedness comes into play here as a process of the divine essence itself, is now set in motion, and for that reason the calamity (*Unglück*) is comprehensible whereas previously it was something incomprehensible, was no more than what is the case (*Seiendes*). Today the calamity is called 'the fortunate fall' (*das Unglückselige, die Seligkeit des Unglücks*). The negative is only negative in one aspect; conceptually it is the turning about of itself, of the evil and, as self-negating, it is what is affirmative, or positive. This turnabout to the positive is not the goodness of the human being based on nature but is instead goodness through its own self, through turning about from evil; it is the engendering of itself from out of the negativity; spirit—something inward—atones for itself, extricates itself, and acts only on that basis. These are the features of the religious consciousness.

Consequences of Christianity for Life and the State

This highest human consciousness then proves to have worldly consequences and determines itself in different ways in relation to existence. So here we begin from thought and proceed to existence.

The first consequence for actuality is that slavery is ruled out in Christianity; for, as Christians, human beings are considered according to what they are inherently, and they are inherently posited as something absolutely valuable, are taken up into the divine nature. Accordingly they are, in God, looked upon in a wholly universal way, and all private concerns fall to the wayside. They count not as Greeks, Romans, Brāhmans, or Jews, as high or low class; instead | they have infinite worth as human beings and, in and 433
for themselves, they are destined for freedom. Insofar as Christianity is actually practiced, it can have no slavery. One must not, however, seek the backing of external history, for instance by saying that slavery was not abolished by councils, and the like; the fact that slavery still exists today is no more pertinent than is the external way in which it has ceased. Slavery is not something that was done away with by kings; instead, Christianity has ended it. The abolition is worldly, but Christianity is the true humanity. For the external mode of the phenomenon is not the truth [about it].

The second consequence, furthermore, is that the forms of ethical life have been changed [by this consciousness]. The beautiful ethical life of the Greeks cannot be present in Christianity. What is now ethical can be ethics and custom too, insofar as it comes from within, albeit proceeding from the One; for subjectivity has now become free and justified. One mode of subjectivity is private interest and caprice, and the other mode is authentic, inner, spiritual subjectivity. With Christianity, however, the private interest that previously appears only as corruption now becomes free too. In this way Christianity indeed rids itself of contingency; but for that reason subjectivity still has its inner restraint. Everything external receives its significance through spirit, albeit as an externality, and it need not be the simple, compliant expression of what is internal. In any event the external feature in the essence of action loses its value; the worth of external existence, as sheerly external, becomes insignificant and takes on the form of something merely external. What is pertinent here is that everything is mediated by free will, partly by the mind (*Gemüt*) as such, partly by the particular will—just as well by what is advantageous as by general interests. Individuality no longer should be sacrificed; particular interest in limited purpose should be valid for its own sake. But there is also present the spiritual, | higher 434
inwardness, and genuine inwardness calls even more so for its own law.

The third consequence is the establishment of two worlds: a *supersensible, spiritual* world in virtue of the truthfulness of subjectivity, one that, as belonging to subjective consciousness, is however at the same time *temporal*, one that has, and enters into, determinate existence, one that stands on earth and binds itself to that existence, giving itself validity as the church and, in another aspect, as the secular world, the state, which is in the main set under the regime of finitude. So there are therefore two kinds of states: one that is eternal within time, and another that embodies worldly purposes.

A fourth consequence is the issue as to what is now the idea of the state, that is, what political constitution is its goal. We have to examine the political constitution of the worldly state. It is clear at the outset that this constitution cannot be Oriental despotism. Ethical life and right cannot exist at the behest of external command or decree, any more than their link with nature can be the Oriental mode of that link. The human being is inwardly free; this freedom is to be gained and maintained by one's own efforts, and it cannot be subverted into the mode of external command. Nor is there the unselfconscious unity of the ethical freedom of Greek democracy, such that my own will is immediately identical with the will of the state, that subjectivity is simply at one with the objectivity of the state. Rather, my own subjective will is now in an inward condition that is explicitly its own. Nor is there the sort of servitude that exists under the constrained and finite purpose of the Roman aristocracy. Internal unity now has an infinite purpose. Therefore, to this extent the worldly authority has its place in what is external, quite apart from the church, and within its own domain it can no longer exercise control over morality, ethical life, and family relationships, and can no longer offer up sacrifices and oppress as it did in the Roman
435 world. |

Obedience to the secular order, to the secular dominion, must now be a matter of negotiation with individual, subjective purpose, in virtue of the fact that the private interest of individuals, the particular inner will, like the higher spiritual will, maintains its own advantage and its own satisfaction within the secular dominion. For that reason also the law and the state must be inherently justified in their purposes, must be independent of private interests and particular opinion. For the very reason that it lends itself to being made a vehicle for private interests, the state must be strong for its own sake, must be a world of external, actual necessity, strong for its own sake; it must be able to accommodate this adoption of private interests in it, but in such a way that at the same time the private interests within it are satisfied. Therefore the state must be a system that does not stand directly in need of what is moral, of immediate ethical life, of religiosity; it must be of a

secure nature, sufficient within itself, as is that external nature that stands over against self-consciousness, that abides on its own account even though the mind does not understand it. The subject must subordinate itself to the state as a power over it. In thus developing itself as this bulwark, the state must be rational in itself, even if subjective opinion or private interests do not acknowledge that. It must be inherently just, also more or less insightfully so, such that the concept can find its satisfaction in it. Therefore rationality, the concept, must now be realized in the state.

What follows from these essential elements is that, by the state developing itself with this nature, and within the state as this implicitly and explicitly necessary world, all the elements of the idea are, in their independence, | 436
given birth, are emergent, and are fully developed. And this totality of organization is the principle of monarchy of modern times. In monarchy all the determinations of the idea by which freedom actualizes itself are thus worked out in this way, are present in the mode of one nature, such that each element is posited as independent power and at the same time is an organ of the whole organism.

The other observation concerns how such a state comes into being in history. This origin is necessarily 'romantic', namely, taking place in such a way that what occurs toward this end occurs as though unconsciously, seeming to constitute something happening by chance; for this origin takes on the shape of external necessity. None of the modern states have had the privilege of framing a constitution for themselves in the way that was done in such ancient states as Athens [and Sparta], under Solon and Lycurgus, or in Rome, for instead all of the modern states seem to have brought themselves about by chance. This need [for a constitution] made itself evident and was satisfied by various laws. Particular passions and interests of princes, of social groups, of cities, and the like, have given rise to these features, and the arrogation by various sectors of power over one another has abated. The whole that came about in this way, the purpose that spirit has, the need that spirit feels, assembles itself out of such single components—peaceably, in part by imposition of power. The opposite [ancient mode] emerges all at once, where the whole has become evident. So these are the worldly consequences of the Christian religion. The development of these consequences constitutes history up to the most recent time, and we ourselves are situated within this development. We have still to recall the chief elements of the external mode of this development. | 437

THE DOWNFALL OF ROME

So we now have to proceed to the appearing of this development. The Christian religion came into being during the era of the Roman world, although not among the Romans themselves but instead in a different people, one that the world spirit determined to be the bearer of this principle. That is because the different principles of the idea, in their existing, do so essentially in a different nation. This principle cannot develop itself in the Romans themselves; instead a Nordic people is bearer of this idea. We saw the Roman Empire and its principle progress internally to the universal dominion of a blind will of *this one*, of something devoid of reason, something barren and abstract—to a dominion or an order that is an abstract and irrational order. Linked to this dominion of *this one* is the fact that the different subjects exist as abstract persons that stand only in legal relationships [to one another]. The third epoch of the Roman Empire is the one in which the Roman world comes into contact with this world-historical people, and via this contact meets its downfall. The Roman Empire perishes. Its downfall has three characteristics.

There is its own corruption that it bears within itself, and through which it turns back within itself and destroys itself by the dereliction of spirit on the part of private individuals, in that subjectivity remains static with particular, private pleasures and interests, and isolates all persons. So the whole is something devoid of spirit, a phenomenon devoid of essential being, a spiritless corpse in which there is a lot of movement, but only by the worms. Avarice and all sorts of depravity are the drivers of private caprice; all the forces of private interest are unleashed and end up with the formula of private rights.

The second feature is that spirit withdraws into itself as into something higher, on the one hand in the philosophies of Stoicism and so on, and on
438 the other hand | in Christianity. Both undermine the status quo and are the revolutionary element over against the Roman world. But they are not merely what is negative *vis-à-vis* the corruption; instead the Christian religion is the positive element from which emerges what ensues, the new world.

The third feature is the downfall as it comes upon the Roman world externally, through the onrush of foreign peoples, Nordic and eastern barbarians of the mass migrations who, like a river, gushed forth over the Roman Empire, something no dam can any longer withstand. Since these Nordic and eastern barbarians were called '*Germanen*', the world-historical people is now the Germanic people.

INTRODUCTION

The Idea and Historical Particularity

This topic presents a number of difficulties. More recent history involves the subjective difficulty that we are not able to approach it as impartially as we can the distant past. The greater difficulty is the objective one that in history we have here both the idea as such and the particularity from which fulfillment of the absolute final end is to emerge.[1] The objective difficulty is due to the fact that the ends of the particular, subjective will are satisfied here. The two sides cannot be united from the beginning. Rather to begin with they are essentially different and yet mediated by each other: the object is mediated by the subjectivity of the will and the satisfaction of the particularities, which also can only achieve their end by conforming with the absolute. The ultimate goal is the unification of the in-and-for-itself (*Anundfürsichsein*) and the particular ends. | 439

Initially, the particularity cannot yet coalesce entirely with the absolute final end; rather, the particular ends are still distinct, and the particular will does not immediately recognize its absolute end and is engaged in a struggle. While the particular will desires this end, it does not recognize this drive, its authentic inner nature; it thrashes about in particular ends and hence is in conflict with itself. In this conflict it fights against that which it truly desires, and thus it effects the absolute itself by fighting against it. The effective agent is then the particular will, which initially has finite ends. What is authentic is the condition of being driven toward an absolute final end. The will is driven

1. What Hegel writes about the tension between the idea as such and the particularity of its means is true of history generally, but it applies in a special way to European history because the subjectivity of will now becomes predominant. The first subsection reflects on how providence achieves its end via the 'recalcitrant volition' of peoples, and it discusses some general characteristics of the Germanic world, such as the relationship between the independence and the unity of states. The next subsection describes how Europe was forged out of a union of Romance, Germanic, and Slavic peoples (although the latter play virtually no role in Hegel's scenario, to say nothing of other ethnic groups such as Finns and Hungarians). On Hegel's use of the terms 'Germanic world' (*germanische Welt*), 'Germanic peoples' (*Germanen*), 'Germanic principle' (*germanisches Prinzip*), etc., see the Introduction to these lectures, n. 79 (above, p. 208). One of his principal sources for the earlier material in this period is Tacitus, *Germania*. For later material he draws upon Karl Friedrich Eichhorn, *Deutsche Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*, 4 vols. (Göttingen, 1808–23), and Johann Stephan Pütter, *Teutsche Reichsgeschichte in ihrem Hauptfaden entwickelt*, 3rd edn. (Göttingen, 1793).

by that which is true; however, this being driven, this drive, is at first obscure; hence we are often forced to judge what has happened in just the opposite way from how it appears to be in the history of peoples. What constitutes a people's misfortune, that which was their lot, both the people and history termed their greatest good fortune, while good fortune was being combated as the greatest misfortune. The French say, *La vérité, en la repoussant, on l'embrasse* [in repulsing truth one embraces it]. This is seen in European history to the extent that it arrives at its final end only by rejecting the truth. This is what Europe has done—it is modern humanity exhausting itself in the bloodiest struggles. Thus the will of the modern world is clouded; truth resides in the background; and the will battles against the in-and-for-itself, toiling and finding satisfaction at the point where often the opposite of the truth is to be found.

This history shows very clearly that the idea in the mode of providence ruled—providence as a veiled inner power (*eingehülltes Inneres*) that achieves its end and prevails via the recalcitrant volition of the peoples—so that what it achieves and what the peoples desire are often at odds. With the Greeks and Romans the idea is not as separated [from the will of the
440 people]; | they are more correctly and truly aware of, and do not misunderstand, what they desire and ought to do.

Associated with more recent history is the fact that conditions appear to be contingent, a shifting of many-faceted events, which have and produce an end result that, while indeed the inner drive [of the idea], appears to be miraculous since the goal of these conditions was veiled. Now let us consider the significance of this circumstance. Events and chance occurrences have a very different significance and status. Extravagant special occurrences or events wherein the greatest genius reveals itself can, when seen from the perspective of the idea, appear to be insignificant and must be relegated to the status of truly unimportant because they produce no result. This is the case with what will appear here as external history.

Should we wish to apply further the character of the Roman world to the [more recent] states, we discover that this character contributes to the formation of the free particularity of states, but in such a way that they still have a unity and connection. This is the basic characteristic of modern times.

The first aspect is that the states strive for sovereignty, for independence from one another, and consider this their foremost glory. Europe shares this tenaciousness with the Greek world. In this regard, history must consider the formation of the particular states with respect to the opposition of church and state, and also the aspect of the form of government. Despite their wide range of differences, all of these states still exhibit a congruity in all the

Germanic principles. Because of this congruity, their independence must be seen as merely formal | in principle and in law. There is not, as is the case 441
with Greece and Persia, an absolute difference. The Christian states are only formally distinct from one another. Each state, even if subject to or incorporated into another, loses its independence only formally, but not its religion and laws, i.e. what is concrete. The extent to which this principle [of independence] is not merely formal depends on other conditions.

The second aspect regarding this independence is the orientation of the states with respect to their unity. As particular, states have an orientation toward each other, a relationship, which results in wars, hostility, and dynastic alliances. This orientation is a special kind of relationship. But the orientation of the states toward general unity corresponds to what was hegemony with the Greeks. In Europe, however, the aspect of hegemony is that of the spirit, which seeks a distinctive kind of unity, such as was seen under Charlemagne and in the Crusades, and in more recent times as the Holy Alliance. These two orientations, that of a particular relationship and that of general unity, are the two essential aspects; and the relationship between independence and unity tilts now in one direction, and now in the other.

The third aspect of these two factors [independence and unity] is that once again all the states of Europe relate to the outside world as a single unity. The Christian states as a whole have an outward orientation. Up to now, the periods [of world history] involved relating to an earlier and a later world-historical people. But now, with the Christian religion, the principle of the world is complete; the day of judgment has dawned for it.[2] The church does indeed point to the beyond; it is in part | a preparation for the future. 442
But eternity is a future only for private concerns, for individuals as particular. The church, however, also has the Spirit of God present within it; it says to sinners, 'Your sins are forgiven you', and they live happily on earth as in heaven. So individuals have enjoyment, satisfaction (*Genuß*). The only

2. In the *Philosophy of Right*, § 340 (*Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 371), Hegel famously refers to world history as world judgment (*die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*). The reference is also found in the Introduction to the Lectures of 1822–3 (see n. 32). Hegel is quoting from the penultimate stanza of Friedrich Schiller's poem 'Resignation' (1786), but his meaning is different. For Hegel, world judgment occurs when the *universal spirit of the world* exercises *its right*, which is the highest right of all, through the dialectic of finite spirits in world history. The expression in the present passage is *der jüngste Tag* (or *das jüngste Gericht*, below, p. 503). The day of judgment dawns when the universal principle of history, the concept of freedom, is fully actualized. *Ge-richt* (judgment) entails the *accomplishing* of *Recht* (justice, right). However, 'dawning' seems to imply the beginning, not the completion of a process.

relationship that the Christian world, as inwardly consummate, can have with the outside world is relative; and, regarding this relationship, it must be clarified that the outside world is intrinsically overcome. For the Christian world, this relationship to the outside is currently the world [of Islam].[3] Islam now exists as only an inessential moment. The Christian world has circumnavigated the globe and dominates it. For Europeans the world is round, and what is not yet dominated is either not worth the effort, of no value to rule, or yet destined to be ruled. Outward relationships no longer constitute epochs, are no longer the determinative factor; the essential revolutions occur inwardly. These are the three aspects that generally come under consideration.

The Beginning of Europe: Three Groups of Nations

Before we consider the plan of the whole, we are led to consider the nature of the beginning, first in regard to the Roman and then to the Germanic world.

As for the Roman world, it is characteristic of the beginning that no people of a more advanced nature succeeds the previous principle, breaks in upon the Roman world; rather, it is wave upon wave of barbarians who
443 bring ruin. In the | Roman world we now find complete disintegration, an entirely abstract externality that is now invaded and toppled by an entirely abstract intensity. Cultured Greece does honor to the Asian world by subjugating it, as the cultured Roman world [in turn] honors the Greek. The subjugation that now follows is different in that it occurs through veiled intensity rather than unveiled externality.

The beginning of the Germanic world is also determined by the consideration that after Greece a cultured, world-historical people cannot emerge in patriarchal fashion or start from patriarchal conditions. While the Greeks banded together on the basis of amity and the Romans abstractly as predators, two absolutely different principles operate with the Germanic peoples. The whole had to be fashioned out of a twofold, absolutely distinctive and disparate culture. This disparate dissimilarity marks the beginning. Three main configurations take shape in this regard: first the Western, [second] that of Germany, and third the Eastern, the Slavic.

3. On Islam, see the Introduction to these lectures, above, p. 187, incl. n. 51. In the 1824 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford, 2007), iii. 242–4, Hegel refers to Islam as the only contemporary religious rival to Christianity, the antithesis to what he regards to be the 'consummate religion' (*vollendete Religion*). He seems to have been particularly concerned about Islam in the early 1820s because the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire was occurring at the time. The relationship with Islam is discussed further below (see pp. 474–7, 492–4).

Historically, mass migrations constitute the beginning. These will not be considered here in detail. They involve a surge of one people after another, peoples of Romance origins (*romantisch*), a tidal flowing and ebbing to no effect. The other peoples who establish something enduring are no Asians but are Germans, coming from north of the Danube and east of the Rhine, attracted in part by the cultured world that they eventually vanquished. | 444
As early as the Battle of Pharsalus,[4] Germanic mercenaries made the decisive difference. They became acquainted with the good things of this [cultured] world, with its amenities, its religion and laws. In part, however, these peoples were forcibly driven west and south by Asian peoples.

We shall now mention briefly the kingdoms that arose [in Europe]. One part of these lands, their western and southern regions in which world history is well-versed, are those that Romans had long possessed and developed in culture, commerce, arts, and life. Among them were Spain, Portugal, and France, areas where the Alemanni and Suevian [Swabian] peoples had settled by the end of the sixth century. Of note later is the kingdom of the Franks, who pushed into France from the lower Rhine and lower Germany and established themselves there. The third is Britain, to which the Angles and Saxons were drawn, and also in part the Normans, who ravaged all the coasts of Europe or settled there. Further, Italy must be mentioned; here the kingdom of the Ostrogoths achieved greatness and splendor under Theodoric and Totila, because the greatness of the Romans and their culture seemed to meld with foreign elements, but had no staying power. It vanished with a flicker, torn from within, and the Lombards from Pannonia, a Gothic tribe of Scandinavian coastal origin, succeeded them and established themselves. The Goths can be traced from Scandinavia as they moved [southward], invading first the eastern and then the western Roman Empire. Later, the Lombardian kingdom was subjugated by the Franks, and lower Italy by the Normans; and soon the church also gained and maintained independent holdings. | The Franks founded a Burgundian kingdom, which later 445
formed a buffer zone between France and Germany. Characteristic of all these countries is that they underwent an intermingling of barbarians with cultured inhabitants. One of the main results of this enormous contrast—a contrast that the barbarians made less striking because they ravaged everything, destroying most elements of civilization—was that in Italy there were two nations, which however coalesced into one.

4. Caesar defeated Pompey at Pharsalus (in Thessaly) in 48 BC with the help of barbarian tribes. The events are recounted in an epic poem by Lucan.

Germany, by contrast, remained apart on its own terms. Only along its borders, on the Neckar and the Danube, had it been Roman. Farther to the east and the north, Germany had remained free, an integral nation (*in sich eine Nation*), although not a state, not a [political] whole: a nation, i.e., integral, not uniform, such that one [people] was in each land—the Alemanni, Thuringians, Bavarians, Saxons, etc., each being distinctive.

Farther east, along the Elbe, Slavic nations were to be found, and between them, through Saxony, Bavaria, and from the south, came later incursions of Hungarians, Magyars. Farther east, to the west of Greece, are the Russians; to the southeast the Albanians, Alans, and Bulgarians—of Asian origin, Asian barbarians—who remained there. Much has been lost and little retained of the thrusts and counterthrusts of these peoples. As part of the East, this Slavic element does not come into the realm of history; even today the East is an inwardly concentrated entity.

We shall now examine more closely the distinctive features of the states. One group of states or nations took form out of Roman and Germanic natural elements. The entire intellectual existence of the desiring and self-
446 conscious life is | thus at its roots bifurcated. The difference established here is most easily seen in the language, which exhibits an intermingling of early Roman and even older indigenous elements with Germanic elements. This language can be designated as Romance, and, in addition to Italy, it is found in France, Spain, and Portugal.

The roots of the other group of states are essentially unmixed: these three are Germany, Scandinavia, and Britain (the latter, as an island, saw Roman culture penetrate only along its borders). The invading Saxons engaged more with the indigenous people; they intermingled with the people they encountered, whose king was Arthur of Wales—a people with whom they were more homogeneous. The Romans had already withdrawn from Britain forty years before the Saxons arrived; the latter first conquered Kent and then Cornwall in the twelfth century. The Norman invasion came later [than the Saxon]. Nonetheless, this was an intermingling of essentially homogeneous elements. The character of these peoples, their basic characteristic, is an undivided, unruptured unity of culture—an unbroken inwardness or subjectivity. This inwardness is to be seen historically especially at the beginning, but as a matter of necessity it is less prominent in the fermentation, in the development [that ensues]. However, the difference between these two groups of states, as seen in subsequent matters, remains undeniable.

Such factors as religion and laws are evident earlier with the first group,
447 are disseminated prior to Christianity, | just as the political constitution is established earlier too, because they are an amalgam of barbarians and

cultured peoples. The legal statutes of the Ostrogoths were set down as early as the fifth century. Thus, overall, these peoples are culturally more advanced by several centuries. In regard to literature, the second group is more distinctive; by contrast, France, Italy, and Spain all look back to Roman literature. In Germany it was not until later that the great writers emerged; but this second group of states remains distinctive. This difference is then a fundamental difference that becomes ever more striking toward the end because mature culture is simply the emergence of the principles in all their depth. In later times these differences manifest themselves the most decisively.

THE PERIODS OF THE HISTORY OF THE GERMANIC WORLD

Also to be noted here are the epochs of the history that lie before us. We have already indicated that the beginning is the mass migration of peoples. Following this, three periods are [to be distinguished]:[5]

[1] [The first epoch is] the rule of Charlemagne[6] over the Franks, over the universal kingdom, over the all-inclusive empire of the Germanic peoples, which then together constitute the [Holy] Roman Empire. Insofar as the Germanic kingdom is considered to be the kingdom of this totality, we can recognize here the specific repetition of earlier elements, which previously occurred independently of one another. So earlier epochs can also be discerned here. Thus the empire of Charlemagne is comparable to the Persian Empire, the epitome of authoritarian rule; it is closer to the realm of substantial unity, which here no longer has the Oriental meaning but is rather a unity of temperament, an unselfconscious unity of the intellectual-spiritual with the ecclesiastical-secular. | 448

[2] The second epoch is the second form of unity, which, in contrast to the first, 'real' unity, is to be defined or designated as the 'ideal' unity. It is the age of the great Spanish monarchy of Charles V,[7] and even more of the period before him when the real unity no longer existed. Here all particularity has become fixed—the various kingdoms, states, and their distinctive classes

5. The periods (early medieval, medieval, and modern) are summarized here in very compact and abstract form as three types of unity (real, ideal, and universal) and are compared with earlier periods of world history: Persian, Greek, and Roman.

6. King of the Franks from 768 to 814; Holy Roman emperor from 800 to 814.

7. Charles V (1500–58) was, as Charles I, king of Spain 1516–56 and, as Charles V, Holy Roman emperor 1519–58.

with their particular situations and privileges. Since the real unity has disintegrated, outer relationships are purely external-political. Thus the relationship is diplomatic; no state can exist without the others. The notion arises of the balance of power in Europe. This unity is purely external or ideal, in the subordinate significance or the sense that the higher or ideal unity is that of spirit, is what proceeds from spirit; spirit goes back into itself, away from the passion and apathy of consciousness—reverts to the point in time at which the world becomes transparent, in its external extent too.

At this point the discovery of America occurs. Religion interprets and transfigures itself in art, becomes transparent to itself in the sensible element. But, in contrast, religion also then becomes transparent to itself exclusively in the element of the innermost spirit, in the Reformation. This period, this epoch, can be compared with the Greek world in the age of Pericles. Just as Pericles can be compared to Leo X,[8] so too can the interiority of Socrates be compared to Luther. Of course, there is no Pericles presiding over this age.

Charles V had astounding material means at his disposal, but he lacked what made Pericles a ruler: he lacked the inner spirit, the absolute means for ruling freely. This period is thus the ideal unity, the process of spirit becom-
449 ing transparent to itself. This is the epoch of real separation, and here is | where the already-indicated differences in the Germanic world emerge.

[3] The third period is that of modernity, which we could compare with the Roman world, for it exhibits a unity of the universal but not a hegemony of abstract universality; rather, it exhibits a hegemony of self-conscious thought—thought that wills and knows the universal and rules the world. Now this universal is the intelligible end (*verständige Zweck*) that governments achieve. The intelligible end of the state is at hand. Privileges disappear or dissolve in the face of this end; peoples gain the consciousness of, and are entitled to, willing not privilege but what is right in and for itself.

Thus it is not treaties (*Traktate*) that hold peoples together; rather treaties now rest on fundamental principles. Similarly, religion can put up with thought, the comprehending of absolute being. Or if it does not, religion can manage without having achieved thought, the absolute concept, and it can withdraw from the externality of the reflecting understanding into the identity of feeling, into faith; but in doing so it can also proceed to the point of superstition, since this identity occurs either because of shallowness or because of a higher need, a despair in regard to thought. The very need, however, has then been produced by thought.

8. Born Giovanni de' Medici, he was pope 1513–21 and became involved in early controversies with Luther.

These, then, are the three periods. With this continuing development of unity as such, the outer relationship also develops, but it no longer determines the epochs. The elements of this relationship will be elaborated upon later and specified briefly at the appropriate point. | 450

THE PREPARATION OF THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES[9]

Commonality and Individuality

First we shall review the elements of the beginning up until the first epoch. The ancient period, when the Germanic peoples lay outside the sphere of world history, will not be mentioned. We began directly by delimiting the epoch at the point where the Germanic peoples lived by themselves outside the context of world history; and we have not treated the distinction among the Germanic peoples that was apparent to the peoples themselves. The essential aspect for the Alemanni tribes was the commonality of association for the sole purpose of securing the necessities of life and outward relations; by contrast, each group of the Saxons isolated itself and remained entrenched until the Franks became their intermediary. This long-standing distinction is due to the uncultured condition and is its natural consequence. The genuine distinction is based on the circumstances of their unification that we already indicated.

Both commonality (*Gemeinsamkeit*) and individualization (*Vereinzelung*) are part of the concrete situation. The abstract distinction between isolation (*Isolierung*) and commonality must combine into one. The outward circumstances already necessitate the disposition to seek commonality. This common bond, which previously exhibited itself more in just one aspect of the Germanic peoples, must even be a common feature of every people in outside relations. With the Germanic peoples, this orientation outward stems from an independent streak, from a free affiliation with a leader; this, then, is the origin of the disparity mentioned above of remaining in the homeland versus migrating. So the Germanic people grow in numbers: we see East and West Franks in France, Suevian and Alemanni tribes in Spain and Germany, Saxons in England and Germany; also Normans in Denmark,

9. This section covers the period from the fall of the Roman Empire (480) to the reign of Charlemagne (800–14). Hegel discusses the relationship between commonality and individuality (freedom), the latter being the distinguishing mark of the Germanic peoples. The section also is concerned with relations between the Occident and the Orient, the latter now being dominated by Islam (see below, n. 14).

451 who remained where they were | and, as knights of the sea, also in turn ravaged the shores of all of Europe, settling their tribes everywhere. As different as their fates initially were—namely, that some of the tribes migrated while others remained where they were—common to all the Germanic peoples was this goal, this advance from their initial circumstances, however different these might have been. The common goal of both groups was to evolve into a state. The three characteristics that we first saw in this development toward a state and toward constitutionality must here of necessity join together in a concrete life.

The first, independent characteristic is the development of commonality, which single individuals initiate, but which does not deprive them of their individuality of will. The second characteristic is the development through and to a focal point, a sovereign, a king, downward from whom or upward toward whom this development proceeds, and from whom the cohesion emanates. The third characteristic is the specific way of mediating both aspects, the freedom of the single ones, of individuals, and the unity of the whole. These three elements will now be examined more closely.

The first characteristic was the independence of individuals, and it concerns Germany. Germany has always had free individuals; its peoples have always been famous for their freedom, and have been understood to be so in contrast to other peoples. In this regard the Romans immediately perceived the Germans to contrast with themselves. Freedom has always been the
452 banner of the Germans. The Thirty Years War, the | Peace of Westphalia, the alliance of princes against Joseph II[10]—all of these elements emanated from the principle of freedom. This was the social condition. As the freedom of individuals evolves into a social element, at the infancy of statehood this development can only lead to assemblies of the peoples, the members of which were all free, and who conferred about each and every matter. Hence, we see with the German peoples—both with those who stayed in their homeland and with those who streamed outwards—gatherings and communities that were allied for all needs and circumstances in respect to meadows, forests, fields, territories, even property and the application of the laws; the communities were also the judges.

With respect to civil law, one circumstance particularly distinguishing the Germanic peoples merits notice, namely that homicide could be discharged or compensated by paying a fine. This is not punishment, nor is it based on blood vengeance as found in the Oriental world; rather we see here that the

10. The Thirty Years War (1616–48) ended with the Peace of Westphalia; Joseph II was Holy Roman emperor 1765–90.

positive existence of individuals was the main feature, the overbearing concern—that the free person should continue in the people's assembly as he was before, no matter what he may have done or what he willed; he had only to make expiation. Today this applies to honor. No matter what someone has done, it does not require that he be vilified. Thus this absolutely concrete value of the individual is here a major characteristic. Just as these associations deliberated upon matters of law, so too the people's assembly deliberated upon general subjects. They were freely allied as under Arminius.[11] The individual as a particular subjectivity is independent and | ultimate. The 453
fact that the people's assembly validated the individual as particular is a fundamental trait that Tacitus described, and it was still apparent in the March Days of the Franks and later at the Imperial German Diet.[12]

The second element validating the individual is the formation of free, enduring focal points: sovereigns, commanders-in-chief, kings. The formation of such a focus, even if due to the external factor of birth, arose out of a voluntary following on the part of individuals. It is a bond of fealty (*Treue*), for fealty is the banner second to freedom on the part of the Germanic peoples. They freely attach themselves to a person [*Subjekt*] and enter his service; this attachment, this characteristic fealty of the Germanic peoples, lends honor to an individual and makes this relationship something unconditional and unbreakable. This relationship was not found with either the Romans or the Greeks. Orestes and Pylades are only a single case, more a relationship of tender friendship than of service. The kings did not serve Agamemnon but rather joined with him for specific purposes.[13] The principle of fealty is thus a principle of the modern world: from one's innermost mind and heart to be in association with another subject. The self, this innermost personality, is what individuals ought to be drawn to. The relationship must, then, be in the mode of subjectivity; that is, one subject must be placed above the other. Whenever action is required, individuals must be in charge. Thus this relationship of fealty is the second banner, which above

11. Arminius (d. AD 21) led a successful revolt against the Romans as they attempted to push east of the Rhine toward the Elbe. Tacitus glorified him as the noble barbarian.

12. On Tacitus, see *Germania*, §§ 11–15 (*Germany*, tr. Herbert W. Benario (Warminster, 1999), 25–9). The 'March Days of the Franks' refers to the Marchfield or annual assembly, when the ordinances of the king were published and gained approval from the people. Originally the meeting was convened for the calends of March but later was moved back to May or even early summer. See Alessandro Barbero, *Charlemagne: Father of a Continent*, tr. Allan Cameron (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 2004), 144–5.

13. In Greek mythology, Pylades helped his close friend Orestes kill his mother, Clytemnestra, after she and her lover had slain Agamemnon. On the relationship of the kings to Agamemnon at Troy, see above, pp. 379–80.

all points outward whenever the necessity arises. Undertakings directed
454 outwardly naturally involve the relationship of fealty. |

The purpose, then, is not that of maintaining and defending what is; rather, it is an orientation toward, or an attack on, something external. The authority (*Spitze*) that forms during a conquest becomes powerful in itself. This authority is in charge of its own and becomes master over the conquered. Upon being vanquished, the conquered must be held in check; they must yield to the authority and appeal to the conqueror. This makes the conqueror even more powerful. Thus an authority, a center is formed, which handles matters and distributes goods. Subordinates are necessarily a part of this arrangement. Here we see two ways of relating. The first is that the individual is a member of his company of associates, where decisions are made by a wholly particular will. The second occurs under the authority of the master, namely to fight for the whole and to take action as a vassal of one's superiors. Thus an individual has two obligations: one for the company of associates, the other as a vassal of the ruling authority. Dukes can be viewed in a twofold sense. Dukes and counts are heads of free associates and at the same time vassals of their superiors. These are the two major relationships.

The third element is the unification of the first two modes of relationship; their combination turns upon the formation of the state. Service of the prince and obligation toward the individual must come together, must also be a universal duty. Here obligations and prerogatives (*Rechte*) arise with respect to two initially separate aspects; the two must join together. The prerogatives that the individual now has must be partly held in common and partly private rights; these rights must apply in part to the private person and in
455 part to the state as universal. | The state should remain as the soul, the master, the self; it should be the source of the determination and justification of rights. Authority flows from the universal determination. The ultimate goal is the unification of what we saw to be fealty with what is the particular will, and the formation of the state proceeds from it. The peculiar feature of the Germanic states is principally their particularity. In the initial stages the two sides collide; the barbarian particularity of subjectivity, which is the most salient feature of the Germanic states, constitutes the first form in which all prerogatives and obligations are comprehended. Thus the prerogatives do not take on the character of general legal statutes; rather all laws executed by the state are diminished to the form of private privileges, and what should be a universal or a whole splinters into a particular private dependency, into clusters of private obligations. Everything splits into particular privileges and particular obligations. This is the most important form

assumed by the life of the state—which for this very reason is no life of the state, since it is merely a great cluster or collection of endlessly many private independencies.

The Triumph of Particularity

It is not until later that something that is universal and rational develops out of this difficult, uncontested state of affairs—a situation that is essentially composed of a totality of private and intrinsically unstructured circumstances. Individual constitutions have developed out of private circumstances; justifications of individual points are not comparable, are internally inconsistent, despite the fact that a totality is present. This is the case with the English constitution, in which there is no internal consistency of individual points. The earlier history of Germany is a painstaking finitude of determinations. In Germany one has to follow a toilsome trail, a painstaking scholarship pertaining to individuality and serfdom, whereas in other histories the image of a | whole is present. The history of the Germanic 456
peoples is, however, a collection of individual details. It is an endless number of forms of dependency in regard to service and likewise in regard to property; and we also find a geographic splintering. The basic character is that there is nothing simple, no history as something universal; rather, all claims and all property are something particular; and both of these, the demand for service and the holding of property, devolve into private privilege. Little or nothing is left to the state. The occupations and offices [of the state] become particular, come to be in private hands, as do matters of service. The benefits enjoyed by vassalage (*Dienstmannschaft*) are privatized, and what is to be carried out is left to the whim of the one who is to do it. Here we find a complete individualization, the loss of all sense of the state, a complete lack of feeling for the state, and a preoccupation with private advantage and fragmentation.

In addition to this individualization, this particularity of circumstances, there comes about the particularity of mind and heart, the particularity of passions in things great and small, which result in the worst atrocities. Religion with its sense of dread, with its consolation and truth, indeed counters self-aggrandizement; but the church, living in these times, acquires the most disparate of rights, just as others do. The church raises souls to higher ends, thereby opposing the particularity that is indifferent toward power and possessions, although it acts in its own interest. The church's indifference to possessions proves advantageous to it; it takes up a position of power in which nothing essential changes in the relationship, and the

457 earlier relationship persists. | When the church wrests passions from individuals, they elevate their spirit and renounce the world that previously was the focus of their needs.

As the European world assumes a new form and is reconfigured, as humanity becomes acquainted with necessities and culture, as peoples become established in their circumstances—then all relationships are defined as particular, dreary private relationships. What ought to become rules and laws here remains an endless number of independent contingencies. What ought to be simple becomes something exceedingly complicated, and the fundamental principles are correspondingly complex. As the peoples turn away from the unity of the Christian religion, they take refuge in particularity. As the universal becomes the particular, what must now appear is a direction entirely opposed to integration of the whole, one in which all private matters are fragmented and the subjectivity of everyone is purged of inner and outer limits.

The Abstract Unity of Islam and its Challenge to Europe

The other revolution, this [other] extreme, is the Oriental world.[14] In the Orient the One, the onefold, became the absolute object of consciousness; it was made into the final end of all action, the ultimate [being] of actuality.

The One beyond all relationship became what binds together all existence. Previously we saw the substantial unity of the Orient, where the unity of thought and the natural was undivided, where spirit was made captive of nature and was unfree. Determinate existence, representational consciousness, disintegrates into countless divinities, into a great number of gods with natural bonds. Now, however, all restrictive particularity is consumed in the pure thought of the One. The pure thought of the One does not allow the emergence of anything determinate or of any organization in the world of actuality. For all particularities are, in contrast to the infinite comprehensiveness, merely something accidental; in it, they are accidental, only

14. The reference here and in the following paragraphs is to Islam, founded in Arabia early in the 7th cent. by the Prophet Muhammad. Within a century, Islam had conquered most of the Middle East and had spread across North Africa and up the Iberian peninsula into Western Europe. As the religion of the one absolute and abstract God, it represents for Hegel the antithesis of the Germanic principle of individual freedom and subjectivity. Hegel speaks harshly of Islamic 'fanaticism', and his reference below to the absence of cause and effect, the lack of all particularity, is an allusion to its so-called 'occasionalism' in which Allah's will is regarded as the sole and proximate cause of everything that occurs. But there are other aspects of Islam that Hegel appreciates, such as the mysticism of Jalāl-al-Dīn Rūmī (see above, p. 187, n. 51), its preservation of works of classical antiquity, and the flourishing of poetry and science in it.

hypothetical (*ideell*). This is not the light of the Persians; even that is merely something natural. The One of the Orient | is thus much more the One of 458
Judaism, which, as consummated in Islam, becomes the religion of the Orient as such. The other mode of consummation is known in Christianity as this One as inwardly self-determining. This One has its *truth* only in Christianity, as fulfilled and determinate within itself.

The first mode of determining the One is to grasp it as pure thought freed from all natural particularity. This One is thus negative over against all that is natural and every particularity. Inasmuch as this One is known as the absolute, the religion of the One must be actual, truly present. This entails that this One be what is solely valid and what is dominant, acknowledged, and desired; it entails that the intuition of the One be what is solely acknowledged and controlling. Insofar as this One alone is valid and realized, there is abolition of all differences; there is fanaticism. The religion that is this pure consciousness on the part of the individual must be fanaticism; for fanaticism is desiring what is abstract and being negative toward everything particular and determinate. When this abstraction is [the focus of one's] sensibility, this sensibility is fanatical. The sensibility is that the One is set over against everything that exists objectively, for the object as such is essentially only something inwardly articulated. The sensibility is fanatical with respect to this object, but not only sensibility; fanatical too is the representation of the One, the abstract, which gives itself actuality.

It is Islam, then, in its splendor, in its freedom, in its breadth and serene clarity, that stands opposed to the preoccupation of the Christian world with the particular. All restrictions disappear. | In this One, all the particularity 459
of the Orient drops away, all caste differences, all birthrights. No positive right exists, no political circumscription of individuals. Property and possessions, all particular purposes, are null and void. There is no establishment of cause and effect, and when this nullity is realized it becomes destructive and devastating. That is why Islam devastates, converts, and conquers all.

Islam first appeared in the first quarter of the seventh century, and it constituted something in contrast to what is seen in the West, to the principle of the West. Given this belief in the One, where consciousness recognizes only the One and nothing else—given this fanaticism—Islam in one sense can remain passive. Insofar, however, as action is called for, and insofar as spirit disposes itself toward actuality, Islam must be essentially negative; for its character is fanaticism.

Here actual life is concrete and determinate. The concretely determined in the life of Islam appears to be something concrete, but it shows itself only as something that is accidental and disparate; it appears to be built on sand.

Everything that seeks to emerge into appearance is only something fleeting, and changing fortune holds sway over all circumstances. This then is the foundation of change, of constant change regarding individuals and entire kingdoms. An individual can at one time be a slave and yet in turn one who commands—a ruler over vast kingdoms—and vice versa. Likewise, a kingdom that has sunken into opulence can restore itself out of its own resources. A number of dynasties have been founded by slaves, but no sooner does a kingdom appear to be at peace than it is destroyed. For Islam is continually rejuvenating itself. That an individual is a sovereign or minister, that royal families and dynasties exist—all of that is mere chance. The favorites of the sovereigns, those who are the pillars of the throne, those to whom, to our way of thinking, the greatest thanks is due, overthrow these very sovereigns
460 and install | themselves on the throne. This is the soil of change par excellence: what seeks to take shape dissipates just as quickly.

The third factor that is also involved here is the particular, the determinate, at which the individual arrives in what he comprehends; the individual is completely absorbed in it and permeated with it. This individual, the Muslim, is not like Europeans, who have a number of concerns. The European by contrast is a bundle of the most diverse circumstances, while the Muslim is completely one thing and only that. If the Muslim is deceitful, then none are more persistent in this cunning, and he remains deceitful for years. If the Muslim is vengeful, then no tiger is more ferocious; similarly, if he is cruel, generous, sensitive, or loving, then, especially with regard to the latter, nothing is more concrete, heartfelt, and intense than this love in which he solely dwells. The ardor, the beauty of love, is found and described to the fullest in the Orient. A sovereign lays all magnificence, all finery at the feet of his beloved; however, just as single-mindedly, he can sacrifice her. So it was with the Turkish emperor who saw a Christian woman as he went to war: for four weeks he remained obsessed by her and lay immobile. But when the army began to grumble, he had the beloved one brought before them and dropped her veil; then he killed her and moved on to engage the enemy. This passion is also to be found in the poetry of the Arabs and Saracens. It is complete dedication, not mere yearning.

Just as for the Greeks and Romans the 'morning' of a beautiful world lay in the East, so for the Christian world, whose natural father is the 'evening', the Western part of Europe, the natural aspect arose in the West. But the East, the Orient, is the more sublime and spiritual father. From the Orient the Romans received Christianity—the element of freedom, of universal-
461 ity—over against the Nordic element, | the Nordic reliance on individualized subjectivities. The bravery of the Europeans flowered into knighthood

in Spain from contact with the Arabs, who also disseminated the sciences and the works of classical antiquity that had influenced them. Similarly, free poetry and free fantasy, brought into play in our day by Goethe, are based on the Orient. Just recently Goethe turned to the Orient and created a collection of songs in his *Divan*, songs of a passion enflamed by the Oriental fire.[15]

This then is the general character of the Orient and its relationship to the West. Never has enthusiasm had greater practical effect than this Oriental [Islamic] enthusiasm. It had no specific goal; rather it is something purely abstract, all encompassing, needing nothing and unstoppable. Without any particular military strategy it irresistibly conquered all, the Euphrates, the lands extending from Tibet to the Mediterranean; Persia too and Hindustan and central Asia, down into central Africa, submitted, so too all of Egypt; and finally, via Spain, it reached the middle of southern France. Not until Poitiers were the Arabs halted, defeated.[16] At the same time, they turned from Provence to Italy, toward Nice. In France they were vanquished in 730 by Charles Martel, the grandfather of Charlemagne; his son was Pepin, whose son was Charlemagne. The Arabs achieved this power within a century, and among them arose just as quickly the flowering of poetry and all the sciences. Under the great caliphs in the third and fourth centuries [after Muhammad] Egypt and the Near East | were full of burgeoning 462
cities. In the eighth century [after Christ] a wealth of cities with the most magnificent palaces existed in Spain. There were scholars and schools everywhere. Particularly brilliant, however, was the court at Baghdad, which shone by its external opulence, poetry, and simplicity of customs. The lowliest person was equal to the caliph; the lowliest Saracen considered the caliph to be his equal; the naive nature of spirit made possible this expression. However, this extensive, magnificent empire soon disappeared; it was itself only something fleeting that subsided without a trace. Later the Turks, who have proven themselves incapable of any culture, occupied most of that extensive empire. At the same time as the great Arabian empire broke up into many separate ones, the great kingdom of the Franks was also breaking up. We shall return to this after considering the contrasting opposites of the Orient and the Occident.[17]

15. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *West-östlicher Divan*, publ. 1819. See Buch des Timur, poem 2, 'An Suleika' (*Goethes Werke* (Hamburg, 1949), ii. 61), quoted in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 111–13, incl. n. 131.

16. At the Battle of Poitiers (or Tours) in 732 the Franks and Carolingians defeated the Muslims, and the Carolingians began their ascendancy in Europe.

17. See Hegel's discussion below of the Crusades (pp. 492–4), also pp. 498–9.

THE MIDDLE AGES[18]

The Empire of Charlemagne

The second period begins in the Occident. Charlemagne brought together the large kingdom called the Frankish kingdom. It was constituted by France, Spain down to the Ebro River, and Germany, where Charlemagne personally subjugated the Saxons—hence all of Germany and the Lombardian kingdom down to Naples. Further to the south the Lombardian dukes reigned, but they also extended to him the sign of submission. In the year 800 Charlemagne was made the [Holy] Roman emperor. Although he was
463 crowned in Rome, he ruled from Aachen. Aachen was | the imperial city where, for centuries after his death, he remained enthroned at his tomb. Thus he is the sovereign of Christendom; for England remained isolated. There is nothing of a special nature to note regarding the character of the empire other than that the realm or the principle of particularity began at this time. However, civil authority is still present in the Frankish kingdom. Authority still pertained to the state and had not yet become privately held. Everything was still in flux, and the particular powers establishing themselves were still in the process of emerging.

After Charlemagne the empire was split up and fell apart. Under Charlemagne his empire became a real empire, the supreme authority. For western Europe it was not to be that the empire would survive as the basis from which succeeding, later developments emerged. The western empire is a spiritual one; here spirit should rule, and this is a return to itself. This return must thus be one that does not proceed from nature lest the result would then remain burdened by the natural element. Spirit too had to begin from what is external in order to produce itself, for it knows only what it makes of itself. This externality is, however, as we have seen, also something immediate, which is the individuality of will, the intensity of soul (*Gemüt*). It is how Charlemagne became the [Holy] Roman emperor, and his empire is rightly to be considered the continuation of the old Roman Empire. This is the case because the strength of the individuality of will, which was the ultimate

18. The period of the Middle Ages runs for Hegel from the reign of Charlemagne (early 9th cent.) through the Reformation of the 16th cent. Luther in particular is still a medieval figure, but he also represents a critical transition to the age of modernity. At one point below (p. 494) Hegel indicates a threefold division of this period: the dominion of the church (our first three subheadings), the church's quest for the empirical presence of Christ (the '*this*') and finding this presence outside itself (our next two headings), and spirit's harmonious relationship with the external world (our last heading). Because of the importance of the transition to modernity, we present it as a separate period.

thing in the Roman Empire, serves the European world at its inception, was its starting point. | The Germanic world reverted to this situation of private 464
individualities, to the formal legality of an endless number of dependencies. For the Germanic world is a reaction to an immediate determinacy, which here is not a force of nature but one of finite spirit.

Medieval Christianity

The period of the Middle Ages has this characteristic, that the real authority should become an ideal one,[19] that Christendom should become inculcated in the hearts [of people], that a truly Christian world should come into being. This is above all the epoch of Christianity and of the church.

The Germanic nations became Christian quite early, but their Christianity was superficial and did not permeate all spiritual relationships. Charlemagne forced the Saxons to foreswear paganism, just as he had done earlier to the Burgundians and other tribes. Their conversion, however, was merely formal. After the teachings had been presented to them for a few days at most, they were baptized. Hence, this form of Christianity remained quite superficial, with respect to both subjective faith and actual cultural permeation. Christianity is now said to rule the world, but in doing so it runs counter to the word of Christ: 'My kingdom is not of this world'.[20] In the wake of that profane world, it must come about that that world is abrogated, for worldliness is separated from spirituality.[21] However, the world must then become spiritual in nature, i.e. become rational; the ecclesiastical domain must purify itself from worldliness. Ultimately both elements must take shape on their own account; for only | in this manner does the true unity of both 465
come to pass. The church and worldliness cannot be in direct union; rather both must have formed themselves into totalities in order to constitute the true unity. In the Middle Ages, therefore, the church becomes worldly. This is neither to be underemphasized nor to be overemphasized, for this unity is not yet true unity.

The other matter that must be considered is that, instead of this real empire, the ideal, spiritual empire is forming; spirit is deepening itself within itself, immersing itself or entering into the truth of the Christian religion, and conflating with it. In this respect, three things must be illustrated. A complete history would have to show how individuals deepened themselves in

19. See above, n. 5.

20. John 18: 36.

21. *Weltlichkeit* is translated variously in this and following sentences as 'profane world', 'this world', 'worldliness'.

religion, how religion now became an object of scholarly study (*wissenschaftlich*), and how its study was spread—how thought apprehended religion. Thought is the innermost aspect of spirit in its abstract freedom. Earlier, the councils and church fathers firmly established this religion, the teachings of the church, and so completed it. What there is now, in addition, is the elaboration of this subject of religion by theologians of the West, who formulated it in thought; these theologians were essentially philosophers. During the Middle Ages philosophy and theology are one, and every theology has to be philosophical; for purely historical treatment does not address the content as truth. If theology is not philosophy, it does not know what it seeks. Teaching is found in the catechism, the explication of which is philosophy. What is historical is not religion. In the Middle Ages it happened
466 that what is | objective in the teachings of Christianity was *thought about*, especially in Scholastic philosophy. Thought has now applied itself to religion. This theology was cognition (*Erkenntnis*) of the truth, not information (*Kenntnis*) about historical evidence. In this respect, the science of theology as cognition of the truth is the [principal] mode of scholarship. Paris became the primary center of this study, and England too. Germany lagged in some areas. Italy, however, distinguished itself by its medical science in Salerno and its jurisprudence in Bologna.

The second aspect is that of feeling, the deepening of religion in the hearts of individuals. The diffusion of Christianity brought with it the spread of convents and monastic orders. The cloister establishments and the monastic life appeal to the hearts of individuals; what presents itself here is the conversion, the suffusion, of the hearts of individuals with ideals. Thus the spiritual principle turns the heart around. Even if the Germanic heart is that firm, gnarled oaken heart par excellence, it is nonetheless split in two by Christianity. Here the life of Germania is pierced by the power of the ideal. It is the incredible power that breaks the stubborn self-will of barbarism and wrests the strength of that nature to the ground; it buckles the inner element in women and men, strips away innocence and beautiful love, buries this vitality, and grants it calm and peace in the form of yearning, a heavenly yearning. Monks and nuns had to take an oath of chastity, obedience, and poverty. The oath of chastity is directed against the ethos of marriage or family love; the oath of obedience to superiors is against self-will; and the oath of renunciation or poverty is directed against private possessions. Gregory VII forbade the entire clergy class to marry, separating the worldly
467 from the spiritual in such a way that the clergy | are wholly severed from the ethos of the family. This breaking asunder of the natural will, this slaying of natural desire, happens partly in a simple way because of cloistered life;

partly, however, it comes after a long struggle that is linked to a most complex process. Of interest here are the stories of individuals that reveal how people with their passions and purposes, with their courage, struggle in the world but fail to find satisfaction, are distressed by the demand of a higher authority; and in this cleavage they either collapse or else finally find peace in the bosom of the church through renunciation of all their interests and passions.

This envisaging (*Einbildung*) of the ideal has two aspects, one by means of thought as universal and the other by the heart; they take on form, as our third point, in that laws as such and private laws in particular are transformed in accord with the perspective of the church. The Christian religion therefore recasts these former perspectives, and what comes into play is an entirely different stance in the consideration of crime. Thus murder takes on an entirely different meaning than before, namely, as a crime. What previously was only a private matter now assumes the status of a public crime. In particular, the law governing marriage is accorded a new status. In reshaping these perspectives, the clergy confronted evil directly. Now it is the spiritual power that directly confronts crime in this regard, intervening in private vengeance, feuds, etc. During the Merovingian dynasty, crime is met with crime as retribution, which of course punishes but becomes punishment or recompense in a worldly manner. During the Carolingian dynasty, this modification takes on quite a different form; for here | it is mainly the 468
pope who intervenes. Synods are held and assert authority. For example, that is what happened with Lothair and his actions regarding his lover.[22] Hence not just the perspective of the clergy, but their spiritual power too, becomes a judicial power. This power is seen to go beyond the merely external and is also internal, as seen in confession and many acts affecting individuals, the ultimate being excommunication, the most drastic act. If we were to look at the Nibelungenlied[23] in these terms—it takes place at the court of the Burgundians in a Christian land—then Christianity, the clergy, is seen to play no role in the entire story; they do not play an important role until Carolingian times. Later on, in the Carolingian era, the church takes on

22. Lothair II (835–69), king of Lotharingia, divorced his wife Teutberga and married his mistress Waldrada in 862, with the consent of a synod of Frankish bishops. However, Pope Nicholas I voided the decision and threatened excommunication. When Lothair agreed to take his wife back, she expressed her desire for a divorce, but he died before the matter could be resolved.

23. The Song of the Nibelungs was a Middle High German epic by a south German poet of the early 13th cent. In Germanic mythology, the Nibelungs were an evil family possessing a magic hoard of gold.

an entirely different and far more powerful position. Just as earlier the church intervened in private matters, now it does so in the relationships, the feuds, between dukes and subjects, sovereigns and states. Thus the power of Christianity carries weight in all circumstances during this period.

Political Developments: Relations between Church and State

The fourth aspect that concerns us here is to consider the incorporation of Christianity into the secular world, into universal, political, and historical circumstances, the fact that politics is determined by this incorporation. To comprehend this entire development in detail one has to recall the earlier circumstances, namely, the two aspects that this incorporation presupposes and how they came about, what the distinction is that constitutes the essentially enduring factor in the political development of states. Hence we have to return to the historical situation as such.

The distinction drawn previously was that the Germanic nations were of
469 two kinds. One part | persisted where it was in a homogeneous (*einfach*) principle; or else, as in England, when it came into contact with other [peoples], it retained its homogeneity undisturbed by this contact. The other part, in contrast, pressed outward and, in uniting with completely different peoples, took on a heterogeneous nature; and its outer governing structure posited, in its own inner being (*Insichsein*), an outer-directed existence (*Außersichsein*). The Germanic nation maintained a double nature in its innermost principle, but also found from the outset the unity within itself that can tolerate a duality within it. This explains the fact that in Romance countries, with Romance peoples, the church discovered a preexisting division of spirit, hence could establish itself in a temporal fashion; the result was that, while the church of course stood over against the temporal order, it could do so within the previously existing arrangement without disrupting the tranquility of the whole—thus leaving matters undisturbed while the principle of the achieved compatibility (*Zusammengehen*) of heterogeneous elements could resolve itself without an ensuing struggle. However, this compatibility, this unification, could only bring about a superficial unity; whereas, where the demand was for a far-reaching unity, this compatibility with the church could not conclude without a struggle. Only through a struggle could what was inherently different be in later days reconciled into a higher rationality. In Germany, therefore, the relationship between church and state had to generate a difficult and hostile struggle, from which, to be
470 sure, the church did at first emerge victorious; | but it was only a relative victory. This unification cannot yet be final, ultimate, and concrete.

If we consider this in more detail historically, the following enters into consideration: through conquest the secular kingdoms that we termed 'Romance' had already developed into a secular unity, a stable unitary state, before Christianity and the church parlayed power into secular authority. The church, spreading farther into Gaul and Spain as a spiritual force, found Christianity already there. The sovereign lords, however, became overlords, and the church only expanded by means of their entrenched areas and achieved all manner of holdings and wealth—but only in a lesser authority since the sovereigns retained secular control. This entrenchment of secular rule was also accomplished by battles and wars; for wars are part and parcel of a state's existence. These wars could be of three kinds: Christian states against Christian states, or against non-Christian states—in the latter case because of secular circumstances (where the spiritual power could not function as mediator); and, thirdly, Christian powers against Christians in such a way that the objective of the state is not merely secular but has within itself a spiritual element.

If we briefly consider the fate of the states after Charlemagne's empire disintegrated, we see that Spain was faced by a Saracen enemy; this was a people completely without legal rights (*unberechtigt*), whereas the Christian people alone had legal rights. In this battle with the noble Arabs, a free and magnificent people, Spain adorned itself not only with the skills, arts, and sciences of the Arabs, | but also with the noblest and purest knighthood— 471
a knighthood of such purity and excellence that it could bear to be parodied, even to the point of irony, while also retaining beauty and nobility in Don Quixote.[24]

France was in an established, secure, secular condition, but not thoroughly formed within itself; it was merely secure as opposed to being a thoroughgoing state, although its secular situation was clearly entrenched. It fell apart into many principalities, but in the process the secular principle remained intact. With the weak Carolingians and after them the Capetian kings, the crown and its royal office were insignificant, an insignificant power, but the secular domain and secular office were established internally and were secure. Because the royal office was of so little import, it entailed the benefit that the crown became all the easier to hand on. The seeds of conflict were therefore sown in France, passing from prince to prince. France now seldom turned outward. It had in the main to face no outward challenges. In conquering England, William of Normandy was an exception.

24. *Don Quixote* is a satirical romance by Cervantes (1605, 1615); the hero tries in a chivalrous but unrealistic way to rescue the oppressed and fight evil.

France had the good fortune and destiny to have been concerned only internally, as one secular element versus another; in this way the royal office, although an abstract foundation of the state, became secure.

England is the third of these kingdoms, and it became a world power through conquest; it engaged widely with worldly elements and preserved thereby the foundation of the state. England had only secular enemies.

The fate of Italy and Germany, however, is quite different. The lot of each was either to disintegrate or to face disintegration; and while there is a
472 whole, this feature | grows ever more hollow and finally disappears. With regard to Italy, although we see it unified by the Lombards, this unification did not last for long. Following the break-up of the Frankish empire, Italy was torn by strife, for the prior unified rule did not last. Under the Italian principle, unity could not prevail. As the land of antiquity, it retained the natural element. The rigid individualization of the understanding, the abstract individualization of the West, combining with Roman abstractness, with the rigidity of Rome in the rational sensibility of the church, indeed brings out on the one hand lovely individuality, indeed develops as beautiful piety and fine art, while on the other hand it also brings out exuberant sensuality. Politically speaking, Italy is still associated with the ancient Roman Empire, as it existed in the Greek world; for the worthiest seat of the church, which required a leader, is Rome. Regarding its temporal aspect, the church had to have an independence, a territory, as well. Moreover, Italy is on the sea, and many points of trade are found along its coasts.

Germany's fate parallels that of Italy in that both disintegrate, but on the other hand it is the opposite of Italy. The peculiar feature of Germany is that it relates to Italy but finds its opposite there and in the church. In Spain the secular order does not collide with the spiritual, or vice versa, nor do they collide in France. Italy fell apart in a reckless fashion, unnecessarily and without the need, effort, and concern to achieve unity; it rashly opposed the spiritual power, so for example Florence was under the ban for ten years. But
473 Germany's fortunes are even more distinctive. |

The German kingdom emerged on its own from Charlemagne's empire, and was internally diffuse. Shortly before the rule of Charlemagne, and in part during it, Germany was Christianized, and secular dominion for its own sake did not really take hold. Secular rule became reliant on Christianity to an extent in general matters, especially in regard to various aspects of culture, of internal affairs; but Christianity also to an extent relied on the established temporal sphere. Thus the church established itself with the secular power and, together with the secular authorities and secular princes,

it came into possession [of secular dominion]. Indeed, in France and Spain the bishops and archbishops were even advisers to the princes and were independent members of the assemblies, although they did not become princes themselves. To the contrary, this did occur in Germany: the archbishoprics and abbeys became secular jurisdictions. In Germany the bishops of Cologne, Mainz, Münster, Osnabrück, and bishoprics in Saxony, and among the Wends and Slavs, were simultaneously secular authorities with the same power for themselves as the secular princes had. Thus the clerics took on the same status as secular lords.

In this way a special power of private authority was established, something we saw earlier to be characteristic. Here private property was at the same time ruled by a spiritual center. By the bond and oversight provided by spiritual rulers, by such a thing, private property became unassailable in Germany, a feature to which then secular rulers also | consented and in 474
virtue of which they could hold their own property just as securely. Owing therefore to the fact that secular rule had at the same time spiritual legitimacy, property became secured and led to the formation of entities so independent that they were not amenable to unification. Unity could not come about here by force, by the dying out of a ruling house, or by a division [of holdings], by inheritance; for these centers could not be suppressed by force or acquired in virtue of rulers dying out. This fragmentation, built on such solid ground, is what has been termed 'German freedom', in fact right up to the present day—an independence of particular rule, a fragmentation, that has always been considered the dignity and honor of Germany, and that in earlier time brought misfortune and ignominy to this land. Thus inwardly fragmented, Germany persists in inwardness in its principle, in the principle that possession did not occur by conquest. The simple inwardness of this principle endures. This principle seeks to be and ought to be internally concrete and ought, by means of a foreign element, to unite itself. The German principle must therefore have the drive, it must be its drive, to put itself together, to make itself concrete, through unification with something initially other to it, as was indeed the case with other [countries] at their inception. Thus Germany must have the drive to unite with something other; its situation is characterized by an unsuccessful striving, an inability [to accomplish it]. The result is the sad recognition of impotence, the impotence of supposed power.

The other, foreign element with which Germany is entangled and struggling, and which it seeks to assimilate, | is Italy. Italy too casts its eyes 475
toward Germany, believing that it could have its foothold in Germany. This 'other Germany' is other in both secular and spiritual ways. The

spiritual power of the church, however, is something with which Germany likewise is implicitly identical, because Germany is Christian. Thus Germany is at one with the church; yet Germany is also in conflict with the church, hence in complete contradiction (*Inkonsequenz*), in a contradictory relationship with it.

It must also be noted that, as Germany separated from Charlemagne's empire, it disintegrated into numerous provinces that in fact are linked together externally; yet, in their interrelations, they were politically stable internally. Germany had been unified into a kingdom that came largely from Charlemagne's empire itself and to which Germany was subjected only out of necessity. When this center of the Frankish empire let go of the provinces, this unity was of little substance and vacuous, and hence the imperial office was appropriate for this kingdom; it was most fitting for this vacuity. The office of [Holy] Roman emperor is described in more splendid terms. The emperor is seen as the head of the Christian church, as the ruler of the Christian world. He is said to have the undisputed first rank above all secular sovereigns, to have the right to bestow the title of king (only a few); all nobility and all knighthood are said to derive from him. However, knighthood in its natural and spiritual sense must derive from individuals themselves. The Christian states were dependent [on him] in name only and
476 did as they pleased. The universal validity of the | imperial laws was, in theory, uncontested. Pütter[25] says that in theory the emperor had supreme power in all domains but had the good sense not to assert it. This ultimate sovereignty was of so little substance because Germany was unified in name only. This insubstantial imperial mantle was a source of much difficulty for Germany. And yet they [the emperors] were astute. This imperial mantle lacked the power to summon anything or provide any sort of protection; in any case it merely inspired in others a magical belief in its potency. France became a kingdom on its own and had little contact with the outside world, which was just as well because its rulers did not become the emperor. Not to attain this honor was a piece of good fortune for France because it was so preoccupied with itself, even though its kings certainly did strive to achieve it.

Germany gained its status from the imperial office. The German emperors sought from the outset to assert their rule in Italy as [Holy] Roman emperors, and to make a stand against their [Italian] 'other'. In particular the Ottos

25. Johann Stephan Pütter, *Teutsche Reichsgeschichte in ihrem Hauptfaden entwickelt*. 3rd edn. (Göttingen, 1793).

of Saxony[26] did this. These long-continuing relationships with Italy mostly ended disgracefully and ignominiously or calamitously. The Italians frequently called upon the emperors to participate in Roman campaigns, yet often barred their German liegemen from entering the cities. German princes did indeed accompany the emperors, yet they abandoned them ignominiously or met their death collectively due to intemperate acts; or else the emperors came with too few men and other resources. The wars were calamitous and brought dire consequences.

This frustration of the emperors, upon coming to power in Italy, was matched by the frustration of the Italians who hoped for German aid against oppression because they depended directly on the emperor, | provided that 477
he chose to administer law and justice, and not be simply an instrument of patronage, and of pillage of those calling on his aid. Thus they sought in every possible way to rid themselves once more of the one called upon for help. Just as on the one hand the Italians disappointed the emperors, on the other hand they bitterly complained about them—as, for example, Dante did about the devastation that crude barbarism inflicted on the Italians and the fact that the emperors were unable to enforce the law.

In addition to a political tie, the German emperors had a different and second tie to Italy, in the efforts of the powerful Swabians, the Hohenstaufens. It involved the subjugation of the spiritual rulers who had become secular princes. Foremost among these was the papal seat itself. The final decision of this at times dreadful struggle was, on the whole, just in a formal sense, in that the archbishops and bishops, the spiritual powers, should be installed, selected, and rewarded not by the secular power but rather by their head, the pope, while their temporal rewards and secular authority would come from the emperor. As a result of struggles and intrigues, however, it turned out that those things that were still dependent on the emperor, things that he had the right to reward, were no longer worth the trouble to claim and acquire.

While the rest of the European kingdoms were by and large at peace with the church and the clergy, and only engaged in secular conflicts, Germany was in a struggle of an entirely different sort: the emperor against the pope. This was a tragedy (*Trauerspiel*) in which the family of the German emperor and the power of the German state, | as well as the unity of Germany, were 478
undermined. The church was victorious, just as it had prevailed peaceably in other states, in the rest of the kingdoms, and where this happened most

26. Three Ottos in succession were kings of Germany and Holy Roman emperors between 936 and 1002. A fourth Otto was Holy Roman emperor 1209–18. All were engaged in various ways with Italy.

thoroughly the church established its dominion. As large a role as it played in the Middle Ages, this struggle between Germany and the church was of incidental importance overall and of little interest to the rest of Europe. The power of the church remained with the church, undiminished by this struggle. The result was that religion and church rose to a position of power in all private and state affairs. All the circumstances of life and all of scholarship came under its dominion. In this way the church asserted authority over every emperor; and essential, hourly, daily life was in one respect in the hands of the church in such a way that there remained no hour of the day in which persons might not feel themselves engaged in spiritual service. The point that we have reached [in our discussion] is, therefore, the displacement of the real kingdom by the dominion of this ideal kingdom.

The Quest for the Presence of Christ in the Church

Now the question becomes one of what was lacking in this church. It can be accused of transgression, abuse, corruption, crimes, but these are merely individual shortcomings. The content is the doctrine of Christianity, the doctrine of the highest truth and the actualization of this doctrine; and the church is the unbroken transmission and dispensing of the treasures of the Spirit. This actualization indeed came about by worldly means but is fully consummated, and so, considered outwardly, there is evidently a need for Christendom to give itself a final, completed form. This need is based on some sort of lack, and to discover what that is we must determine the shape that the Christian religion gave to itself. So we must return to the nature of the Christian
479 church, | to its distinctive form and how it took shape during this time.

The aspect that now comes into consideration is how the Christian religion has a footing in the presence experienced by self-consciousness.[27] The early church councils established the objective, absolute content of Christianity; it was completed long ago by the church fathers. This content was not altered by the Scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, and philosophy in our own time too can only transpose the content into the form of the concept. One aspect of this doctrine is that for humans the divine being is not a quantity (*Großes*) of some kind, not a content. Rather the fundamental quality is the unity of the divine with the human, the unity of the human and divine nature, such that God appeared to humanity and is utterly present to humanity. This aspect is requisite to the infinite form. The

27. The German reads: *in der Gegenwart des Selbstbewußtseins*. In this and the following paragraphs, variations on the term *Gegenwart* ('the present', 'presence') occur, e.g. *gegenwärtig* ('present'), *Gegenwärtigkeit* ('presence'), *Vergegenwärtigkeit* ('realization of presence').

divine nature has therefore within itself the quality of the *this*.[28] Christ has appeared, and this presence, this unity of the human and the divine, of divine and human nature, is what the world has ever been striving for. It is the specification as such of this presence that is at stake. We have seen that the church, inwardly prospering, finds its completion as dominion over the whole world. The ultimate point is that the divine always has the quality of the *this*, the going forth [of the divine] into the wonder of presence—that God is spiritual and is also present in the Spirit. Everything hinges on this point. In the church this could not be something immediately natural, such as light. This presence could not exist in an external or an immediate way.

The God, the God-man Jesus Christ, as a human being in his immediacy, existed as a temporal being and therefore is a past being. The presence necessary for the spirit could not, for the spirit, be like that of a Dalai Lama, where the god is present to the human.[29] The pope, the head of Christendom, could not be this Dalai | Lama, for the pope is not venerated 480
as this [particular] human being. That is because this human being is sentient, external, natural, and what is merely natural is accorded very little status in the Christian religion, and it is what is sublated. One must account for this. The 'why' must be explained. What is past is no longer, but the *this* should still be present. The pope as a human being stands before God, together with the community, expressing humility toward God. Thus the pope is the servant of servants, and is such a servant as a single person, humbling himself. Much greater, however, is the *this*, a single human being, an immortal soul, an absolute atom, thus by itself, excluding other singular individuals, excluding all others. In the Christian religion the singularity of self-consciousness is no mere form. In India, in Hinduism, God is only substance that exists in singular, contingent ways—now this way, now that—which are only modes (*Modi*) or accidents of substance.[30] In the Christian religion, however, singularity is an absolute moment, and the single human being [Christ] is therefore no mere mode but rather infinite

28. On the incarnation of God in *this* one single individual, Christ, see *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 113–14 (1821 lectures), 211–15 (1824 lectures). Hegel discusses 'the *this*' (*das Dieses*), which gives Christianity its concrete specificity, at some length in the following paragraphs. See also above, pp. 391, 396–7.

29. Hegel takes the Dalai Lama to be God in an immediate, sentient, natural presence; when one lama dies he is succeeded by the next one in a continuous chain of divine presence. On the Dalai Lama and Lamaism, see *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 107, 307, 315, 563 n. 140, 570, 576–9. See also above, pp. 250, 299–300.

30. Hegel may be alluding to Spinoza's doctrine in *The Ethics* (pt. 1, def. 5) of modes (*modi*) as accidents of substance. See *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and tr. Edwin Curley (Princeton, 1985), i. 409.

on his own account, excluding another *this*. Thus the single human being exists utterly on his own account and in such a way that cannot be a mode of the appearance of God. Thus Christ as singular cannot reappear in another person; he cannot be present as natural, for he is past, is himself only the single appearance. But this divine singularity must be present.

Thus Christ cannot be present in the church as the Dalai Lama. But God had to have been present in the Christian church by way of the *this*, and it is the *this*, the figure, the personality [of Christ], that is to be remembered in the church as it was immediately present. The main figure by which Christ was known and present in the church as the *this* is the way he is in the Mass and the Last Supper. The life, suffering, and death of the actual Christ is ever-
481 present daily in the Mass. | This, however, did not just occur once but happens eternally; for it is the life, suffering, and death *of God*; and, in relation to time, what has being in and for itself (*das Anundfürsichseiende*) must be eternally, therefore at the end of days and for every time. Thus the sacrifice takes place daily and forever and as an actual presence (*wirkliche Gegenwart*). It is shallow and irreligious to take this life, this suffering and death of Christ, as merely historical (*bloß historisch*), as a happening; for it is divine history (*gottliche Geschichte*). God has appeared; it is the actual God; this [sacrifice] must take place perpetually in the community [of faith], which is itself the co-celebrant. Christ sacrifices himself within the man and rises again in him. This is not a mere representation of Christ, as in the Reformed Church.[31] A represented Christ is a psychological Christ, who remains at a distance and about whom the mind can evoke all manner of psychological feelings and emotions whenever it chooses, for the mind is then in charge. Its particular subjectivity is juxtaposed to this representation of the Master, keeps him at a distance, if it chooses. It belongs then to fate whether or not this represented Christ evokes emotions in and has an influence on such minds. It is otherwise in the [Catholic and Lutheran] Church because there God is a presence (*Gegenwärtiges*), not a past being (*Gewesensein*). Becoming other in the man [Jesus] and being resurrected goes on forever. That is how this presence and the *this* are represented in the church.

31. In the 1821 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 155–6, Hegel says that the Reformed Church lacks the 'mystical element' (i.e. the real presence of Christ in the sacrament) that is found in the Catholic and Lutheran Churches. Instead, it offers 'a memorial, an ordinary psychological relationship'. This critique, which properly applies only to Zwingli, not Calvin, is found in later lectures as well (iii. 236, 339 n. 245, 373 n. 29).

Regarding this determination, it must still be noted that Christ is known and recognized here as the *this*; so it is even essential that Christ is at the same time represented as something external, as the host that is consecrated by the priest. No objection can be raised against this consecration. It is the Spirit of the church that takes on this external, sensible presence and thus at first imparts itself as the *this*. A main point, however, concerns the manner by which God is brought to appearance, is held up, is instated as the *this*—the fact that the host is supposed to be worshiped as God, | i.e., [God] as 482
this thing, insofar as God still stands outside [us] as something external. In the church the *this* is thus present every day and to every individual; each one is intertwined with the divine life, and the passion and resurrection of God are present at this place in this individual.

The church might have been satisfied with this presence, with this worship. But once it is established and conceded that God's self-disclosure is external and lends itself to this fixity, then it is at this point that the outward, sensible presence becomes an endless multiplicity, and the need for presence is boundless, producing itself in a manner that is endless and manifold. Christ as he appears here is apprehended or defined in such a way that he might make himself known in many other ways, so that, for example, his divine mother likewise disclosed herself as present in him; and other saints and blessed persons are likewise appearances, or effects, of divine activity. This establishes the manifold bestowals of grace associated with the present appearance [of God]. These manifestations, these effects of the divine in something present, the images of Mary—these are all hosts, are active, effective realizations of presence. A third and different kind of miracle, the relics that sustain the sensible presence, are sustenance for those who belong to heaven, in the same way as the miracles express the appearances of God not in a universal manner as law, but rather in a particular manner. All of this is related to the need for the presence of divinity.

In such ages the church is a world full of miracle, and the devout community has no satisfaction in the world as such, in merely external existence, in the rational and necessary connections of nature; rather satisfaction is found in single details of nature as converted into a particular manifestation of the divine, | as a portrayal of the divine as a *this* in this 483
place and time. The divine in sensible form is a miracle, for the sensible is something limited and singular. The divine as such a single thing is a miracle, and with that it is admitted that the divine has appeared in a particular way. This is the way, therefore, in which the church completes itself internally: that the divine appears as a *this*, that the church has the divine as a *this*, as something immediate. The question now is what the church itself lacks in

this situation—not what we may find lacking, and how the church must seek to arouse these needs within itself. The church has everything that we ask of the divine nature, [namely,] dominion in actuality and the honing of what we saw as its own features. The question concerns what the church still lacked in its own principle, what deficiency it must have had without losing itself, without going beyond its principle.

This deficiency is that miraculous images, miraculous words, etc., in which grace appears in particular form, are not of an absolute but of a limited nature and therefore must be endlessly reproduced. It is likewise with the host, this higher element, as itself all of these miracles, as every *this*, as Christ reproduced in countless churches. Christ himself, however, as the Son of God, is utterly *one*. As the host, this divinity is merely substance, although transubstantiated, conveyed into sensible presence, into singularity. But this singularity is at the same time a universal singularity that is present in all communities, so it is only a reflection of the universal, not this one singularity, spatially omnipresent (*letzte in Raum*), but is only one among many and is not the utterly one, the singular. This is what the church demands; this utterly one on earth, here below (*dieses schlechthin eine Diesseits*), is what the church must seek.

The final singularity into which presence gathers itself is that which is in
484 space, in a locality. Even if in time the | singularity of a person passes away, the spatial singularity remains. Christendom must discover and make its own this ultimate point of sensible singularity, the singularity that is called for in space. Access to it is in the hands of unbelievers;[32] the church is blocked from it. It is a shame and disgrace that it should be blocked from it. Christendom was unanimous about the fact that, in order to cast off this humiliation, war served not just any purpose but one alone, namely the Crusades.[33]

The Crusades

What impelled Christians to the Orient was to make the sign of the cross [over this land]. We have already seen the West drawn to the East under Alexander—with truly an individual at the fore. Christendom does not have the *this* at the forefront [of the Crusades]. It is not a genuine individual who

32. The reference is to the Holy Land, which was in the hands of Muslims.

33. The word 'crusade' is from the Middle Latin *cruciate*, 'marked with a cross'. The German term *Kreuzzug* literally means 'procession of the cross'. Nine crusades occurred between 1095 and 1291. They failed in their ultimate objective of holding the Holy Land, but they expanded Western hegemony in other regions.

leads the way to the Orient as in Alexander's day; rather Christendom is intent on seizing the *this*, winning and enjoying it. Thus the Westerners set forth to the Orient to conquer the *this*; they wanted to take possession of the place. They achieved their purpose in conquering, in winning back, the birthplace of Bethlehem, the Jordan, Jerusalem, the Holy Sepulcher, Golgotha, and Gethsemane. This was their goal: to secure what was most holy for them (*ihr Höchstes*) as a presence; it was to see and feel, to savor this presence. On the one hand, Christendom was seriously engaged in going after this presence; on the other hand, it founded additional kingdoms and principalities, and an opportunity was provided to conquer Constantinople. We have not yet spoken of the Greek [Byzantine] | Empire, this distinctive 485
Christian empire that survived a thousand years longer than the Western Roman Empire. But even as they set out on their triumphal processions,[34] the Crusaders were so inept that hundreds of thousands of their numbers fell by the wayside, met their deaths. They were similarly inept and lacking in understanding as they set up and governed those Oriental kingdoms.

What they actually gained were the sacred sites, the wood of the cross; but of greatest interest was the capture of the tomb of the Lord. In the Holy Sepulcher, in any tomb as such, all idle thoughts cease and matters become serious. In the tomb, in this very negation[35] of the temporal this, is where the reversal comes about. Isaiah says: 'Thou dost not allow the saints to perish.'[36] Here, in this grave, the [idle] thoughts of Christendom had to perish and the doctrine had to find its ultimate meaning in the sensible *this*, for the response sounded a second time: 'Why do you seek the living, the risen, among the dead? He is not here, but has risen.'[37] Indeed, in the resurrection of Christ, in the fact of his being risen, there was the rationale for being able to have relics, and the impossibility of doing so. If this rationale had been sufficient, the church would have been over and done with the matter. But if Christendom had come to this purely common sense view (*verständigen Anschauung*), the Christian religion would have been idol worship. Christ is risen, sensible presence is removed and [that] speaks for itself. After Christ's | sensible presence, the Holy Spirit would come to 486
lead the people into all truth; for, after Christ, the Holy Spirit came upon the

34. Hegel apparently intends a connection between *Siegeszüge* (triumphal processions) and *Kreuzzüge* (Crusades)—an ironic connection because here the cross represents military triumph rather than suffering and death. The cross becomes a sword.

35. Our text reads, following Griesheim: *in diesem negativen Selbst* Hotho reads: *im Negativen*

36. Isa. 26: 19 reads: 'Your dead shall live, their corpses shall rise.'

37. Cf. Luke 24: 5–6.

community—the living Spirit, not a sensible Spirit.[38] The extremity of subjectivity is to be sought not among the dead but among the spiritually living.

This is the result, the significance of the Crusades. The tomb expelled their illusions about the meaning of the *this*; thus the Holy Sepulcher and Canaan once again had to cease being the focus for the Christians. This was the blessing of the Crusades. The Crusades brought much benefit and much damage. This is the stuff of empirical history. The result of the Crusades was the blessing, the Spirit that simply is: the Spirit that comes to itself in the negation of its immediate presence, such that the Spirit is present only in the negation of sensibility, of immediacy. Thus the spirit of Christianity had to reach the point of negating the sensible *this*, of detaching from itself the meaning of the *this* in the form of sensible immediacy and placing it outside itself, precisely because it is external to spirit.

This is the situation that now discloses itself in world history. The *this* as sensible is now what is external to spirit. Spirit has yearned for the sensible *this*; it is what spirit wanted as its own, but as something external to it. Because this externality is both its own and an other, it is now the world, the world of nature, that has become such a *this*, the object of interest, for spirit. The other, nature, is its own; it itself is this nature, but as an other. Spirit has become interested in nature, and so the pursuit of this interest is a task that is now legitimate for it. Thus spirit now has nature as the sort of setting in which to work and enjoy itself. The situation is that the *this* is desired, but it is truly outside the spirit. This externality is nature; it is separated from spirit, its other, but at the same time it is what spirit desired and that with
487 which spirit felt justified in occupying itself. | It follows from this that the sensible *this* is not found in the church but outside it.

The Turn to the External World and Nature

What transpires then in the world is that human beings turn to the world, freely let it be as a *this*, gain confidence in relation to it, deal practically with it, and so freely let it be free just as they themselves are free. In the church spirit is freed from the sensible *this*. Thus an entirely different ascent of spirit begins. This is the third characteristic of this period. The first was the dominion of the church, the second that the church seeks the *this* and finds it outside itself. The third is the harmonious relationship with this externality, is this tranquil relation to the world and to nature as the *this*, making it

38. This is a theme of the Gospel of John. The Son must depart in order for the Holy Spirit to come (John 15: 26, 16: 7). 'When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth' (John 16: 13).

one's own, envisaging it inwardly, beyond the bounds of the church. The external world is now outwardly set over against the church as that with which spirit now has to deal, discovering in the world its own features. This characteristic is now a factor in the world and it assumes many forms.

The first of these forms is that all manner of industry, crafts, and trade come alive, especially along the coast of Italy and in the Italian cities. Nature was adapted to human purposes, especially in regions of Italy, Catalonia, and Flanders, as well as in Germany along the Rhine and the Danube, where cities were founded, just as deeper into Germany cities were also established during the conflict with the Slavs. The struggle against pagan cultures began in the north of Germany. This is where | the Hanseatic League[39] and other 488
associations for similar purposes were found. This marks the flowering of trade. The understanding is working its way into the sensible element and has a place here because that element is excluded from the church. The expansion of the limits of external existence is connected with this process. This activity, expanded to include universal viewpoints, establishes the certainty of the understanding for its own sake.

Falling within this period are many discoveries or inventions that are primarily instrumental in nature. For many of them the question as to where they were discovered is secondary. Whether that took place in the West or not is immaterial because the characteristic thing is that now such inventions come into general use, that now the legitimacy of finding satisfaction in the external world has dawned on people. Two inventions will be mentioned above all: gunpowder and the printing press.

The most likely or best supposition is that gunpowder was invented by the monk Schwarz.[40] This invention altered the art of warfare with the following consequences: castles were made [both] vulnerable and secure, for good and evil purposes, and protection of the body by sturdy defensive equipment, a suit of armor or a cuirass, became obsolete. The difference between the weapons of lords and those of serfs was now diminished, thereby eliminating the power differential between them. A common objection is that the bravest could now be vanquished by the weak, be slain by the most cowardly. But that had always been the case, and this means, gunpowder,

39. A mercantile league principally of north German cities, which flourished in the 13th–16th cents. A Hansa was a company of merchants trading with foreign lands.

40. The origin of gunpowder is probably Chinese, for it seems to have been known in China as early as the 9th cent. and was not introduced into Europe until the 14th cent. Some German scholars have attributed its invention to the alchemist-monk Berthold Schwarz. In the Introduction to these lectures, Hegel says that the Chinese invented gunpowder (above, p. 141); but a later reference (p. 190) is ambiguous.

essentially brought about a higher level of mental, rational, reflective cour-
489 age. | For in present-day warfare, command has for this very reason become the main factor. Even with the ancients, in the ancient art of war, the individual placed his security in the context of the whole and in the belief that everything depended on it. The use of gunpowder brought with it an end to the individual one-on-one [of battle], the individual's animosity toward the enemy [combatant]; this hostility ended, and the result was fighting and firing upon an abstract, generalized enemy. As a consequence, wars are now less bloody because everyone can surely recognize the danger from afar. The understanding is better able to grasp the whole because the battle plays out at a distance. So one must appreciate the invention of gunpowder as a means that is essentially linked with the modern understanding.

The printing press advanced the desire to stay interconnected with others through ideas; this desire gave rise to the printing press in the first place. By means of printing, opinions and ideas could be easily spread, inundating Germany like a plague after its invention.[41] The means for trade and industry, for widespread, peaceful interconnection in the world, had now arrived.

Directly related [to this desire for connection] were the discoveries, the heroic sea voyages of exploration by the Portuguese, the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope, and the discovery of America launched from Spain. Spanish knighthood sought a new field of action and discovered it in a different way, seemingly limited in the first place to the search for profit.
490 However, by venturing out in this way, the knighthood expanded and | demonstrated its gallantry in a way that initially appeared to be just the opposite of gallantry.

Quite inseparably linked in part to this industriousness was, in the second place, the rise of freedom in the cities. By people looking to their own hands and seeing their accomplishments, and by their subjective self-consciousness setting to work in external nature, they find it legitimate to do so and shape themselves accordingly, seeing themselves obligated to conduct themselves in a universal way, according to the nature of things and of their own needs. People put themselves at the service of their occupation and must comply with the general nature of this objective; they must conquer their sheer desire, their crudeness and awkwardness, by overcoming momentary, capricious urges and crude behavior. They become cultured, and make themselves

41. Within a century of Gutenberg's invention of movable type, Germany was flooded with pamphlets related to Luther's struggle against Rome. The Reformation would not have been possible without the printing press.

cultured, by acting in a universal rather than a merely private fashion. Associations are founded for this external purpose, for crafts and trades (*Industrien*). Besides, people knew themselves to have the right to be engaged in a general way in these activities, in this work, and the linking factors become, in another respect, law and civic freedom. In this way a new element, a new world, arises in the European world, in European Christendom. It is a world that differs from the church, which, as we saw, shut out the outside world, thus setting it free. Likewise, the outside world now opposes the relationship of lordship and servitude, the system of dependent bondsmen, the feudal system, that previously held sway. Thus a new system of freedom entered the feudal system, a principle that in its content embraced rational freedom, a freedom to be sure, although limited in extent and having a limited meaning—the freedom of property, of | talent, and of 491
what ensued from it. However, within this sphere the content is rational. In the other system, the feudal system, there is dependence as such, and it is indeterminate, and random, whether the content is rational or not, or is justified. In the feudal system everything is supposed to be private privilege, even what is by its nature not, such as *droit du pucelage* (privilege of virginity),[42] as well as ministerial posts, and the like. Either everything becomes private property, at odds with ethical relations, or it is against the law of the state. So the chastity of maidens became the property of their overlords; and, on the other side, the office of field commander became the property of [their] ministers. The new system of civic freedom now contrasts with this system of private property, in which what was property ought not, conceptually, to be property.[43]

This element of rationality and rights clashes in many ways with the earlier system. It can be seen in the impressive Italian republics, which these days are no longer mentioned, although each of them has its own interesting and impressive history. Republics form, some of which flourish and are independent, while others are correspondingly unfortunate, destroying themselves internally or being torn apart in unfortunate wars. At times, cities freed themselves only under the authority of princes, as happened so often in France. At this point three essential estates or classes (*Stände*) emerge: the estate of the peasants, that of the bourgeoisie, and that of the nobility; in addition there is the estate of the clergy. These are the essential classes that appeared in India as castes, and that are conditioned by basic physical and spiritual requirements. The differences are related to life-

42. The privilege of 'first night' was that of feudal lords to deflower maiden brides.
43. Adding 'nach' to the German so as to read: *es seinem Begriff nach nicht sein sollte.*

492 circumstances. These are | therefore the classes that must emerge everywhere. Like the castes in India, they emerge here too and become in part distinctions of nature and of region. More importantly, however, they have been legally defined and established. Such a legal arrangement can only come from the will, not from nature or a purely natural arrangement; rather it is the will that makes this determination that is universally and reciprocally distinguishable from its opposite. Hence these essential estates are established, partly by nature and partly by law. It is important to note further that these classes, while indeed classes of bourgeois society, have also become distinctions and determinations under the authority of the state, which likewise is divided into these estates. The two aspects are related. These estates, which initially represent ways of living, are also political. This distinction is very important.

Today we forget that the estates have this explicitly dual character. They are usually understood solely in their political sense rather than as distinguishing particular ways of life. As merely political, they are not also rooted in the requirements that particular ways of life entail. The estates, however, are at the same time distinctions in ways of life and in political relationships. The nobility was equally a political estate. Hence the nobility also possessed political power, as did the upper aristocracy. The same was true of the inhabitants of cities, the bourgeoisie, who also achieved the status of a political estate; being a member of an estate entailed a political dimension and was also anchored in bourgeois life. The peasantry was more or less excluded from political life. But this was not entirely the case, as for example in Switzerland, where the peasantry as a whole made up the entire state.

493 These estates | in their dual significance became legally established, not merely under constitutional law but in such a way that the political state of affairs has at the same time the shape of private ownership. This latter aspect partly contravenes the nature of the state: the fact that all of these relationships became matters of private rights to a degree undercuts the state; on the other hand, however, the relationships and determinations of rights in the state also became greatly strengthened in this way.

This point demonstrates where the Occidental countries differ greatly from the Oriental, Islamic countries; it shows where the European states contrast with the Islamic states. Such a fixity of distinctions does not exist in the latter; there nothing is anchored with certainty. The Holy Sepulcher is the place where the East bade farewell to the West.

For that very reason, there is order in the state. This firmness of distinctions, an ordered state, is found only in Europe. Unity in the East is solidified, abstract, and fanatical, whereas in Europe, on the contrary, distinctions

were established. A lasting, enduring, and intelligible establishment of relationships exists and indeed is pervaded by private rights. The most important point is that the formation of states in Europe obtained stability, and that they were interwoven with private property.

In this regard the stable heritability of the throne is particularly important, as is later the indivisibility of lands. The heritability of the throne was a fruit of the system of private rights.[44] By emphasizing this point we can, from the juxtaposition of European legality to the Oriental world, explain its distinction from the disorganization of the Oriental system. At this time, however, the determination by private rights of what determines state authority had | not yet given way to this absolute sphere [i.e., the state]. 494
For in the state no private legality has validity, and no legality that is private and apart from the throne is allowed. However, two matters of state authority must be anchored in private rights: first, the royal house and the upper aristocracy as pillars of the throne; second, the constitution and freedom.

However, the system of private legality had not yet given way to this sphere. The understanding, which established the laws and distinctions here, has previously been more closely examined.[45] The states of this period were, as such, also reciprocally and externally in a legally stable relationship, in virtue of treaties determined reciprocally and legally; and through alliance they entered into mutual relationships that came to be known as the balance of power in Europe. Previously, states had remained more isolated, whereas now alliances were formed. The League of Cambrai in 1508[46] was among the first, demonstrating that a single state could achieve little for itself without an association with others. Thenceforth the states acted in partnership; they pursued their interests jointly. These are the major points in this regard. What we have is on the one hand the ancient church, on the other hand the outside world, with the understanding present there in its autonomy (*in seinem Selbstsein*). This brings us to the point of transition into modernity as the third period.

44. The term *privatrechtlich* refers to the fact of certain legal matters being in the hands of particular persons or social groups, rather than under the control of the state as such. We render it here as 'private legality' or 'private rights', although it can also mean 'civil law'.

45. The understanding (*Verstand*) has been examined several times above. See e.g. the distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* on p. 187, and the discussion of its abstract individualization on p. 484.

46. An alliance formed in 1508–10 by Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, King Louis XII of France, Pope Julius II, King Ferdinand V of Aragón, and several Italian city-states, against the Republic of Venice to check its territorial expansion.

THE TRANSITION TO MODERNITY[47]

Three fundamental points must be addressed with respect to this period of transition: (1) art, (2) the corruption of the church, and (3) the Reformation.

Art

The last matter of which we spoke was that the secular world developed itself for its own sake, that in it spirit issued forth on its own account. Worldliness is the principle of the *this*, developing itself outside the church. Spirit sought the completion of the *this*, found the *this* for the church—but in
495 such a way that it cut the *this* off from the church | and shut out the church. The church, however, retained within itself the external *this* or the sensible as such, and so there is a twofold sensible element as the *this*. Thus the sensible element exists within the church while also being excluded from the church. As the original (*erste*) church, it has in it the element of sensibility as immediacy that has not yet reverted to spirituality within it. Because the church has this sensible element within itself, the sensible is made inward and is even transfigured, and this transfiguration is brought about by art. Art spiritualizes, elevates, breathes life into the external, the sensible. It elevates the external to a form that belongs to spirit; and feeling (*Gemüt*) or devotion relates itself to art no longer as to a mere thing but instead as the soul relating to something involved with soul, to a spirit. It is a different matter if spirit aspires to devotion, if spirit relates itself to something spiritual as the veneration of a thing such as a host or piece of wood. In a relationship of the former kind, in relating itself to what is spiritual, spirit is free, is for itself, is [related] to something in its own likeness.

Piety can act piously toward a thing, can have devout feelings toward something merely sensible, and divine grace can even operate by this means; but then the sensible is wholly superfluous. What is true must present itself in objective shape. The thing (*das Ding*) is nothing objective, nothing absolutely true, but rather something untrue; and over against it spirit is not free, is not related to a truth but is utterly dependent, captive, and bound. Spirit turns here to something unspiritual and untrue, while it is only in truth that spirit is free.[48] If such a state of bondage, of unfree dependence on a thing,

47. This is not one of the three major divisions of the Germanic World that Hegel identifies above (early medieval, medieval, modern). But just as the Middle Ages is preceded by a period of preparation, so also it is followed by a period of transition, which is as much early modern as it is late medieval; therefore we designate it as a separate section.

48. Cf. John 8: 32: 'You will know the truth, and the truth will make you free.'

were the standpoint and need of religion, then such a need of spirit would not find satisfaction in relating to something beautiful. For the most trivial portrayals | are the most expedient in filling the need for subjugation. 496
Experience should even show that the truest [artistic] portrayals, such as Raphael's madonnas,[49] do not enjoy the admiration shown to lesser ones. Piety fails to recognize genuine works of art. Experience also demonstrates that piety venerates to a lesser degree genuine works of art, for the latter lead to an inner satisfaction and freedom, whereas piety seeks only to be poised in a state of dull, insensible dependence. When the need is merely to feel a dull dependency, then piety fails to recognize genuine works of art because it feels that it is spoken to inwardly, that what is foreign to it therefore consists of counterfeit voices.[50]

The Corruption of the Church

As for the corruption of the church, it has been noted what the church had lacked, and how it incorporated this deficiency. Its corruption must not be seen as fortuitous; it is not to be taken as a chance event; rather the corruption is necessary. It could be said that it arose from an abuse of power. 'Abuse in the church' seems to say that what in itself is good is only corrupted by subjective intentions, intentions that then only need to be removed to salvage the situation. This implies that the setup itself was faultless and that only a person's contingent desires perverted this good into a means of satisfying passion. Then the evil is seen as something external to the situation. If the situation is only abused (and if this in fact is only abuse), then it is only incidental and accidental. Thus it only happens in individual instances. However, the principle of corruption resides *within* the church; it has infiltrated the church and lies in the fact that it conducts worship as something sensible and has not truly and wholly excluded the sensible element. Art did not suffice to transfigure the sensible, for art itself has the form of sensibility. In art the sensible is still justified. For art is not

49. While working in Florence and Rome, Raphael (1483–1520) painted numerous madonnas, of which the most famous is the Sistine Madonna (now in Dresden).

50. Hegel's critique of Friedrich Schleiermacher's doctrine that religious piety consists in the feeling of utter dependence (*Gefühl der schlechthinnige Abhängigkeit*) may echo in this paragraph. The 1st edn. of Schleiermacher's *Der christliche Glaube*, setting forth this doctrine, was published in 1821–2, a year prior to the present lectures. Contrary to what Hegel seems to imply here, Schleiermacher's feeling of utter dependence on God both presupposes and is the condition of a feeling of relative freedom toward the world. For Hegel on Schleiermacher, see *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, i. 136 n. 52, 263 n. 33, 279 n. 37, *et passim*.

497 what | satisfies the ultimate needs of spirit, and the element of art is the sensible. Spirit, however, requires a spiritual element.

The world spirit has already excluded the sensible element and for that reason indeed parted company with the church; thus it stands above the church, which takes no part in this excluding division (*ausgeschlossenen Teil*) but instead retains the sensible within itself. From now on, the church takes a back seat to the world spirit precisely because the latter has indeed reached the point of dealing with the sensible as such. The world spirit has now accepted the external as something external, and we have a subjectivity that is justified in subordinating the external to itself. However, the sensible has remained within the church, and this situation now develops within itself to the point of corruption. The church no longer has opposition; it has achieved a ruling position, and everything finds its consummation in the church itself. Everything, being internal to the church, receives [there] its determinate form as fully consummate. This appears as a contradiction within the church itself. Thus the corruption can be understood as existing within the piety itself, as superstition, as something that is bound to a sensible *this*—a sensible object that is supposed to be venerated as something absolute, as spirit. Bound in this way, spirit is unfree. Belief in miracles of the most absurd kind and in the most childish fashion exemplifies this lack of freedom. The divine is expressed as existing there in the most particular of forms. Lust for power, barbarity, hypocrisy, sensuality—all passions are unleashed in their own way, crudely and wildly, erupting crudely in undisciplined fashion. Virtue in the church is, in contrast, now just abstractly negative toward the sensible, taking the form of retreat, renunciation, and lifelessness. Virtue does not attain internal moral rectitude but only retreats from worldliness into renunciation. In contrast, the highest virtue is found in the realm of the living, in the family.

It is these contrasts within the church that now come to prominence: on
498 the one hand, crude desire and vulgar depravity; on the other | hand, total renunciation by lofty, religious souls, who sacrifice everything. These contrasts are heightened by the antithesis, by the understanding, by the distinct states in which a person feels caught up. The ultimate undoing of the church is that it is supposed to save souls from corruption; but because the church itself is corrupt, it makes this salvation or this absolute purpose itself into a merely external means, and satisfies this purpose in a wholly external manner, namely the indulgences (*Ablaß der Sünden*). Subjectivity seeks its greatest satisfaction in the certainty of its oneness with God. But when satisfaction is bestowed on the soul irresponsibly in this way—and when the church offers this certainty externally and irresponsibly and does so for

external purposes, for its own opulent life—the soul must be outraged to the extreme and necessarily indignant over such actions. However, the purpose for this service [the selling of indulgences] was not opulent living but the building of St Peter's Church, the outwardly most splendid and largest church of all; and things turned out here as they did in Athens. The Athenians used the money of their allies [in the Delian League] for art and for the temple of Athena, and for this reason they lost their support.[51] Just as this was the misfortune of Athens, so too this structure, St Peter's, which Michelangelo adorned with the image of the Last Judgment, became the last judgment on this proudest and grandest structure of the church—a last judgment on the church itself in its corruption.

The Reformation

If one wants to become acquainted with the corruption of the church, | one 499
only needs to read some of Luther's writings;[52] the present-day church is by no means in the same condition, having been inwardly cleansed by the Reformation. The age-old, tried and true inwardness of the German people is what led to the fall of the old order, and from this inwardness genuine unity was restored. This inwardness was said, by its efforts, to actualize the principle of freedom. This principle of spiritual freedom was preserved in the inwardness of the German spirit. All the other peoples ventured forth to the East Indies, to India, and to America, to achieve worldly sovereignty, as for example, did Spain. Whereas in Germany there emerged a simple monk who was conscious that the *this* is to be found in the deepest recesses of the heart, in the absolute ideality of inwardness, who was clearly aware of present conditions, and whose deepest heart was distressed by the distortion of the truth. He is the one who recognized, kept after, and destroyed the distortion of the church.

Luther's simple teaching is that consciousness of the *this* in the present is nothing sensible but something actual (*ein Wirkliches*) and spiritual; it is consciousness of an actual presence, not in the sensible realm but in faith and partaking (*im Glauben und Genuß*). This is not the consciousness of a God

51. See above, p. 414.

52. Hegel is probably thinking of early writings of Martin Luther (1483–1546), such as *An Open Letter to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate*, and *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, both publ. 1520. Luther's positive statements about Christian freedom, the inwardness of faith, the real or spiritual presence of Christ in the sacrament, etc., are exemplified by his treatise on *The Freedom of a Christian* (also 1520). See in general the writings contained in *Luther's Works*, xxxi–xxxii (Career of the Reformer I, II) (Philadelphia, 1957–8). On Luther and the Reformation, see also Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (Oxford, 2006, 2009), iii. 24, 38, 75–9.

that is said to exist sensibly as a thing, nor is it that this object is merely imagined and not something present. Rather, God is actually present, although not sensibly so. For this reason, in his doctrine of the Last Supper, Luther could make no concessions or compromises.

In addition to this departure from the sensible nature of the *this*, many other doctrines are central, such as the nullity of works—practical works, taken as actions carried out not from faith but from some external motive. Concerning faith, one should firmly grasp that Lutheran faith is by no means a certainty regarding what is merely finite, regarding merely finite things; it is therefore not a certainty that depends on the merely finite
500 subject as such. |

Faith here is not faith in something absent that has already taken place or is in the past; it is not, for example, believing that Moses crossed the Red Sea with dry feet, or similar kinds of spiritless externalities. These things have nothing to do with faith. Nor does believing that the trumpets at Jericho had the effect of cannons. Such things involve certainty about temporal matters.[53] Christ disparages the Jews for wanting to derive their faith from signs and miracles. Christ himself said it was wrong to demand signs and miracles in order to believe,[54] that is, self-referentially to seek certainty about the divine in an external, isolated occurrence. Faith, on the contrary, is certainty about the eternal, about the truth that subsists in and for itself.

The certainty or truth about God is something entirely different from such externalities. The Lutheran Church says that this certainty is produced and given only by the Holy Spirit. For it is the certainty that attaches not simply to individuals according to their particularity, but instead attaches to one's own essential being, the certainty that comes from the Spirit. This Lutheran doctrine is thoroughly Catholic; but everything that relates to externality is pruned away. It is only to the extent that the Catholic Church retains this externality that it runs counter to Luther's doctrine. To the extent that Catholic teaching does not assert this externality, Lutheran doctrine is not opposed to it.

One aspect still needs to be emphasized: the distinction between the priesthood and the laity. Now [with Luther] that distinction is abolished. [In the Catholic Church] the laity must still accept everything spiritual as something foreign to them, as a given, something commanded, including all

53. Hegel is referring to the account in Heb. 11: 29–30, which says that it was 'by faith' that the Israelites passed through the Red Sea and that the walls of Jericho fell; see also Exod. 14: 21–31 and Josh. 6: 12–21. His criticism is of our belief that this happened, which is not the same as the faith that empowered the Israelites to accomplish certain things.

54. See Mark 8: 11–13; Matt. 16: 1–4.

ethical, religious, and juridical content. The clergy, however, is in possession of all spiritual power. This distinction drops away in the Lutheran principle. In the Lutheran Church the heart, the sensitive spirituality, the innermost consciousness or conscience, is what is said to become aware of and to possess the truth— | with the stipulation that the individual subject as 501
such identifies itself with this truth.

By this means the church gains freedom, the absolute inwardness of soul that is integral to religion. The *this* is now a spiritual matter, and consciousness of it is not something sensible but instead something spiritual. The subjectivity of individuals, their certainty or inwardness, is genuine subjectivity only in faith, that is, only when this subjectivity has transformed itself, having been reborn in the knowledge of the Spirit in the truth.[55] This subjectivity is not natural subjectivity but is what is substantial. It must be *made* true: it must surrender subjective opinion and make its own the teaching of the church. This is without qualification, and necessarily, the doctrine or content of the Lutheran principle. The subject must have the object as something subsisting in and for itself. Subjective certainty, i.e. the subject's knowledge of the true, which should be for it an objective truth, subsisting in and for itself, only becomes authentic when, in relation to this content, particular subjectivity is surrendered; and this happens only by making the objective truth one's own truth. What the subject makes its own is the truth, the Spirit, the Trinity. This Spirit is the absolute being (*das absolute Wesen*), the being of subjective spirit. The subject, the subjective spirit, becomes free in relating to it because the subject is thereby inwardly relating to its very being and truth and negating its own particularity. Subjective spirit comes to itself through this self-negation because it is absolutely at home with itself (*bei sich*). This is how Christian freedom is actualized. If subjective freedom is based on feeling alone without this content, there is no movement beyond pure naturalness, the natural will. The feeling will is | the natural will. Humanity is only human when 502
undergoing the process of consciousness; it is only spirit when participating in the true, objective content, and when appropriating it within itself.[56]

55. See John 8: 32.

56. In this paragraph Hegel summarizes in his own conceptuality Luther's treatise on *The Freedom of a Christian* (see above, n. 52); and he reprises his critique of Schleiermacher's emphasis on religious feeling to the exclusion of *knowledge* of an objective content (see above, n. 50). Schleiermacher's religious feeling is a feeling of utter dependence on God, and in Hegel's view it is an expression of the natural will (see *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 93 n. 93).

This is the new and ultimate banner around which peoples gather, the flag of freedom, of the true spirit. This is the spirit of the modern era, and it designates the modern period. The ages prior to our age have faced but one labor, have had but one task, and that has been to incorporate this principle into actuality, thereby achieving for this principle the form of freedom, of universality.

Thus there are three shapes that are now present in the world. First, there is the realm of the ancient church, which has the same content, one and true; but the content is burdened with externality and therefore has not been elevated to subjective freedom. Second, we have in addition the external, temporal world in which external nature, the necessities of life, and subjective aims are dealt with; this includes all external relationships, in which there exist authority and civil society but in such a way that the understanding establishes itself therein. And third, there is the modern church, the freedom of spirit in the shape of subjective knowledge, of subjective identity.

What must now happen is that this reconciliation of actuality, which has happened implicitly, must be [explicitly] envisaged.[57] This can only occur if the reconciliation itself becomes actually objective in form, taking on the form of thought. This form belongs to culture, for the latter is the activity of the universal, of thinking as such. As far as the spheres of the finite will are concerned—law, state, administration—they come to be determined in a universal mode in accord with the concept. It is in this way that truth now appears to spirit in the external, natural, and subjective will. The material of appearance is the particular will, and what appears is the concept of free will, which at the same time is the concept of authentic spirit. Thus it is
503 essential being that | appears in this element, and it can only appear to the extent that the subject matter (*Stoff*) is envisaged in the element of the universal by and through the concept; it can only appear to the extent that the identity of spirit takes on the form of the universality of thought.

Thus one can say that the government of states is based on religion. So religion constitutes the basis of states. This does not mean that the state makes use of religion as a means, or alternatively, that states carry out their functions via their religious obedience. Instead, states are simply the appearance of the true content of religion. The appearance of this new principle in the present is yet to be discussed.

57. The German editors have changed *umgebildet* ('reconstructed') to *eingebildet* ('envisaged'); *eingebildet* appears again later in this paragraph.

The Constellations of Europe After the Reformation

The difference between Romance [and Germanic] nations with respect to this appearance is in turn evident. In their first formation into existence as states, the Romance nations had an external focus as part and parcel of their internal being; they had a split character internally. For this specific reason it became intrinsically necessary that they adhere to the ancient church; then there is within them something set and positive that opposes the freedom of spirit. In contrast, within the other [the Germanic] nations that we said retained their age-old inwardness, the modern church has the ability to thrive and has done so. A survey of the European kingdoms results in the following distinctions.

[1.] In the first place, we have Italy as the present instance [of a nation] that does not succeed at defining itself through thought, through the universal. All that is situated beyond the bounds of determinate thought, all that is uncivilized, can fully blossom here, as well as all that is sweet and mild, just as on the other hand, however, deception and vileness have their place here too. Thus we find here images of the most sublime piety, the loveliest bloom, the flowering of ethicality, but also heedless sensuality in the form of the wildest immorality and lawlessness. | 504

Just as Italy stands for subjective individuality, the Spanish represent honor and earnestness; they are the people who saw knighthood reach its fullest brilliance, saw it unfold in most brilliant fashion. However, this knighthood, this sense of chivalry, went forth into a new world, to America, heedless with regard to its innermost self. So there is no industry in the country; Spain lags in the arts; the social classes lose their independence because the Inquisition stifles the emergence of the self. The Inquisition had a harsh, African[58] character and thus did not allow any aspect of the self to emerge.

The third people to be considered here are the French. They are a people of thought and spirit that, however, remain essentially abstract—a people of boundless culture, but whose thought is encumbered by externality toward the concrete. Spirit only takes hold of the concrete abstractly, as native common sense (*Witz*). Abstract thought and common sense are the two forms of consciousness encountered here.

[2.] The other group of nations consists of those that retain inwardness, and here too they are three in number. The freedom of the church thrived in

58. Hegel is perhaps referring to the sterner African Christianity that is the heritage of Tertullian and (the anti-Pelagian) Augustine.

them. To the extent that each one maintained this inwardness, it is again divided inwardly in threefold fashion.

As the first nation we can cite Great Britain, which is inwardly divided in a threefold way, within England, Scotland, and Ireland, as the Episcopalian, Catholic, and Presbyterian Churches. Great Britain is comparable to France.
505 We also see there the principle of abstract thought, of *raisonnement*, but | more concretely, for it has more concrete thought and specific rights as its object, and with a view to [practical] concerns.

The second people are the Scandinavians, who are triply divided into the nations of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. With its chivalry and its ancient voyages of conquest that appeared again later in another form, and with its heroes such as Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII,[59] great knights who reinstated the path of chivalry, this people is comparable to the Spaniards. At home these leaders were at times supported by their proud grandees, but at other times they were in warring opposition to their nobility.

The third people is Germany,[60] which shares the same fate as Italy. The principle of singularity, of individuality, of subjectivity holds sway here. The Reformation emerged here in this focal point of inwardness. Of a spiritual nature, this country did not know how to achieve political unity. Instead, it disintegrated to such an extent that, on the one hand, the peasant class in Switzerland was allowed to become independent; in Switzerland the peasants are a totality on their own account, a discrete, independent entity. On the other hand, cities formed a league for trade and industry; and the freedom of city-dwellers in the Netherlands developed into independence, became wholly autonomous. As such, Germany is a microcosm of Europe. Eastern peoples, the Slavs, attached themselves to its large, eastern states.

The main representatives of the two European principles underlying the state, the principles of the modern world, are necessarily to be found in Germany. The principle of the ancient church is represented in Austria, that of the modern church in Prussia, to which the gaze of freedom directed itself and ever will do so. The other [states of Germany] remain a varied group, individually situated and more or less maintaining their independence through alliance with these two. The smaller states that have to achieve independent governments cluster about these central points.

59. Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden 1611–32, expanded Swedish hegemony into the Baltic states and Germany. Charles XII, king 1697–1718, was a man of amazing military ability and grandiose ambitions, whose final defeat cost Sweden its rank as a great power.

60. 'Germany' here includes German-speaking peoples outside the German principalities, such as Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands (which uses a form of Low German).

In addition to these two large constellations in Europe [Romance and Germanic], there is a third, the Slavic nature, which persists in its initial solidity. | This is Russia, which perhaps only recently, in the last hundred 506
years, has approached closer to European life and begun to resemble European culture. It has not yet had an impact on the process of European culture; it is a state that has remained on the outside in art and science. From an external, political perspective, however, Russia is indeed a player in the political sphere as this massive power, as what is firm, compact, self-enclosed, and it has even established and maintained a bond of coexistence with the European kingdoms, albeit implicitly and in fact just a passive one.

THE HISTORY OF MODERNITY[61]

The history of this modern era presents three developments that are of interest to us:

1. By its very nature (*Existenz*), the modern church[62] acquires for itself a worldly, determinate existence (*Dasein*).

2. The principle of the modern church; in shaping itself as it initially exists, the subjectivity of consciousness has the form of sensibility, of representation; it must therefore give itself the form of the universality of thought.

3. This formal universality must obtain a concrete content and be the determinative factor in concrete actuality.

The Worldly Existence of the Modern Church: Wars of Religion

The first point of interest includes the religious wars. Great campaigns are evident even earlier, such as the Crusades, which were of widespread interest. In addition, there were particular wars, which also continue in the more recent world. With the latter, however, as is generally the case | in modern 507
times, an element of contingency is involved. The War of the Spanish

61. In the lectures of 1822–3, Hegel appears to have left insufficient time for this final topic, for the presentation of the material is quite compressed. In his survey of the history of the Germanic world (above, p. 468), Hegel says that modernity, by contrast with the early medieval ('real') and medieval ('ideal') periods, 'exhibits a hegemony of self-conscious thought—thought that wills and knows the universal and rules the world'. The first development of modernity runs through the religious wars of the 17th cent.; the second continues into the 18th cent. and is concerned especially with the natural sciences; and the third is that of the Enlightenment and its aftermath.

62. By *die neue Kirche* Hegel means the Protestant Church.

Succession[63] is such a war in which a particular interest was at stake, the main interest being whether Austrian or French princes should gain succession to the Spanish throne.

What interests us are the actions of the modern church and the fact that it creates a worldly existence for itself. In this regard we must call to mind the vast empire that we find before us, namely the vast empire and imposing monarchy of Charles V,[64] although it is of little significance per se. This great world power is present but reveals that, as such, its time, its intrinsic significance, is past. Its power is ineffectual and leaves no outcome of world-historical importance. Rather it proves to be intrinsically impotent, unable to unite within itself the interests of the era. This power coincides in time with the Reformation but does not know what to make of it. Charles V imprisoned the leaders of the Protestant religion; he struggled with them for a long time without knowing what to do with them, and one of them finally had to prostrate himself in order to return to his homeland once again. In a war with France he went so far as to take his enemy, King Francis I, prisoner, but this too led to nothing. He conquered Rome and plundered it; he besieged the pope in San Angelo Castle, but the latter escaped secretly. Even though the center of the Catholic world was in his hands, nothing was gained; from all this activity nothing was achieved. A remarkable story recounted by Frundsberg[65] describes how German soldiers staged a procession after the pope was trapped in the castle, a procession in which they made themselves out to be the pope and cardinals and Luther, and in front of the pope they elevated 'Luther' to the office of pope. The Duke of Alba[66] then advised Emperor Charles to shift the seat of
508 the empire to Rome | and to bring the pope under his power and authority, and then he would be the mightiest of emperors; or else he should blame everything on the Germans; or, alternatively, he should present himself as a benevolent emperor, reinstate the pope, and restore everything as before, bringing back the old order. Thus Alba had the idea of keeping the head of the church in his power. But none of these things came to pass; rather the

63. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) was the last of the general European wars caused by King Louis XIV to enhance French power. The feeble condition of King Charles II of Spain, who was childless and in poor health, precipitated an extended rivalry over the succession in which all the major powers became involved.

64. As Holy Roman emperor from 1519 to 1558, the Spaniard Charles V engaged in protracted struggles with the Lutherans but finally lost out to them.

65. Georg von Frundsberg (1473–1528), a German military commander in the service of Charles V.

66. Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alba (1507–82), Spanish general and administrator.

mighty empire proved itself to be entirely impotent. Maurice of Saxony[67] revealed the impotence of this empire.

The main point, however, is that the modern church also obtained a worldly existence. The ancient church had retained a firm hold on the lands it occupied, and it was essentially in league directly with the political powers; this was due partly to its wealth of possessions and partly to the immediate political arrangement in which the state had not yet taken on a separate role. In Germany, where the [modern] church established a determinate existence, controversies inevitably arose, and this condition could not evolve without dissension. Things might have evolved peacefully had there not been numerous clerical bishoprics, the holdings of which belonged to the universal [i.e., Catholic] church. Here clerical principalities were also the property of the church, belonged to the whole church. Moreover, numerous political interests in the pre-existing church were interwoven with possession of the clerical properties. The ruling families designated their younger sons as holders of clerical principalities and thereby succeeded in taking control of them through their younger sons. The status of these holdings naturally changed when they fell into secular hands. The interests of the nobility were linked to the laws just as were those of the townspeople and the peasants; the lowliest peasant could become an abbot. The distinction between the social classes was fixed, and it was only in the church that someone might aspire to a higher role and higher secular offices; but this was not so in the state. Civil offices were not yet open to the citizens. | This 509
change [brought about by the Reformation] therefore must also have had an effect on the status of those at the lowest rank.

Thus in Germany, because of the Reformation, there broke out civil strife that can even be called domestic warfare, although these events were not, on the whole, revolts or wars of rebellion. However, in other states that were unified countries, uprisings and veritable insurrections occurred once the opposition erupted. In Germany, where dominion was the privilege of the principalities, where the princes enjoyed considerable political independence *vis-à-vis* the emperor, such circumstances were not possible, and the new teaching was not perceived as rebellion, as it was in France. The latter was the case in France in particular. But even here there was no general rebellion, and the unrest did not take the form of rebellion everywhere; for

67. Maurice (1521–53), duke and elector of Saxony, initially fought on the side of Charles V, but turned against him after the emperor's maltreatment of the Protestant leader Philip of Hesse. Maurice nearly captured Charles and forced him to flee. At the Treaty of Passau (1552) much of Germany was acquired for the Lutherans.

the rights of the large and separate cities were extensive, lending them considerable independence. In the Netherlands, however, vehement insurrection broke out against Spain. The revolt of the Netherlands, a battle waged by energetic citizens, was a veritable revolution, truly memorable because of the lack of available means to bring to bear against Spain, against the lords of the riches of Mexico. The wars of religion in the Netherlands were at the same time constitutional struggles, a renunciation of the confessional yoke [of religion] and also a political liberation from oppression. Religious freedom could not come about without a change in political circumstances. England had religious and political conflicts. To establish religious freedom, political change was also required.

The severest struggle a bit later, involving nearly all of Europe, was the infamous Thirty Years War in Germany.[68] The other European powers, with the exception of France and England, were politically justified in intervening. This is because, in Germany, the powers were not supporting rebels, but instead parties with valid political interests. Each people
510 streamed back to the place of origin from which it had emanated, | and the struggle for the principle of self-realized inwardness was fought out there. This struggle ended with both sides, both parties, tolerating the existence of the other. But nothing was accomplished as to thought, apart from something gained for thought on the basis of mere externality. The conclusion was of a purely political nature, that there should be a mutual tolerance of differences. No basic principle emerged or was acknowledged, nor did a reunification of the religions occur; with the Council of Trent,[69] this could no longer come about. Leibniz corresponded at length with Bossuet[70] about the reunion of the two religions, building on the fact that France had not yet recognized the Council of Trent, in which the Catholic religion had expressed itself in a wholly exclusionary yet understandable manner. As a basis for reunification, Leibniz demanded of Bossuet that the [decisions of the] Council of Trent be suspended; Boussuet's response was

68. The Thirty Years War (1618–48) was a struggle of the German Protestant princes and allied foreign powers (France, Sweden, Denmark, England, the Netherlands) against the Holy Roman Empire as represented by the Habsburgs and Catholic princes. As a result the Empire was broken up and enormous damage was inflicted on Germany. The war was settled at the Peace of Westphalia, which ushered in a period of greater religious tolerance but no true religious accommodation.

69. The Council of Trent (1545–7, 1551–2, 1562–3) redefined Catholic doctrine and initiated the Catholic Counter-Reformation.

70. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, ed. the Prussian Academy of Sciences (Leipzig, 1923 ff.), i. 8–9. Jacques Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704) was a French prelate, a brilliant orator, and a powerful controversialist.

that this annulment would depend solely on the clergy, not the laity; the matter was not at all the province of Parliament but that of the clergy alone. So Leibniz abandoned the dispute.

As far as Germany was concerned, the war ended with the formation of the empire, i.e. of the constitutions of the individual established states. The peace was concluded with the formation or establishment of the private rights of the various princes ([Hippolytus] a Lapide).[71] This best illustrates the notion that German freedom only involves particularization. There can be no talk of a common end on the part of the state; rather the notion of German freedom was only that of the complete particularization and establishment of private rights. The organization of Germany could best be described as an organized anarchy; | for it was the stabilization of an 511
empire where all the circumstances of those in power are defined in terms of private rights, in such a way that interest lay in the fact that individuals have safeguards only for themselves and only in their not acting on behalf of the whole. Thus the interest of the individual parts *vis-à-vis* the whole, and vice versa, was preserved in the most inviolable fashion.

The Peace of Westphalia served as a palladium for Germany, but it soon became evident what it actually meant: it was in fact the greatest misfortune. This was demonstrated in particular by the ignominious war against the Turks, who threatened Vienna and were only repulsed with the help of the Poles; there was an even more ignominious war with France in which the protective defenses of the German empire were overrun by the French. This organization of Germany, which brought about the demise of Germany as an empire, was the work of Richelieu.[72] His was the fate of many great statesmen: he achieved the opposite in his own state of what he wanted to do to his friends, the opposite of what he accomplished in the enemy states. He suppressed the political independence of Protestants in his own country, provided security to the empire, and was cursed for it by his fellow citizens. In Germany he brought about impotence. He destroyed Germany's independence as an empire, and the Germans rejoiced over the organization that was attained; they blessed him for it. The immediate consequence was that

71. 'Hippolytus a Lapide' was a pseudonym of Samuel Baron von Pufendorf (1632–94), whose chief historical work, *De statu imperii Germanici* (Geneva, 1667), described Germany as a monstrous aggregate lacking a strong imperial center. Pufendorf apparently borrowed the pseudonym from an earlier writer, Philipp Bogislaw von Chemnitz. In Latin, *lapido* means 'to throw stones at'.

72. Cardinal Richelieu (1585–1642) became the chief statesman of Louis XIII of France. Under his influence royal power was consolidated, the Huguenots were persecuted, and alliances were made with the German Protestant states.

Germany obtained its so-called organization and freedom of religion. In other states, religion, the Protestant Church, was emergent as insurrectional and faced a different fate, either being completely suppressed or achieving only a troubled existence. The outcome [in Germany], therefore, was only politically motivated, and the highest interest was satisfied in the fact of religion's entrance into determinate being. Religion now had a legally
512 secured existence. |

The Formal Universality of Thought: The Natural Sciences

The second period is that of the formal development of the understanding. Religion is complete within itself and has legal existence, so it does not come into play. Now particular interests come to the fore and initiate the feuds during this period. Hence they are purely political feuds. Developments in the personal sphere differ from this activity.

Subjectivity, valid in itself, now establishes the validity, and acquires the form, of universality, and enters into the external world. Culture has been present in all ages, but it obtains here the significance of its own distinctive value. For spirit on its own account, whose political existence is secured, also then allows the external world to be free, now even allows to the external world it own subsistence; spirit seeks itself and the truth in this world in the way it exists externally. The other, the external, is free only for free human beings; they seek the appearance of the divine not as miracle, not as something unique, but permit the external world to stand as something external. They intrinsically apply themselves partly in a practical manner through industriousness, and indeed in such a way that activity in the external world would be justified on its own account, meaning that humanity has to bring this understanding, the same consciousness, to bear on the external world in the presence of God, and is permitted to do so.

Rectitude (*Rechtschaffenheit*) refers to the manner in which an individual behaves in particular circumstances of life. This rectitude, however, must extend or advance to a consciousness of the absolute, to the religious consciousness, and it is from the latter that rectitude truly arises. In other words, God, the truth, active in particular circumstances, *is* rectitude, is the realization of the true in particular circumstances; God is this spirit of truth, and this is no other spirit than that of religion, except that it is applied to the particular. Humanity is absolutely in the right (*berechtigt*) in coming before
513 God with this same spirit. The situation is not different if one | sees one's moral rectitude only as a negative form of existence opposed to what the church demands. In that case one purchases, as it were, through offerings

and contributions to churches and monasteries, the permission to behave in such a worldly manner. It is a duplicitous existence, a double life, when someone theoretically considers it wrong to kill people in war, and wrong to live in a commercial and family context. Spirit, however, is active in actual life, now rightly engages in such activity, and no longer needs to purchase rectitude (*das Recht*) or buy its way out through such offerings.

A further issue that comes into play can be introduced by the culture of the century of Louis XIV.[73] The culture of that century in France under Louis XIV is brilliant. It is, as the French called it, a golden age of the arts and sciences. Evident are formal virtues, ones with the forms of dignity and grandeur, and that of the good will that seeks to respect others and be pleasing to others, and to conduct oneself in a friendly way. Prevalent are conversation and distinctions regarding conduct. The art of conversation becomes the fluent sophistry of passion; in part with a view to their content, these traditional virtues are emphasized in conversation. The content of these conversations is of course traditional virtue, but it is passion as well. The main thing, however, is that no truly absolute principle holds good; there is no unity of the spiritual, or any recourse to freedom, and these virtues do not emanate from absolute ethical freedom.

The next matter to be discussed is the form of the culture that is now constituted by the emerging sciences. True culture is essentially that of science (*Wissenschaft*). It is | aligned with the state, not the church. The 514
church has taken the lead neither in religious freedom nor in the sciences—neither in the empirical sciences of the mind (*des Gedankens*) nor in those of external nature. It is primarily the natural sciences, the experience of outer and inner nature, that develop in England and France. These sciences first emerged in France and England in particular. Reflective spirit positioned itself in relation to nature by letting nature be [as it is]—in this case prosaically drawing upon the external reality that spirit had freely released from itself. Spirit no longer fears for itself over against this externality and no longer despairs, for it knows how to reconcile itself with the external and to find itself therein. These sciences are constituted by information about empirical existence, and, what is more, about the universal laws of nature, what is universal in nature and in the understanding. What is universal seeks this out, the spirit that is closer to the understanding in this instance. The understanding is partly a mode of subjective thinking and partly the nexus of externality.

73. Louis XIV was king of France 1643–1715. Under him absolute monarchy, based on the theory of divine right, reached its height, as did the grandeur of French culture.

These sciences of the understanding are now accepted as valid; this science honors both humanity and God. The Catholic Church had not wanted to concede that science honored God, denying this and forcing Galileo to recant his portrayal of the Copernican system because his system appeared to contradict what the Bible said (as part of the above-mentioned faith).[74] True faith comprises something other than this—namely, what resides in the nature of God and God's inner workings. [Galileo's] demonstration plays no role in faith, and Galileo's address was not lacking in humility, contrary to what has recently been asserted. Just a year ago the account in newspapers was that he was condemned for the arrogance of his address
515 and his conversation, although the latter did not factor in the decision. | The story in an Austrian newspaper, most likely based on Friedrich von Schlegel, recounted that when Galileo was seventy he was forced to abjure and condemn the error that the sun was said to be stationary. Thus the church in its earlier form was here hostile toward the sciences. After such events, all thinking people distanced themselves from the church.

On the other hand, however, the church was correct about the sciences, in maintaining that they lead to materialism and atheism; for nature itself and its laws are taken to be something ultimate, something universal unto itself. Of course one can add that God has created this natural world and these laws; but these sciences require insight into what is found [empirically], that all connections be looked into. But precisely in the ascent to God this bridge or linkage is not evident. The connection of these laws with God is not expressed, and this linkage contradicts the very principle of these sciences, which is to accept only what is subject to scientific investigation. Thus a contradiction presents itself here. This knowledge has two aspects: first, these laws or cognitions have as their basis experience, sensible being; and second, the way in which direct perception, this manifold of perception, is elevated into the form of universality, is comprised in something universal, is as laws and species or kinds of things (*Gattungen*). In the laws and in the species or kinds too, in this universal feature, spirit or the understanding is present to itself. Sensible material provides the matter, the content, the point of departure, and then [spirit] passes over into the universal; and this universal is the understanding. The understanding recognizes itself in the universal; it has conformed itself to what is found or given [empirically], has

74. Galileo (1564–1642) was tried by the Inquisition in 1633 and forced to condemn all writing and teachings that held the sun to be the central body and the earth a moving body revolving about it. Various biblical passages state that the earth 'shall never be moved' (Psalms 93: 1, 96: 10, 104: 5; 1 Chron. 16: 30).

elevated the manifold into something universal. The understanding finds satisfaction in the form of the law because here | the understanding 516
has before it this identity that it itself is. This then is the activity of the understanding with respect to the sciences. Our second concern has been with the emergence of this form of universality.

The Turn to Concrete Actuality: The Enlightenment

Our third point of interest is that this universal, this knowledge that initially is theoretical, also turns to the practical, to actuality. The sequence proceeds initially from concrete being (*Seiende*) to laws. A different aspect, however, is that these principles, these laws are used as standards, as fixed perspectives or assumptions against which to test what is subjected to them, what lies before them. This application leads to the third point of interest.

This third interest comes upon the scene when the understanding, with its knowledge and with its laws, turns itself as 'enlightenment' against the spiritually concrete, the religious sphere; it does so by taking natural being as the basic principle, whether an existing being of a physical nature or one of a spiritual nature. The understanding holds this foundation, the specific experiences, to be what is true, as the touchstone for all that is said to have validity. Its principles are those of logical consistency, of identity, of coherence; with these it turns against religion, and thus it is enlightenment (*Aufklärung*).[75]

The understanding holds the laws of nature to be true, and its method involves consistency. What is presupposed or natural, what is given for it, also includes intellect, feelings, drives, a sense of immortality, sympathy, etc. By the understanding working in this way, it *is* enlightenment. Thus religion cannot stand up to it when the understanding sticks with this focus as what is absolutely true. For the very principle of religion | is that the natural is 517
precisely what is negative and needs to be sublated. Furthermore, religion is speculative; it has a speculative content and thus is inconsistent with the abstract consistency of the understanding. For reason (*Vernunft*) is precisely what comprises distinctions within itself as a unity, grasps distinctions as a unity, as something concrete that is contrary to the identity of the understanding (*Verstand*)—an identity that is abstract and lacking distinctions within itself. The understanding holds fast to this; it says, 'The finite is not

75. The 18th-cent. Enlightenment, according to Hegel, 'explains' or 'illuminates' (*aufklärt*) reality in terms of the laws of the understanding (*Verstand*). Thus it is opposed to speculative religion, although it may allow for forms of practical or moral religion, as in the case of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*.

infinite'. Everything mysterious, the speculative aspect of religion,[76] counts as nothing for it. This, then, is the negative attitude of the understanding toward religion.

A second and different matter, however, concerns the relationship of the understanding as such to the state. When the state and government operate according to the understanding, when they comprehend their activity as a universal purpose, as a universal, then the notion of a universal purpose of the state appears—a notion of what is highest and most valid. This idea of the purpose of the state must initially separate what is solely a private prerogative from the affairs of the state, what is merely a particular entitlement to the use of power. As the state becomes reflective, it adopts in actuality a different stance. What had been privileges are now, in and of themselves, no longer valid in the form of private property. By definition and in terms of their content, all matters having the form of private rights are the province of the state. This content is therefore removed from the sphere of private rights. This form is allowed to comprise only what by its nature can be private rights.

The government now comprehends the purpose and the thought of the state, and since this aspect has come up, we must take note of Frederick II.[77] He is a person of world-historical import, known as a 'philosopher-king', because he grasped the universal thought of the state and kept steadfastly to its universal purpose. One can also call him a 'philosopher-king' insofar as
518 he was occupied with metaphysics | or was a philosopher as a private person. He was a philosopher-king not because he was this exclusively, but because he first grasped this principle and brought it to bear in his activity as king. When this principle came to be generally accepted, philosophy was called sound human understanding. It was Frederick who held to the purpose of the state and put it into force; he no longer gave heed to what is particular, to special privileges, insofar as they were opposed or contrary to

76. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel remarks that the Neoplatonic philosophers, Proclus in particular, connected speculative thought with the idea of 'mystery' as inherited from Greek religion (i. 382 n. 44). 'The speculative idea is opposed not merely to the sensible but also to what is understandable; for both, therefore, it is a secret or mystery. . . . *Mystērion* is what the rational is; among the Neoplatonists, this expression already means simply speculative philosophy' (iii. 280). See also *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, ii. 344–5. For the speculative way of thinking, 'finite' and 'infinite' are not fixed categories; rather they are fluid and each passes over into the other. See *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, ed. and tr. Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford, 2007), 117–26, 158–65.

77. Frederick II ('the Great') was king of Prussia 1740–86. Under his reign Prussia expanded greatly and became the foremost military power in Europe. As an 'enlightened despot', he instituted important civil and political reforms.

the purpose and maintenance of the state. Instead, he gave preference to arrangements that were advantageous for the whole.

Foreign political operations and the wars of this period must be termed constitutional,[78] whereas those of earlier periods were religious or merely political. The Seven Years War was surely such a war.[79] It could be called a constitutional war. At first glance it appears that the outward purpose allying all the great states or powers against Frederick was Silesia, but the truly driving force was that a different spirit occupied the throne than previously, a spirit that introduced a new principle, a spirit of different activities and with different methods. While other particular or private matters were involved, the main driving force was that a man who was differently animated sat on the throne. The ensuing wars were all the more constitutional wars.

The purpose and consequences of revolution and war in modern times have been to change governments through force from below. A revolution of this sort has its beginning and origin in thought; for thought develops by now taking hold firmly, by erecting universal representations as ultimate, and by comparing them to what was the case. Thought rebels when it finds the status quo to be in contradiction with that purpose. The most sublime characteristic that thought can hit upon in this setting is that of the | freedom of will. All other principles regarding the happiness and 519
well-being of the state are more or less indeterminate. Freedom of the will, however, is determinate in and for itself because it is nothing other than self-determination. Thought has now grasped that the characteristic of the freedom of the will is in actuality what is highest. The sense in which thought is correct here is to be explained elsewhere, and has a different science to establish it.[80] Freedom of the will is freedom of the spirit in action, in its orientation to what is actual. Freedom of the will emerges directly from the principle of the Protestant Church. However, the will as something particular is to be distinguished from the freedom of will of which the state is the actualization. What we have to understand by this is not, as one might suppose, a particular will. Rather the freedom of will that is in and for itself

78. By 'constitutional', Hegel apparently means that the wars were carried out in accord with laws rather than for religious or political ends.

79. The Seven Years War (1756–63) was waged between Prussia and Austria (joined by Russia and France), ostensibly over the possession of Silesia. After the peace of 1763, Frederick promoted an alliance with Russia, which led to the eventual partition of Poland.

80. Hegel is apparently referring here to his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), esp. § 4 (pp. 35–7). See also *Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, 1827–8*, tr. Robert R. Williams (Oxford, 2007), esp. 247–65.

is the freedom of God within itself; it is the freedom of spirit, not of a particular spirit but of the universal spirit as such, in accord with its essential being. Revolutions, then, have proceeded from thought. This thought has had to do with actuality and has turned forcibly against the established order; it has become a force against the existing order and this force is in fact revolution.

The question then is under what circumstances and in which form this phenomenon has emerged, and revolution appears. Thought has resorted to force wherever it found itself facing the positive as absolute force. Thus we see that revolutions have occurred in France, Italy, Naples, the Piedmont, and finally Spain too—in all the states, therefore, that we have called
520 Romance. | But those nations in which the freedom of the Protestant Church had already been established remained at peace: they have undergone their political reformation or revolution, together with their religious one. The most important matter in the Romance countries is the overthrow of the monarchy, which had previously succeeded and then again been undone. With these revolutions it must be emphasized that they were exclusively political revolutions, and no change in religion took place. However, religion either decreased or increased in terms of freedom of spirit. For without a change in religion, no genuinely political change or revolution can be successful. The freedom of spirit, the principles of freedom, which were made principles of government in these countries, remained quite abstract themselves, for they emerged in opposition to the positive, existing order; they did not originate from the freedom of spirit as it is found in religion. Hence this is not the freedom of spirit that is found in religion and in the divine and authentic freedom.

The countries belonging to the Protestant Church have thus already completed their revolution; in these countries the revolution is over. For in them we find that what ought to transpire, in virtue of discernment, general education, and peace, has taken place. This by no means contradicts the idea of a concrete purpose of the state. But in the other countries, the Romance countries, elements that run counter to the characteristic purpose of the state are so absolutely legitimated that they are capable of mounting absolute resistance to it. The evangelical, Protestant countries differ markedly in the outward form of their constitutions; for example, Denmark, England, the Netherlands, and Prussia are quite different. However, present in all of them is the essential principle that what ought to be valid in a state must
521 proceed from discernment, from the universal | purpose of the state, and must be justified thereby. This is the necessary characteristic, abstractly put.

CONCLUSION

We have now briefly portrayed world history. The intention was to show that its entire course is a consistent [expression] of spirit, and that the whole of history is nothing other than the actualization of spirit, an actualization that culminates in states; and [that] the state is the worldly actualization of history. On the one hand, the true (*das Wahre*) must be present as an objective, developed system in the purity of thought; on the other hand, it must also be present in actuality. But this [truth] must not [remain] outwardly objective; rather, the same subjective spirit must be free for itself in this objectivity; and in the third place it must recognize the content of what exists, this objective content of the world spirit, as its own. Thus it is spirit that bears witness to spirit, and in this way it is present to itself and free. What is important to discern is that spirit can find freedom and satisfaction only in history and the present—and that what is happening and has happened does not just come from God but is God's work.[81]

81. The last sentence reads in German: *Wichtig ist die Einsicht, daß der Geist sich nur in der Geschichte und Gegenwart befreien, befriedigen kann und daß das, was geschehen ist und geschieht, nicht nur von Gott kommt, sondern Gottes Werk ist.*

GLOSSARY

The glossary contains a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation. It has served only as a guide, to which the translators have not felt obliged to adhere when context or English idiom has required different renderings. When more than one English word is given, the generally preferred terms are listed first. 'Cf.' indicates related but distinguished German terms, which often are translated by different English equivalents. Adjectives are listed without endings.

Abendland	the West, the Occident
absolut	absolute
Absolute	the absolute
allgemein	universal, general
Allgemeine	the universal
Anderssein	other-being, otherness
anerkennen	recognize, acknowledge (cf. 'erkennen')
Anerkenntnis	recognition (cf. 'Erkenntnis')
anschauen	intuit, envisage
Anschauung	intuition, contemplation, envisagement (cf. 'Wahrnehmung')
an sich	in itself, implicit (cf. 'in sich')
Ansich	in-itself, implicit being
Ansichsein	being-in-self
Anundfürsichsein	being-in-and-for-self
Arbeit	labor (cf. 'Werk')
auffassen	comprehend, grasp (cf. 'begreifen', 'fassen')
Auffassung	comprehension
aufheben	sublate, suspend, supersede, annul

Aufhebung	sublation, suspension, supersession, annulment
auflösen	resolve, dissolve
Auflösung	resolution, dissolution, dissolving
Bedeutung	meaning, significance
Befriedigung	satisfaction, gratification
Begebenheit	event, happening, occurrence
Begierde	(sensuous) desire, appetite
begreifen	conceive
Begriff	concept
behandeln	treat, deal with
beherrschen	govern
bei sich	with self, present to self, at home
Beisichsein	presence with (to) self, self-communion, at home with self
beobachten	observe
Beobachtung	observation (cf. 'Betrachtung')
berechtigen	justify
Berechtigung	justification, rights, privilege
Beschäftigung	occupation, concern
besonder	particular (cf. 'partikulär')
Besonderheit	particularity
bestehen	subsist, endure, consist
Bestehen	subsistence
bestimmen	determine, define, characterize, specify
bestimmt	determinate, definite, specific
Bestimmtheit	determinateness, determinacy
Bestimmung	determination, definition, character(istic, -ization), destination, vocation, specification, attribute
betrachten	consider, treat, deal with
Betrachtung	consideration, contemplation, reflection, inquiry (cf. 'Beobachtung')
Bewußtsein	consciousness, awareness
beziehen	relate, connect, refer to
Beziehung	relation, connection, reference (cf. 'Verhältnis', 'Zusammenhang')
Bild	image
bildlich	imaginative, figurative
Bildung	culture, formation, cultural formation, cultivation, education (cf. 'Kultur')
bloß	mere, simple, sheer

Boden	ground, soil, land
Böse	(moral) evil (cf. 'Übel')
darstellen	present, portray, set forth
Darstellung	presentation, portrayal, depiction, exposition (cf. 'Vorstellung')
Dasein	existence, determinate being, existent being (cf. 'Existenz', 'Sein')
denken	think
Denken	thinking, thought (cf. 'Gedanke')
denkend	thinking, thoughtful, reflective
deutsch	German (cf. 'germanisch')
eigentümlich	characteristic (adj.), proper
Einbildung	imagination (cf. 'Phantasie')
Eine	the One, the one
einfach	simple
Einsicht(en)	insight, discernment, judgment; (pl.) views, opinion
Einzelheit	singularity, single (or singular) individual (cf. 'Individuum')
einzeln	single, singular
Einzelne	single individual (cf. 'Individuum')
Element	element (cf. 'Moment')
empfinden	sense
Empfindung	sensibility, sensation, feeling, emotion (cf. 'Gefühl')
Endzweck	final end, final purpose (cf. 'Zweck')
Entfremdung	estrangement, alienation
Entgegensetzung	opposition
Entstehung	emergence, rise, origin, genesis
Entwicklung	development
erfassen	apprehend, grasp (cf. 'auffasen', 'fassen')
erheben	elevate, raise up
Erhebung	elevation, rising up
Erinnerung	recollection (cf. 'Gedächtnis')
erkennen	know, cognize, recognize, learn, discern (cf. 'anerkennen', 'kennen', 'wissen')
Erkenntnis	cognition, knowledge, cognitive knowledge (cf. 'Anerkenntnis', 'Kenntnis', 'Wissen')
erscheinen	appear (cf. 'scheinen')
Erscheinung	appearance, phenomenon
Erziehung	education
evangelisch	Protestant, evangelical

Existenz	existence (cf. 'Dasein')
existieren	exist (cf. 'sein')
fassen	grasp, apprehend
Form	form (cf. 'Gestalt')
Fortgang	progress, process, advance
Fortschritt	progress, progression
frei	free
Freie	the free
Freiheit	freedom
für sich	for (by, of) itself, on its own account, explicit
Fürsich	for-itself
Gattung	species, type
Gebiet	field, realm, territory
Gedächtnis	memory (cf. 'Erinnerung')
Gedanke	thought, conception (cf. 'Denken')
Gefühl	feeling (cf. 'Empfindung')
Gegensatz	antithesis, contrast, opposition
Gegenstand	object, topic, what-stands-over-against (cf. 'Objekt')
Gegenwart	presence, present (time)
Gehalt	substance, content, import
Geist	spirit
gelten	count, be valid, hold good
Geltung	value, worth, validity, consequence, importance
Gemeinde	community
Gemüt	mind, heart, disposition
Genuß	enjoyment, pleasure, communion
geoffenbart	revealed (cf. 'offenbar')
Gericht	judgment, court of justice (cf. 'Recht')
Germanen	Germanic peoples
germanisch	Germanic (cf. 'deutsch')
Geschehene	event, occurrence
Geschichte	history, historical narrative, story (cf. 'Historie')
geschichtlich	historical (cf. 'historisch')
Geschichtsschreiber	historian, historiographer
Geschlecht	kind, species, lineage, race
Gesetz	law
Gesetzmäßigkeit	legality
Gesinnung	conviction, disposition
Gestalt	shape, figure (cf. 'Form')
Gestaltung	configuration, construction, formation

Gewalt	authority, dominion, force, power, violence (cf. 'Macht')
Gewissen	conscience
Gewohnheit	habit, custom, practice
Glauben	faith, belief
Gleichgültigkeit	indifference, unconcern
Gliederung	articulation
Glück	happiness, fortune
glücklich	happy, fortunate
Glückseligkeit	bliss, happiness
Grund	ground, reasons, basis
Handlung	action
herleiten	derive
Herr	master, lord, ruler, sovereign, nobleman
Herrschaft	dominion, power, rule, authority, command
hervortreten	emerge, come forward, step forth
hinausgehen	overpass, go beyond
Historie	history, historical record (cf. 'Geschichte')
Historiker	historian (cf. 'Geschichtsschreiber')
historisch	historical, historical study (cf. 'geschichtlich')
ideal	ideal (speculative reference)
Idealität	ideality
Idee	idea
ideell	ideal (empirical reference)
Individualität	individuality, individualism, individual
Individuum	individual (cf. 'Einzelne')
jenseitig	otherworldly
Jenseits	the beyond, the other world
kennen	know (cf. 'wissen')
Kenntnis	information, acquaintance (cf. 'Erkenntnis', 'Wissen')
Königreich	kingdom (cf. 'Reich')
Königtum	kingship
Kraft	force, strength, energy (cf. 'Macht')
Kultur	culture, cultivation (cf. 'Bildung')
Kultus	cultus, worship
Land	land, country
Leidenschaft	passion
Macht	power, authority, might, strength (cf. 'Gewalt', 'Kraft')

Mannigfaltigkeit	manifold(ness), multiplicity, diversity
Meinung	opinion, intention
Mensch	human being (sometimes 'person' or 'one')
Menschheit	humanity
mit sich	with self, integral
Mittelpunkt	center, focal point, focus
Moment	moment, element (cf. 'Element')
Moralische	moral sphere (cf. 'Sittliche')
Moralität	morality (cf. 'Sittlichkeit')
Morgenland	the East, the Orient
Nachdenken	meditation, meditative thinking
Nation	nation (cf. 'Staat', 'Volk')
Natur	nature
Natürlichkeit	natural life, natural state, naturalness, simplicity, unaffectedness
Objekt	object, topic (cf. 'Gegenstand')
offenbar	revelatory, manifest (cf. 'geoffenbart')
Offenbarung	revelation
partikulär	private, personal (cf. 'besonder')
Pflicht	duty, obligation
Phantasie	fantasy, fanciful imagination (cf. 'Einbildung')
Positive	the positive, positivity
Privateigentum	private property, privilege
Privatrecht	civil law, private right (cf. 'Staatsrecht')
privatrechtlich	under civil law, private legality, private rights
Räsonnement	argumentation, reasoning
real	real (speculative reference)
realisieren	realize (cf. 'verwirklichen')
Realität	reality (cf. 'Wirklichkeit')
Recht	right, law, justice, prerogative, privilege (cf. 'Gericht', 'Gesetz')
Rechtschaffenheit	righteousness, rectitude
reell	real (empirical reference)
reflektierend	reflective
reflektiert	reflected
Reflexion	reflection, reflective power
regieren	rule
Reich	realm, empire, kingdom (cf. 'Königreich', 'Königtum')
Religiosität	religiosity, religious piety

Sache	thing (that is at work, that something is about), (subject) matter, fact, case
Schauspiel	spectacle, drama
Schein	semblance, show
scheinbar	seeming
scheinen	seem
Schicksal	destiny, fate
schlechthinnig	utter, simple (cf. 'absolut')
Schmerz	anguish, sorrow, pain
Schuld	guilt, responsibility, culpability
Seele	soul
seiend	having being, subsisting, actual
Seiende(s)	actual being, entity, subsisting being
sein (verb)	is, exists, occurs
Sein (noun)	being
Seite	side, aspect
Selbstgefühl	sense of self, self-reliance
sinnlich	sensible, sentient, sensuous
Sinnlichkeit	sensuousness, sensible nature
Sitte	custom, ethical practice, ethical custom
sittlich	ethical
Sittliche	ethical sphere (cf. 'Moralische')
Sittlichkeit	ethics, ethical life, ethicality (cf. 'Moralität')
Spekulative	the speculative, speculation
Staat	(political) state
Staatsrecht	constitutional law (cf. 'Privatrecht')
Stamm	clan, tribe
Stand(e)	class, condition, standing; (pl.) estates
Stoff	material
Stufe	stage, step, level
Subjekt	subject
Subjektivität	subjectivity
Tat	act, action, deed
Tätigkeit	activity
Trieb	drive, impulse, instinct
Übel	evil (cf. 'Böse'), calamity; (pl.) ills
Überbildung	over-refinement
Übergang	transition, passing over
übergehen	pass over
übergreifen	overreach

überhaupt	generally, on the whole, as such, altogether, after all, in fact, etc.
Überzeugung	conviction
unangemessen	incongruous, unsuitable, inadequate, incommensurate
unbefangen	naive, natural, unaffected, ingenuous
Unglück	misery, unhappiness
unmittelbar	immediate
Unmittelbarkeit	immediacy
Untergang	decline, downfall, destruction
unterscheiden	distinguish, differentiate
Unterscheidung	differentiation, distinction (cf. 'Verschiedenheit')
Unterschied	distinction
unterschieden	distinguished, differentiated, distinct, different (cf. 'verschieden')
Veränderung	alteration, change (cf. 'Wechsel')
Verbildung	decline, degeneration
Vereinigung	unification, association, union
Vereinzelung	singularization, individualization
Verfassung	(political) constitution, political institution, system of government
Verhalten	attitude, comportment, behavior
Verhältnis	relationship, condition (cf. 'Beziehung', 'Zusammenhang')
Verhältnisse (pl.)	conditions, circumstances, state of affairs
Vermittlung	mediation
Vernunft	reason (cf. 'Verstand')
vernünftig	rational
verschieden	different, distinct, diverse (cf. 'unterschieden')
Verschiedenheit	difference, diversity, disparity (cf. 'Unterscheidung')
Versöhnung	reconciliation
Verstand	understanding (cf. 'Vernunft')
Verwaltung	administration
verwirklichen	actualize (cf. 'realisieren')
Verwirklichung	actualization (cf. 'Wirklichkeit')
Volk	people, tribe (cf. 'Nation')
Völkerschaft	tribe, people
Volksgeist	spirit of a people, folk spirit
vollendet	consummate, perfect, complete, final
Vollendung	consummation

vorhanden	present, at hand, extant
vorhanden sein	be present, be at hand, exist
Vorsehung	providence
vorstellen	represent, imagine
vorstellend	representational, representative
Vorstellung	representation, impression, indication, notion, view
wahr	true
Wahre	the true
wahrhaft(ig)	true, genuine, authentic, truthful
Wahrhafte	the true, the genuine
Wahrheit	truth
Wahrnehmung	(sense) perception (cf. 'Anschauung')
Wechsel	change (cf. 'Veränderung')
Weltgeist	world spirit, spirit of the world
weltlich	secular, profane, worldly
Weltlichkeit	secularity, worldliness
Weltteil	continent
Werk	work (cf. 'Arbeit')
Wesen	essence, being, essential being
Willkür	free will, caprice, arbitrariness
wirken	effect, do, work, operate
wirklich	actual
Wirklichkeit	actuality (cf. 'Realität')
Wirksamkeit	efficacy
wissen	know (cf. 'kennen', 'erkennen')
Wissen	knowledge, knowing (cf. 'Erkenntnis', 'Kenntnis')
Wissenschaft	science, discipline, scientific knowledge
Zeugnis	witness, testimony
Zufall	chance
Zufälligkeit	contingency
Zusammenhang	connection, interrelationship, nexus, matrix, coherence (cf. 'Beziehung', 'Verhältnis')
Zustand	condition, state (of affairs)
Zweck	purpose, aim, end
zweckmässig	purposeful, expedient, useful
Zweckmässigkeit	purposiveness, expediency, utility

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